The goal of this research is to improve the security of smart home hubs by developing a standard against which hubs can be evaluated. This was done by first reviewing existing standards, guides, and collections of best practices. I determined that adapting or extending an existing standard was the best way to proceed. Potential candidates were selected, and after thorough comparison, I chose to extend the OWASP Application Security Verification Standard (ASVS). Extensions were composed of additional security requirements to address smart home hub functionality not covered by the existing requirements of the ASVS. These additional requirements were developed based upon existing best practices and are referred to as the Smart Home Extensions. Where a best practice or guidance did not yet exist for a particular hub functionality, guidance from related fields was adapted. The entire set of Smart Home Extensions were reviewed by industry experts, updated based on feedback, and then sent on for further peer review. Four smart home hubs – VeraLite, Wink, Connect, and SmartThings – were evaluated using the ASVS with the Smart Home Extensions. The evaluation uncovered security vulnerabilities in all four hubs, some previously disclosed by other researchers, and others new. Analysis of the evaluation data suggests that authentication is a common problem area, among others. Based on the performance of the hubs and the data collected, I suggest that the ASVS and Smart Home Extensions can be an effective tool to provide insight into the security posture of smart home hubs.

<p>As successful as the Standard Model has been in describing particle interactions, there are still many open questions it does not answer; the strong CP violation and the existence of dark matter among them. To address these issues many extensions to the Standard Model have been devised. Some of these extensions propose a new force mediating particle; a massive particle results in a potential described by a Yukawa-like interaction, while a massless exchange particle leads to power law type potentials. Limits on the strength of these interactions at the sub-micron range of separation between two particles are poorly characterized, but previous experiments conducted at IUPUI placed the best limits to date on the strength of a Yukawa-like interaction. Those experiments used a spherical test mass and a planar source mass. However, if a cylindrical test mass was used, the increased interaction volume of the cylinder would result in an increased sensitivity of about an order of magnitude over the spherical test mass experiment. Building such a system presents many challenges, namely the alignment of the cylinder with respect to the planar source mass. A capacitance based scheme to determine the alignment of a cylinder with respect to a plane will be discussed. The thesis concludes with an outline for a new type of measurement system. The new experiment attempts to induce a gravitational Π-pulse in a nanoshphere to probe extensions to the Standard Model.</p> <p> </p>

No description available.

<p>In this work, we consider the addition of a single neutral massive vector boson to the Standard Model (SM). This boson, which we refer to as N⁰, induces dipolar transitions between electrons and muons. We obtain bounds on the strength of its coupling and its mass: from the scattering process e+e- to mu+mu-; from its contribution to muonium-antimuonium oscillations; and from its possible contribution to the rare muon decay mu- to e+e-e-. In particular, we examine the two cases where the mediator is both heavy and light compared with the scattering energies for, and place constraints on the relevant parameters based on their contributions to the cross section and the forward-backward asymmetry. For muonium-antimuonium oscillations, we consider only the case where the mediator is heavy compared to all other scales, reducing its effect to an effective contact interaction. Finally, we consider an SU(2) invariant theory from which the N⁰ interaction emerges, and find that flavour diagonal interactions also emerge, giving a tree-level path for the decay mu- to e+e-e-. We find that the heavy N⁰ is not strongly constrained by this contribution, while the light N⁰ is very strongly constrained by it. Very generally, we find that the heavy N⁰ is much less constrained than other lepton flavour violating processes, while the constraints on the light N0 vary in strength between processes.</p> / Master of Science (MSc)

Práca sa zaoberá problematikou kontroly a blokovania externých zariadení v operačnom systéme Apple macOS za účelom ochrany pred únikom citlivých dát. Implementované riešenie ukazuje zvolené prístupy pre blokovanie externých a cloudových diskov. Pre blokovanie USB diskov bol použitý DiskAbitration framework, čo je najvodnejšie riešenie tohto typu úlohy. Avšak cloudové disky sú v skutočnosti synchronizované zložky a úlohu nehrajú ovládače ani strom pripojených zariadení. Ku kontrole operácií v cloudových diskoch bol použitý Endpoint Security framework. Aktuálne podporovaní cloudový poskytovatelia sú iCloud a Dropbox a prístup k nim môže byť obmedzený úplne alebo iba na čítanie. Schopnosť synchronizácie vzdialenýh zmien bola zachovaná avšak v prípade Dropboxu si to žiada nepoužívať ich aplikáciu na správu súborov.

