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Untersuchungen zu Platons EuthydemKeulen, Hermann. January 1971 (has links)
Originally presented as the author's thesis, Bonn. / Bibliography: p. 93-101.
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Plato's EuthydemusHirsch, Darryl Bernard 07 1900 (has links)
This thesis is a careful examination of one small Platonic dialogue, the Euthydemus. In broad terms, it argues that the Euthydemus is concerned with what might be described as 'word games', with teaching both the need to know how to speak well and the worth of being able to do so. In more specific terms, it argues that the Euthydemus is comprised of three distinct levels, Socrates' conversation (primarily) with the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, his conversation with Crito, and Plato's conversation with the reader; levels, it is suggested, which cannot be fully understood unless Crito's role in each of them is first recognized. The first level, Socrates' conversation (primarily) with the brothers Euthydemus and Dionysodorus, is seemingly composed of three separate discussions, between Socrates and the brothers, between Socrates and Clinias, and between Socrates and Ctesippus. The first discussion is a general demonstration of knowing how to use words (or 'word games') and, further, of knowing how to use them well. The second discussion, in contradistinction to the first, centres on a coherent application of words to a specific goal; that being, to begin to demonstrate both that knowledge is the greatest good for individuals and, as well, that philosophy is nothing more than a 'perpetual ruthless questioning' . The third discussion reveals something about Ctesippus' nature. More importantly, it illustrates how words can be used to communicate with certain individuals and not others. The second level of the Buthydemus, Socrates' conversation with Crito, might accurately be described as an application of words to a specific goal writ large. The reason is that, here, Socrates tells Crito a 'story' (this being what was described above as the first level of the E:uthydemus) in order to discourage him from giving his sons a philosophic education. The third level, Plato's conversation with the reader (or Plato as distinguished from Socrates), raises the broader issue of the relation between the philosopher and the city. More precisely, it begins to reveal the effects that different methods of speaking have on an individual, on the opinions that others form as a result of his or her choice in this regard, and thus on the need for an individual to choose wisely. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)
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Platonic Craft and Medical EthicsBader, Daniel 14 February 2011 (has links)
Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.
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Platonic Craft and Medical EthicsBader, Daniel 14 February 2011 (has links)
Platonic Craft and Medical Ethics examines the Platonic theory of craft and shows its application to different ethical problems in medicine, both ancient and modern. I begin by elucidating the Platonic use of the term “craft” or “technē”, using especially the paradigmatic craft of medicine, and explicate a number of important principles inherent in his use of the term. I then show how Plato’s framework of crafts can be applied to two ancient debates. First, I show how Plato’s understanding of crafts is used in discussing the definition of medicine, and how he deals with the issue of “bivalence”, that medicine seems to be capable of generating disease as well as curing it. I follow this discussion into Aristotle, who, though he has a different interpretation of bivalence, has a solution in many ways similar to Plato’s. Second, I discuss the relevance of knowledge to persuasion and freedom. Rhetors like Gorgias challenge the traditional connections of persuasion to freedom and force to slavery by characterizing persuasion as a type of force. Plato addresses this be dividing persuasion between sorcerous and didactic persuasion, and sets knowledge as the new criterion for freedom. Finally, I discuss three modern issues in medical ethics using a Platonic understanding of crafts: paternalism, conclusions in meta-analyses and therapeutic misconceptions in research ethics. In discussing paternalism, I argue that tools with multiple excellences, like the body, should not be evaluated independently of the uses to which the patient intends to put them. In discussing meta-analyses, I show how the division of crafts into goal-oriented and causal parts in the Phaedrus exposes the confusion inherent in saying that practical conclusions can follow directly from statistical results. Finally, I argue that authors like Franklin G. Miller and Howard Brody fail to recognize the hierarchical relationship between medical research and medicine when they argue that medical research ethics should be autonomous from medical ethics per se.
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