This dissertation examines the use of argumentum ad baculum in preaching in general and the sermons of George Whitefield in particular. Argumentum ad baculum has traditionally been considered an informal fallacy of relevance. The fallacy can be defined as an appeal to force or an appeal to fear. Chapter 1 discusses the relationship of argumentum ad baculum with the empirical study of fear appeals and the rhetorical use of pathos. Attention is also given to the preaching of Whitefield and his place in the history of preaching as an innovator. Whitefield's role in the shift to a more passionate and emotional sermon style is noted. The chapter also addresses the challenges a study of Whitefield's sermons presents. Chapter 2 is devoted to defining argumentum ad baculum, examining the history of the phrase, the two ways it has been defined, the nature of it as a fallacy, and fear appeals as a part of the definition. The chapter includes a discussion of source credibility in relation to fear appeals. Chapter 3 analyses the sermons of Whitefield to identify his use of fear appeals. The types of fear appeals he used in his sermons are listed along with evidentiary sermon material. The types of material Whitefield used to formulate the appeals are also discussed. Chapter 4 gives attention to the effect of Whitefield's fear appeals on his auditors. In order for an appeal to be effective, it must first arouse fear in the recipients of the appeal. Historical narratives are examined from Whitefield himself, eyewitness accounts, and personal testimonies of those who were present at his meetings. The chapter provides evidence of the general and specific effect of Whitefield's fear appeals. Chapter 5 concerns the ethicality of Whitefield's appeals. The chapter surveys a number of standards for ethical judgment. The chapter argues that Whitefield's use of fear in his published sermons was ethical, primarily because of the intention with which he used them. Chapter 6 offers guidelines for the contemporary use of argumentum ad baculum in preaching. Modern audiences are unaccustomed to the use of fear for persuasive means. However, this type of argumentation can be used ethically and effectively.

"Might makes right," so the saying goes. What does this mean? What does it mean to say that humans live by this saying? How can this saying that is considered by almost all as an expression of injustice play a justificatory role practically universally and ubiquitously? How can it be repulsive and yet, nonetheless, attractive as an explanation of the ways of the world? Why its long history? I offer a non-cynical explanation, one based on a re-interpretation of the saying and of both recognized and unrecognized related phenomena. This re-interpretation relies on the notion of a tacit justification for violence. This non-cynical, re-interpretive explanation exposes the ambiguity of the saying and the consequential unwitting, self-deceptive, fallacious equivocations that the ambiguity makes possible under common conditions. While this explanation, furthermore, focuses on thinking factors--specifically on fallacious thinking, on humans' unwittingly and self-deceptively committing the fallacy of equivocation--it does not deny the possible role of non-thinking factors; it only tries to show that the thinking factors are significantly explanatory. What is the ambiguity? "Might makes right" expresses two principles. The first principle is the common meaning, namely, that the dominance of the mightier over the weaker is right. This principle is generally considered to be not a definition of justice but an expression of injustice. The second principle, which is almost universally shared in a tacit and unreflective way, is a principle of life, namely, that it is right for any living being to actualize its potential. This second principle is originary and thus primary, while the first principle is derivative and thus secondary. The use of all powers, natural or social, can be ultimately derived legitimately or illegitimately from this primary principle. A common manifestation of "might makes right" is the unwitting abuse of power, an abuse that is not recognized as such by the so-called abuser, but that is rather suffered by this latter, who misapplies the second principle in situations that fall under the first principle, thereby unwittingly living by the saying, tacitly justifying abusive ways by it. This unwittingness calls for critical control and forgiveness.

Studien undersökte konjunktionsfelslutet och hur det påverkas av förvåning och en konjunktions komponentlängd. En konjunktion (A&B) kan enligt sannolikhetslärans konjunktionsregler endast vara mindre eller lika sannolik som någon av dess komponenter (A eller B). Bryts denna regel begås ett konjunktionsfelslut. 227 deltagare (142 män och 86 kvinnor) randomiserades till 2 olika betingelser och fick utifrån olika långa konjunktioner av fotbollsrelaterade matchresultat antingen bedöma resultatens sannolikhet eller hur förvånade de blev av utfallet. Konjunktionerna var varierande långa och innehöll upp till 3 matchresultat som var utformade för att upplevas som mycket sannolika samt 1 matchresultat som utformats för att upplevas som mycket osannolik. Inga signifikanta resultat erhölls för att antalet konjunktionsfelslut förändras tillsammans med konjunktionens komponentlängd. Ju fler sannolika komponenter en konjunktion hade desto sannolikare (η2part=0,145) och mindre förvånande (η2part=0,336) bedömdes den däremot vara. Korrelationen mellan sannolikhet och upplevd förvåning utifrån varje konjunktions medelvärden var r=-0.985. Resultatet tyder på antalen konjunktionsfelslut inte påverkas av komponentlängden men däremot att konjunktionens utformning kan influera bedömningen av olika valalternativ samt att förvåning har ett mycket starkt samband med sannolikhetsbedömningar.

