近十年來，由於無線網路的普及與人們對於即時服務的需求提高，導致人們迫切需要更好的服務品質，WiMAX是其中最被看好的一種無線網路傳輸技術。但在WiMAX無線網路中，標準的規格中並未規範connection admission control (CAC)、bandwidth request (BR)、bandwidth allocation、scheduling等機制，在本篇論文中，我們將上述機制設計並實作於MAC layer中。 本論文首先探討在設計connection admission control、bandwidth request、bandwidth allocation、scheduling會遇到的相關參數及相關議題。並進一步提出一個有效的方法以改善目前大部分設計在bandwidth allocation的公平性 (Fairness)及contention bandwidth request等效率差的問題。我們將設計一個MAC Layer co-function，稱之為Dynamic Polling Interval function (DPI function)。利用DPI function設計no contention bandwidth request改善傳統 contention bandwidth request的效率，以及利用DPI function的特性改善bandwidth allocation以及scheduling的公平性。最後我們將利用網路模擬器NS-2 (Network Simulater version 2)與測試實驗架構作不同效能的驗證比較並評估所提方法的有效性。 / Over the past decade, wireless network access and real-time services have become more popular than ever. People are eager to have better quality of service. Among all, WiMAX is one of the best wireless communication technigues . However, WiMAX standard does not specify those mechanisms of connection admision control (CAC)、bandwidth request (BR)、bandwidth allocation and scheduling . In this thesis, we propose the above mechanisms and imcorporate them as MAC layer functions. First, we discuss those related parameters and issues when designing connection admision control、bandwidth request、bandwidth allocation and scheduling. Second, we propose an efficient method to improve the fairness of bandwidth allocation and efficiency of contention bandwidth request. We design a MAC layer co-function called dynamic polling interval function (DPI function). We use the DPI function to design a no contention bandwidth request method to improve the efficiency of traditional bandwidth request method and use the features of DPI function to improve the fairness of bandwidth allocation and scheduling. At last , we use NS-2 (Network Simulator version 2) as our network simulator and compare the result of simulations to prove the efficiency of our proposed methods.

L'Homme attache de l'importance à l'équité et est prêt à aller jusqu'à subir des pertes financières pour la défense de l'équité. Cet attachement coûteux à l'équité constitue un paradoxe pour les théories de l'évolution. Récemment, certains auteurs ont proposé de voir le sens de l'équité comme une adaptation psychologique évoluée pour résoudre le problème du partage des coûts et bénéfices de la coopération. Quand il est possible de choisir avec qui coopérer, partager les coûts et bénéfices d'une manière impartiale aide à être choisi comme partenaire social et procure des bénéfices directs en terme de valeur sélective. Dans cette théorie, le choix du partenaire est donc le mécanisme central permettant l'évolution du sens de l'équité. Ici, nous proposons une étude interdisciplinaire de l'équité pour mettre cette théorie à l'épreuve. Après une revue des théories en compétition pour expliquer l'équité (Article 1, en cours de revue), nous développons des modèles de théorie des jeux et des simulations individu-centrées pour savoir si le choix du partenaire permet d'expliquer deux éléments-clés de l'équité: le refus de profiter de sa force pour exploiter les plus faibles (Article 2, Evolution), et l'attrait des distributions dans lesquelles la rétribution est proportionnelle à la contribution (Article 3, en cours de revue). Nous montrons que le choix du partenaire permet d'expliquer ces deux caractéristiques. Nous produisons également des simulations plus réalistes et prenant mieux en compte les mécanismes d'évolution en essayant de faire évoluer des robots qui se comportent de manière équitable. Nous testons ensuite la théorie de façon empirique, et montrons que le choix du partenaire crée des distributions équitables dans une expérience comportementale (Article 4, Proceedings of the Royal Society B). Nous développons un jeu vidéo collaboratif pour estimer l'importance de la variabilité interculturelle de l'équité dans des situations de justice distributive, et présentons des résultats obtenus sur un échantillon de sujets occidentaux (Article 5, en préparation). Nous passons en revue les expériences cherchant de l'équité chez les animaux non-humains, et discutons pourquoi un sens de l'équité aurait eu plus de chances de se développer chez l'Homme que dans une autre espèce, alors que le choix du partenaire est loin d'être un mécanisme évolutionnaire restreint à l'Homme. Enfin, nous discutons trois