La recherche se centre sur trois études de cas pour caractériser la manière dont les savoirs de la danse et de la création chorégraphique sont mobilisés dans différentes institutions : séances de travail entre un chorégraphe et des danseurs en contexte de création, interventions d’un artiste chorégraphique en milieu scolaire, pratique scolaire de la danse menée par une enseignante à l’école élémentaire. Notre approche relève d’une anthropologie didactique, en s’appuyant sur la théorie de l’action conjointe en didactique (TACD), qui amène à analyser les transactions des différents acteurs observés (chorégraphe, danseurs, enseignantes, élèves), pour saisir à travers la construction des oeuvres chorégraphiques, la vie des savoirs qui leurs donnent forme. Elle conduit à caractériser la création comme un processsus d’enquête, à partir duquel chorégraphes et danseurs s’engagent dans un milieu d’invention. La mise en perspective des différentes études de cas permet de reconsidérer les conditions et les enjeux d’un enseignement-apprentissage de la danse à l’école, par un rapprochement entre pratiques chorégraphiques professionnelles et pratiques scolaires. En particulier, la question de l’expérience des élèves dans les processus de création en contexte scolaire est ici interrogée à l’aune d’une analyse de l’activité effective des artistes en situation de création. La recherche amène à questionner la manière dont les pratiques artistiques peuvent être pratiquées au sein de l’institution scolaire. L’approche didactique retenue permet de reconsidérer la relation professeur/élèves, à la lumière des spécificités inhérentes à ces pratiques. / The research focuses on three case studies to characterize how knowledge of dance and choreographic creation is mobilized in different institutions: work sessions between a choreographer and dancers in a context of creation, interventions by a choreographic artist in schools, and school dance practice conducted by an elementary schoolteacher. Our approach is based on a didactic anthropology, based on the Joint Action Theory in Didactics (JATD), which leads us to analyse the transactions of the different actors we observe (choreographers, dancers, teachers, students) in order to understand through the construction of choreographic works, the life of the knowledge that shapes them. It results in characterizing creation as a process of inquiry, from which implies that choreographers and dancers get involved into an inventive milieu. The different case studies we put into perspective lead us to reconsider the conditions and issues of dance teaching and learning in schools, and to argue for a closer relatioship between professional choreographic practices and school practices. In particular, the question of students' experience in creative processes in the school context is questioned here on the basis of an analysis of the actual activity of artists in creative situations. The research raises questions about how artistic practices can be practiced within the school institution. The didactic approach chosen allows us to reconsider the teacher-student relationship in the light of the specificities inherent in these practices.

Epistemic beliefs are individuals’ beliefs about the nature of knowledge, how knowledge is constructed, and how knowledge can be justified. This study employed a mixed-methods approach to examine: (a) middle and high school students’ self-reported epistemic beliefs (quantitative) and epistemic beliefs revealed from practice (qualitative) during a problem-based, scientific inquiry unit, (b) How do middle and high school students’ epistemic beliefs contribute to the construction of students’ problem solving processes, and (c) how and why do students’ epistemic beliefs change by engaging in PBL. Twenty-one middle and high school students participated in a summer science class to investigate local water quality in a 2-week long problem-based learning (PBL) unit. The students worked in small groups to conduct water quality tests at in their local watershed and visited several stakeholders for their investigation. Pretest and posttest versions of the Epistemological Beliefs Questionnaire were conducted to assess students’ self-reported epistemic beliefs before and after the unit. I videotaped and interviewed three groups of students during the unit and conducted discourse analysis to examine their epistemic beliefs revealed from scientific inquiry activities and triangulate with their self-reported data. There are three main findings from this study. First, students in this study selfreported relatively sophisticated epistemic beliefs on the pretest. However, the comparison between their self-reported beliefs and beliefs revealed from practice indicated that some students were able to apply sophisticated beliefs during the unit while others failed to do so. The inconsistency between these two types of epistemic beliefs may due to students’ inadequate cognitive ability, low validity of self-report measure, and the influence of contextual factors. Second, qualitative analysis indicated that students’ epistemic beliefs of the nature of knowing influenced their problem solving processes and construction of arguments during their inquiry activities. Students with more sophisticated epistemic beliefs acquired knowledge, presented solid evidence, and used it to support their claims more effectively than their peers. Third, students’ self-reported epistemic beliefs became significantly more sophisticated by engaging in PBL. Findings from this study can potentially help researchers to better understand the relation between students’ epistemic beliefs and their scientific inquiry practice.

