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This is a dissertation in philosophy of psychiatry and ethics focused on the question of how does one live and react responsibly to the experience of mood disorders such as depression and anxiety. In looking to the current state of psychiatry and cultural understandings of mental disorder, I identify what I call being “epistemically adrift” – the sense that individuals face too many conflicting opinions and a constant debate of how to live with depression that they are unable to process for themselves what their best options for living are. This feeling of being epistemically adrift is all the more complicated by the experience of mood disorder itself, which often makes individuals feel morally inadequate and pressured to do the right thing without clear direction. In the absence of a clear path regarding depression and anxiety, this dissertation proposes an ethics for depression and anxiety disorders – drawing a virtue theory from the existentialist tradition that focuses on the outskirts of mental disorder in order to create an inclusive ethical system for those generally excluded in moral philosophy. The first chapter outlines the general theory of being epistemically adrift in relation to depression and anxiety and how the themes of uncertainty in these conditions inherently lead to different epistemic insights. This chapter establishes the dissertation’s roots in existential phenomenology and epistemic injustice literature in order to sketch out how the combined uncertainty in interdisciplinary understanding of mental illness with the uncertainty experienced within mood disorders lead individuals to feeling adrift and unable to determine what they should do for themselves in living good lives. Meanwhile I argue that the insights of depression and anxiety attune individuals to the world in different ways than their non-depressed peers, which imports interesting questions regarding our responsibility toward one another. The second chapter explores a case study of this sort of insight, arguing that the experience of excessive or “delusional” guilt within depressive disorders can provide a deeper insight into our general moral responsibility towards one another. I compare this feeling of guilt to Karl Jaspers’ conception of “metaphysical” or collective guilt in his analysis of the German people after the Second World War and Holocaust. These sorts of guilt feelings within depression is often incapacitating and hard to make sense of for individuals, but it additionally has a transformative ability to reevaluate moral life. I argue that parallel to the concept of “depressive realism” where individuals with depression have different and sometimes better insights than others, depressive guilt differently attunes individuals to how they relate to others and the world at large. From there, the third chapter engages with how psychiatric diagnosis shapes and limits one’s perceptions of their freedom and agency. More specifically, this chapter employs an existentialist analysis of how one can react to their diagnosis in bad faith – deflecting their own responsibility either by indulging into diagnostic patterns as inherent destiny or denying the condition’s effect on their motivations. I argue that there must be a middle path where one takes responsibility for one’s situation as being depressed or anxious, which both acknowledges the condition but also sees it as a personal challenge to improve on one’s life. The final chapter of the dissertation culminates in the development of an ethical theory that directly centers itself within the experience of mood disorders. This theory stems from both existentialism for its commitment to projecting meaning on uncertainty and absurdity along with virtue theory which allows for a sense of imperfection and improvement over time. I have been developing a set of virtues for how to be responsible for one’s depression or anxiety. “Responsibility” in this sense is the question of how one responds to their moods and other symptoms related to mood disorders, that is, an account of responsibility that resists narratives of fault or blame. These virtues are meant to be a set of therapy-informed guidelines to help those with depression and anxiety counteract the worst feelings of being adrift and foster autonomy and dignity for themselves. / Philosophy

One understudied barrier to science education reform concerns teachers’ cognitive processes and how they relate to instructional decision-making. Epistemic cognition—teachers’ beliefs about knowledge and knowledge acquisition and goals for their students’ knowledge acquisition—could provide important insights into the choices science teachers make in the classroom and why they might and might not adopt different instructional practices. Previous research has found mixed results regarding the relationship between beliefs and practice. Uniquely, science teachers encounter epistemic beliefs from both science and education, with potential differences that may need to be negotiated. This study found significant differences between the two belief systems but failed to find differences between biology, chemistry, physics, and Earth science. Three profiles were identified that were significantly different on their epistemic beliefs in the natural sciences and the learning sciences. Those in the naïve profile (highest beliefs in certainty of knowledge, authority as source of knowledge, and attainability of truth) had significantly less self-efficacy than those in the sophisticated profile, which predicted lower frequency of investigative teaching practices and practices promoting an investigative culture. Those in the flexible profile (medium beliefs in certainty of knowledge, authority as source of knowledge, and attainability of truth) used practices promoting an investigative culture significantly less frequently than those in the sophisticated profile. The findings from this study add to the literature on epistemic cognition and its influences. / Educational Psychology