Dans cette thèse, nous nous sommes intéressés aux problématiques de sécurité et de confidentialité liées à l'utilisation d'applications web et à l'installation d'extensions de navigateurs. Parmi les attaques dont sont victimes les applications web, il y a celles très connues de type XSS (ou Cross-Site Scripting). Les extensions sont des logiciels tiers que les utilisateurs peuvent installer afin de booster les fonctionnalités des navigateurs et améliorer leur expérience utilisateur. Content Security Policy (CSP) est une politique de sécurité qui a été proposée pour contrer les attaques de type XSS. La Same Origin Policy (SOP) est une politique de sécurité fondamentale des navigateurs, régissant les interactions entre applications web. Par exemple, elle ne permet pas qu'une application accède aux données d'une autre application. Cependant, le mécanisme de Cross-Origin Resource Sharing (CORS) peut être implémenté par des applications désirant échanger des données entre elles. Tout d'abord, nous avons étudié l'intégration de CSP avec la Same Origin Policy (SOP) et démontré que SOP peut rendre CSP inefficace, surtout quand une application web ne protège pas toutes ses pages avec CSP, et qu'une page avec CSP imbrique ou est imbriquée dans une autre page sans ou avec un CSP différent et inefficace. Nous avons aussi élucidé la sémantique de CSP, en particulier les différences entre ses 3 versions, et leurs implémentations dans les navigateurs. Nous avons ainsi introduit le concept de CSP sans dépendances qui assure à une application la même protection contre les attaques, quelque soit le navigateur dans lequel elle s'exécute. Finalement, nous avons proposé et démontré comment étendre CSP dans son état actuel, afin de pallier à nombre de ses limitations qui ont été révélées dans d'autres études. Les contenus tiers dans les applications web permettent aux propriétaires de ces contenus de pister les utilisateurs quand ils naviguent sur le web. Pour éviter cela, nous avons introduit une nouvelle architecture web qui une fois déployée, supprime le pistage des utilisateurs. Dans un dernier temps, nous nous sommes intéressés aux extensions de navigateurs. Nous avons d'abord démontré que les extensions qu'un utilisateur installe et/ou les applications web auxquelles il se connecte, peuvent le distinguer d'autres utilisateurs. Nous avons aussi étudié les interactions entre extensions et applications web. Ainsi avons-nous trouvé plusieurs extensions dont les privilèges peuvent être exploités par des sites web afin d'accéder à des données sensibles de l'utilisateur. Par exemple, certaines extensions permettent à des applications web d'accéder aux contenus d'autres applications, bien que cela soit normalement interdit par la Same Origin Policy. Finalement, nous avons aussi trouvé qu'un grand nombre d'extensions a la possibilité de désactiver la Same Origin Policy dans le navigateur, en manipulant les entêtes CORS. Cela permet à un attaquant d'accéder aux données de l'utilisateur dans n'importe qu'elle autre application, comme par exemple ses mails, son profile sur les réseaux sociaux, et bien plus. Pour lutter contre ces problèmes, nous préconisons aux navigateurs un système de permissions plus fin et une analyse d'extensions plus poussée, afin d'alerter les utilisateurs des dangers réels liés aux extensions. / In this thesis, we studied security and privacy threats in web applications and browser extensions. There are many attacks targeting the web of which XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) is one of the most notorious. Third party tracking is the ability of an attacker to benefit from its presence in many web applications in order to track the user has she browses the web, and build her browsing profile. Extensions are third party software that users install to extend their browser functionality and improve their browsing experience. Malicious or poorly programmed extensions can be exploited by attackers in web applications, in order to benefit from extensions privileged capabilities and access sensitive user information. Content Security Policy (CSP) is a security mechanism for mitigating the impact of content injection attacks in general and in particular XSS. The Same Origin Policy (SOP) is a security mechanism implemented by browsers to isolate web applications of different origins from one another. In a first work on CSP, we analyzed the interplay of CSP with SOP and demonstrated that the latter allows the former to be bypassed. Then we scrutinized the three CSP versions and found that a CSP is differently interpreted depending on the browser, the version of CSP it implements, and how compliant the implementation is with respect to the specification. To help developers deploy effective policies that encompass all these differences in CSP versions and browsers implementations, we proposed the deployment of dependency-free policies that effectively protect against attacks in all browsers. Finally, previous studies have identified many limitations of CSP. We reviewed the different solutions proposed in the wild, and showed that they do not fully mitigate the identified shortcomings of CSP. Therefore, we proposed to extend the CSP specification, and showed the feasibility of our proposals with an example of implementation. Regarding third party tracking, we introduced and implemented a tracking preserving architecture, that can be deployed by web developers willing to include third party content in their applications while preventing tracking. Intuitively, third party requests are automatically routed to a trusted middle party server which removes tracking information from the requests. Finally considering browser extensions, we first showed that the extensions that users install and the websites they are logged into, can serve to uniquely identify and track them. We then studied the communications between browser extensions and web applications and demonstrate that malicious or poorly programmed extensions can be exploited by web applications to benefit from extensions privileged capabilities. Also, we demonstrated that extensions can disable the Same Origin Policy by tampering with CORS headers. All this enables web applications to read sensitive user information. To mitigate these threats, we proposed countermeasures and a more fine-grained permissions system and review process for browser extensions. We believe that this can help browser vendors identify malicious extensions and warn users about the threats posed by extensions they install.