malentendus classiques sur la théorie du choix du partenaire et identifions des directions de recherche intéressantes pour le futur. / Humans care about fairness and are ready to suffer financial losses for the sake of it. The existence of such costly preferences for fairness constitutes an evolutionary puzzle. Recently, some authors have argued that human fairness can be understood as a psychological adaptation evolved to solve the problem of sharing the costs and benefits of cooperation. When people can choose with whom they want to cooperate, sharing the costs and benefits in an impartial way helps to be chosen as a partner and brings direct fitness benefits. In this theory, partner choice is thus the central mechanism allowing the evolution of fairness. Here, we offer an interdisciplinary study of fairness to put this theory to the test. After a review of competing theories (Paper 1, in review), we build game-theoretical models and agent-based simulations to investigate whether partner choice can explain two key aspects of human fairness: the wrongness to take advantage of one's strength to exploit weaker people (Paper 2, Evolution), and the appeal of distributions where the reward is proportional to the contribution (Paper 3, in review). We show that partner choice succeeds at explaining these two characteristics. We also go towards more realistic and mechanism-oriented simulations by trying to evolve fair robots controlled by simple neural networks. We then test the theory empirically, and show that partner choice creates fairness in a behavioral experiment (Paper 4, Proceedings of the Royal Society B). We develop a collaborative video game to assess the cross-cultural variation of fairness in distributive situations, and present results coming from a Western sample (Paper 5, in preparation). We review the experiments looking for fairness in non-human animals, and discuss why fairness would have been more prone to evolve in humans than in any other species, despite partner choice being an evolutionary mechanism far from restricted to the human species. Finally, we discuss three common misunderstandings about the partner choice theory and identify interesting directions for future research.

"Thèse présentée à la Faculté des études supérieures en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur en Droit (LL.D.) et à la Faculté de Droit et de Sciences Politiques de l'Université de Nantes en vue de l'obtention du grade de Docteur" / From its inception, intermodal transport of goods has served trade, shippers and carriers, radically increasing transactions of goods worldwide. Multimodal carrier liability rules, however, have not evolved with the same rhythm and remain fragmented cross-modally and cross-country. This is also the case of the U.S. and Canada. The need to seek uniformity of applicable rules in these two countries led us to the comparative analysis of unimodal (landocean) rules in these two countries. Guided by past failed initiatives (1980 United Nations Convention on International Multimodal Transport), the European intermodal reality, transport deregulation, pragmatism, fairness in the relation between the carrier and the shipper and Law & Economics principles, we used harmonization, codification and contractualism in advancing our suggestions on uniform multimodal carrier liability rules. / Dès sa naissance, Ie transport intermodal a servi le commerce, les chargeurs et les transporteurs, augmentant de façon importante le transport des marchandises au niveau mondial. Pourtant, les règles de responsabilité du transporteur multimodal n'ont pas evolué au meme rythme et restent fragmentées à travers les modes et les pays. C'est aussi Ie cas des États-Unis et du Canada. Le besoin de chercher l'uniformité des règles applicables nous a conduit à l'étude comparée des règles unimodales (terrestres-maritimes) dans ces deux pays. Guidés par l'échec des initiatives passées (Convention de Nations Unies sur Ie Transport Multimodal International des Marchandises, 1980), la réalité intermodale europeenne, la déréglementation du transport, Ie pragmatisme, la justice dans Ie rapport entre le transporteur et le chargeur et l'analyse économique de droit, nous avons utilisé l'harmonisation, la codification et le contractualisme en vue d'avancer nos suggestions sur des règles de responsabilité uniformes du transporteur multimodal.