A disjunction is an expression using ‘or’, such as ‘Anne has a Ford or a Tesla’. From such a statement, we cannot usually infer either disjunct, for example, that ‘Anne has a Ford’. However, in choice situations like ‘You may have coffee or tea’ we can infer either option. The problem of free choice disjunction is to determine why these choice inferences are legitimate (von Wright 1968, Kamp 1973, Meyer 2016). Central to this discussion is the observation that a modal possibility operator ranging over a disjunction sometimes implies a conjunction of possibilities. In the case of permission, we express this as the choice principle ‘May (P or Q)’ entails ‘May P and May Q’ (Zimmerman 2000). Unfortunately, this inference cannot hold in a logical language without significant modification of the systems involved. I explore the history of proposed solutions to this problem, including semantic solutions that assign a distinctive meaning to free choice disjunctions and pragmatic solutions that use features of their utterance to solve the problem. I draw connections between semantics and pragmatics and, using the tools of dynamic logic (Baltag et al. 1998, van Benthem 2010), I present a formal account of one major (Gricean) approach to the problem (Kratzer & Shimoyama 2002). Ultimately, I explore the role of logic in this debate and argue that we should formally represent the meaning of these expressions directly as conjunctions of possibilities. Thus, rather than trying to account for the choice principle within a logical system, we must instead account for the fact that, in choice situations, the meaning of ‘May (P or Q)’ translates into logical formalism as (May P & May Q). / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / A disjunction is a statement using ‘or’, like ‘Anne has a Ford or a Tesla’. From such a statement, we cannot infer either disjunct—e.g. ‘Anne has a Ford’. In choice situations like ‘You may have coffee or tea’ we can infer either option. Why this choice inference is legitimate is the problem of free choice disjunction. I explore the history of solutions to the problem, including semantic solutions that propose a special meaning to choice disjunctions and pragmatic solutions that appeal to the circumstances in which they are uttered. I draw connections between semantics and pragmatics and present a formal account of one major pragmatic approach to the problem. Where others have sought to explain how 'May(P or Q)' entails 'May P and May Q', I argue instead that the meaning of ‘May (P or Q)’ in choice scenarios translates directly into logical formalism as ‘May P & May Q’.

The status of theory in the Digital Humanities (DH) has been the subject of much debate. As a result, we find different theory narratives competing and entangled with each other. If at all, these narratives can only be grasped and examined from a somewhat detached perspective. Here, we attempt to investigate these elusive narratives by means of a conceptual history approach. In doing so, we define different theory dimensions, ranging from specific cultural and literary theory frameworks to more generic uses of the concept of theory. We examine the use and semantic changes of these theory notions in a large corpus of DH journals. Using a mixture of heuristic methods and approaches from the field of distributional semantics, we aim to create tellable conceptual stories of DH theory.

This study examined the motivations pre-service teachers possess as they progress though a teacher education program. Using Watt and Richardson’s (2007) Factors Influencing Teaching Choice (FIT-Choice) model as the theoretical underpinnings, the following research questions set the foundation for this study: 1) Do pre-service teachers’ motivation to pursue a teaching career change over the course of a teacher education program, and 2) Is there a relationship between pre-service teachers’ values and their satisfaction with their choice to pursue a teaching career? Quantitative results indicate significant drops in motivation from students’ Freshman/Sophomore year to students’ Graduate year. Qualitative results demonstrated a greater frequency of responses for social utility values, intrinsic motivation, positive prior teaching and learning experiences, career development aspirations, and epistemic values. / Educational Psychology

