This paper examines whether the presence of transient institutional investors is associated with increases in firms’ return on net operating assets. Previous research argues that the short-term focus of institutional investors influences the corporate strategy of managers; as a result, institutional investors induce managerial myopia. I test this hypothesis by examining the relationship between transient institutional ownership—ownership by institutions that exhibit “transient” behavior—and return on net operating assets (RNOA). The results are inconclusive, as my regressions generate conflicting results. Therefore, the theory that transient institutional ownership causes myopia can neither be confirmed nor denied. Furthermore, I find that transient institutional ownership has an inverse relationship with asset turnover, which in the context of DuPont Analysis suggests that transient institutional ownership leads to decreases in RNOA and decreases in myopic behavior. This result contradicts my hypothesis, inferring that institutional ownership reduces managerial myopia.

In this paper, I examine the top ten historical upward and downward daily shocks in the Dow Jones Industrial Average, and test whether industry specific abnormal returns can be explained by industry specific leverage ratios on those days. I use modified versions of the Capital Asset Pricing Model and the Fama French 3 Factor regression to examine within-industry abnormal returns. I then proceed to rank the industry abnormal returns and industry leverage ratios, from high to low, on days corresponding to these large shocks. Finally, I examine the correlation between these ranks on the days corresponding to the large moves. The results show that on upward moving days, there is no relationship between industry abnormal returns and industry leverage. However, on downward moving days, there is moderate negative correlation between industry abnormal returns and leverage, suggesting that higher leverage leads to lower abnormal returns. This paper explains these results in further detail, and discusses the implications to the greater field of financial economics.

The Fama and French five-factor model is molded into a smart beta investment strategy with strong exposure to the profitability factor. This constructed portfolio outperforms the market significantly despite an unintentional negative correlation with profitability that can be attributed to the intra-factor return correlations. The second portfolio, constructed by investing directly in profitability as represented by gross profit over total assets, outperforms both the market and the first portfolio.

Using data of first time fund in venture capital in United States from 1995 to 2015, I explore characteristics of the funds in relation to the fund performances. Three groups of characteristics that examined are fund characteristics, manager characteristics and limited partners’ characteristics. The paper also incorporates the time effects to show if market cycles have influences in these relationships. Some of the critical findings include that fund sizes have essentially zero impact on the fund return. In manager characteristics, it is very helpful to have a lead manager with MBA or equivalent degree. For limited partners, it is useful to have school endowments as limited partners which could influence the funds’ return positively. Both general partners and limited partners could learn from this paper and be more mindful of certain factor when investing in first time fund.

In this paper, I examine the effects of unconventional monetary policies and quantitative easing programs in the U.S and UK on their respective commercial real estate markets. I study two sample periods (2007-2017 and 2009-2017) and find that between 2007 and 2017, quantitative easing and the expansion of the U.S monetary base significantly drives the returns of the U.S commercial indices as well as the returns of the UK commercial index. Between 2009 and 2017, I find the expansion of the U.S monetary base only drives the UK commercial index. The difference in the results between these two sample periods may be a function of the magnitude of assets being purchased by the Fed prior to 2009 as well as the volatility and uncertainty that gripped the markets between October and December of 2008. I find that the UK index drives the expansion of the UK monetary base in both 2007-2017 and 2009-2017. This is likely the result of global uncertainty and volatility surrounding 2008 as well as the risk of financial market collapse inspiring monetary policy action. I also find the indices show a predominantly negative reaction to U.S and UK monetary policy events; suggesting the indices react negatively to the events that preceded the monetary policy announcements as well as the announcements themselves.

The first paper revisits the link between interest rates and corporate bond credit spreads by applying Rigobon’s (2003) heteroskedasticity identification methodology. The second paper investigates the assumption that financial asset prices including stocks and bonds, reflect intrinsic value. The third paper decomposes the stock price into fundamental permanent, fundamental transitory, and non-fundamental shocks in order to explore the determinants of stock price fluctuations.

The “Great Recession” of 2007 created havoc in the homebuilding industry, more than any other previous economic down cycle. Countless seasoned local homebuilders across the country did not survive. The impact of their failure on the economy, community, employment, lenders, suppliers, and subcontractors was devastating. While previous studies have sought to identify the symptoms and causes of business failure, very little research has been done on home builder business failure due to acts, omissions, characteristics, or other events which are non-financial. Specifically, those that are attributable to the failed entities' top management and leadership during the housing crisis and the Great Recession. Therefore, the purpose of this qualitative inquiry is to uncover those nonfinancial factors and help to fill the gap in the literature Additionally, we seek to find specific strategies that could be incorporated into the business models of local homebuilders which allow them to anticipate and navigate turbulent economic times. The ultimate goal of such strategies, however, is to shield the organizations of those builders from the negative effects of recessions and allow them to thrive in the aftermath.

