Ända sedan införandet av de svenska ränteavdragsbegränsningarna, som kan leda till nekat avdrag för räntekostnader inom intressegemenskapen beroende på mottagarens skattesituation och syftet bakom transaktionen, har reglernas förenlighet med EU-rättens etableringsfrihet varit ett omdiskuterat ämne. Syf-tet med denna uppsats är att utröna reglernas förenlighet med EU-rätten på denna grund.EU-rätten förbjuder vanligtvis alla former av hinder mot etableringsfriheten. Avsteg får dock göras i särskilda fall om hindrande åtgärder kan motiveras mot bakgrund av art. 52(1) FEUF eller ett trängande allmänintresse. De hindrande åtgärderna måste vidare ha till syfte att uppnå de anförda rättfärdigandegrun-derna samt inte gå utöver vad som är nödvändigt för att uppnå dess mål.EU-kommissionen menar att reglerna särskilt missgynnar gränsöverskridande verksamhet. Vidare anser EU-kommissionen att reglerna går utöver vad som är nödvändigt, trots att reglerna förvisso skulle kunna motiveras. Regeringen menar att reglerna inte utgör ett hinder mot etableringsfriheten, eller att reglerna i vart fall kan motiveras och är proportionerliga.Vid en granskning av de svenska ränteavdragsbegränsningarna finner författar-na att det föreligger hinder för etableringsfrihetens utövande, men att detta hinder kan motiveras med stöd av behovet att motverka skatteflykt och beho-vet att upprätthålla en väl avvägd fördelning av beskattningsrätten mellan medlemsstaterna. Det svenska regelverket går dock utöver vad som är nödvändigt för att uppnå dessa mål, särskilt avseende rättssäkerhet och det totala nekandet av avdrag, och måste därför anses vara oförenliga med unionsrätten. / The Swedish interest deduction limitation rules have been a topic of discussion ever since they were approved. Questions have been raised as to whether the rules restrict the freedom of establishment within EU law. The purpose of this thesis is to assess whether the rules are compatible with EU law in this matter.Restrictions to the freedom of establishment are generally prohibited according to EU law. Such restrictions are warranted only if they adhere to art. 52(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or if they pursue a legitimate objective compatible with EU law and are justified by overriding reasons relating to the public interest, in which case they must be suitable for securing the attainment of that objective and must not go beyond what is necessary in order to do so (rule of reason).The EU Commission claims that the Swedish rules restrict cross border activity and the freedom of establishment. The Commission initially states that the rules could potentially be justified by the rule of reason doctrine, but ultimately concludes that the rules go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective of the justification grounds. Upon an examination of the rules, the authors find that the rules restrict the freedom of establishment, but that they can be justified by the need to combat tax avoidance and evasion and need to preserve the balanced allocation be-tween Member States. The rules do, however, go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective, especially when it comes to the principle of legal certainty and the denying of the entire expense instead of adjusting it to market value, and are therefore not compatible with EU law.

This final thesis deals with the issue of transfer of registered office within the EU law. The thesis follows three lines of legal regulations: harmonization of company law, rule-making in the field of European companies and case-law dealing with primary freedom of establishment. The goal of the thesis is to sum up possibilities of the transfer of registered office assured by current legal situation to both companies established according to intrastate legislation and European forms of companies. The thesis also deals with prospects of possible future development.