The thesis aims at analyzing the concepts of risk and safety as well as the class of concepts to which they belong, thick concepts, focusing in particular on the normative aspects involved. Essay I analyzes thick concepts, i.e. concepts such as cruelty and kindness that seem to combine descriptive and evaluative features. The traditional account, in which thick concepts are analyzed as the conjunction of a factual description and an evaluation, is criticized. Instead, it is argued that the descriptive and evaluative aspects must be understood as a whole. Furthermore, it is argued that the two main worries evoked against non-naturalism – that non-naturalism cannot account for disagreement and that it is not genuinely explanatory – can be met. Essay II investigates the utilization of the Kripke/Putnam causal theory of reference in relation to the Open Question Argument. It is argued that the Open Question Argument suitably interpreted provides prima facie evidence against the claim that moral kinds are natural kinds, and that the causal theory, as interpreted by leading naturalist defenders, actually underscores this conclusion. Essay III utilizes the interpretation of the Open Question Argument argued for in the previous essay in order to argue against naturalistic reduction of risk, i.e. reduction of risk into natural concepts such as probability and harm. Three different normative aspects of risk and safety are put forward – epistemic uncertainty, distributive normativity and border normativity – and it is argued that these normative aspects cannot be reduced to a natural measure. Essay IV provides a conceptual analysis of safety in the context of societal decision-making, and argues for a notion that explicitly includes epistemic uncertainty, the degree to which we are uncertain of our knowledge of the situation at hand. Some formal versions of a comparative safety concept are also proposed. Essay V puts forward a normative critique against a common argument, viz. the claim that the public should follow the experts’ advice in recommending an activity whenever the experts have the best knowledge of the risk involved. The importance of safety in risk acceptance together with considerations from epistemic uncertainty makes the claim incorrect even after including plausible limitations to exclude ‘external’ considerations. Furthermore, it is shown that the scope of the objection covers risk assessment as well as risk management. Essay VI provides a systematized account of safety engineering practices that clarifies their relation to the goal of safety engineering, namely to increase safety. A list of 24 principles referred to in the literature of safety engineering is provided, divided into four major categories. It is argued that important aspects of these methods can be better understood with the help of the distinction between risk and uncertainty, in addition to the common distinction between risk and probability. / QC 20100803

This dissertation consists in a defence of the claim that belief is a state on which its bearer can reflect only deliberatively. That partial characterization of the concept is intended to throw light on the status of belief as a rational phenomenon. I defend it by appeal to features of our actual and imagined practices of ascribing belief linguistically, both to others and ourselves. Having set out the characterization in the first of four chapters, in the second chapter I survey the ways of learning from words: evidentially, by report, and by belief-expression. I go on to propose that where a person’s words afford belief of his belief, they do so through the belief-expressive character of assertoric speech. In the third chapter, I defend that claim as it applies to the case of ascribing belief to another. I argue that my characterization best explains the fact that we do not ordinarily report our beliefs or invite others to do so. I explain our ordinarily ascribing belief from the expressive character of assertoric speech by appeal to the relation between assertion and belief. In the fourth chapter, I turn to the prospect of ascribing oneself belief based on one’s own words. I argue that self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of words is alone consistent with the self-ascriber’s basic psychological and linguistic integrity. I recommend my characterization of belief for its capacity to explain the disintegrating effects of self-ascribing belief by one’s own report. I again appeal to the relation between assertoric speech and belief to explain the feasibility of self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of one’s words.

American political culture has virtually precluded public discussion about the fundamental weaknesses of capitalism, forcing media reformers to argue defensively that commercial broadcasting is a special case of market failure. This investigation questions the historical inevitability of commercialized mass media structure by examining how the ideology of media professionalism is deployed in public debate over noncommercial uses of mass media resources. The work of John Dewey and Walter Lippmann frame a theoretical understanding of how professional autonomy works in opposition to community, and thus how professionalization works in opposition to a shared democratic sphere. Relying on the fundamental concepts of discursive formations studied in depth by Michel Foucault, three case studies analyze historic moments (the invention of listener support by Lewis Hill, the rise of news reporting by community television volunteers, and the introduction of media literacy in K-12 public education) that offer evidence of discursive breaks within the constructions of professionalism that support commercialization, and what those breaks suggest about the re-instantiation of the historical inevitability of the commercial regime. The conclusion discusses how conditions have led us to a point of deprofessionalization, a state in which media consumers disarm the notion of professionalism before it can be deployed as a governing relation, and how deproduction of authoritative texts effectively contains the power of professionalized norms. INDEX WORDS: Professionalism, Professionalization, Media reform, Commercialization, Noncommercial media, Dewey-Lippmann debate, Lewis Hill, Community television, Media literacy, Deproduction, Deprofessionalization

