In June 2016, UK chose to terminate the EU membership. The negotiation period for the exit (Brexit) has started at a time the UK economy has become increasingly dependent on the service sector as the main engine of job generation and a source of export demand. The purpose of this study is to give an overview of how Brexit possibly influences the service economy within the UK. The empiric data is collected from recent journal articles exposing issues regarding the service economy fallacies reasoned for regarding distribution of goods, user-financed services and tax-financed services. Findings revealed that a termination of the EU membership has led to market consternation and dramatic drop in the British Pound Sterling, which may affect the production costs, the wages, and the international trade that may lead to the fact that the competitiveness of the UK's service economy may be weaken. Besides, the sustainability of the pension system may be negatively affected due to the decreased immigration from other EU member states. Also, there is a need to reconstruction of the security and defence policies, which on the other hand may meet obstacles to remain the cost-efficiency.

People typically underestimate the time it will take them to complete tasks, even when they are familiar with the process of executing those tasks (the “planning fallacy”; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Buehler, Griffin & Ross, 1994). One reason that individuals may show a chronic misprediction of task completion time hinges on an incomplete conception of the steps required for task completion. Support Theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994) suggests that “unpacking” such steps may help to attenuate the planning fallacy. Indeed, when a task is unpacked into procedural steps, people give longer task completion time estimates, and the planning fallacy is minimized (Kruger & Evans, 2004). Construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998) suggests that a lower-level construal of a task (i.e., a task construed in the near-future) may also foster less optimistic predictions, akin to the underlying mechanism of unpacking a task. It is hypothesized that the effects of unpacking on task completion time will be more pronounced for near-future tasks, because the lower-level construal of such tasks emphasizes details of component steps, making them more readily available to be “unpacked” as part of the prediction process. Conversely, for distant-future events, unpacking effects should be attenuated. Further, these distance-dependent unpacking effects should depend critically on the content of steps unpacked. These hypotheses were tested in five studies. Unpacking effects on completion time estimates are attenuated for distant- relative to near-future tasks, and that this attenuation emerges as a result of an abstract conception of the steps of the task when considered in the distant future.

This dissertation used an original fable to explore how the humanities might be used to inform readers about educational issues and promote dialogue among groups of educational stakeholders. Along with the fable, The Foal and the Ranch, I have described tools with which to recognize and overcome policy fallacies. Additionally, I have provided evidence to support the events represented in the fable and to further enhance the conversation about justice, fairness, and equity in public education as purported in Saskatchewan public education documents. The purpose of this study was to explore the use of a fable as an instrument of the humanities towards creating personal transformation of understanding and meaningful dialogue on educational issues. For this study, 11 participants were divided into three relatively homogeneous discussion groups. The first group was comprised of three teacher candidates, the second group was made up of five experienced educators who were also doctoral candidates, and the third group consisted of three parents who each had children attending public schools. Participants read the fable individually, completed a pre-discussion survey, engaged in a group discussion, and then completed a post-discussion survey. The findings indicated that perceived individual transformation related to understanding as a result of reading and discussing the fable varied greatly and seemed to be inversely related to the amount of experience that the participants had had with educational systems. Those with vast experience (administrators/teachers) felt they had experienced minor transformation, those with moderate experience (teacher candidates) showed moderate transformation, and those with little experience (parents) indicated considerable transformation. The experienced teachers felt affirmed by the fable, the teacher candidates felt frustrated, and the parents said they simultaneously felt validated, outraged, and overwhelmed. All groups felt that the fable would be beneficial toward engaging stakeholders in productive dialogue concerning educational issues. The dialogue among participants was measured according to Bloom’s Taxonomy for affective learning and all three groups stayed primarily in the lower three levels of affective learning: receiving, responding, and valuing. Research findings corroborated existing theories advocating the usefulness of the humanities to function as both a mirror to see one`s self as well as window through which to view the world. The stakeholders that were included in this study indicated a belief that there is a disconnect between educational policies and practices, implying that informed dialogue is necessary and that constructs such as the fable used in this study may support understanding. Implications relate to the usefulness of the humanities as a tool in supporting change in Education. Further research is necessary in exploring what actual change might transpire as a result of humanities-inspired dialogue.