There are two serious methodological problems in the research literature on school effectiveness, the ecological problem in the analysis of aggregate data and the problem of not controlling for important confounding variables. This dissertation corrects these errors by using multilevel modeling procedures, specifically Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), and the Canadian Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2007 data, to evaluate the effect of school variables on the students’ academic achievement when a number of theoretically-relevant student variables have been controlled. In this study, I demonstrate that an aggregate analysis gives the most biased results of the schools’ impact on the students’ academic achievement. I also show that a disaggretate analysis gives better results, but HLM gives the most accurate estimates using this nested data set. Using HLM, I show that the physical resources of schools, which have been evaluated by school principals and classroom teachers, actually have no positive impact on the students’ academic achievement. The results imply that the physical resources are important, but an excessive improvement in the physical conditions of schools is unlikely to improve the students’ achievement. Most of the findings in this study are consistent with the best research literature. I conclude the dissertation by suggesting that aggregate analysis should not be used to infer relationships for individual students. Rather, multilevel analysis should be used whenever possible.

There are two serious methodological problems in the research literature on school effectiveness, the ecological problem in the analysis of aggregate data and the problem of not controlling for important confounding variables. This dissertation corrects these errors by using multilevel modeling procedures, specifically Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM), and the Canadian Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) 2007 data, to evaluate the effect of school variables on the students’ academic achievement when a number of theoretically-relevant student variables have been controlled. In this study, I demonstrate that an aggregate analysis gives the most biased results of the schools’ impact on the students’ academic achievement. I also show that a disaggretate analysis gives better results, but HLM gives the most accurate estimates using this nested data set. Using HLM, I show that the physical resources of schools, which have been evaluated by school principals and classroom teachers, actually have no positive impact on the students’ academic achievement. The results imply that the physical resources are important, but an excessive improvement in the physical conditions of schools is unlikely to improve the students’ achievement. Most of the findings in this study are consistent with the best research literature. I conclude the dissertation by suggesting that aggregate analysis should not be used to infer relationships for individual students. Rather, multilevel analysis should be used whenever possible.

Daniela Foltinová: Constantly Think: A Philosophical Interpretation of Thinking in Thomas Bernhard and Friedrich Nietzsche The thesis presents a philosophical interpretation on the problem of thinking acquired through the thorough analysis of Thomas Bernhards' novels Gehen, Verstörung and Alte Meister and an interpretation of knowledge, fallacy and thinking in the works of Friedrich Nietzsches' Menschliches, Allzumenschliches and Fröhliche Wissenschaft. The focal question of the thesis is: What does it mean to think? Interpretations of Bernhard held in three lines are always connected with the character in the novel. The fourth interpretation focuses solely on Nietzsches' thinking. There are four interpretations of thinking then. The first one characterizes thinking as a state of chaos taking place in the madmans' mind. The second one leads to the conception of reflective thinking of an observer. Both of them present a negative way of treating thinking as non-thinking. The third one with a storyteller taking thinkers' position shows procesual part of thinking: it is necessarily an activity with no further need for reflecttion or conceptualization. Therefore, it is to be found in the literary form of the novels. The analysis of Nietzsches' thinking emphasizes the need to dispute over the conceptual...

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Throughout the early Platonic dialogues, Socrates repeatedly tells his interlocutors that if, as they claim, they truly have knowledge concerning some morally significant property, then they should be able to define the nature of that property. Invariably, the interlocutors fail to furnish him with such definitions, leading him to conclude that they, and all humankind, are ignorant of any knowledge about such property. This leads him to encourage his interlocutors, and us, to adopt a sense of intellectual humility and to dedicate their lives to studying these properties in an effort to gain moral insight. Many scholars have cited Socrates' demand for definition as evidence that he accepts a Priority of Definition principle - an epistemological principle asserting that a person must first know the definition of a property before she can know anything else about the property. Many of the scholars who make this ascription also argue, for various reasons, that such a principle is erroneous. If these scholars are correct and Socrates does accept a flawed Priority of Definition principle, then his epistemology, along with his whole philosophy, suffers devastating harm. Students of the early dialogues must consider whether Socrates does, in fact, accept the principle and, if so, whether the principle is incorrect. The thesis will examine the issues that arise from the ascription of a Priority of Definition principle to Socrates. The study will first examine textual evidence supporting the ascription along with texts that bring the ascription into question. It will then outline three general philosophical criticisms of the principle. Finally, this study will examine a number of different understandings of Socrates' conception of knowledge. Hopefully, an understanding can be discovered that preserves his philosophy by effectively showing that either (1) Socrates does not accept the principle, or (2) he does accept the principle but the principle is not philosophically problematic. If such an understanding can be discovered, then Socrates' conception of knowledge is saved from the criticisms raised by scholars. Otherwise, his whole philosophy will be placed in a very troubling light. / Master of Arts