Title of thesis is "Social aspects of taxes." The main objective of this study is to characterize the various social aspects that can be found in the Czech legal system. The work is divided into several parts. The first part contains the definition of basic concepts such as social aspect, tax and its functions, the main attention is paid to the redistributive function of taxation together with an explanation of what causes uneven distribution of income. The first part includes the description of the rates, particularly progressive tax rate. The first part is completed by a definition of a flat tax. The second part deals with the tax principles of legality, efficiency, and different views on tax fairness and its two main principles, the principle of utility and welfare. The second part also concludes chapter devoted to the description of a reasonable tax rate. The third part describes the various types of social aspects, ie. exemption from tax object, full and partial exemptions, standard and non-standard deductions and tax credits. A brief overview of taxes that constitutes the tax system in the Czech Republic is ranked at the end of the third parts. The last part of my work deals with social aspects, which can be found in taxes. The thesis is completed by a summary of the social aspects and outline...

The work focuses on analyzing the concept of justice as fairness in the political and moral philosophy. Mapping the development of opinion on the fairness of the ancient world, which will deal mainly with access to justice in Platon and Aristoteles. Particular attention will be paid to the concept of justice in the social contract T. Hobbes, J. Locke, J. J. Rousseau and I. Kant. The core work will consist of an analysis of John Rawls's theory of justice as fairness and approach to social justice by Friedrich August von Hayek. Keywords: theory of justice, social contract, social fairness, civil society, morality

The evolution of computer communications and the Internet has led to the emergence of a large number of communication technologies with widely different capabilities and characteristics. While this multitude of technologies provides a wide array of possibilities it also creates a complex and heterogeneous environment for higher-layer communication protocols. Specific link technologies, as well as overall network heterogeneity, can hamper user-perceived performance or impede end-to-end throughput. In this thesis we examine two transport layer centered approaches to improve performance. The first approach addresses the decrease in user satisfaction that occurs when web waiting times become too long. Increased transport layer flexibility with regards to reliability, together with error-resilient image coding, is used to enable a new trade-off. The user is given the possibility to reduce waiting times, at the expense of image fidelity. An experimental examination of this new functionality is provided, with a focus on image-coding aspects. The results show that reduced waiting times can be achieved, and user studies indicate the usefulness of this new trade-off. The second approach concerns the throughput degradations that can occur as a consequence of link and transport layer interactions. An experimental evaluation of the GSM environment shows that when negative interactions do occur, they are coupled to large variability in link layer round-trip times rather than simply to poor radio conditions. Another type of interaction can occur for link layers which expose higher layers to residual bit errors. Residual bit errors create an ambiguity problem for congestion controlled transport layer protocols which cannot correctly determine the cause for a loss. This ambiguity leads to an unnecessary throughput degradation. To mitigate this degradation, loss differentiation and notification mechanisms are proposed and experimentally evaluated from both performance and fairness perspectives. The results show that considerable performance improvements can be realized. However, there are also fairness implications that need to be taken into account since the same mechanisms that improve performance may also lead to unfairness towards flows that do not employ loss differentiation.