People typically underestimate the time it will take them to complete tasks, even when they are familiar with the process of executing those tasks (the “planning fallacy”; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; Buehler, Griffin & Ross, 1994). One reason that individuals may show a chronic misprediction of task completion time hinges on an incomplete conception of the steps required for task completion. Support Theory (Tversky & Koehler, 1994) suggests that “unpacking” such steps may help to attenuate the planning fallacy. Indeed, when a task is unpacked into procedural steps, people give longer task completion time estimates, and the planning fallacy is minimized (Kruger & Evans, 2004). Construal level theory (Liberman & Trope, 1998) suggests that a lower-level construal of a task (i.e., a task construed in the near-future) may also foster less optimistic predictions, akin to the underlying mechanism of unpacking a task. It is hypothesized that the effects of unpacking on task completion time will be more pronounced for near-future tasks, because the lower-level construal of such tasks emphasizes details of component steps, making them more readily available to be “unpacked” as part of the prediction process. Conversely, for distant-future events, unpacking effects should be attenuated. Further, these distance-dependent unpacking effects should depend critically on the content of steps unpacked. These hypotheses were tested in five studies. Unpacking effects on completion time estimates are attenuated for distant- relative to near-future tasks, and that this attenuation emerges as a result of an abstract conception of the steps of the task when considered in the distant future.

No description available.

Humans are in general poor at making judgments that adhere to the logical principles of probability theory. One demonstration of this is termed the “conjunction fallacy”: judging a conjunction (A&B) as being more probable than its constituent (A). Systematic commitment of the conjunction fallacy has been shown in numerous studies on probability judgments. Different actions to remedy the fallacy have been suggested. According to the nested-sets hypothesis, when the nested-set structure of a problem becomes clear (i.e. the relation between categories and subcategories), then the conjunction fallacy is remedied. However, previous demonstrations of this remediation have provided very explicit task-related information and it can be questioned whether it is trivial that such information leads to more correct judgments. The primary aim of this study was to test the nested- sets hypothesis in two different formats of a probability judgment task, by more subtly hinting about the nested-set structure. Twenty-nine participants were randomly divided into two groups, one Probability condition and one Informed probability condition, where participants in the latter condition were provided with the hint. The second aim was to investigate whether the Informed probability condition was performed more slowly, potentially due to the time-cost of more elaborated judgments. The results show that a subtle hint about the nested-set structure was able to remedy the conjunction fallacy in a forced-choice probability judgment task but not statistically reliably in a probability estimation task. No response-time differences were observed between the conditions. The results support the nested-sets hypothesis and imply that even a subtle reasoning hint clarifying the relation between categories and subcategories might remedy one of the most robust probability judgment fallacies. / Människor är i allmänhet dåliga på att göra bedömningar som följer principer för sannolikhetsteori. En indikation på det är ”konjunktionsfelet”: att bedöma en konjunktion (A&B) som mer sannolik än sin konstituent (A). Konjunktionsfelet har påvisats i flera studier på sannolikhetsbedömningar. Olika sätt att avhjälpa felet har föreslagits. Enligt nested-set hypotesen föreslås att när nested-set strukturen av ett problem blir tydlig (dvs. relationen mellan kategorier och subkategorier), minskas benägenheten att begå konjunktionsfelet. Däremot har tidigare demonstrationer av den här minskningen angett väldigt explicit uppgifts-relaterad information och det kan ifrågasättas om det är trivialt att sådan information leder till mer korrekta bedömningar. Studiens primära syfte var att testa nested-set hypotesen i två olika sannolikhetsbedömningsformat, genom att subtilt antyda om nested-set strukturen. Tjugonio deltagare delades slumpmässigt in i två grupper, en Sannolikhetsbetingelse och en Informerad sannolikhetsbetingelse, där den senare betingelsen fick den extra informationen. Det andra syftet var att undersöka om Informerad sannolikhetsbetingelsen skulle utföras långsammare, potentiellt på grund av tids-kostnaden av mer elaborerade bedömningar. Resultatet visar att en subtil antydan om nested-set strukturen minskade konjunktionsfelet i en fler-vals uppgift på sannolikhetsbedömningar men inte statistiskt pålitligt i en sannolikhetsestimeringsuppgift. Inga responstidsskillnader hittades mellan betingelserna. Resultat stödjer nested-set hypotesen och antyder att även en subtil antydan som klargör relationen mellan kategorier och underkategorier kan åtgärda ett av de mest robusta tankefel som observerats vid sannolikhetsbedömningar.

The 'open question' argument, as it has come to be known, was popularized by G. E. Moore. However, it is universally recognized that his presentation of it is unconvincing, as it is based on dubious metaphysics, semantics and epistemology. Yet, philosophers have not confined the argument to the history books, and it continues to influence and shape modern meta-ethics. This thesis asks why this is the case, and whether such an influence is justified. It focuses on three main positions, analytic naturalism, non-analytic naturalism and supernaturalism. It concludes that the 'open question' argument challenges all three.

