Import sanctions were used to a very limited extent against South Africa in the early sixties and latter half of the seventies to clearly signal the international community's disapproval of the country's apartheid policy. In the middle eighties South Africa was further exposed to a two year wave of export and financial sanctions. This was after the government had already committed itself to move away from apartheid as a policy that was no longer deemed feasible. All these sanctions were lifted in the early nineties after the abolition of apartheid but before negotiations for a new constitutional dispensation had firmly got under way. Contrary to some popular impressions, the 1985-87 sanctions were also severe1y limited in scope and nature, with the result that their economic impact was only marginal at best. They were introduced at a time when the country unexpectedly had to face a foreign debt crisis and had to drastically adjust the economy downward, not unlike that experienced by many other developing countries. The severe recession and greater socio-political unrest that followed did not lead to an escalation of sanctions, but nevertheless threatened to make large parts of the country ungovernable. The evidence is that sanctions only played a minor role in bringing about this poor and deteriorating state of affairs. The political aims of abolishing apartheid and preparing the way for negotiations was achieved mainly as a result of certain internal political developments, together with the political implications of such major other outside developments as the economic collapse of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Soviet Union. South Africa's experience with sanctions confirms that as elsewhere their economic impact as an instrument of foreign policy was invariably exaggerated, whereas their contribution in explaining the subsequent course of political events was at best uncertain. / Department of Economics / Ph.D. (Economics)

M.Com. (Economics) / The purpose of this dissertation was to investigate the contribution of the world economy to instability in the South African economy via inflation. Double digit inflation in the South African economy remains the most important and' sole major problem influencing stabilization policy in the country. This study concentrated on the instability of the economic growth path in South Africa since the recession period of 1976. From a multiplier-accelerator model the conclusion is reached that two of the main endogenous variables in the economy, namely private consumption and total investment have adapted to behaviour patterns since 1977, in such a way that an economic growth path which deviates monotonically from the equilibrium paths has been guaranteed. The. reason for this is found in the values of two main coefficients namely the propensity to consume and the propensity to invest. The openness of the South African economy is an exogenous threat to stability in the South African economy if a high inflation rate persists.

D.Com. (Transport Economics) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

Chapter 1 shows that there is a negative relationship observed between sanctions and civil liberties in the target country, which is driven by how exposed the target country's trade was to the sanctioning countries. Using a fixed panel regression covering 160 countries from 1972-2005, it is found that import exposure to the sanctioning countries drives this negative relationship, with every percentage point of import exposure reducing the inverted FHI freedom score by 0.165 points. This implies that restricting imports to a country that promotes an oppressive response by the targeted government. Chapter 2 examines whether countries change their trade patterns in response to economic sanction threats in addition to imposed sanctions. Using a bilateral gravity panel dataset covering 180 countries from 1950-2005 I find that imposed sanctions cause a very significant 55.43% increase in purchases from third party suppliers or a smaller 49.78% increase in sales to third party buyers during sanction events. Sanction threats cause a 42.05% increase in purchases from third party suppliers, and a 42.76% increase in sales to third party buyers, all significant at the 1% level. I conclude that both imposed sanctions and sanction threats lead to a significant increase in trade with third party countries, preempting and subverting sanction regimes. Chapter 3 studies whether there is evidence of cheating during sanction events by examining the difference in reporting for exports in the selling country versus imports in the buying country. A systematic change in reporting behavior is detected, with the log difference of reported exports minus reported imports increasing 7.46% in the case of exporter imposed sanctions, and decreasing 9.86% in the case importer imposed sanctions. This is consistent with the theory that firms in the sanctioning countries face harsher penalties for being caught compared to the targeted countries.

