Nietzsche has often been interpreted as the champion of heroic, self-sufficient individuals, who manage to fashion some order out of the raw material of Nature through the exercise of free will. On the face of things, Nietzsche's doctrine of eternal recurrence creates a problem for such an interpretation. If history must eternally repeat itself, then it can take only one possible route. Individuals' future actions would then be constrained by the sole possible path of history, and free will would seem to be undermined. In order to avoid the conclusion that eternal recurrence obviates free will, scholars have attempted to show that: (1) Nietzsche does not wish to establish a link between eternal recurrence and cosmology - that is, eternal recurrence should not be read as the cyclical repetition of history; (2) eternal recurrence can be construed so that it aggrandizes the importance of free choice. Contrary to these two trends in scholarship about eternal recurrence, I believe that Nietzsche intends to draw a connection between eternal recurrence and cosmology, and this connection undermines free will. In order to establish this, I examine the textual evidence on eternal recurrence from The Gay Science and Zarathustra to show that Nietzsche employs eternal recurrence as a metaphor for determinism in those works. As a metaphor for a deterministic cosmos, eternal recurrence undercuts free will. Turning to Nietzsche's late works, I show that Nietzsche broadens the scope of eternal recurrence. Eternal recurrence comes to serve as a metaphor for the Dionysian character of Nature. Only by relinquishing one's desire for free will and submitting to necessity and to the trans-individual potency of Nature can the individual see herself as powerful. Hence, it is argued that Nietzsche does not believe individuals manifest strength by asserting their free wills against Nature, as commentators often maintain. Instead, Nietzsche enjoins individuals to cede their desires for free will and to participate in the trans-individual vitality of Nature.

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Descartes' philosophy concerning the relationship between God and the eternal truths has been an unresolved and problematic issue since he first declared it. For Descartes, God's power is limitless and nothing can exist independently of Him. The problem is that if that is true, things such as "God knows that he does not exist" are possible because the truth of that proposition rests on God's power. In fact, the existence of any eternal truth depends on God’s power. Examples of such truths are: "the interior angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles," "3+4=7," and "two contraries cannot exist together." Descartes built his entire metaphysics around a certain conception of God, a conception that includes His not being a deceiver. But if it turns out that God is as limitless as Descartes thinks He is, Descartes' philosophy does not rest on as firm a foundation as he believes. In fact, it is inconsistent: we know what we clearly and distinctly perceive because God would not deceive us and his power is unlimited. But since His power is absolutely unlimited, it might be the case that God is not a deceiver and everything we know is true, but at the same time we have been misled by God and there is an actual reality we are not, and will never be, privy to. There have been a number of attempts to make Descartes’ view consistent. I consider two of the most recent and promising lines of interpretation. The first, Universal Possibilism, holds that God’s power is utterly limitless and He can make any proposition true, including problematic ones such as “I think, but I am not.” This theory argues that what we can and cannot conceive are merely epistemic limits rather than indicators of truth. The second, Limited Possibilism, maintains that God has power over the possibility of any proposition. Any proposition, under this view, is possibly possible; this preserves the integrity of the connection between what we conceive as true and what is actually true. The major drawback to this line of thought is that it puts an unintuitive limit on God: He can make something possible, but he can’t then do the seemingly simple task of making that thing true. I argue that a proper understanding of Descartes' conception of the meanings of "possible," "impossible," "contingent,". "necessary" and God's nature renders his position consistent. Descartes holds that God necessarily exists, and his nature is immutable and the existence of anything else is contingent. If one interprets Descartes' God to hold limitless power over contingent propositions, but not over his nature or existence, Descartes' position is no longer inconsistent.

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Thesis advisor: Robert C. Bartlett / In my dissertation I seek to contribute to the revival of interest in Augustine’s political thought by attempting to uncover his doctrine of eternal law. While absent from his mature writings, including the City of God, this doctrine is central to the investigation of justice in Augustine’s early writings. After considering Augustine’s summary of this early investigation in the Confessions, the most surprising feature of which is Augustine’s insistence on the importance of specifically political questions to his mature understanding of justice, I take up the two treatments of eternal law. In the dialogue On Free Choice, the eternal law is contrasted with the temporal law and is understood in terms of the fundamental command to “order,” which means in the first place wisdom, but also “right and honorable” action. In the anti-Manichean polemic Contra Faustum, the eternal law is presented as the will of God that commands the preservation of the natural order, which means that actions are truly just insofar as they conduce to “mortal health.” I argue that these two discussions of eternal law indicate the limitations of any kind of “higher law” doctrine. On Free Choice demonstrates the difficulty of breaking free of the guidance of temporal law and its harmonization of the demands of eternal and temporal law depends on an understanding of moral virtue whose independence is rather assumed than proven. Contra Faustum shows that the natural ends of self-preservation, procreation, and civic peace are only the beginning points of moral reasoning, since the pursuit of those ends is governed by further moral criteria that cannot easily be understood in terms of nature. In the end, then, I argue that the doctrine of eternal law, while illuminating a great deal about the problems of politics and morality as Augustine encountered them, points to the crucial importance of the question of human virtue and of acquiring the prudence that provides for this virtue in light of the necessary limitations of political life. It is probably for this reason that Augustine does not return to the doctrine in his later writings and does not rely on it in his reconciliation of the two cities in the City of God. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2016. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Political Science.