Thesis advisor: Gary M. Gurtler / Aristotle’s Sophistical Refutations (SE) investigates the five devices which sophists employ to appear wise in dialogue. The sophist’s primary device is the sophistical refutation which is a particular kind of fallacy. A sophistical refutation is a merely apparent refutation. Thus, the fallacy has two causes: the “causa apparentiae” and the “causa non existentiae." A genuine refutation is a syllogism based on an interlocutor’s opinions that leads necessarily to a conclusion which contradicts some other established position of the interlocutor. The sophist desires especially the apparent refutation of his opponent because the greatest glory follows upon seeming to expose the ultimate defect in opponent’s understanding, a contradiction. The SE neither accounts for every cause of error nor every type of false reasoning; “ad” arguments like ad baculum or ad hominem are not in investigated in the SE because they are not apparent refutations. After a description of the SE’s subject matter, the dissertation’s introduction locates the role of the SE in Aristotle’s Organon and explains why a dialectician would investigate and untie sophisms. Sophistic is the sham portion of the dialectic which is a universal art (τέχνη) of syllogizing from endoxes to the contradiction of an interlocutor. Unlike principles of demonstrations, endoxes are premises that are in accord “with the expectation (ἔνδοξος) of all or most or the wise, and of all the latter or most or of the most knowing.” They do not need to be certain or true; instead, they must be acceptable to a dialectical opponent. Dialecticians derive endoxes from dialectical places (τόποι), i.e., extrinsic and most universal principles which usually affirm relations between logical intentions and may be employed in any given subject matter. Sophists use sophistical places which may be expressed as universal propositions and provide the foundation for the apparent reasonability of the sophistical refutations. That said, unlike dialectical places, Aristotle does not present sophistical places as universal conditional statements of logical intentions; they are presented as common distinctions—such as the distinction between the different senses of a word—that a sophist may exploit to produce a sophistical refutation. A dialectician will study sophistic for the same reasons he will learn dialectic; it is useful for exercise, conversation, and in the philosophical sciences. Moreover, investigating sophisms facilitates appreciation of distinctions that are fundamental to Aristotelian philosophy, protects the philosopher from error, and preserves his reputation. Although translation of Aristotelian logical works is difficult—especially one which contains many examples of linguistic fallacies—the dissertation provides a faithful and consistent translation of the treatise. The line by line commentary contains explanation of the order, purpose, and meaning of the text, clarification of Aristotle’s difficult examples, discussion of scholarly treatment of controversial passages, and references to other relevant passages in the Organon. The dissertation ends with two appendices to provide a thorough treatment of Aristotle’s two most deceptive fallacies: the fallacy of equivocation and the fallacy of the accident. The first appendix locates equivocation as a kind of proper naming (as opposed to figurative) and offers an original interpretation of Aristotle’s argument for the necessity of equivocation based on his understanding of how we name. Afterward, the appendix unfolds the nature and solution to the fallacy, explains Aristotle’s places (τόποι) for detecting equivocation, and categorizes the kinds of equivocation. The second appendix unfolds a unique and overlooked explanation of the fallacy of the accident that allows Aristotle to be read consistently, distinguishes the fallacy from the other fallacies, and accounts for Aristotle’s examples. The fallacy of the accident occurs when a middle term’s connection to one extreme term is accidental to its connection to the other. The appendix locates the fallacy through a reduction of all fallacies outside of speech to ignorance of refutation, offers four distinct meanings of ‘accident’ in Aristotle, shows which meaning Aristotle attributes to the fallacy, divides the fallacy into three species, and answers objections to its explanation. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2018. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

This study is set out to explore how cognitive biases, gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect, exert an effect on individual crop insurance purchase decision. A laboratory experiment comprised of two separate games was used to establish an insurance purchase environment to induce individual’s behavior. The gambler’s fallacy and hot hand effect failed to be found in the experiment. But the subjects’ perceived probability of loss plays a significant role in determine their purchase decisions—the higher probability they predicted, the more likely to buy insurance they were. It is also fascinating to find that the longer the exposure to random risks the subjects had, the more willing to engage in insurance protection they were.

Both New England’s Robert Frost and Northern Ireland’s Seamus Heaney are considered major poets of the 20th century. Both poets present speakers who rely upon rural settings to explore troublesome feelings and difficult experiences. Their speakers project their human experience onto nature, but because nature is indifferent, they cannot find solutions for their personal discomfort and uncertainties. By examining the writers in this order—Ralph Waldo Emerson, Mary Oliver, Seamus Heaney, and Robert Frost—a spectrum concerning the poet and their relationship to nature emerges. By considering John Ruskin’s pathetic fallacy, we will see a movement from irrationality in transcendental depictions, to empirical depictions that rely upon naturalist themes. By considering naturalist depictions as empirically responsible, I will evaluate each authors’ use of personification when describing their environment. While transcendental depictions offer a more soothing outcome for the speaker, Heaney’s and Frost’s depictions do not reflect a sense of relief.