Weber’s discussion of ethics in his famous lecture (and then essay) Politics as a Vocation (1919) clearly indicates that two possible ethical stances, the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, are rooted in ‘distinct and irreconcilably opposed principles’. Throughout Politics as a Vocation, it is the ethic of responsibility that appears to be endorsed by Weber as suited for political life. Yet, Weber concludes his essay by claiming that a combined ethic is ideal for a political vocation. This makes Weber’s position regarding the ideal ethical stance for a man who has a ‘true political calling’ appear contradictory: the ethics are opposites but somehow to be combined. Commentators have mostly concluded that, for Weber, the ethic of responsibility is the ideal ethic for politics. That appears further in accord with the fact that a key concern of the speech in its historical context was to warn political students of the dangers associated with an ethic of conviction. Weber, as a realist, was especially critical of a stance that disregarded the corrupted nature of the world, which the ethic of responsibility alone seems to accept. Politicians with single-minded convictions were responsible for Germany’s political stalemate, supporting the fact that the ethic of conviction should not be deemed acceptable in politics. And yet there is much this position neglects by opting for only one of the two ethics, by concluding that only the ethic of responsibility is appropriate for political vocation. My thesis offers something different; something I admit is ambitious. What I propose is the synthesis of the opposition, of finding a way to combine the two irreconcilably opposed ethics.

Weber’s discussion of ethics in his famous lecture (and then essay) Politics as a Vocation (1919) clearly indicates that two possible ethical stances, the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, are rooted in ‘distinct and irreconcilably opposed principles’. Throughout Politics as a Vocation, it is the ethic of responsibility that appears to be endorsed by Weber as suited for political life. Yet, Weber concludes his essay by claiming that a combined ethic is ideal for a political vocation. This makes Weber’s position regarding the ideal ethical stance for a man who has a ‘true political calling’ appear contradictory: the ethics are opposites but somehow to be combined. Commentators have mostly concluded that, for Weber, the ethic of responsibility is the ideal ethic for politics. That appears further in accord with the fact that a key concern of the speech in its historical context was to warn political students of the dangers associated with an ethic of conviction. Weber, as a realist, was especially critical of a stance that disregarded the corrupted nature of the world, which the ethic of responsibility alone seems to accept. Politicians with single-minded convictions were responsible for Germany’s political stalemate, supporting the fact that the ethic of conviction should not be deemed acceptable in politics. And yet there is much this position neglects by opting for only one of the two ethics, by concluding that only the ethic of responsibility is appropriate for political vocation. My thesis offers something different; something I admit is ambitious. What I propose is the synthesis of the opposition, of finding a way to combine the two irreconcilably opposed ethics.

Weber’s discussion of ethics in his famous lecture (and then essay) Politics as a Vocation (1919) clearly indicates that two possible ethical stances, the ethic of conviction and the ethic of responsibility, are rooted in ‘distinct and irreconcilably opposed principles’. Throughout Politics as a Vocation, it is the ethic of responsibility that appears to be endorsed by Weber as suited for political life. Yet, Weber concludes his essay by claiming that a combined ethic is ideal for a political vocation. This makes Weber’s position regarding the ideal ethical stance for a man who has a ‘true political calling’ appear contradictory: the ethics are opposites but somehow to be combined. Commentators have mostly concluded that, for Weber, the ethic of responsibility is the ideal ethic for politics. That appears further in accord with the fact that a key concern of the speech in its historical context was to warn political students of the dangers associated with an ethic of conviction. Weber, as a realist, was especially critical of a stance that disregarded the corrupted nature of the world, which the ethic of responsibility alone seems to accept. Politicians with single-minded convictions were responsible for Germany’s political stalemate, supporting the fact that the ethic of conviction should not be deemed acceptable in politics. And yet there is much this position neglects by opting for only one of the two ethics, by concluding that only the ethic of responsibility is appropriate for political vocation. My thesis offers something different; something I admit is ambitious. What I propose is the synthesis of the opposition, of finding a way to combine the two irreconcilably opposed ethics.

Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T15:13:43Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Tese Patricia Medina.pdf: 1692546 bytes, checksum: aac3ae5803ec10cb87b345b97b14dcbd (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-07-13 / This is a theoretical study devoted to reconstructing conceptions of nature-care-ethics theme, in an expository approach of Martin Heidegger (2002) ideas, in conversation with Hans Jonas (2004-2006), aiming, in the future, to subsidize the philosophical foundations an environmental education methodology. The research method was the phenomenological hermeneutics of Heidegger, expressed in his work Being and Time . The basis of reflection is the relationship between man and nature, its actual sense and verifying that Care (Sorge) can serve as critical to our civilization and as a guiding principle of convivial with nature. If the technique and technology take on a new sense of ethics because of the central role they now occupy, it will be able to come to a state of irreversibility for nature and human life, requiring that human behavior becomes duty subject. The ethics need will be exponentially greater as much as the powers of human action are governed by it. Only an ethics based on the human being, maintenance and custody of existence can have an effective sense. This indicates that care takes on the original centrality and provides a lumen to the merits of its value and its meaning to life that causes one diverse devise to the society. Care should constitute the root of ethics, as it has its psychological basis in the human capacity to transcend the concrete situation of the will directed to itself, to make decisions and live for the common welfare, being around its formative dimension: responsibility is the care recognized as an obligation towards other living beings when there is a threat to the vulnerability of live. / Trata-se de um estudo teórico vinculado à linha de pesquisa Cultura e Processos Educacionais do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Educação da Faculdade de Educação da Universidade Federal de Goiás dedicado a reconstruir concepções acerca do tema natureza-cuidado-ética, numa abordagem expositiva das ideias de Martin Heidegger (2002) e Hans Jonas (2004-2006), em vista aos fundamentos filosóficos para uma metodologia de educação ambiental. A fundamentação teórica da pesquisa seguiu o fluxo do círculo hermenêutico constitutivo do método fenomenológico heideggeriano, expresso na obra Ser e Tempo. A base da reflexão é a relação homem-natureza, seu sentido atual e a verificação se o cuidado (Sorge) pode servir de crítica à nossa civilização e também como princípio inspirador de convivencialidade com a natureza a partir da descrição das tensões e das fertilidades nas relações entre cuidado, civilização e a convivência com a natureza. Se a técnica/tecnologia assumem um novo sentido ético por causa da centralidade que agora ocupam, poder-se-á chegar a uma situação de irreversibilidade para a natureza e a vida humana, havendo necessidade de que o comportamento humano se torne objeto de dever. A realização deste estudo possibilitou concluir que a necessidade da ética será exponencialmente maior quanto maiores forem os poderes do agir humano que esta deverá regular. Somente uma ética fundada na vida, na manutenção e na custódia da existência pode ter um sentido efetivo. Isso indica que o cuidar assuma a centralidade original e forneça um lúmen à procedência do seu valor e do seu sentido para a vida. O cuidado deve constituir a raiz da ética, pois possui sua base na capacidade do humano transcender a situação concreta da vontade orientada para si, para tomar decisões e viver voltado para o bem estar comum estando sua dimensão formativa no entendimento da responsabilidade no cuidado reconhecido como obrigação em relação a outro ser vivo quando existe uma ameaça à vulnerabilidade da vida.

No description available.

The thesis proposes and defends a maxim which can serve as a foundation and guideline for professional ethics in nursing, the maxim that nurses should act so far as possible to promote patient's self-determination. The thesis is informed by philosophical ethics and by knowledge of professional nursing practice.