In this thesis I develop an account of Nietzsche’s great man framed around the idea that he is a ‘monster of energy.’ In the first part I establish that Nietzsche developed a criterion to assess the value of values, centred on whether they express abundance or exhaustion. Cultivating an abundance of energy is the key to how we should approach the problem of suffering, how we master ressentiment, and ultimately, how we experience authentic joy. We should thus use energy expenditure as the standard to evaluate the different narratives that we use to interpret ourselves and our existence. In the second part I use this criterion to establish the types of narratives most conducive to creating oneself as the monster of energy. I argue that the great man should desire to determine his own will, should cultivate strength of character, believe in the freedom of his will, and take responsibility for the self that he has created. Finally, I examine the attitude the great man should adopt towards his past, and argue that we should reject the idea that the eternal return plays an important role in the process of becoming a great man, since this process should emphasise the necessity of self-mastery, asceticism, and the cultivation of a unified and volitional self.

Much ado has been made regarding Descartes's understanding of the creation of what he called the "eternal truths" because he described them, paradoxically, as both the free creations of God, and necessary. While there are many varying interpretations of Cartesian modality, the issue has heretofore been treated in a vacuum, as a niche issue having little import beyond being an interesting puzzle for Descartes Scholars. I argue that this treatment is misguided, and that in order to properly understand Cartesian philosophy at all, one must properly understand Descartes's theory of modality. This, however, is no small feat; in order to understand Descartes's seemingly peculiar view on modality, one must first make sense of what Descartes understood the nature of God to be. One reason for this, I argue, is the systematic nature of Cartesian philosophy; indeed when dealing with a dense inter-connection of philosophical issues, one must move from what is more known in itself to what is more known to us, and not the other way around. I argue that in the literature on Cartesian modality, insufficient attention has been paid to the influence of the French School of Spirituality (in particular the work of Cardinal Bérulle) on the Cartesian notion of the divine. I argue that this influence pushed Descartes to criticize traditional attempts (Aquinas's in particular) to split the horns of Plato's Euthyphro dilemma as violating a proper understanding of the doctrine of divine simplicity. Descartes's commitment to a radical form of the doctrine of divine simplicity leads him to a version of divine voluntarism wherein all `things' depend on God for their existence, and God cannot have had antecedent reason to prefer the creation of anything over anything else. There is little doubt that Descartes embraced the voluntarist horn of the Euthyphro dilemma, but just what that means for Cartesian modality and philosophy generally remains a contentious issue. I argue that Descartes is best read as what I call an `agnostic quietist' regarding God (and modality generally) given textual, historical, and systematic considerations. One virtue of an agnostic quietist reading is that I am able to square the passages where Descartes discusses the inconceivability of God's power with the conclusions reached regarding God's non-deceiving nature in the Meditations and elsewhere. Further virtues that I explore are the effects that a quietist reading has on the Cartesian scientific programme, the infamous mind-body problem, Descartes's seemingly inconsistent view regarding human free-will and Descartes's refusal to engage in "theology." Traditionally, Cartesian epistemology has been understood to be a purely a priori undertaking, which succumbs to deep and insurmountable problems. One of the greatest problems facing the Cartesian was the move from the mind to the world. Simon Blackburn, for example, says of the Cartesian epistemological project in the Meditations that Descartes "has put himself on a desert island from which there is no escape." This view is echoed by, and even motivates some of the contemporary views concerning Cartesian modality. I argue, however, that a proper understanding of the Cartesian doctrine of clear and distinct ideas circumvents this famous problem. By highlighting the proper understanding and application of the doctrine of clear and distinct ideas, I show that such ideas not only guarantee the existence of an external truth-maker, but also that such ideas do not do much more than show that there is a truth-maker. I argue that in instances of clear and distinct perception, the truth of the idea is normatively certain, but what makes it true is yet to be established. In this way, clear and distinct ideas are both powerful, in terms of guaranteeing truth, and relatively unhelpful, in that further work is required in order to determine to what the ideas conform. I argue that this is the case not only for actual truths, but for some clearly intuited truths about possibility. As an illustration of my overall thesis, I address the Cartesian argument for the separability of mind and body, and entertain the various interpretations of Descartes's view of human freedom. I argue that in order to understand Cartesian views on either of these issues, one must first make sense of his modal commitments. In both of these cases Descartes claims that finite minds can know that something is possible, even though what makes it possible is well beyond what they can understand.

