Submitted by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-10-09T18:12:28Z No. of bitstreams: 1 swaelen.pdf: 570327 bytes, checksum: cfd7441dce726c4b44c74dc6c12e1c99 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-10-09T18:13:19Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 swaelen.pdf: 570327 bytes, checksum: cfd7441dce726c4b44c74dc6c12e1c99 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2013-10-09T18:13:35Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 swaelen.pdf: 570327 bytes, checksum: cfd7441dce726c4b44c74dc6c12e1c99 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-10-09T18:16:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 swaelen.pdf: 570327 bytes, checksum: cfd7441dce726c4b44c74dc6c12e1c99 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 / Este estudo examina a relação entre o porte da empresa de auditoria e a manipulação da informação contábil. Consistente com a literatura, o porte de auditoria tem sido utilizado como proxy de qualidade do serviço, e classificado como auditoria Big 6 e não-Big 6, sendo quanto maior o porte, maior a qualidade. A pesquisa abrangeu os estudos que utilizam acumulações discricionárias na estimação da manipulação da informação contábil. Por meio de uma revisão sistemática da literária, foram selecionadas 14 pesquisas empíricas, abrangendo Estados Unidos, Europa e Ásia. Com base na análise dos seus aspectos substantivos e metodológicos, a conclusão é que a magnitude da manipulação da informação contábil não é uniforme nos países estudados sugerindo que os ambientes cultural, institucional e legal podem influenciar a capacidade da auditoria em mitigar a ação discricionária dos gestores. / This study examines the relation between the audit firm size and the manipulation of accounting information. Consistent with the literature, firm size has been used as a proxy for quality of service, and classified as Big 6 and non-Big 6, and the larger the size, the better the quality. The survey covered the studies that use discretionary accruals in the estimation of earnings management Through a systematic review of literature, 14 empirical researches were selected, covering the United States, Europe and Asia. Based on the analysis of their substantive and methodological issues, the conclusion is that the magnitude of the accounting manipulation of information is not uniform in the countries surveyed suggesting that the cultural, institutional and legal environments may influence the ability of the audit to mitigate managers’ discretion.

The job of an auditor has still been quite a new one in the Czech Republic. It is connected with the transformation of our economy in the late 80s and early 90s. Despite its relatively short history the job's importance is going up. Just the external audit itself can lower the information inequality between the owner and the manager. Internal audit, on the other side, is a means of precaution how to prevent problems or solve them already before their coming into existence. My diploma work aimed at deeper insight into the problems of an auditor's job.

The thesis is focused on process of external auditing with emphasis on the use of the work of other professionals. At the beginning it introduces the definition of external audit, historical development of auditing process, its objectives and legislation to the readers. Next item of the thesis is a comparison of the external audit with internal audit and specification of their relationship. The main part of the work is related to auditing process with emphasis on the use of the work of other professionals, which is illustrated on a fictional company called "Tipni si a vyhraj".

This thesis deals with external and internal audit in practice. It contains historical evolution and progression of internal and external audit, their functions and goals as well as risks and frauds in audit and its legislation. Significant section of this thesis focuses on working procedures in internal and external audit. These procedures are divided by audits phases. The main goal of this thesis is to transfer theoretical knowledge into practice. In the practical part there is performed fictitious internal and external audit in company Thomas Cook Ltd.