Hierarchical or asymmetrical power relationships among states have long been a focus of scholarly attention (e.g., asymmetrical alliances, trade dependencies). While the "power to hurt" is one expression of power, an alternative approach is to gain and exercise authority, or "rightful rule." One of the major impediments to the study of social concepts such as authority or legitimacy, however, is in their informal or intangible nature. This dissertation uses game theoretic and latent variable approaches to capture informal, social authority relationships, or social hierarchies, among international states and explores the effects of these hierarchies on security and economic behavior. I posit that states adopt one of two social roles--that of a dominant or a subordinate. Each subordinate chooses a degree of autonomy that it is willing to cede to the dominant in exchange for a corresponding degree of protection. Ranging from complete autonomy to complete control, these dyadic bargains make up a social international hierarchy. This hierarchy affects the relationships between each subordinate and the dominant, as well as the relationships among subordinates. In the security realm, the probability of conflict initiation is inversely related to the degree of subordination. When conflict does occur, dominants are more likely to intervene when the target is located at a higher position in the dominant's social hierarchy than the aggressor state. Economically, the probability that a state enacts illiberal policies is inversely related to its degree of subordination. Moreover, more subordinated states face a lower risk of economic sanction than states located lower in the hierarchy, even for similar illiberal actions. Empirical analysis of states within the US hierarchy (1950-2000) and UK hierarchy (1870-1913) using strategic probit models supports these theoretical predictions.

This history identifies international economic sanctions as a central and understudied innovation of interwar internationalism. Sanctions were initially conceived by the victors of World War I—principally Britain, France, and the United States—as an ‘economic weapon’ inspired by new techniques of blockade and economic warfare developed in 1914-1919. Enshrined in Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, sanctions entailed the coercive economic isolation of countries that violated peace treaties. Sanctions were novel because they were a form of economic pressure imposed against civilian populations in peacetime and internationally legitimated as punishment for the crime of aggression—a break with preceding centuries in which such acts of economic isolation were only allowed in time of war. The study clarifies the differences between sanctions as they emerged in the early twentieth century and other forms of economic pressure—embargoes, (pacific) blockades, boycotts—and recovers the meaning and agendas behind sanctions as argues that the wartime origins and coercive nature of sanctions were widely recognized by their advocates and critics alike, and that this recognition persisted deep into the 1920s and 1930s, when the discourse of international blockade and economic weaponry was slowly displaced by the more neutral language of ‘sanctions’ and ‘collective security’. It demonstrates that the most popular political and strategic theory of sanctions was one which conceptualized them as a deterrent: sanctions were thought to be capable of keeping the rulers and populations of other states peaceful by threatening them with quick and universal material devastation if they transgressed international rules. It emphasizes how the introduction of economic sanctionsentailed a revolution in international law, ending the centuries-old concept of neutrality: to effectively isolate aggressors, interactions with neutral countries had to cease, and impartiality was delegitimized. In the following pages, a new interpretation of the international political, economic and military crisis of the 1930s is developed which centers around the role of sanctions as an instrument of deterrence in an interdependent world economy. While the rapid advent of sanctions meant that many countries were materially and politically not quite prepared to implement them, the discourse of the economic weapon become very strong and feared, partially by reviving memories of the power of blockade in WWI. The existence and threat of sanctions was therefore an unintentional stimulus to autarky, and a factor which accelerated attempts by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy and militarist Japan to aggressively challenge the interwar order. Finally, this analysis considers sanctions as a form of politicization of the early twentieth century world economy. It recovers the forgotten interwar history of the ‘positive economic weapon,’ a mirror image of the negative instrument of sanctions that focused on provision and resource mobilization instead of deprivation and interdiction. It shows how attempts to construct this financial instrument against aggression failed in the 1920s and 1930s before appearing, in a different guise, in the form of Lend-Lease, during WWII, and how this material support function improved the appeal of internationalist institutions after 1945. Altogether, this work situates the birth of economic sanctions in its political, material, legal, theoretical and strategic context, helping us understand why these measures inspired by economic total war against civilians survived far beyond WWI into the twenty-first century, where they continue to form a prominent part of international affairs.