Osteopathic physician (D.O.) residency programs that do not achieve accreditation under the new Single Accreditation System (SAS) standards by June 30, 2020 will lose access to their share of more than $9,000,000,000 of public tax dollars. This U.S. Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS) funding helps sponsoring institutions cover direct and indirect resident physician training expenses. A significant financial burden would then be shifted to marginal costs of the residency program’s sponsoring institution in the absence of CMS funding. The sponsoring institution’s ability or willingness to bare these costs occurs during a time when hospital operating margins are at historic lows (Advisory.com /Daily Briefing /May 18, 2017 | The Daily Briefing / Hospital profit margins declined from 2015 to 2016, Moody's finds). Loss of access to CMS funding may result in potentially cataclysmic reductions in the production and availability of primary care physicians for rural and urban underserved populations. Which osteopathic residency programs will be able to survive the new accreditation requirement changes by the 2020 deadline? What are some of the defining attributes of those programs that already have achieved “initial accreditation” under the new SAS requirements? How can the osteopathic programs in the process of seeking the new accreditation more effectively “pivot” by learning from those programs that have succeeded? What are the potential implications of SAS to both access and quality of health care to millions of Americans? This report is based upon a study that examined and measured how osteopathic physician residency programs in the U.S. are accommodating the substantive structural, financial, political and clinical requirements approximately half way through a five-year adaptation period. In 2014, US Graduate Medical Education (GME) physician program accreditation systems formally agreed to operate under a single accreditation system for all osteopathic (D.O) and allopathic (M.D.) programs in the U.S. Since July 1, 2015, the American Osteopathic Association (AOA) accredited training programs have been eligible to apply for Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) accreditation. This agreement to create a Single Accreditation System (SAS) was consummated among the AOA, the American Association of Colleges of Osteopathic Medicine (AACOM) and ACGME with a memorandum of understanding. As this research is published, the ACGME is transitioning to be the single accreditor for all US GME programs by June 30, 2020. At that time, the AOA would fully relinquish all its GME program accreditation responsibilities. The new SAS operates under published ACGME guidelines and governance. Business policy and health care resource allocation question motivated this research. Failure of osteopathic programs to “pivot” to the new standards could result in fewer licensed physicians being produced in the high demand primary care field. Potential workforce shortage areas include urban and especially rural populations (CRS Report 7-5700 R44376 Feb 12, 2016). Large physician shortages already have been projected to care for a rapidly aging US population without considering the impact of the GME accreditation changes currently underway (Association of American Medical Colleges 2017 Key Findings report www.aamc.org/2017projections). The goal of this research is to provide osteopathic GME programs practical insights into characteristics of a sample of osteopathic GME programs that have successfully made the “pivot” into SAS requirements and been accredited by ACGME and those that have not. The study seeks to better understand the experiences, decisions, challenges and expectations directly from osteopathic programs directors as they strive to meet the realities of the new SAS requirements. Do programs that are already accredited differ significantly from those that have not? How do characteristics such as program size, geographic locations, clinical program components, program sponsor structure, number and experience of faculty and administration, cost planning and perceived benefits of the movement to SAS factor into successfully meeting the new requirements before the 2020 closing date? A cross-sectional research survey was designed, tested and deployed to a national sample of currently serving osteopathic GME program directors. The survey elicited data about each program’s “pivot” from AOA GME accreditation practices and guidelines to the new Single Accreditation System (SAS). The survey instrument was designed to obtain information about patterns in osteopathic GME program curricula, administrative support functions, faculty training, compliance requirements and program director characteristics shared by those programs that have been granted “initial accreditation” by the Accreditation Council for Graduate Medical Education (ACGME) who administer SAS. Thirty five (35) osteopathic GME program directors responded to the 26 question survey in June 2017. Descriptive statistics were applied and central tendency measures determined. The majority of survey respondents were Doctors of Osteopathic Medicine (D.O.s) from specialty residency programs sponsoring an average of 16 residents. Respondents were mostly non-profit, urban, multi-facility health system locations with an existing affiliation with a research college or university. About half of the programs had completed some form of fiscal due diligence related to the potential cost impact of SAS. None of those surveyed reported utilizing outside consultants to assist in the SAS “pivot” process. Most programs plan to keep the same number of residents while others expressed an interest in expanding or contracting. None of the respondents planned to close their program. The dichotomous dependent variable (DV) was whether or not the Osteopathic GME program had “achieved or not yet achieved initial SAS accreditation” at the time of the survey. A cross tabulation analysis of the DV with potential predictive variables (IV) was conducted and Chi-square and various exact significance tests were applied to gage goodness of fit. Results were grouped into categories that aligned with the five research questions and hypotheses. Several characteristics were shared by those programs that achieved SAS. GME sponsor institutions that currently have dually accredited programs by the AOA and ACGME seemed to be at a distinct advantage. Although they represented a smaller number of total survey respondents (20%), all primary care program participants reported SAS achievement. Directors reported an average of six (6) full-time paid faculty members teaching in their programs and twice that number of preceptor volunteers in the total sample. Realization of any operational cost savings or efficiencies as a result of moving to a single accreditation system was a principle concern for the majority (86%) of GME program director respondents, regardless of current accreditation status, although most felt SAS would result in offering medical student graduates access to all accredited US GME residency and fellowships programs.