L'Homme attache de l'importance à l'équité et est prêt à aller jusqu'à subir des pertes financières pour la défense de l'équité. Cet attachement coûteux à l'équité constitue un paradoxe pour les théories de l'évolution. Récemment, certains auteurs ont proposé de voir le sens de l'équité comme une adaptation psychologique évoluée pour résoudre le problème du partage des coûts et bénéfices de la coopération. Quand il est possible de choisir avec qui coopérer, partager les coûts et bénéfices d'une manière impartiale aide à être choisi comme partenaire social et procure des bénéfices directs en terme de valeur sélective. Dans cette théorie, le choix du partenaire est donc le mécanisme central permettant l'évolution du sens de l'équité. Ici, nous proposons une étude interdisciplinaire de l'équité pour mettre cette théorie à l'épreuve. Après une revue des théories en compétition pour expliquer l'équité (Article 1, en cours de revue), nous développons des modèles de théorie des jeux et des simulations individu-centrées pour savoir si le choix du partenaire permet d'expliquer deux éléments-clés de l'équité: le refus de profiter de sa force pour exploiter les plus faibles (Article 2, Evolution), et l'attrait des distributions dans lesquelles la rétribution est proportionnelle à la contribution (Article 3, en cours de revue). Nous montrons que le choix du partenaire permet d'expliquer ces deux caractéristiques. Nous produisons également des simulations plus réalistes et prenant mieux en compte les mécanismes d'évolution en essayant de faire évoluer des robots qui se comportent de manière équitable. Nous testons ensuite la théorie de façon empirique, et montrons que le choix du partenaire crée des distributions équitables dans une expérience comportementale (Article 4, Proceedings of the Royal Society B). Nous développons un jeu vidéo collaboratif pour estimer l'importance de la variabilité interculturelle de l'équité dans des situations de justice distributive, et présentons des résultats obtenus sur un échantillon de sujets occidentaux (Article 5, en préparation). Nous passons en revue les expériences cherchant de l'équité chez les animaux non-humains, et discutons pourquoi un sens de l'équité aurait eu plus de chances de se développer chez l'Homme que dans une autre espèce, alors que le choix du partenaire est loin d'être un mécanisme évolutionnaire restreint à l'Homme. Enfin, nous discutons trois malentendus classiques sur la théorie du choix du partenaire et identifions des directions de recherche intéressantes pour le futur. / Humans care about fairness and are ready to suffer financial losses for the sake of it. The existence of such costly preferences for fairness constitutes an evolutionary puzzle. Recently, some authors have argued that human fairness can be understood as a psychological adaptation evolved to solve the problem of sharing the costs and benefits of cooperation. When people can choose with whom they want to cooperate, sharing the costs and benefits in an impartial way helps to be chosen as a partner and brings direct fitness benefits. In this theory, partner choice is thus the central mechanism allowing the evolution of fairness. Here, we offer an interdisciplinary study of fairness to put this theory to the test. After a review of competing theories (Paper 1, in review), we build game-theoretical models and agent-based simulations to investigate whether partner choice can explain two key aspects of human fairness: the wrongness to take advantage of one's strength to exploit weaker people (Paper 2, Evolution), and the appeal of distributions where the reward is proportional to the contribution (Paper 3, in review). We show that partner choice succeeds at explaining these two characteristics. We also go towards more realistic and mechanism-oriented simulations by trying to evolve fair robots controlled by simple neural networks. We then test the theory empirically, and show that partner choice creates fairness in a behavioral experiment (Paper 4, Proceedings of the Royal Society B). We develop a collaborative video game to assess the cross-cultural variation of fairness in distributive situations, and present results coming from a Western sample (Paper 5, in preparation). We review the experiments looking for fairness in non-human animals, and discuss why fairness would have been more prone to evolve in humans than in any other species, despite partner choice being an evolutionary mechanism far from restricted to the human species. Finally, we discuss three common misunderstandings about the partner choice theory and identify interesting directions for future research.

Tomadas de decisões intertemporais envolvem escolhas entre opções, cujas consequências ocorrem em diferentes intervalos. Os tomadores de decisões tendem a preferir recompensas menores e mais cedo sobre recompensas maiores e tardias, refletindo em descontos de resultados atrasados. Dentre os vários fatores motivacionais, que podem influenciar nas Escolhas Intertemporais, pode ser considerado o papel moral como relevante. O modelo do Jogo do Ultimato é usado, especialmente, para examinar a interferência das ações éticas sobre o comportamento econômico. Entende-se a rejeição de uma oferta baixa nesse jogo como uma punição altruísta, aplicada como estratégia de recuperar uma cooperação justa. Os fatores psicológicos que motivam essa \"punição altruísta\" não são totalmente compreendidos. Para alguns, a punição