Submitted by Edineia Teixeira (edineia.teixeira@unioeste.br) on 2019-03-11T19:52:22Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Jessica_Rodrigues_2018.pdf: 1353993 bytes, checksum: 9e77a71398195423e20a09632837b4f6 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2019-03-11T19:52:22Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Jessica_Rodrigues_2018.pdf: 1353993 bytes, checksum: 9e77a71398195423e20a09632837b4f6 (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-12-11 / The current dissertation presents an analytical reading upon the translation process of the book O Filho Eterno (2007), by Cristovão Tezza, whose translation to the English language is given the title The Eternal Son (2013), by the translator Alison Entrekin. To do so, we aim at establishing a comparative perspective between the Original Text (OT) and the Translated Text (TT), identifying the path followed along the translation process. The Translation Studies, from 1980s on, consolidates itself as an autonomous research and intellectual production field, not anymore as a branch of the Comparative Liteature or Linguistics. Literature scholars, for too long, focused themselves on a defensive posture, upon fidedignity aspects of the OT and the TT. Linguistics, yet, very poorly has explored the cultural aspects of the translation analysis. This comparative study between the O Filho Eterno and The Eternal Son broadened the literary analysis possibilities as it permitted a reflection on the understanding the creative expression lines used in the book through the double, the autofiction and the silence. The interdicts and the vertigo feeling from the original narrative are suppressed on the translation throughout a simplification of the creative resources, such as punctuation, word omissions and explanatory insertions; furthermore, a lexical and semantic diversification of the recurrent use of the original Filho for preferable terms of the translator as son, child, baby and Felipe, that, along the plot, turn out to be a guideline for the foreign reader. The TT simplification can be analyzed from four settled moments of the book: waiting the messianic son as a prize (son), not-acceptance of the child with Down Syndrome (child), the rising empathy with the stimulus sessions (baby) and the identity construction of Felipe with talents, tastes and features, beyond his Syndrome. The whole process is interweaved by the construction of the father and son double, established with feedbacks and reflections from the father-character, under the lens of a selective omniscient narrator that also ensured the narrative distance and the autofictional aspect of the book. Under such perspective, language is continuously challenged as the comfortable values of the symbolic plan categorization is doubted, such as comprehension, apprehension and valuation measures of the world’s narrator from O Filho Eterno come down to the experience of helplessness, inexpressible and of full meaningful silence. This study is based upon the theorical and critical approaches by Mona Baker (1993, 1995, 1996), Itamar Even-Zohar (1978), Susan Basnnett (2005), Philippe Lejeune, (2008), Diana Klinger (2006), Santiago Kovadloff (2003), Roland Barthes (1977, 2004), among others. / A presente dissertação apresenta uma leitura analítica do processo de tradução da obra O Filho Eterno (2007), de Cristovão Tezza, cuja obra em língua inglesa recebe o título de The Eternal Son (2013), na tradução de Alison Entrekin. Para isso, buscamos estabelecer uma perspectiva comparativa entre o Texto Original (TO) e o Texto Traduzido (TT), com a identificação do caminho adotado no processo tradutório. Os Estudos da Tradução, a partir da década de 1980, consolidam-se como uma área de pesquisa autônoma e de produção intelectual, não mais como um desmembramento da Literatura Comparada ou da Linguística. Teóricos da literatura, por muito tempo, pautaram-se, em uma postura defensiva, em questões de fidedignidade entre o TO e o TT. Já a Linguística, pouco explorou os aspectos culturais nas análises tradutórias. O estudo comparado entre O Filho Eterno e The Eternal Son ampliou as possibilidades da análise literária ao permitir refletir sobre a compreensão das linhas de expressão criativas, pautadas na obra pelo duplo, pela autoficção e pelo silêncio. Os interditos e o sentimento de vertigem do original são suprimidos na narrativa traduzida por meio de uma simplificação de recursos criativos, como pontuação, supressão de palavras e inserções explicativas; também, por uma diversificação lexical e semântica do recorrente uso no original da lexia Filho, por vocábulos preferenciais da tradutora como son, child, baby e Felipe, que, no enredo, tornam-se guia no contexto narrativo ao leitor estrangeiro. A simplificação no TT pode ser analisada a partir de quatro momentos da obra: à espera do filho messiânico como um prêmio (son), a não-aceitação da criança com Síndrome de Down (child), a crescente empatia com as sessões de estímulo (baby) e a configuração da identidade de Felipe, com talentos, gostos e características, para além da Síndrome. Todo o processo é perpassado pela construção de um duplo entre pai e filho, estabelecido com flashbacks e reflexões do personagem pai, sob a lente de um narrador onisciente seletivo, que assegura um distanciamento narrativo e o aspecto autoficcional da obra. Sob tal perspectiva narrativa, a linguagem é desafiada à medida que os valores confortáveis da categorização no plano simbólico, como medidas de compreensão, apreensão e valoração do mundo do narrador de O Filho Eterno, culminam em uma experiência de desamparo, do indizível e de um silêncio pleno de significado. Este estudo ancora-se em abordagens teóricas e críticas advindas de Mona Baker (1993, 1995, 1996), Itamar Even-Zohar (1978), Susan Basnnett (2005), Philippe Lejeune, (2008), Diana Klinger (2006), Santiago Kovadloff (2003), Roland Barthes (1977, 2004), entre outros.