<p dir="ltr">In contemporary engineering education landscapes, integrating the arts and engineering often adopts a utilitarian lens, emphasizing the enhancement of engineers' creativity or the aesthetic embellishment of final solutions. However, this narrow perspective overlooks the profound potential of the arts in co-creating meaningful solutions, perpetuating epistemic injustices by relegating the arts and other ways of knowing to mere complements of technical knowledge. In this seminar, I present the findings of an autoethnographic inquiry aimed at disrupting traditional disciplinary boundaries within engineering design education. I explore novel educational paradigms by integrating arts and engineering to challenge the notion of engineering as the exclusive owner of problem-solving knowledge.</p><p dir="ltr">Through the lens of autoethnography, I engage in reflective analysis of my role as a curriculum and instructional designer endeavoring to integrate the arts and engineering in pursuit of epistemic justice for the arts. Four distinct curricular initiatives are studied: the Compassionate Engineering course for undergraduate engineering students, the Shadow Puppetry Box activity for middle-school students within a summer camp setting, the Elegance in Engineering module for graduate-level engineering education, and the Social Justice and Civil Engineering module designed for undergraduate civil engineering students. By crafting autoethnographic artifacts such as video reflections and video art, I embrace reflexivity and introspection, elucidating the critical considerations and obstacles encountered in designing for epistemic justice through arts-engineering integration. Additionally, I explore how the learning design process facilitated the development of comprehensive and impactful curricula. I also examine the outcomes and implications of implementing these emergent curricula on pedagogical approaches and student learning experiences.</p><p dir="ltr">This study provides a space for reflection, inquiry, and inspiration, inviting participants to challenge conventional disciplinary boundaries, interrogate prevailing engineering paradigms, and envision transformative approaches to interdisciplinary education. By embracing the complexities of arts-engineering integration, I endeavor to forge new pathways toward inclusive and equitable educational practices, reshaping the education landscape for the better.</p>

Cette recherche a consisté en le développement et la validation d'outils psychométriques servant à mesurer chez les étudiants une évolution dans les croyances épistémiques (c.-à-d. les croyances concernant les sciences, l'enseignement et l'apprentissage) et les attitudes épistémiques (c.-à-d. les conceptions, affects et valeurs envers des objets épistémiques comme la connaissance ou le savoir scientifique). Les valeurs et affects sont d'une importance primordiale dans l'éducation épistémologique, comme le sont les croyances ou les valeurs. Toutefois, ils semblent souvent négligés dans les approches pédagogiques ou dans la recherche. De plus, avant la présente recherche, il n'y avait pas d'instrument quantitatif fiable adapté au contexte français pour mesurer les croyances envers les sciences, l'enseignement et l'apprentissage. Pour ces raisons, nous avons développé dans la langue française un Questionnaire sur les Attitudes et les Croyances Epistémiques (QACE ou EBAI en anglais pour Epistemic Beliefs and Attitudes Inventory), qui est composé d'échelles de Likert et de différentiateurs sémantiques. Nous avons mené trois études. La première (Study 1) a été menée en France auprès de 283 étudiants pour explorer la structure de la première version du QACE (QACE1). Ensuite, cette version été utilisée pour évaluer l'impact de deux modules d'épistémologie sur les populations d'étudiants concernées. Les résultats ont indiqué une bonne consistance interne des échelles et leur capacité à mesurer des changements significatifs dans les attitudes et croyances épistémiques des étudiants. Dans une deuxième étude menée au Vietnam, nous avons examiné les propriétés psychométriques d'une traduction vietnamienne du QACE1 auprès de 228 étudiants ou professeurs (Study 2). Un résultat marquant est que les différentiateurs sémantiques se sont révélé être des outils novateurs simples et prometteurs pour mesurer les attitudes et croyances épistémiques. Cela peut être expliqué par leur robustesse psychométrique, leur forte sensibilité pour discriminer entre les groupes et la facilité avec laquelle on peut les adapter dans une autre culture. Troisièmement, la version préliminaire de l'instrument a été améliorée. Nous avons ensuite conduit en France une étude de validation de cette nouvelle version (QACE2) après de 729 étudiants (Study 3). Plusieurs construits théoriquement apparentés (comme le Epistemological Beliefs Inventory de Schraw et al., 2002; le Cognitive Complexity Indicator indiquant les position de Perry à partir du questionnaire Learning Environment Preferences de Moore, 1989; et l'échelle de dogmatisme de Shearman & Levine, 2006) ont été utilisés pour établir la validité du QACE2. Les résultats de la validation croisée sur les moitiés d'échantillons et de la fiabilité test-retest ont mis en évidence que le QACE2 est un outil fiable, stable et valide pour mesurer les croyances et attitudes épistémiques. Cette recherche a ouvert de nombreuses perspectives concernant, notamment, la vérification de la capacité du QACE2 à mesurer l'impact de modules d'épistémologie, la vérification de son adaptation à d'autres contextes francophones ou encore l'utilisation potentielle des différentiateurs sémantiques pour les recherches interculturelles sur l'épistémologie personnelle. / This research has