altruísta é um ato ético de aplicação da norma de justiça, que requer autocontrole, enquanto outros afirmam que é um ato impulsivo, dirigido principalmente pela emoção. Nosso objetivo foi avaliar se a punição altruísta de participantes apontados no contexto do Jogo do Ultimato tem relação com o autocontrole nas distribuições de Escolhas Intertemporais. Um total de 100 participantes realizou o procedimento, individualmente. O software PAJUEI usado contém uma série de 27 ofertas no formato do Jogo do Ultimato e 130 séries de Escolhas Intertemporais. No Jogo do Ultimato, foram ofertados nove níveis de porcentagens entre 3-50% de três recompensas fixas (R$50,00; 100,00 e 150,00), em que o participante tinha duas opções de resposta: aceitar ou recusar. Na fase seguinte das Escolhas Intertemporais, foram apresentadas duas opções: uma de tempo de recebimento imediato e menor valor monetário e a outra com um tempo de recebimento tardio e maior valor monetário. Foram empregados cinco diferentes atrasos de recebimento vinculados a duas recompensas fixas (R$500,00 e 100.000,00); cada recompensa imediata variou em 13 valores entre 5% e 95% do valor fixo tardio. As punições altruístas foram determinadas pela taxa de rejeição das ofertas do Jogo do Ultimato. A partir das decisões feitas nas Escolhas Intertemporais, foram determinados os descontos temporais e categorizados os grupos com baixas, médias e altas escolhas imediatas. Descobrimos que os indivíduos que esperaram por recompensas maiores também rejeitaram ofertas menores, mesmo que positivas, por uma percepção de injustas. Esses indícios indicam que os participantes do estudo exerceram a punição altruísta em resposta à falta de cooperação, como uma reação de autocontrole. / Temporal decision making are choices between options which the consequences occur at different intervals. Decision makers tend to prefer smaller and earlier rewards over larger and later rewards, discounting on later results. Among the several motivational factors that may influence the delay-discounting task, the moral role can be considered relevant. The Ultimatum Game model is especially used to examine the interference of ethical actions on economic behavior. The rejection of a low offer in this game is known as an altruistic punishment, applied as a strategy to recover a fair cooperation. The psychological factors that motivate this \"altruistic punishment\" are not fully understood. For some, altruistic punishment is the ethical act of applying the rule of justice, which requires self-control. On the other hand, others claim that it is an impulsive act, driven primarily by emotion. Our objective was to evaluate if the altruistic punishment of participants pointed out in the context of the ultimatum game is related to the self-control in the distributions of the delay-discounting task. A total of 100 participants performed the procedure individually. The PAJUEI software contains a series of 27 offers in the format of the Ultimatum Game and 130 series of the delay-discounting task. In the Ultimatum Game, nine levels of percentages were offered between 3-50% of three fixed rewards (R $ 50,00, 100,00 and 150,00), in which the participant had two options to choose from: to accept or to refuse. At the next phase of the the delay-discounting task, two options were presented: one of immediate receiving time and smaller monetary value and the other with a late receiving time and greater monetary value. Five different collection delays were applied to two fixed rewards (R$ 500,00 and 100.000,00); each immediate reward varied in 13 values between 5% and 95% of the late fixed value. The altruistic punishments were determined by the rejection rate of the Ultimatum Game offerings. From the decisions made at the delay-discounting task, the temporary discounts were determined and the groups with low, medium and high immediate choices were categorized. We found that individuals who waited for larger rewards also rejected smaller offers, five positive ones, due to a perception of unfairness. These findings indicate that the studied participants exercised altruistic punishment in response to a lack of cooperation, such as a reaction to self-control.

