"Might makes right," so the saying goes. What does this mean? What does it mean to say that humans live by this saying? How can this saying that is considered by almost all as an expression of injustice play a justificatory role practically universally and ubiquitously? How can it be repulsive and yet, nonetheless, attractive as an explanation of the ways of the world? Why its long history? I offer a non-cynical explanation, one based on a re-interpretation of the saying and of both recognized and unrecognized related phenomena. This re-interpretation relies on the notion of a tacit justification for violence. This non-cynical, re-interpretive explanation exposes the ambiguity of the saying and the consequential unwitting, self-deceptive, fallacious equivocations that the ambiguity makes possible under common conditions. While this explanation, furthermore, focuses on thinking factors--specifically on fallacious thinking, on humans' unwittingly and self-deceptively committing the fallacy of equivocation--it does not deny the possible role of non-thinking factors; it only tries to show that the thinking factors are significantly explanatory. What is the ambiguity? "Might makes right" expresses two principles. The first principle is the common meaning, namely, that the dominance of the mightier over the weaker is right. This principle is generally considered to be not a definition of justice but an expression of injustice. The second principle, which is almost universally shared in a tacit and unreflective way, is a principle of life, namely, that it is right for any living being to actualize its potential. This second principle is originary and thus primary, while the first principle is derivative and thus secondary. The use of all powers, natural or social, can be ultimately derived legitimately or illegitimately from this primary principle. A common manifestation of "might makes right" is the unwitting abuse of power, an abuse that is not recognized as such by the so-called abuser, but that is rather suffered by this latter, who misapplies the second principle in situations that fall under the first principle, thereby unwittingly living by the saying, tacitly justifying abusive ways by it. This unwittingness calls for critical control and forgiveness.

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L'approccio argomentativo alla definizione permette di aprire una nuova prospettiva su questo tema. La definizione può essere infatti analizzata dialetticamente come un endoxon, una conoscenza comunemente accettata che ha come oggetto la struttura semantico-ontologica condivisa. La definizione dialettica può costituire lo standpoint di un'argomentazione ed essere fondata su argomenti, oppure fungere da premessa in un sillogismo retorico ed essere quindi uno strumento argomentativo e persuasivo. Le caratteristiche della definizione dialettica possono essere delineate a partire dalle sue origini nella Topica di Aristotele. Da un'interpretazione in chiave predicativo-argomentale di quest'opera emerge come la definizione per genere e specie sia uno strumento di analisi semantica fondamentale per comprendere il nesso di ragionevolezza negli entimemi ed al tempo stesso origine di inferenze argomentative. La tradizione aristotelica è ripresa nella tradizione latina e medievale, in cui viene evidenziato il rapporto tra i differenti tipi di definizione e la loro funzione argomentativa e persuasiva. Nella riflessione moderna e contemporanea il concetto di definizione dialettica è alla base dell'analisi della definizione persuasiva, cioè una strategia argomentativa fondata sulla ridefinizione e sulle inferenze valoriali che derivano dal “significato emotivo” del definito. Le categorie di definizione dialettica e di definizione persuasiva permettono di analizzare le funzioni argomentative della definizione nel contesto comunicativo scientifico, giuridico e politico. / A new perspective on the problem of definition can be opened by an argumentative approach to this subject. Definition can be dialectically analyzed as an endoxon, namely as an aspect of common knowledge regarding the shared semantic-ontological structure. The dialectical definition can be the standpoint of an argumentation and be supported by arguments, or the premise of a rhetorical syllogism. In this case, the dialectical definition can be used argumentatively and persuasively. The characteristics of dialectical definition can be found inquiring into its origins, namely Aristotle's Topics. By interpreting this work in a predicate-argument perspective, it is possible to notice how genus-species definition is a instrument of semantic analysis, which is fundamental to understand the relation between logic and reasonableness in enthymemes and how definitions can be source of inferences. The Aristotelian tradition has been revived in the Latin and Medieval tradition by analyzing the relationship between different types of definition and their argumentative and persuasive function. In the framework of modern and contemporary argumentation theories, the dialectical definition can be considered the foundation for a new interpretation of a particular argumentative and persuasive strategy grounded on definition: the persuasive definition. Persuasive definition can be seen as a redefinition aimed at altering the inferences from values (or judgments of value) which can be drawn from the definiendum. The concepts of dialectical definition and persuasive definition allow one to examine the argumentative functions of definitions in the scientific, legal, and political communicative context.

L’intérêt que porte ce mémoire à la méthodologie de la recherche aristotélicienne de la vérité le confine à un examen précis des étapes préliminaires de cette recherche, dans l’objectif de surmonter une conception trop simplifiée de l’opposition entre la science et l’opinion chez Aristote. S’ancrant dans une présentation des fonctions de la dialectique, telles que décrites par le philosophe dans les Topiques, cette enquête entend fournir une comparaison étroite entre les méthodes dialectique et apodictique. Plus précisément, elle est le lieu d’une déconstruction des préjugés qui sous-tendent une lecture traditionnelle des Seconds analytiques, selon laquelle (1) la méthode apodictique doit guider la recherche scientifique et (2) l’épistémologie d’Aristote est radicalement fondationnaliste. La lecture, alternative, de ce traité que propose ce mémoire lui permet d’assouplir les conditions imposées par Aristote aux prémisses du syllogisme apodictique, de manière à exploiter les nuances qui s’inscrivent dans la distinction qu’il opère entre le mieux connu par nature et le mieux connu pour nous. Ce faisant, la frontière entre la dialectique, qui part des idées accréditées, et l’apodictique, qui part de prémisses vraies, se révèle moins franche et la notion d’epistēmē, moins « scientifique » au sens moderne du terme. Enfin, cette lecture alternative des Seconds analytiques est mise à contribution pour l’examen de l’hypothèse, inspirée d’un essai d’Owen (1961), selon laquelle le chapitre II, 19 de ce traité fournirait les pistes de réflexion permettant d’élucider, en même temps que le rôle de l’induction, celui de la dialectique dans le cheminement vers les premiers principes. / The attention this master’s thesis gives to the aristotelian method towards truth confines it to a precise examination of the preliminary steps of this method, in order to distance itself from an over-simplified opposition between science and opinion in Aristotle. Starting from a presentation of the functions of dialectic, as described by the philosopher in the Topics, this inquiry intends to provide a close comparison between the methods of dialectic and demonstration. More precisely, it aims to deconstruct the presuppositions underlining a traditional reading of the Posterior analytics, according to which (1) demonstrative method should provide a guide for scientific research and (2) Aristotle’s epistemology is radically foundationalist. The alternative reading this study suggests to adopt allows it to ease the conditions imposed by Aristotle on the premises of apodictic syllogism, as ways to exploit the distinction he makes between what is better known by nature and what is better known for us. In doing so, the frontier between dialectic, which starts from accredited ideas, and demonstration, which starts from true premises, appears to be less opaque and the concept of epistēmē, less “scientific” in the modern sense. Finally, this alternative reading of the Posterior analytics is put to contribution in examining the hypothesis, inspired by an essay from Owen (1961), regarding the possibility for the last chapter (II, 19) of this treatise to help us elucidate, both at the same time, the role of induction and that of dialectic in the path towards truth.