The experiments presented and analyzed in this dissertation concern two well-established phenomena in behavioral economics: that human decision makers hold biased beliefs about probability and that free-form communication between economic agents promotes cooperation far in excess of what standard theory predicts. First, Chapter 2 studies subjective probability, focusing on the well-established existence of both the Hot Hand and Gambler's Fallacies — the false expectation of positive and negative autocorrelation, respectively. Both biases are prevalent throughout a wide variety of real-world contexts; what causes a person to favor one over the other? We conduct an experiment in which we observe fully informed subjects switching between the Hot Hand and Gambler's Fallacies when predicting future outcomes of mathematically identical sequences. Subjects exhibit the Gambler's Fallacy when predicting single outcomes but favor the Hot Hand when asked explicitly to estimate probabilities. Connecting our results to existing theory suggests that very subtle changes in framing lead decision makers to employ substantially different approaches to form predictions. The remainder of this dissertation studies cheap talk communication between human subjects playing incentivised trust games. In Chapter 3, we study free-form communication using a dataset of over 1000 messages sent between participants in a laboratory Trust game. We employ Natural Language Processing to systematically generate meaningful partitions of the messages space which we can then examine with established regression approaches. Our investigation reveals features correlated with trust that have not previously been considered. Most notably, highly detailed, specific promises establish trust more effectively than other messages which signal the same intended action. Additionally, we observe that the most and least trusted messages in our dataset differ starkly in their quality. Highly trusted messages are longer, more detailed, and contain fewer grammatical errors whereas the least trusted messages tend to be brief and prone to errors. In Chapter 4, we examine whether the difference is message quality affects trust by acting as a signal of effort. We report the results of an experiment designed to test whether promises which require higher levels of effort result in greater trust from their recipients. We find that more costly promises lead recipients to trust more frequently. However, there is no corresponding, significant difference in the trustworthiness of their senders. Further, when asked their beliefs explicitly, recipients do not believe that higher cost promises are more likely to be trustworthy. This presents a potential challenge to our understanding of trust between economic decision makers. If effort increases trust without altering receivers' beliefs, receivers must be concerned with factors other than their own payoff maximization. We conclude by presenting a follow-up experiment where varying effort cost cannot convey the sender's intentions, however, the results are inconclusive. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation presents three projects in which we examine how human decision makers' choices differ from those predicted by standard economic theory. The experiments we conduct cover two broad topics: the way humans estimate the probability of random events and how communication leads to greater cooperation between agents with potentially conflicting monetary interests. It is well established that humans often hold distorted beliefs about probability. Depending on the direction of their bias, these beliefs are consistent with either the Hot Hand or Gambler's Fallacy. In Chapter 2, we examine the factors which may cause people to change the direction of their bias. Subjects exhibit the Gambler's Fallacy when predicting single outcomes, but favor the Hot Hand when asked explicitly to estimate probabilities. Chapters 3 and 4 study cheap talk communication between decision makers — messages which carry with them no commitment mechanism. It is no surprise to the average person that communication may enhance cooperation and trust between people. Experimental economists have verified this intuition in laboratory experiments and found that free-form communication is particularly effective. However, the precise mechanism through which free-form communication enhances cooperation is unclear. In Chapter 3, we collect a large dataset of free-form messages transmitted between players of an investment game. We then employ Natural Language Processing tools, novel to the Economics laboratory, to parse the unstructured data and identify message features associated with changes in trust and trustworthiness. Chapter 4 continues to examine communication, investigating whether the effort required to a promise affects its perceived or actual trustworthiness. We find that higher effort promises lead to greater trust, but find no corresponding increase in trustworthiness.

I Role of Behavioral Finance in Portfolio Investment Decisions: Evidence from India Abstract Extreme volatility has plagued financial markets worldwide since the 2008 Global Crisis. Investor sentiment has been one of the key determinants of market movements. In this context, studying the role played by emotions like fear, greed and anticipation, in shaping up investment decisions seemed important. Behavioral Finance is an evolving field that studies how psychological factors affect decision making under uncertainty. This thesis seeks to find the influence of certain identified behavioral finance concepts (or biases), namely, Overconfidence, Representativeness, Herding, Anchoring, Cognitive Dissonance, Regret Aversion, Gamblers' Fallacy, Mental Accounting, and Hindsight Bias, on the decision making process of individual investors in the Indian Stock Market. Primary data for analysis was gathered by distributing a structured questionnaire among investors who were categorized as (i) young, and (ii) experienced. Results obtained by analyzing a sample of 92 respondents, out of which 53 admitted to having suffered a loss of at least 30% because of the crisis, revealed that the degree of exposure to the biases separated the behavioral pattern of young and experienced investors. Gamblers' Fallacy, Anchoring and...