Fairneß (d.h. faire Konfliktlösung), Randomisierung (d.h. Münzwürfe) und partielle Synchronie sind verschiedene Konzepte, die häufig zur Lösung zentraler Synchronisations- und Koordinationsprobleme in verteilten Systemen verwendet werden. Beispiele für solche Probleme sind das Problem des wechselseitigen Ausschlusses (kurz: Mutex-Problem) sowie das Konsens-Problem. Für einige solcher Probleme wurde bewiesen, daß ohne die oben genannten Konzepte keine Lösung für das betrachtete Problem existiert. Unmöglichkeitsresultate dieser Art verbessern unser Verständnis der Wirkungsweise verteilter Algorithmen sowie das Verständnis des Trade-offs zwischen einem leicht analysierbaren und einem ausdrucksstarken Modell für verteiltes Rechnen. In dieser Arbeit stellen wir zwei neue Unmöglichkeitsresultate vor. Darüberhinaus beleuchten wir ihre Hintergründe. Wir betrachten dabei Modelle, die Randomisierung einbeziehen, da bisher wenig über die Grenzen der Ausdrucksstärke von Randomisierung bekannt ist. Mit einer Lösung eines Problems durch Randomisierung meinen wir, daß das betrachtete Problem mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 1 gelöst wird. Im ersten Teil der Arbeit untersuchen wir die Beziehung von Fairneß und Randomisierung. Einerseits ist bekannt, daß einige Probleme (z.B. das Konsens- Problem) durch Randomisierung nicht aber durch Fairneß lösbar sind. Wir zeigen nun, daß es andererseits auch Probleme gibt (nämlich das Mutex-Problem), die durch Fairneß, nicht aber durch Randomisierung lösbar sind. Daraus folgt, daß Fairneß nicht durch Randomisierung implementiert werden kann. Im zweiten Teil der Arbeit verwenden wir ein Modell, das Fairneß und Randomisierung vereint. Ein solches Modell ist relativ ausdrucksstark: Es erlaubt Lösungen für das Mutex-Problem, das Konsens-Problem, sowie eine Lösung für das allgemeine Mutex-Problem. Beim allgemeinen Mutex-Problem (auch bekannt als Problem der speisenden Philosophen) ist eine Nachbarschaftsrelation auf den Agenten gegeben und ein Algorithmus gesucht, der das Mutex-Problem für jedes Paar von Nachbarn simultan löst. Schließlich betrachten wir das ausfalltolerante allgemeine Mutex-Problem -- eine Variante des allgemeinen Mutex-Problems, bei der Agenten ausfallen können. Wir zeigen, daß sogar die Verbindung von Fairneß und Randomisierung nicht genügt, um eine Lösung für das ausfalltolerante allgemeine Mutex-Problem zu konstruieren. Ein Hintergrund für dieses Unmöglichkeitsresultat ist ein unerwünschtes Phänomen, für das in der Literatur der Begriff Konspiration geprägt wurde. Konspiration wurde bisher nicht adäquat charakterisiert. Wir charakterisieren Konspiration auf der Grundlage nicht-sequentieller Abläufe. Desweiteren zeigen wir, daß Konspiration für eine große Klasse von Systemen durch die zusätzliche Annahme von partieller Synchronie verhindert werden kann, d.h. ein konspirationsbehaftetes System kann zu einem randomisierten System verfeinert werden, das unter Fairneß und partieller Synchronie mit Wahrscheinlichkeit 1 konspirationsfrei ist. Partielle Synchronie fordert, daß alle relativen Geschwindigkeiten im System durch eine Konstante beschränkt sind, die jedoch den Agenten nicht bekannt ist. Die Darstellung der Unmöglichkeitsresultate und die Charakterisierung von Konspiration wird erst durch die Verwendung nicht-sequentieller Abläufe möglich. Ein nicht-sequentieller Ablauf repräsentiert im Gegensatz zu einem sequentiellen Ablauf kausale Ordnung und nicht zeitliche Ordnung von Ereignissen. Wir entwickeln in dieser Arbeit eine nicht-sequentielle Semantik für randomisierte verteilte Algorithmen, da es bisher keine in der Literatur gibt. In dieser Semantik wird kausale Unabhängigkeit durch stochastische Unabhängigkeit widergespiegelt. / Concepts such as fairness (i.e., fair conflict resolution), randomization (i.e., coin flips), and partial synchrony are frequently used to solve fundamental synchronization- and coordination-problems in distributed systems such as the mutual exclusion problem (mutex problem for short) and the consensus problem. For some problems it is proven that, without such concepts, no solution to the particular problem exists. Impossibilty results of that kind improve our understanding of the way distributed algorithms work. They also improve our understanding of the trade-off between a tractable model and a powerful model of distributed computation. In this thesis, we prove two new impossibility results and we investigate their reasons. We are in particular concerned with models for randomized distributed algorithms since little is yet known about the limitations of randomization with respect to the solvability of problems in distributed systems. By a solution through randomization we mean that the problem under consideration is solved with probability 1. In the first part of the thesis, we investigate the relationship between fairness and randomization. On the one hand, it is known that to some problems (e.g. to the consensus problem), randomization admits a solution where fairness does not admit a solution. On the other hand, we show that there are problems (viz. the mutex problem) to which randomization does not admit a solution where fairness does admit a solution. These results imply that fairness cannot be implemented by coin flips. In the second part of the thesis, we consider a model which combines fairness and randomization. Such a model is quite powerful, allowing solutions to the mutex problem, the consensus problem, and a solution