Single Sign-On (SSO) är en autentiseringsprocess som tillåter en utvecklare att delegera autentiseringsansvaret till en dedikerad tjänst. OAuth 2.0 är ett auktoriseringsramverk som ofta står som grund för ett autentiseringslager som i sin tur möjliggör SSO. En identitetsleverantör är tjänsten som står för hantering av användaruppgifterna och autentiseringen, två vanliga identitetsleverantörer är Google och Facebook som i sin tur implementerar SSO med hjälp utav autentiseringslagren OpenID Connect respektive Facebooks egna autentiseringslager. Det har visat sig att många klienter som ska utnyttja SSO med OAuth 2.0 implementerar det fel så att säkerhetsbrister uppstår, studier har utförts med förslag till lösningar men många bristande implementationer fortsätter produceras och existera. Att skapa diverse verktyg för att främja säkerhet i dessa sammanhang är en metod där OAuthGuard utvecklats med visionen att även kunna skydda användaren, direkt från en webbläsare. OAuthGuard har även tidigare använts för att analysera säkerheten med Google SSO och visat att 50% av undersökta klienter har brister, men motsvarande studie eller verktyg saknas för Facebook SSO. Denna studie gjorde en motsvarande undersökning för Facebook SSO-klienter med en vidareutvecklad version av OAuthGuard och fann att de lider av brister med liknande trend som tidigare studies resultat mot Google-SSO-klienter, men att färre Facebook- SSO-klienter har brister i jämförelse. Vid vidareutvecklingen av OAuthGuard upptäcktes ett antal svårigheter och framtiden för denna typ av verktyg behöver vidare analyseras. Vidare analys behöver även göras för att bedöma om Facebook-SSO kan vara att föredra över Google-SSO ur säkerhetsperspektiv samt vidare utforskande av nya säkerhetsfrämjande metoder behöver utföras. / Single Sign-On (SSO) is an authentication process that allows a developer to delegate the authentication responsibility to a dedicated service. OAuth 2.0 is an authorization framework that often serves as a base for authentication layers to be built upon that in turn allows for SSO. An identity provider is the service that is responsible for handling user credentials and the authentication, two common identity providers are Google and Facebook that implement SSO with the authentication layers OpenID Connect respectively Facebooks own authentication layer. It has been shown that many clients using OAuth 2.0 as base for SSO make faulty implementations leading to security issues, a number of studies has proposed solutions to these issues but faulty implementations are continually being made. To create various tools to promote security in these contexts is a method where OAuthGuard has been developed with the vision to also directly protect the common website user directly from the browser. OAuthGuard has been used in an earlier study to analyze the security of clients using Google SSO and discovered that 50% of the analyzed clients had flaws, no comparable study has been done for clients using Facebook SSO, which is the second largest third party log in variant. This study made a comparable investigation for Facebook SSO clients with a further developed version of OAuthGuard and found that these clients suffer from flaws with a similar trend as the previous study with Google-SSO clients, although fewer Facebook-SSO clients suffer from these flaws. When further developing OAuthGuard a dumber of difficulties was discovered and the future of these kind of tools needs to be investigated. Further analysis needs to be done to assess if Facebook-SSO should be recommended over Google-SSO from a security perspective and also further exploration of new methods to promote security needs to be done.