This dissertation consists in a defence of the claim that belief is a state on which its bearer can reflect only deliberatively. That partial characterization of the concept is intended to throw light on the status of belief as a rational phenomenon. I defend it by appeal to features of our actual and imagined practices of ascribing belief linguistically, both to others and ourselves. Having set out the characterization in the first of four chapters, in the second chapter I survey the ways of learning from words: evidentially, by report, and by belief-expression. I go on to propose that where a person’s words afford belief of his belief, they do so through the belief-expressive character of assertoric speech. In the third chapter, I defend that claim as it applies to the case of ascribing belief to another. I argue that my characterization best explains the fact that we do not ordinarily report our beliefs or invite others to do so. I explain our ordinarily ascribing belief from the expressive character of assertoric speech by appeal to the relation between assertion and belief. In the fourth chapter, I turn to the prospect of ascribing oneself belief based on one’s own words. I argue that self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of words is alone consistent with the self-ascriber’s basic psychological and linguistic integrity. I recommend my characterization of belief for its capacity to explain the disintegrating effects of self-ascribing belief by one’s own report. I again appeal to the relation between assertoric speech and belief to explain the feasibility of self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of one’s words.

An instrumental defense of a right to do wrong is plausible because we cannot directly intervene in an individual's choices so as to effectively promote that individual's moral good, if her moral good is conceived as being some form of individual autonomy. An epistemic defense is also plausible if we reorient J.S. Mill's epistemological argument for his Harm Principle in "On Liberty" to center on the agent's knowledge, rather than on the interfering observer's knowledge. Restrictions on harmless acts that are imposed because the acts are wrong are only justifiable to that individual if she herself knows that her acts are wrong. Both approaches depend upon the limited subjectivity and fallibility of the agent or interfering observer. Moreover, both approaches make the justification for a right to knowingly do wrong problematic.

It is widely believed that we have immediate, introspective access to the content of our own thoughts. This access is assumed to be privileged in a way that our access to the thought content of others is not. It is also widely believed that, in many cases, thought content is individuated according to properties that are external to the thinker's head. I will refer to these theses as privileged access and content externalism, respectively. Though both are widely held to be true, various arguments have been put forth to the effect that they are incompatible. This charge of incompatibilism has been met with a variety of compatibilist responses, each of which has received its own share of criticism. In this thesis, I will argue that a contrastive account of self-knowledge is a novel compatibilist response that shows significant promise.

Rapid Prototyping (RP) is the process of building three-dimensional objects, in layers, using additive manufacturing. Rapid Manufacturing (RM) is the use of RP technologies to manufacture end-use, or finished, products. At small lot sizes, such as with customized products, traditional manufacturing technologies become infeasible due to the high costs of tooling and setup. RM offers the opportunity to produce these customized products economically. Coupled with the customization opportunities afforded by RM is a certain degree of uncertainty. This uncertainty is mainly attributed to the lack of information known about what the customers specific requirements and preferences are at the time of production. In this thesis, the author presents an overall method for selection of a RM technology, as an investment decision, under the geometric uncertainty inherent to mass customization. Specifically, the author defines the types of uncertainty inherent to RM (epistemic), proposes a method to account for this uncertainty in a selection process (interval analysis), and proposes a method to select a technology under uncertainty (Decision Theory under strict uncertainty). The author illustrates the method with examples on the selection of an RM technology to produce custom caster wheels and custom hearing aid shells. In addition to the selection methodology, the author also develops universal build time and part cost models for the RM technologies. These models are universal in the sense that they depend explicitly on the parameters that characterize each technology and the overall part characteristics.

The primary concern of this piece of work is to reconsider scientific realism debate in the philosophy of science. Accordingly, the overall aim is to come up with the clues of a viable scientific realist attitude in the face of anti-realist interpretations of scientific theories. To accomplish this aim, I make use of two modified versions of scientific realism, that is, &lsquo / epistemic structural realism&rsquo / and &lsquo / entity realism&rsquo / . Epistemic structural realism is a realist position of which proponents claim that the only knowable part of the reality is the structure of it which is expressed by the mathematical equations of our best scientific theories. On the other hand, according to entity realism, the only assured knowledge obtained from scientific theories is the existence of theoretical entities posited by these theories. I argue that a combination of the properly construed versions of these two positions might fulfill the afore-mentioned aim of this thesis.