focused on developing and validating psychometric tools to measure changes in university students' epistemic beliefs (i.e., beliefs about science, teaching, and learning) and epistemic attitudes (i.e., conceptions, affects, and values towards epistemic objects e.g., knowledge, scientific knowledge). Epistemic affects and values are of primary importance in epistemological education, as epistemic beliefs or conceptions do. However they seem to be often neglected in the pedagogical and research approaches. Moreover, before the present research, there was no reliable quantitative instrument to measure beliefs about science, learning and teaching specifically adapted to the French context. For these reasons, we developed the Epistemic Beliefs and Attitudes Inventory (EBAI), a set of Likert-type and semantic differential scales. We conducted three studies. The first study (Study 1) was conducted in France on 283 university students to explore the structure of the first version of the EBAI (EBAI1). The EBAI1 has then been used to evaluate the impact of two scientific epistemology related modules on the corresponding two students' populations. Results indicated robust internal consistencies of the scales and their ability to measure changes in students' epistemic beliefs and attitudes. In a second study, we preliminarily examined the psychometric properties of a Vietnamese translation of the EBAI1 in Vietnam with 228 participants, university students and teachers (Study 2). The results unravelled inadequacies of some scales to the Vietnamese context. One striking result is that the semantic differential scales appeared to be promising innovative and simple tools to measure epidemic attitudes and epistemic beliefs. We explain that by their strong psychometric properties, their high sensitivity in group discrimination, and the easiness to adapt them to another culture. Thirdly, the preliminary version of the instrument was revised for improvement and strengthening. We then conducted, in France, a validation study of this new version (EBAI2) among 729 students (Study 3). Several theoretically related constructs (e.g., general epistemological beliefs measured by the Epistemological Beliefs Inventory, Schraw et al., 2002; Cognitive Complexity Indicator indicating Perry's positions measured by the Learning Environment Preferences, Moore, 1989; and dogmatism measured by the Dogmatism Scale, Shearman & Levine, 2006) were used to establish the construct validity of the updated instrument (EBAI2). Results of double-split cross-validation and test-retest reliability showed a high reliability and temporal stability of the EBAI2. In summary, the findings supported that the EBAI2 is a reliable, stable and valid tool to measure epistemic beliefs and attitudes. This research opened many perspectives such as, for instance, checking for the EBAI2 ability to measure the impact of scientific epistemology related modules, checking for its adaptation to other francophone contexts, or using semantic differentials for cross-cultural researches in personal epistemology.

Com base nos pressupostos da psicologia sociocultural, da alfabetização científica, da antropologia social e dos estudos de sociologia e filosofia da Ciência, nesta dissertação buscamos analisar como as práticas epistêmicas da ciência mobilizadas no ensino e na aprendizagem de ecologia se relacionam com as práticas epistêmicas comumente utilizadas nos estudos científicos desenvolvidos nesse campo do conhecimento; e como o engajamento com tais práticas proporcionou aos estudantes a oportunidade de se apropriar de aspectos da cultura cientifica. Neste trabalhamos também procuramos compreender como o envolvimento em uma atividade investigativa sobre dinâmica populacional propiciou a formação de uma comunidade epistêmica de práticas, na qual estudantes e professora trabalharam de maneira coletiva e colaborativa, por meio do compartilhamento e validação de práticas socioculturais (as práticas epistêmicas), valores, critérios, procedimentos, explicações, ideias, argumentos, etc. Esta pesquisa foi conduzida como um estudo de caso qualitativo. Os dados analisados nesta pesquisa foram coletados por meio de gravações audiovisuais durante as aulas de biologia do primeiro ano do ensino médio (alunos com idades entre 15 e 16 anos) de uma escola pública estadual da cidade de São Paulo. As gravações audiovisuais foram transcritas, organizadas em unidades de análise e interpretadas por meio de rubricas/descritores das categorias de análise. Nossos resultados indicam que o compartilhamento de um objetivo em comum (responder à pergunta de investigação da atividade investigativa), o engajamento com as práticas epistêmicas e os processos de validação e legitimação de técnicas, ferramentas, conhecimentos, procedimentos e evidências, conduziram o grupo sala a um processo de constituir-se como uma comunidade epistêmica de práticas. Nesse processo destaca-se o papel da professora na avaliação e legitimação das proposições dos estudantes, promovendo a consolidação da comunidade e o estabelecimento de critérios para julgamento do que conta como dado, evidência e justificativa na atividade investigativa. Este estudo também trouxe evidências de como a natureza do conhecimento que tematiza a atividade didática influenciou na mobilização de práticas epistêmicas similares às empregadas nos estudos científicos sobre