O objetivo deste estudo foi avaliar os resultados radiográficos obtidos pelas analises de subtração radiográfica digital e linear de implantes dentários com superfície SLA e SLActive submetidos a carga funcional e sobrecarga oclusal precoce restaurados com reconstruções em cantilever (pôntico suspenso). Cinco cães beagle tiveram seus pré-molares mandibulares extraídos bilateralmente. Após três meses, retalhos foram elevados e seis implantes (três SLA e três SLActive) foram instalados em um desenho de boca dividida e aleatorização por blocos. Após quatro semanas, os implantes foram restaurados em cada lado da mandíbula da seguinte forma: uma coroa unitária com contatos oclusais estáveis (OE), uma coroa e uma unidade de cantilever com contatos oclusais excessivos (SO), e um implante protegido pela unidade em cantilever que não recebeu carga funcional (NR). Os cães foram mantidos em um programa de controle de placa periódico, durante o período do experimento. Radiografias padronizadas foram tomadas utilizando-se guias radiográficas individualizadas e padronizadas em dois momentos: na instalação das próteses e 24 semanas após o carregamento. Análises de subtração radiográfica digital e medições lineares (entre um plano projetado entre os ombros do implante e o primeiro contato implante-osso) foram realizadas. As análises estatísticas, ANOVA para medidas repetidas, ANOVA para dados equilibrados e teste t de Bonferroni foram utilizados para identificar diferenças entre as médias, entre os seis grupos avaliados: SLA OE, SLA SO, SLA NR, SLActive OE, SLActive SO e SLActive NR. Achados gerais similares foram observados para os grupos SLA e SLActive (todos os grupos OE, NR e SO) em relação ao nível ósseo peri-implantar e as dimensões das áreas indicando alterações de densidade óssea ao redor dos implantes. As mensurações lineares variaram de 1,61 mm (grupo SLActive SO) a 1,94 mm (grupo SLA SO) no tempo 0 (antes da aplicação das cargas funcionais) e 2,00 mm (grupo SLA SO) a 2,99 mm (grupo SLActive NR) na avaliação após 24 semanas, sem diferenças estatisticamente significativas dentro ou entre-grupos (p = 0,672). Com relação à área de mudança de densidade óssea, esta variou de 0,91 mm2 (grupo SLA OE) para 1,40 mm2 (grupo SLA SO), mas sem diferenças significativas entre os grupos (p = 0,568). Por outro lado, um ganho de densidade óssea estatisticamente significativa foi encontrado para o grupo SLA com sobrecarga oclusal (p = 0,012). Nenhuma diferença significativa na alteração de densidade óssea foi detectada entre os outros cinco grupos (p> 0,05). Em conclusão, a sobrecarga oclusal precoce aplicada sobre implantes restaurados com reconstruções em cantilever, não levou a mudanças significativas na altura óssea peri-implantar após 24 semanas. No entanto, a densidade óssea ao redor de implantes SLA com sobrecarga oclusal, foi significativamente maior que nos outros grupos. / The objective of this study was to evaluate the radiographic outcomes of SLA and SLActive dental implants submitted to functional load and early occlusal overload restored with cantilever reconstructions. Five beagle dogs had their mandibular premolars extracted bilaterally. After three months, flaps were raised and six implants (three SLA and three SLActive) were installed in a block-randomized split-mouth design. After four weeks, implants were restored on each side of the mandible as follows: one single crown with stable occlusal contacts (OE), one crown and a cantilever unit with overt occlusal contacts (SO), and an implant protected by the cantilever unit not submitted to functional load (NR). The dogs were maintained in a strict and periodic plaque control program during the period of the experiment. Standardized radiographies were taken using standardized and individualized radiographic stents in two distinct moments: at prostheses installation and 24-weeks after loading. Digital subtraction radiography analyses and linear measurements were performed. Statistical analyses used repeated measures ANOVA and ANOVA for balanced data and the Bonferroni Student t test to identify differences between the means of the six evaluated groups: SLA OE, SLA SO, SLA NR, SLActive OE, SLActive SO and SLActive NR. Similar findings were found for SLA and SLActive groups regarding the peri-implant bone level and the area of bone density change around implants. Baseline linear measurements ranged from 1.61 mm (SLActive SO group) to 1.94 mm (SLA SO group) at baseline, and from 2.00 mm (SLA SO group) to 2.99 mm (SLActive NR group) at the 24-week evaluation, with no statistically significant differences within- or between-groups (p=0.672). With respect to the areas of bone density change, they ranged from 0.91 mm2 (SLA OE group) to 1.40 mm2 (SLA SO group), but without significant differences between groups (p=0.568). On the other hand, a statistically significant bone density gain was found for the overloaded SLA group (p=0.012). No significant differences in bone density change were detected between the other five groups (p>0.05). In conclusion, the early occlusal overload applied to implants restored with cantilever reconstructions did not lead to significant changes in the peri-implant bone height. However, bone density around overloaded SLA implants was significantly higher than in the other groups.

