Includes bibliographies. / This dissertation seeks to represent, as clearly as it is possible, South Africa's National Party perceptions on United States foreign policy in the 1980s. The primary area of focus is the policy switch from constructive engagement to punitive sanctions in the mid-1980s and the circumstances to which they have given rise. The following is a brief summary and the contents of the dissertation. The dissertation will give a complete and formal statement in chapter two on U.S. foreign policy toward South Africa since approximately World War Two. The dissertation will provide a clear definition and understanding of economic sanctions in chapter three and touch on the current on-going sanctions debate in South Africa. The core of the dissertation is displayed in chapter four which is a presentation the of field data collected from personal interviews with a third of the National Party caucus. This displays the National Party's perceptions on U.S. foreign policy. Following, chapter five presents alternative views to those held by the NP on the same issues discussed in chapter four. The final chapter makes an attempt at some conclusions based on the data presented in the dissertation. This study is important because it maintains that the data and questions presented in this dissertation offer interview material that has been little studied in the past, thus the findings have the virtue of freshness and uniqueness.

This thesis focuses on the humanitarian implications of economic sanctions. States are increasingly using sanctions as a foreign policy tool, but the ramifications for the citizens of the country have yet to be analyzed in depth. Although sanctions are an extremely powerful foreign policy tool, the humanitarian implications are too drastic. There are two main outcomes of sanctions that states seek: the pressure of the sanctions forces the government to change their policy or the humanitarian implications force the citizens to revolt against the government. These outcomes rarely occur as we can see clearly in cases such as Cuba or North Korea. This thesis will use three case studies: Cuba, Iraq, and Iran. The three cases differ in the type of sanctions which in return varies the degree of humanitarian implications. The types of sanctions are unilateral, multilateral, and universal. The four sectors of humanitarian implications are economic growth, health and drugs, food and nutrition, and education. Cuba has sustained unilateral economic sanctions imposed by the United States for years and the sanctions have not made a change in the attitudes of the government. Instead the sanctions have created humanitarian implications in Cuba. Because the government refuses to allow any dissent from citizens, the sanctions will neither change the policy of the government nor pressure citizens to revolt against the government. Therefore the sanctions in Cuba have been quite ineffective and have solely had the effect of hurting the ordinary citizens of Cuba. The second case study is of Iraq. Iraq is the most publicized case of humanitarian implications of universal sanctions. The infamous interview with Madeleine Albright stating that the half a million children that died in Iraq because of the sanctions and war were 'worth it.' Although this statement was later clarified, it shed light on the dramatic implications of the sanctions. The sanctions hurt almost every sector of Iraq and left the state in shambles. The last case study is on Iran. The US has imposed sanctions on Iran for years, but the UN community got involved after the Iranian nuclear program. These sanctions are for the most part multilateral. The sanctions against Iran have also had significant humanitarian implications, specifically economic growth and the health and drugs sector. It is unknown if the new government of Iran will prompt a change in the sanctions imposed by the international community. All three case studies will present a strong correlation between the economic sanctions imposed and the humanitarian implications. The three states that are used as case studies were showing progress in at least one of the humanitarian sectors prior to the imposition of sanctions. We can see decay in economic growth, health and drugs, and food and nutrition most prevalently.

As the economy of the international community becomes consistently more integrated, states and international organizations often look toward economic methods to serve as alternative policy options in resolving international disputes. The past decade has seen a dramatic increase in the use of economic sanctions as a tool of foreign policy. The increase in the number of economic sanction regimes and the question of their efficacy in achieving political goals has become a key issue for policymakers and political analysts. Statistical research based upon case studies reports that sanctions are often limited in achieving primary foreign policy goals. Why then, if sanctions are commonly reported to be unsuccessful in achieving their primary political objectives do policymakers continue to use them at such a high rate? The purpose of the study is to show that the traditional criteria for defining success has been too narrow. Success has often been determined by compliance with immediate primary goals. The thesis will argue that economic sanctions are effective in achieving important secondary goals such as signaling or bargaining incentives, and therefore may have a higher success rate than previously assumed.

The main aim of this diploma thesis is to assess the effectiveness of economic sanctions in the case of Iran. Different types of economic sanctions are compared according to the sender subject or character of sanctions and its effectiveness is assessed. The first chapter deals with the theory of economic sanctions. Effectiveness of economic sanctions is elaborated in the second chapter. Mainly the criteria of effectiveness are described. The third chapter appplies the theory of sanction policy on Iranian case. After describing the history of Iran and its nuclear program, the sanction policy of European Union, United States and UN is analyzed. Then the impact of economic sanctions on Iran according to macroeconomic indicators is evaluated. In the end the effectiveness of specific economic sanctions on Iran is judged and the prospective development of Iranian nuclear program is considered.

This dissertation investigates implementation problems in economic sanctions and how a state's concerns about policy implementation affect its decisions and the outcomes of sanctions. This study builds on the premise that sanctions are carried out by firms within a sanctioning state, not the state itself. First, using a game-theoretical model, I show that firms' non-compliance with sanction policies not only undermines the effectiveness of unilateral sanctions, but also has a counter-intuitive effect on a sanctioning state's decision to impose sanctions. The model suggests that a state is more likely to impose sanctions when it anticipates firms' non-compliance. A number of empirical implications are derived from the model and corroborated with data. Second, this study also investigates a sanctioning state's decision to sanction multilaterally or unilaterally, and how its expectations about the enforcement of sanctions influence this decision. When the enforcement of unilateral sanctions is expected to be difficult, the state is more likely to sanction multilaterally, but only when it has enough resources and the bureaucratic capability to help other states enforce their sanctions. The empirical evidence also buttresses these theoretical results. This study highlights the importance of incorporating expectations about enforcement into a full understanding of the sanctions processes. The conclusion is that states' ability to influence firms' decisions at home as well as abroad is a crucial determinant of whether they impose, how they design, and the effectiveness of sanctions.