Orientador: José Carlos Bruni / Banca: Clélia Aparecida Martins / Banca: Franklin Leopoldo e Silva / Resumo: Esta pesquisa tem como objetivo analisar a construção filosófica de Friedrich Nietzsche acerca do sentido de sabedoria trágica, desde sua formulação no estudo sobre a tragédia até os escritos finais no que concerne ao trágico. Nesse intuito, busca-se aprofundar o estudo dos elementos tratados por Nietzsche ao longo de sua produção filosófica, passando pelos conceitos apolíneo e dionisíaco, a partir dos quais tratará do nascimento da arte trágica e do enfrentamento do pessimismo, e retratando as modificações sofridas por seu pensamento ao distanciar-se da concepção metafísica de arte e voltar-se a um projeto pelo qual enaltece a força dionisíaca em oposição ao conhecimento moral e metafísico. Desse modo, serão analisados os caminhos percorridos por esta filosofia trágica, que encontrará sua máxima na concepção do eterno retorno e na força dionisíaca de afirmação da existência / Abstract: This research aims to analyse the philosophical construction of Friedrich Nietzsche specifically the tragic wisdom's meaning, since when it was formulates in the study of the tragedy until the final writings in regard to the tragic. To this end, the focus was to analyse with details the study of elements that are used by Nietzsche throughout his philosophical production, through with the apollonian and dionysian's concepts, from which will deal with the begin of the tragic art and the confront of the pessimism, and reflecting the changes suffered from his thought that is to be distant from the metaphysical conception of art and to be with a project that extols the dionysian force in opposition to the moral and metaphysical knowledge. Thus, it will be analysed the paths that are taken by this tragic's philosophy, and that will find its maximum in the conception of eternal recurrence and Dionysian's power of life's affirmation / Mestre

O principal objetivo de nossa tese foi examinar de que maneira a doutrina do eterno retorno do mesmo se relaciona com o projeto de transvaloração dos valores e com a noção nietzschiana de trágico. Para efetivar nosso intento, realizamos, primeiramente, uma investigação acerca da esfera cosmológica da doutrina do eterno retorno. Em segundo lugar, promovemos a relação entre esse âmbito cosmológico do eterno retorno e o projeto de transvaloração dos valores. Essa relação deu ensejo a duas problemáticas para as quais tentamos dar resposta nas duas últimas partes de nossa tese. Nesse sentido, tentamos responder à primeira problemática que chamamos de o problema do determinismo no eterno retorno esclarecendo a noção nietzschiana de trágico e tentando mostrar de que forma ela está relacionada com a doutrina do eterno retorno e com o projeto de transvaloração dos valores. Por fim, propomos uma resposta à segunda problemática, a saber, a incompatibilidade entre o perspectivismo e a cosmologia do eterno retorno do mesmo. / The main aim of this thesis is to examine how the doctrine of the eternal recurrence of the same is related to the project of transvaluation of values and to the Nietzschean notion of tragic. To accomplish this purpose, first we examined the cosmological sphere of the doctrine. Secondly, we promote the relationship between this cosmological context and the project of transvaluation of values. Two problems have emerged from this relationship to which we tried answering in the last two parts of the thesis. We tried answering the first problem that we called the problem of determinism in the eternal return clarifying the Nietzschean notion of tragic and showing how it is related to the doctrine of the eternal return and to the project of transvaluation of values. Finally, we propose an answer to the second problem, namely the incompatibility between perspectivism and cosmology of the eternal return of the same.