to the generalized mutex problem. In the generalized mutex problem (a.k.a. the dining philosophers problem), a neighborhood relation is given and mutual exclusion must be achieved for each pair of neighbors. We finally consider the crash-tolerant generalized mutex problem where every hungry agent eventually becomes critical provided that neither itself nor one of its neighbors crashes. We prove that even the combination of fairness and randomization does not admit a solution to the crash-tolerant generalized mutex problem. We argue that the reason for this impossibility is the inherent occurrence of an undesirable phenomenon known as conspiracy. Conspiracy was not yet properly characterized. We characterize conspiracy on the basis of non-sequential runs, and we show that conspiracy can be prevented by help of the additional assumption of partial synchrony, i.e., we show that every conspiracy-prone system can be refined to a randomized system which is, with probability 1, conspiracy-free under the assumptions of partial synchrony and fairness. Partial synchrony means that each event consumes a bounded amount of time where, however, the bound is not known. We use a non-sequential semantics for distributed algorithms which is essential to some parts of the thesis. In particular, we develop a non-sequential semantics for randomized distributed algorithms since there is no such semantics in the literature. In this non-sequential semantics, causal independence is reflected by stochastic independence.

As obras dedicadas à história do direito do trabalho costumam dar pouca atenção à fase anterior à Consolidação das Leis do Trabalho, em especial à chamada fase ministerial (ou administrativa) da Justiça do Trabalho. O objetivo da presente dissertação é produzir, por meio da análise de processos submetidos ao Conselho Nacional do Trabalho, um retrato do funcionamento do sistema burocrático de distribuição de justiça em matéria trabalhista e previdenciária montado na estrutura do Poder Executivo, mais especificamente no Ministério do Trabalho, Indústria e Comércio, especialmente entre 1934 e 1946, quando o Conselho Nacional do Trabalho passou a exercer função propriamente judicante. Para isso, buscou-se desvendar o desenho institucional do Conselho Nacional do Trabalho, a atuação dos conselheiros, as fontes doutrinárias a que recorriam, os personagens que gravitavam no seu entorno, todos dedicados ao manejo do sistema criado, de modo a observar como o aparato burocrático composto pelo Conselho Nacional do Trabalho (e demais órgãos a ele vinculados) construiu as primeiras soluções jurídicas para o reconhecimento e o enforcement dos direitos sociais no Brasil, em especial os de índole trabalhista e previdenciária. A colocação em movimento dos direitos sociais pelo CNT, pela doutrina e pelos demais atores relevantes mostram uma atuação efetiva dos órgãos de distribuição de justiça trabalhista, com elevada demanda pelos serviços por parte dos trabalhadores, que souberam articular um discurso fortemente impregnado da linguagem da legalidade para fazer valer suas pretensões. As construções das soluções dos casos são as mais variadas, ora com remessa ao texto legal ora buscando os institutos propagados como fundamentais no arcabouço do novo direito, tais como equidade, espírito da lei e vontade do legislador. / Labor law history studies do not usually focus attention to the period preceding the Consolidation of Brazilian Labor Laws, in particular to the so-called ministerial (or administrative) period. This essay intends to produce, by means of the analysis of labor claims submitted to the National Labor Commission, a portrait of the bureaucratic system of labor and social security justice in operation inside the structure of the Executive Branch, specially between 1934 and 1946, when the Commission started to perform its judicative legal attribution. For this purpose, we presented the National Labor Commissions institutional design, the commissioners actions, the doctrine sources consulted, the players surrounding it, all of them dedicated to manage the created system, in order to build the first legal solutions aimed at recognizing and enforcing social rights in Brazil, specially labor and social security rights. The setting in motion of the social rights by the NLC, by the doctrine and by other relevant players shows an effective action of the bodies of labor justice administration and workers high demand for its services. We also show the workers ability to articulate a discourse strongly pervaded by the rule of law jargon in order to enforce their rights. The solutions for the cases vary, sometimes containing a reference to the legal text and in other circumstances using legal institutions fundamentally related to the new law, such as fairness, spitit of the law and will of the legislator.