O objetivo deste estudo foi avaliar os resultados radiográficos obtidos pelas analises de subtração radiográfica digital e linear de implantes dentários com superfície SLA e SLActive submetidos a carga funcional e sobrecarga oclusal precoce restaurados com reconstruções em cantilever (pôntico suspenso). Cinco cães beagle tiveram seus pré-molares mandibulares extraídos bilateralmente. Após três meses, retalhos foram elevados e seis implantes (três SLA e três SLActive) foram instalados em um desenho de boca dividida e aleatorização por blocos. Após quatro semanas, os implantes foram restaurados em cada lado da mandíbula da seguinte forma: uma coroa unitária com contatos oclusais estáveis (OE), uma coroa e uma unidade de cantilever com contatos oclusais excessivos (SO), e um implante protegido pela unidade em cantilever que não recebeu carga funcional (NR). Os cães foram mantidos em um programa de controle de placa periódico, durante o período do experimento. Radiografias padronizadas foram tomadas utilizando-se guias radiográficas individualizadas e padronizadas em dois momentos: na instalação das próteses e 24 semanas após o carregamento. Análises de subtração radiográfica digital e medições lineares (entre um plano projetado entre os ombros do implante e o primeiro contato implante-osso) foram realizadas. As análises estatísticas, ANOVA para medidas repetidas, ANOVA para dados equilibrados e teste t de Bonferroni foram utilizados para identificar diferenças entre as médias, entre os seis grupos avaliados: SLA OE, SLA SO, SLA NR, SLActive OE, SLActive SO e SLActive NR. Achados gerais similares foram observados para os grupos SLA e SLActive (todos os grupos OE, NR e SO) em relação ao nível ósseo peri-implantar e as dimensões das áreas indicando alterações de densidade óssea ao redor dos implantes. As mensurações lineares variaram de 1,61 mm (grupo SLActive SO) a 1,94 mm (grupo SLA SO) no tempo 0 (antes da aplicação das cargas funcionais) e 2,00 mm (grupo SLA SO) a 2,99 mm (grupo SLActive NR) na avaliação após 24 semanas, sem diferenças estatisticamente significativas dentro ou entre-grupos (p = 0,672). Com relação à área de mudança de densidade óssea, esta variou de 0,91 mm2 (grupo SLA OE) para 1,40 mm2 (grupo SLA SO), mas sem diferenças significativas entre os grupos (p = 0,568). Por outro lado, um ganho de densidade óssea estatisticamente significativa foi encontrado para o grupo SLA com sobrecarga oclusal (p = 0,012). Nenhuma diferença significativa na alteração de densidade óssea foi detectada entre os outros cinco grupos (p> 0,05). Em conclusão, a sobrecarga oclusal precoce aplicada sobre implantes restaurados com reconstruções em cantilever, não levou a mudanças significativas na altura óssea peri-implantar após 24 semanas. No entanto, a densidade óssea ao redor de implantes SLA com sobrecarga oclusal, foi significativamente maior que nos outros grupos. / The objective of this study was to evaluate the radiographic outcomes of SLA and SLActive dental implants submitted to functional load and early occlusal overload restored with cantilever reconstructions. Five beagle dogs had their mandibular premolars extracted bilaterally. After three months, flaps were raised and six implants (three SLA and three SLActive) were installed in a block-randomized split-mouth design. After four weeks, implants were restored on each side of the mandible as follows: one single crown with stable occlusal contacts (OE), one crown and a cantilever unit with overt occlusal contacts (SO), and an implant protected by the cantilever unit not submitted to functional load (NR). The dogs were maintained in a strict and periodic plaque control program during the period of the experiment. Standardized radiographies were taken using standardized and individualized radiographic stents in two distinct moments: at prostheses installation and 24-weeks after loading. Digital subtraction radiography analyses and linear measurements were performed. Statistical analyses used repeated measures ANOVA and ANOVA for balanced data and the Bonferroni Student t test to identify differences between the means of the six evaluated groups: SLA OE, SLA SO, SLA NR, SLActive OE, SLActive SO and SLActive NR. Similar findings were found for SLA and SLActive groups regarding the peri-implant bone level and the area of bone density change around implants. Baseline linear measurements ranged from 1.61 mm (SLActive SO group) to 1.94 mm (SLA SO group) at baseline, and from 2.00 mm (SLA SO group) to 2.99 mm (SLActive NR group) at the 24-week evaluation, with no statistically significant differences within- or between-groups (p=0.672). With respect to the areas of bone density change, they ranged from 0.91 mm2 (SLA OE group) to 1.40 mm2 (SLA SO group), but without significant differences between groups (p=0.568). On the other hand, a statistically significant bone density gain was found for the overloaded SLA group (p=0.012). No significant differences in bone density change were detected between the other five groups (p>0.05). In conclusion, the early occlusal overload applied to implants restored with cantilever reconstructions did not lead to significant changes in the peri-implant bone height. However, bone density around overloaded SLA implants was significantly higher than in the other groups.