dinâmica de populações. As interações discursivas dos estudantes e da professora evidenciaram um engajamento com práticas epistêmicas muito similares às dos estudos ecológicos de dinâmica de populações, como a utilização e construção de gráficos que expressam a dinâmica da população ao longo do tempo e o estabelecimento de metodologias e técnicas de contagem e amostragem de indivíduos. / Based on the assumptions of sociocultural psychology, scientific literacy, social anthropology and the studies of sociology and philosophy of science, in this dissertation we seek to analyze how the epistemic practices of science mobilized in the teaching and learning of ecology are related to the epistemic practices commonly used in the scientific studies developed in this field of knowledge; and how engaging with such practices has given students the opportunity to appropriate aspects of the scientific culture. In this work we also try to understand how the involvement in a inquiry activity about population dynamics led to the formation of an epistemic community of practices, in which students and teachers worked in a collective and collaborative way, through the sharing and validation of sociocultural practices (epistemic practices), values, criteria, procedures, explanations, ideas, arguments, etc. This research was conducted as a qualitative case study. The data analyzed in this research were collected through audiovisual recordings during biology classes of high school (students aged 15 to 16 years) of a state public school in the city of São Paulo. Audio-visual recordings were transcribed, organized into units of analysis and interpreted through descriptors of analysis categories. Our results indicate that the sharing of a common objective (answering the research question of the inquiry activity), the engagement with epistemic practices and the validation and legitimation processes of techniques, tools, knowledge, procedures and evidence led the group to a process of establishing itself as an epistemic community of practices. In this process, the role of the teacher in the evaluation and legitimation of the students\' proposals is highlighted, promoting the consolidation of the community and establishing criteria for judging what counts as data, evidence and justification in the inquiry activity. This study also provided evidence of how the nature of the knowledge that thematicised the didactic activity influenced the expression of epistemic practices similar to those used in scientific studies on population dynamics. The discursive interactions of the students and the teacher showed an engagement with epistemic practices very similar to those of the ecological studies of population dynamics, such as the use and construction of graphs that express the dynamics of the population over time and the establishment of methodologies and techniques of counting and sampling of individuals.

Democracy has been encountering an increasing number of critics. Whether it comes from a sympathy for autocrats, free-markets, or the more knowledgeable, this increasing democratic scepticism often takes an epistemic form. Democracy's critics argue that democratic procedures and institutions are unlikely to make good decisions or produce good outcomes in terms of justice or the common good, and should, therefore, be restricted if not completely rejected in favour of its more able alternatives. In the face of such scepticism, this thesis develops an epistemic theory of deliberative democracy. This theory has two principal aims. The first is to analyse and define the epistemic properties of deliberative democracy, and the second is to clarify the possible role epistemic values can play in a wider justification of democratic rule. In accordance with the first, the thesis analyses the ability of deliberative democratic institutions to make good or correct decisions in comparison to a broad range of prominent alternatives. These include traditional rivals such as autocracy and aristocracy, but also more modern and less considered alternatives such as free-markets, limited epistocracy and forms of technical calculation. Through these comparisons, it is argued that we have no good or clear epistemic reason to reject democracy. Deliberative democracy is found to be epistemically superior to many of its alternatives and epistemically equivalent to even its best competitors. The thesis, therefore, mounts a strong reply to democracy's epistemic sceptics. The analysis, however, also helps clarify which form of deliberative democracy is epistemically most valuable, pointing to the value systems approaches which give a prominent role to direct citizen deliberation. The epistemic theory of deliberative democracy also aims to clarify what role epistemic values can play in a wider justification of democratic rule. The thesis argues that deliberative democracy is epistemically superior to many of its rivals and no worse epistemically than even its best alternatives. This suggests that although epistemic values cannot mount a stand-alone defence of democracy, democrats would only be required to defend very weak non-epistemic values to produce a mixed justification. Far from being 'rule by the incompetent many' and therefore highly reliant on procedural values, the thesis will demonstrate that epistemic values can carry significant weight in an argument for democratic rule.