In den letzten Jahren häuften sich spektakuläre Bilanzskandale, was zu einer „Krise der Überwachungssysteme“ geführt hat. Vor diesem Hintergrund beschäftigt sich die Studie mit der Untersuchung und der Würdigung des Managerverhaltens im Prüfungsverhältnis aus Interner Revision, Aufsichts- bzw. Verwaltungsrat und Abschlussprüfer im Vergleich deutscher und kamerunsicher Aktiengesellschaften. In der Studie sollen die wesentlichen Elemente ans Licht gebracht werden, welche die Interaktionsmuster und die unterschiedlichen Verhaltensstrategien charakterisieren, die von den Akteuren mittels der sich ihnen bietenden Freiräume genutzt werden können. Mit Hilfe der für jedes Land spezifischen rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen werden die Interaktionen zwischen diesen Akteuren anhand eines Prüfungsdreiecks dargestellt bzw. aufgezeigt. Die Analyse des Zusammenspiels der Akteure bietet auch die Möglichkeit, die formelle und die informelle Macht der Akteure des Prüfungsprozesses Anhang ausgewählter Corporate-Governance-Theorien zu extrahieren. Auf diesen Charakteristika aufbauend wurde eine den einzelnen Aktiengesellschaft entsprechende Management-Typologie erstellt. Anschließendes Ziel der Studie ist die Entwicklung eines einheitlichen Corporate Governance Modells sowie die Formulierung von Empfehlungen zur Verbesserung der Überwachungsstruktur der Aktiengesellschaft.:Erster Teil: Gegenstand und theoretischer Rahmen der Untersuchung 1. Einleitung 2. Theoretischer Rahmen und Grundsätze der Corporate Governance Zweiter Teil: Rechtliche Grundlage der Corporate Governance deutscher und kamerunischer Aktiengesellschaften 3. Einblick in die Corporate-Governance-Systeme und die Organisationsstruktur der deutschen und kamerunischen AG 4. Überblick der Interaktionen zwischen den Überwachungsorganen und der Geschäftsleitung der deutschen und kamerunischen Aktiengesellschaften: die Entstehung eines Prüfungsdreiecks Dritter Teil: Auf der Suche nach einem geeigneten Governance-Modell der deutschen und kamerunischen Aktiengesellschaften 5. Charakteristiken des Managementmodells der SA/AG: Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der beiden Corporate-Governance-Systeme 6. Für die Verbesserung der Governance der AG/“SA“: Auf der Suche nach einer rationalen Organisation der Macht in der Aktiengesellschaft 7. Zusammenfassung / From the perspective of the spectacular accounting scandals that have led to a 'crisis of the monitoring systems', the study deals with the investigation and assessment of managerial behavior towards the internal audit, the supervisory board or the board of directors and the external auditor in German and Cameroonian public companies. The study thus aims to bring to light the essential elements that characterize the nature of the interactions and the different behavioral strategies that the actors can use through the freedom afforded to them. With the help of the legal frameworks specific to each country, the interactions between these actors are presented through an examination triangle. Based on the exchanges, it is also possible to extract the formal and informal power of the actors in the audit process Appendix of selected corporate governance theories. Based on these characteristics, we introduce a management typology corresponding to the individual public limited companies. Instead, the aim is to develop a unified corporate governance model and recommendations for improving the supervisory structure of the public limited company.:Erster Teil: Gegenstand und theoretischer Rahmen der Untersuchung 1. Einleitung 2. Theoretischer Rahmen und Grundsätze der Corporate Governance Zweiter Teil: Rechtliche Grundlage der Corporate Governance deutscher und kamerunischer Aktiengesellschaften 3. Einblick in die Corporate-Governance-Systeme und die Organisationsstruktur der deutschen und kamerunischen AG 4. Überblick der Interaktionen zwischen den Überwachungsorganen und der Geschäftsleitung der deutschen und kamerunischen Aktiengesellschaften: die Entstehung eines Prüfungsdreiecks Dritter Teil: Auf der Suche nach einem geeigneten Governance-Modell der deutschen und kamerunischen Aktiengesellschaften 5. Charakteristiken des Managementmodells der SA/AG: Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede der beiden Corporate-Governance-Systeme 6. Für die Verbesserung der Governance der AG/“SA“: Auf der Suche nach einer rationalen Organisation der Macht in der Aktiengesellschaft 7. Zusammenfassung

Bakgrund: Privata företag förväntas ha färre finansieringsmöjligheter än publika börsnoterade företag, vilket gör privata företag mer begränsade till extern skuldfinansiering från kreditinstitut. Kostnaden för den externa skuldfinansieringen påverkas av kreditgivarens riskbedömning och det kontrollbehov som bland annat uppstår på grund av agentkonflikten mellan långivare och låntagare. Vi ämnar därför undersöka hur ägaren och ägarens val av styrelse och extern revisor kan reducera agentkonflikten och därmed reducera företagens räntekostnader vid extern skuldfinansiering. Syfte: Syftet med vår uppsats är att undersöka huruvida ägarkoncentrationen samt ägarens val av styrelse och extern revisor påverkar företagens externa räntekostnader i privata svenska aktiebolag. Metod: Studiens ansats är av deduktiv art utifrån en tvärsnittsdesign. Studien utgår från en kvantitativ metod för att testa studiens hypoteser utifrån ett urval av medelstora privata svenska aktiebolag. Resultat: Ägarkoncentrationen, styrelsens storlek samt styrelsens oberoende har ingen signifikant påverkan på räntekostnaden. Däremot visar resultaten i studien att det finns ett signifikant negativt samband mellan räntekostnaden och valet att utse en extern revisor från Big4. / Background: Private companies are expected to have fewer funding opportunities than public listed companies, which makes private companies more dependent on external debt financing from credit institutions. The cost of the external debt financing is affected by the lenders risk assessment and the need for control that naturally appears because of the agency conflict between lenders and borrowers. We aim to examine how the owner and the owner’s choice of board of directors and external auditor can reduce the agency conflict and thus reduce the companies interest costs in external debt financing. Purpose: The purpose of the study is to investigate if the owner concentration as well as the owner’s choice of board composition and external auditor, affects the external interest costs of private Swedish limited companies. Method: The study’s approach is deductive in nature and based on a cross sectional design. The study is based on a quantitative method for testing the hypotheses, based on selection of medium-sized private Swedish limited companies. Conclusions: The ownership concentration, the board size and the board independence have no significant influence on the interest rate. The study does however show a significant negative correlation between the interest rate and the choice to appoint an external auditor from one of the Big4.