La régulation de l’Internet constitue depuis toujours un défi pour le droit :le « réseau des réseaux » a été conçu dans un esprit de connectivité universelle, avec la volonté que chaque utilisateur intéressé puisse y relier son ordinateur et accéder aux informations disponibles en ligne, sans que celles-ci soient altérées en fonction du lieu de connexion et donc sans tenir compte d’éventuelles règles nationales, régionales ou internationales. S’il s’inscrit ainsi en porte-à-faux avec les principes fondamentaux du droit national et international, fondés sur la souveraineté des États et sur des frontières géographiques bien établies, l’Internet n’est pas pour autant un espace anarchique. Il constitue plutôt un terrain propice à l’émergence de nouveaux régulateurs et à l’expérimentation de nouvelles formes de normativité. L’espace virtuel global repose en effet sur une architecture physique et informatique qui peut être modelée et sollicitée à des fins de régulation des flux d’informations en ligne. Dans cette optique, notre thèse se penche sur le Domain Name System (DNS), le système de nommage et d’adressage de l’Internet qui assure les correspondances entre les noms de domaine intelligibles pour les humains et les adresses IP numériques utilisées par les ordinateurs pour communiquer entre eux. La structure hiérarchique de cet annuaire global en fait une cible de choix pour ceux qui aspirent à un contrôle centralisé du réseau et des informations qu’il véhicule. Le DNS est administré depuis 1998 par une organisation globale atypique, l’Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), constituée sous la forme d’une société privée de droit californien, investie de ses compétences en vertu de contrats avec le gouvernement des États-Unis et caractérisée par un modèle de gouvernance multipartite mobilisant des représentants du secteur privé, de la société civile et des gouvernements. Par une étude pragmatique des actes juridiques produits par l’ICANN en vue d’attribuer de nouvelles extensions de noms de domaine génériques – à côté du fameux .com et en parallèle des extensions nationales telles le .be – nous démontrons que l’organisation ne se cantonne pas à une mission essentiellement technique mais se profile, à son corps défendant, comme un régulateur global des contenus en ligne. Nous mettons en évidence, d’une part, que les normes globales édictées par l’ICANN pour justifier le rejet des candidatures indésirables ne visaient pas seulement les termes proposés comme nouvelles extensions mais aussi les conditions d’exploitation envisagées par les candidats, afin d’assurer ex ante la licéité et la qualité des informations présentées dans les futurs domaines. Nous montrons, d’autre part, que l’ICANN a été amenée, sous la pression des gouvernements, à investir ses sous-contractants, les registres et registraires de noms de domaine, d’obligations d’intérêt public relatives au contenu des sites web auxquels leurs noms de domaine donnent accès, en vue de lutter contre les activités abusives et de protéger les consommateurs. Nous démontrons que l’ICANN a ainsi renforcé, sous sa supervision, le rôle des intermédiaires du DNS en tant que points de contrôle du contenu posté en ligne et pointons les dérives potentielles de cette évolution, qui n’est accompagnée d’aucun garde-fou pour préserver la liberté d’expression en ligne. / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished