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The purpose of the dissertation is to investigate the degree of compatibility of two fields: phenomenology and computational cognitive science. The former field proposes to explicate all structures of conscious experience in terms of conscious experience. The latter proposes to explicate all structures of consciousness partly in terms of unconscious causal factors. These endeavors have been seen as mutually exclusive. I put forward the thesis that the original formulation of phenomenology may be seen to have a computational theory of mind in the background. To this end, I show in the first chapter that the founder of phenomenology articulated, prior to founding phenomenology, a computational theory of mind in terms of its two modern theses: (1) syntactic representations, and (2) their causal generation and interaction. Insofar as I am able to provide sufficient evidence for this thesis, I am theoretically licensed to proceed to trace its influence on the founding of phenomenology proper. On the above textual basis, I proceed in the second chapter to discuss Husserl's methodology in the founding work of phenomenology - the Logical Investigations. I there show how my compatibility thesis may be true; indeed, I demonstrate that formal evidence is the causal product of what Husserl calls “unsere Denkmaschine” – a thought-machine that manipulates syntactic symbols. The third chapter discusses several arguments against (Humean) associationism, and by extension against (Churchlandian) connectionism, and show that they demand in their stead computationalism, both on account of the nature of the explananda as well as for the sake of theoretical completeness. In the fourth chapter, I discuss, with a view to deepening my interpretation, the much-celebrated property (since Chomsky) of productivity. This leads to a discussion of the methodological relation between “universal grammar,” as it appears directly in the 4th Logical Investigation, and the computational theory of mind. In the fifth chapter, I discuss how Husserl’s descriptive treatment of the propositional attitudes (as act-matters & act-qualities), nominalization, and categorial intuition may be supplemented on the explanatory side by a language of thought.

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The aim of this paper is to explore the theme of history in Husserl’s phenomenology, a theme to which he had a complex relation. While in his programmatic text, Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft, he opposed himself to the so-called “historicism” of some of his contemporaries, claiming that it leads to relativism, he later in his career sought to incorporate historical reflections into the core of the phenomenological method. The challenge, then, is to understand, or perhaps to reconcile, the tension between Husserl’s early anti-historicism and his later turn toward history and historical reflections. By highlighting some of the key points in the development of his phenomenology, such as the distinction between static and genetic analysis, this tension is shown to be nothing but apparent. By expanding the scope of his notion of essences to also include motivations, origins, and ideals, the later Husserl gives to phenomenology a fundamentally historical and temporal dimension. A central component in this development, it is argued, is the notion of sense-reflection (Besinnung), connecting phenomenology both to historical and ethical concerns. In later texts such as Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften, sense-reflection is used in a variety of contexts: as indicating the retrieval of historically lost meaning (such as that within the sciences); as indicating the Socratic ethos of self-knowledge (Selbstbesinnung); and lastly, as indicating the process of performing the phenomenological reduction. Ultimately, according to Husserl, only by engaging in historical sense-reflections can phenomenology become a truly rigorous science, seeking to clarify the meaning of science as an intersubjective project aiming toward the realization of human rationality and reason.

This work explores three phenomenological views of subjectivity in light of methodological transitions within phenomenology since its inception. Jean-Luc Marion offers a critique of Husserl 's transcendental ego in Cartesian Questions. This critique characterizes Husserl's transcendental ego as a 'schizophrenic ego'. This criticism is aimed at phenomenology's intentionality thesis as well as the method of reduction(s). Marion is influenced by Emmanuel Levinas' ethics and takes issue with a 'theoretical bias' within Husserl 's thought, a bias that characterizes subjectivity in the same terms as objectivity. I frame Marion's and Levinas' views of subjectivity in terms of two seemingly opposed 'origins' of subjectivity: Marion's notion of subjectivity embraces a notion of an originally auto-affected subject, while Levinas' position privileges an originally hetero-affected subject. I argue that both these views of subjectivity remain within dualist perspectives. Both thinkers try to overturn a hierarchy of reason over sensation/ emotion/ feeling by calling for a radically passive institution of subjectivity through either a givenness prior to subjectivity (Marion) or the face to face encounter with an Other (Levinas). However, both positions end up instituting a new hierarchy, one where reason is subjugated to feeling. Rather than dismantling dualism both thinkers end up defending a revised hierarchical thinking. I argue that Husserl's transcendental ego is indeed a 'schizophrenic ego' (i.e., a split ego) in Marion's sense but that this is not a problem for classical phenomenology but an alternative to either an auto-affected subject or a hetero-affected subject. Husserl's works on internal time-consciousness and passive and active synthesis illustrate a necessary correlation between passivity/ activity, matter/ form, reason/ emotion, ego/ world and self/ other which moves beyond the hierarchical thinking associated with traditional dualist thought. Husserl's notions of correlation and synthesis actually suggest a subject that is always intentionally related to the world and others and is also intentionally self-related. The implicit aim of this work is to suggest an alternative to an ethics of irreducibility endorsed by both Marion and Levinas. Husserlian phenomenology offers the possibility of an ethics of reciprocity, which paradoxically does not undermine the irreducibility of the subject, others or the world. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

La question du temps marque profondément notre siècle. Elle est implicitement et explicitement au cœur des thématiques les plus importantes de notre époque. Traversant toutes les sphères du savoir, le "souci pour Je temps" est présent dans les sciences physiques, avec la théorie de la relativité, dans la philosophie et les sciences humaines, en tant que sciences de l'histoire. Le projet de Husserl n'est pas une exception a cette règle. Au contraire, sa doctrine sur la temporalité est au cœur de sa phénoménologie. À plusieurs égards, c'est sa contribution historique la plus importante et ceci pour plusieurs raisons. D'abord, c'est sa méthode phénoménologique qui permettait pour la première fois l'élucidation systématique de la temporalité immanente et de ses profondes implications sur la connaissance que nous avons de nous-mêmes. De même, la nouveauté radicale de ses vues conduisit à l'existentialisme d'ordre ontologique, où la temporalité joue un rôle primordial ainsi qu'au renouveau de la philosophie de l'histoire. Il est donc essentiel de "retrouver", de repenser ces études sur le temps car, comme nous le verrons elles révèlent une richesse thématique et une profondeur de sens que seules les plus grandes philosophies savent nous offrir. Dans ce travail, nous nous efforcerons d'exposer l'essentiel des recherches phénoménologiques de Husserl sur la temporalité, surtout à travers ses leçons pour une phénoménologie de la conscience du temps œuvre maîtresse en ce domaine. Nous aborderons l'horizon pré-phénoménologique des recherches sur le temps de conscience. Ensuite nous exposerons l'a priori du temps comme structure immanente, pour finalement montrer comment ce temps premier est la source du concept de temps objectif.