The ethics of economic sanctions is an issue that has been curiously neglected by philosophers and political theorists. Only a handful of philosophical journal articles and book chapters have ever been published on the subject; yet economic sanctions, as I will show, are significantly morally problematic and their use stands in need of moral justification. The aim of this thesis then is to consider how economic sanctions might be morally justified. Of the few writers who have considered this issue, the majority point to the analogies between economic sanctions and war and use the just war principles (just cause, proportionality etc.) as a framework within which to assess their moral permissibility. I argue that this is a mistake. The just war principles are derived from a set of complex and detailed arguments all planted firmly within the context of war. These arguments contain premises that, whilst they may hold true in the case of war, do not always hold true in the case of economic sanctions. Nevertheless, the rich just war tradition does offer a valuable starting point for theorising about economic sanctions and in the thesis I consider how the wider just war tradition might be brought to bear on the case of economic sanctions, beginning, not with the just war principles, but with the underlying arguments for those principles. In particular, I consider whether economic sanctions can be justified on the grounds that they are a form of self- or other-defence, that they are the ‘lesser evil’ and that they are a form of punishment. I argue that certain types of economic sanctions can be justified on the grounds that they are a form of self- or other- defence and that, in extreme circumstances, certain types of economic sanctions can be justified as the ‘lesser evil’. However, I argue that economic sanctions cannot be justified on the grounds of punishment. I also develop a ‘clean hands’ argument for economic sanctions that is unavailable to the just war theorist; I argue that where the goods and services to be supplied would contribute to human rights violations or other wrongful acts, there is a duty to impose economic sanctions to avoid complicity in this wrongdoing.

Title from PDF of title page (University of Missouri--Columbia, viewed on March 2, 2010). The entire thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file; a non-technical public abstract appears in the public.pdf file. Dr. A. Cooper Drury, Dissertation Chair. Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

The research presented here provides a deeper assessment of the effects of economic sanctions on Iran’s economy, especially macroeconomic variables. According to the study project, the exposure of Iran’s nuclear program prompted the international community; the US, the UN, and the EU to impose severe economic sanctions on Iran. Indeed, the sanctions targeted macro variables of the economy and people in order to influence the Iranian leadership’s political conduct. So, this research aims to investigate the rationale behind and efficacy of sanctions against Iran and add a fresh viewpoint to the sanctions debate, which has typically claimed that sanctions are ineffective even though governments frequently choose to employ them. Considering the sanctions placed on Iran initially were less economic and gradually became more severe, the impact of the sanctions between 2000 and 2015 was investigated through a comparative case study of Iran. Despite disagreements concerning the effectiveness of sanctions, this paper concludes that sanctions are a far more successful instrument than military action because economic pressures and financial difficulty finally compelled Iran to return to discussions and ratify the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2014.

This study analyzes the US sanction regime imposed on the Islamic Republic of Iran. This single case study assesses its weaknesses and shortcomings in order to present a preliminary conclusion of the character of Iranian policies to bust the US sanctions regime. In charting the evolution of the US sanction regime through three distinct "waves" of sanctions the study highlighted the general shortcomings of the regime. First, the US sanction regime has failed to impose significant costs on Iran. Second, the slow pace of unveiling each new wave of sanctions failed to bring the necessary immediate pressure on Iran. Third, the inability of the US to gain sufficient multilateral support has limited the scope of the sanctions. These failures has allowed the Iranian leadership to construct a viable counterstrategy to bust US sanctions and continue the stalemate over the conflict of an Iranian foreign policy based on supporting Hamas and Hezbollah and the continued secrecy of its nuclear program. The Iranian counterstrategy has been centered on a domestic economic policy of autonomy, the courting of states outside the US sanction regime through the use of its valuable energy resources and the procurement of sanctioned goods through regional third party states.

Import sanctions were used to a very limited extent against South Africa in the early sixties and latter half of the seventies to clearly signal the international community's disapproval of the country's apartheid policy. In the middle eighties South Africa was further exposed to a two year wave of export and financial sanctions. This was after the government had already committed itself to move away from apartheid as a policy that was no longer deemed feasible. All these sanctions were lifted in the early nineties after the abolition of apartheid but before negotiations for a new constitutional dispensation had firmly got under way. Contrary to some popular impressions, the 1985-87 sanctions were also severe1y limited in scope and nature, with the result that their economic impact was only marginal at best. They were introduced at a time when the country unexpectedly had to face a foreign debt crisis and had to drastically adjust the economy downward, not unlike that experienced by many other developing countries. The severe recession and greater socio-political unrest that followed did not lead to an escalation of sanctions, but nevertheless threatened to make large parts of the country ungovernable. The evidence is that sanctions only played a minor role in bringing about this poor and deteriorating state of affairs. The political aims of abolishing apartheid and preparing the way for negotiations was achieved mainly as a result of certain internal political developments, together with the political implications of such major other outside developments as the economic collapse of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Soviet Union. South Africa's experience with sanctions confirms that as elsewhere their economic impact as an instrument of foreign policy was invariably exaggerated, whereas their contribution in explaining the subsequent course of political events was at best uncertain. / Department of Economics / Ph.D. (Economics)