<p>I have conducted a survey of the economic sanctions on Iraq 1990-2003 and focused on how the sanctions were implemented and how economic sanctions work in practice. In particular, I have researched the objectives the United Nations had for implementing economic punishment on Iraq, how they came into use and the outcome of it in brief.</p><p>As for the million-dollar question: Were the economic sanctions on Iraq efficient and did they “work”? My opinion stands clear that economic sanctions can work in the future. The sanction policy faced major problems in Iraq, but it also disarmed the Iraqi dictator and gave more autonomous power for the Kurds in the north. They did not “work” as the world community had expected, but no one knows what the outcome would have been if the United Nations had not reacted with such determination as they did in this matter. It is easy to be wise after the event, and it is my personal wish that economic sanctions can be used in the future, as an alternative to open war, but with a lower cost in terms of civilian lives.</p>

I have conducted a survey of the economic sanctions on Iraq 1990-2003 and focused on how the sanctions were implemented and how economic sanctions work in practice. In particular, I have researched the objectives the United Nations had for implementing economic punishment on Iraq, how they came into use and the outcome of it in brief. As for the million-dollar question: Were the economic sanctions on Iraq efficient and did they “work”? My opinion stands clear that economic sanctions can work in the future. The sanction policy faced major problems in Iraq, but it also disarmed the Iraqi dictator and gave more autonomous power for the Kurds in the north. They did not “work” as the world community had expected, but no one knows what the outcome would have been if the United Nations had not reacted with such determination as they did in this matter. It is easy to be wise after the event, and it is my personal wish that economic sanctions can be used in the future, as an alternative to open war, but with a lower cost in terms of civilian lives.

My dissertation contributes to the accountability literature in international relations by examining the role constituents' preferences can potentially play in fomenting or constraining coercive foreign policies in democracies. In times of international crises, domestic audiences have specific coercive foreign policy preferences and will support executives who represent them when selecting coercive foreign policies. Executive actions will increase popular support or generate audience costs depending on whether these actions are consistent with the specific policy preferences that domestic audiences have given the threat a crisis poses to national security. To determine when audiences prefer economic or military coercion and how these preferences affect their evaluation of the executive I conduct three experiments, including a survey experiment conducted with a representative sample of Americans and an experiment conducted with a convenience sample in the United Kingdom. The results show interesting similarities and differences between the cross-national samples regarding foreign policy preferences and the public's propensity to support and punish leaders during times of international conflict. Mainly, I find that (1) the concept of audience costs can be expanded to cases of economic coercion, (2) under certain circumstances audience costs operate even in crises that are not very salient and (3) when there is a mismatch between public preferences and threats issued by the executive, audience costs do not operate at all.

Abstract In 2010, a Chinese fishing vessel ¡§Min Jin Yue No.5179¡¨ collided with Japanese patrol boats in Diaoyutai. The Japan Coast Guard arrested the captain of the Chinese vessel for the violation of Japanese ¡§Fisheries Act¡¨. China reiterated again and claimed that Diaoyutai fishing incidence is in Chinese territory. This incidence has resulted in the Diaoyutai sovereignty dispute on the international community. The Diaoyutai sovereignty dispute has been exist dated from 20th century into 21st.. The problem is that countries of dispute have their own national sovereignty claim. Japan claims that the Diaoyutai was included in the return area to Japan for the US-Japan Agreement to return Okinawa in 1971. By this, Japan starts harshly to prohibit both Taiwan and Chinese fishing boats into this area. This has resulted in many accidents occurring among Japan, China and Taiwan. The present study assesses and analyzes the conflicts of Diaoyutai waters associated with the attitude of China and Japan on dealing with the dispute, such as the diplomatic confrontation of China-Japan; the Japanese government quoted the wrongly legal custody of detained Chinese fishing boat captain; China postponed conference of cooperative exploitation ¡§Chunxiao Oilfield¡¨ with Japan; suspended increased flights and expanding aviation rights etc., in addition to a series of implement of political and economic sanctions, these has triggering global concerns. China practiced rare earth embargo for Japan that had probably resulted in explosive potential global trade war. Therefore, the present study has also research into the international case studies of their ruling, as examples, on resolving the sovereignty dispute. As a result of inducing settled methods and models for the island¡¦s sovereignty dispute, the present work has resulted in the deduction of ideas, suggestions and prospects to the problem of Diaoyutai especially the suspensive sovereignty and residual sovereignty issues.