In the first essay titled “Monthly Cyclicality in Retail Investors’ Liquidity and Lottery-type Stocks at the Turn of the Month”, we find that the well-documented underperformance of lottery stocks masks a within-month cyclical pattern. Demand for lottery stocks increases at the turn of the month especially in areas whose demographic profile resembles that of the typical lottery-ticket buyers (i.e., gamblers) driving their prices higher at the turn of the month. This effect is particularly pronounced among firms located in areas whose demographic profile resembles that of the typical lottery-ticket buyer and propelled by the within-month cyclicality of local investors’ personal liquidity positions. A long-short investment strategy based on this cyclical pattern of lottery stocks performance yields gross abnormal returns of about 15% per year. In the second essay titled “Lottery-type Stocks and Corporate Strategies at the Turn of the Month”, we test whether cyclical demand for lottery stocks by retail investors, that tends to peak at the turn-of-the-month (ToM), affects firms’ financial activities. Consistent with the notion that the peak in demand is driven by a propensity to gamble and is associated with inattention, we find underreaction to earnings news issued at the ToM by lottery-type firms located in areas with many gambling investors. We also find that the ToM also provides a window of opportunity for SEO issuing lottery-type firms. Such issuing firms may strategically choose to issue lottery-type stocks at the ToM to save the direct marketing costs because it flattens the elasticity of pre-offer demand curve.

In the first essay I examine the relation between firm advertising and tax aggressiveness. Advertising increases firm visibility in both the product and the financial market. While investors would appreciate more tax savings, they are aware of the negative impact of tax aggressiveness on consumers’ views of the firm and hence its competitive positions in the product market. We find that firms that spend more on advertising have fewer tax sheltering activities, lower book-tax differences, and higher cash effective tax rates. Specifically, an increase of 1% on Advertisingi,t (ADVGPi,t), the firm pays an additional tax of $0.70 million ($10.92 million). However, the negative impact of advertising on tax aggressiveness becomes weaker (and even reverses) for firms having great transparency, more public scrutiny, or strong external monitoring. We control for endogeneity using propensity score matching and an instrumental variable approach. Our findings are consistent with the argument that advertising enhances corporate reputation and is an important determinant in firms’ tax planning. In the second essay I document a significant increase in opportunistic insider trades when retail investors are paying greater attention to the stock. Using Google SVI to proxy for their level of attention, we find that a higher (lower) SVI on a stock is associated with more insider sales (purchases) of the stock and greater abnormal returns on the sales (purchases). A value-weighted long-short portfolio mimicking insider trades would earn an abnormal return of 1.19% per month (14.28% per year), excluding transaction costs. We also fund that the SVI-related insider traders tend to be non-independent directors who have long tenures but no senior executive positions in their firm and the firm tends to exhibit weaker governance, lower reputation, and poorer social responsibility. Our results are more pronounced for lottery-type stocks but are weaker for stocks with large attention of local investors. Interestingly, the risk of SEC investigation and litigation is lower on SVI-related insider sales and this type of sales actually rises following an increase in news releases of SEC enforcement action. Overall, certain insiders appear to engage in trades to take advantage of variations of retail investors’ attention to their stock.