Tout d'abord, en ce qui concerne le premier chapitre, cette thèse vise à vérifier l'impact des normes des Traités, comme, par exemple, la liberté d'établissement et la libre prestation de services, par rapport aux activités économiques qui sont offerts sur les espaces domaniales. Ensuite, après avoir examiné la jurisprudence de la Cour de justice en matière de services, en ce qui concerne le deuxième chapitre, nous avons examiné aussi l'impact des principes généraux du droit européen et de l'art. 16 de la Charte des Droits Fondamentaux sur les services offerts sur le domaine public. En ce qui concerne le troisième chapitre, nous avons adressé un examen approfondi de la Directive « Services » : après avoir analysé sa genèse, plutôt problématique et difficile, nous en avons décrit les objectifs et la ratio. Le résultat qui a émergé est une fragmentation du marché commun de services, en particulier pour ce qui concerne les services qu’on prend en examen dans cette recherche. L'une des phases les plus critiques par rapport à la Directive « Services », c'est sa transposition. Ce qui semble clair, c'est une fragmentation générale qui entrave l’achèvement et le bon fonctionnement du marché commun. Une fois qu'on a examiné le rôle de la directive « Bolkestein », on a montré la nécessité d'évaluer l'impact de cette norme sur les services offerts sur le domaine public. Dans le quatrième chapitre, on a décidé d'examiner le rôle des directives sur les contrats publics. D'un point de vue juridique, les contrats publics et les concessions sont deux choses distinctes, même si la logique sous-jacente à l’article 12 de la Directive « Services » et le principe de concurrence établissent que les espaces (et, indirectement, par conséquence, les services qui sont intéressés) concernés doivent être attribués dans le cadre d'une procédure de sélection publique. Il convient de rappeler que, avant la présentation d'une proposition de directive de la Commission Européenne pour réglementer les concessions, les principes applicables à ces dernières ont été (et sont encore aujourd’hui) empruntés à la discipline des contrats publics. Nous avons décidé de mettre en évidence comment l'état actuel des contrats publics et les concessions sont interconnectés. On montre aussi que les directives sur les marchés publics jouent un rôle important dans la régulation des types de concessions examinées dans le présent document. On a décidé d'examiner l'impact potentiel de la Directive « concessions ». Dans le cinquième et le sixième chapitre, nous avons examiné et comparé les différents systèmes des États membres de l’Union Européenne. En particulier, nous avons vu comment les concessions des plages sont réglementées en Italie, où, par exemple, il y a un problème juridique qui est loin d’être adressé, en France, en Croatie, en Portugal, et, finalement, en Espagne. Dans le septième et le huitième chapitre, nous avons choisi de parler du risque éventuel de violation des normes en matière d'aides d’État. / With regard to the first chapter, this thesis aims at analysing the impact of the Freedom of Establishment and of the Free Movement of Services on those economic activities which are offered in areas belonging to the public domain. Thus, after examining the relevant case-law of the ECJ in the field of services, in the second chapter what has been analysed is the impact of the general principles and of Art. 16 of the Charter on the services provided in areas belonging to the public domain. In the third chapter, a deep analysis of the Services Directive has been conducted: after addressing its genesis, which was quite problematic, both its objectives and its rationale have been analysed. What has emerged is a fragmentation of the internal market of services, especially with regard to the activities that are examined in this research. One of the most problematic issues related to that Directive is its implementation. Again, what has emerged is a fragmentation of the market of services. Thus, what has been addressed is the impact of the Directive on the services provided in areas belonging to the public domain. In the fourth chapter, the impact of the Public Contracts Directives has been examined. Legally speaking, public procurement contracts and concessions are different, even if the rationale beyond Art. 12 of the Services Directive together with the general principle of competition require the services at issue to be awarded through a selection procedure. Indeed, even before the adoption of what is now the Concessions Directive, the principles applicable to concessions have always been the same as those applicable to public procurement contracts. What emerges is that the public procurement contracts and concessions are strongly interconnected. The potential impact of the Concessions Directive has been addressed as well. In the fifth and in the sixth chapter a comparison between the Italian status quo with regard to those services provided in areas belonging to the public domain and the situation in Portugal, Croatia, France and Spain has been drawn. In the seventh and in the eighth chapter all the implications regarding potential violations of the State Aid rules have been addressed.

The harmonization within EC Company Law has been relativley successful. Despite its relative success; important differences still remains in European company law. The freedom of establishment itself, and the ECJ’s interpretation of the freedom provides European companies with a substantial cross-border mobility. As a consequence of this mobility, together with the differences in national legislation; mandatory rules in company law can be easily evaded. A typical example of this is that a Swedish enterprise, by running their business through a British private limited company, can escape the Swedish legislation on capital contributions when forming a company with limited liability for its members. These rules are thereby undermined. The fact that these, otherwise mandatory, rules can be evaded should result in a questioning of their existence. The main purpose of rules on minimal capital contributions is to safeguard the interests of the creditors of the company. The analysis in this thesis shows that the Swedish legal capital regime is very unlikley to fulfill its purpose. The alternative, English company law, can in various aspects be seen as more efficient. / Den gemenskapsrättsliga harmoniseringsprocessen har på bolagsrättens område varit relativt framgångsrik. Trots detta går det i dagsläget inte att tala om någon konform europeisk bolagsrätt. Betydande skillnader kvarstår mellan de nationella bolagsrättsliga regelverken. Den EG-rättsliga etableringsfriheten, och EG-domstolens tolkning av densamma, innebär att de europeiska företagen ges ett relativt stort mått av gränsöverskridande rörelsefrihet. En följd av denna mobilitet tillsammans med skillnaderna i de nationella regelverken är att tvingande nationell bolagsrättslig lagstiftning relativt enkelt kan kringgås. Ett typexempel på detta är att svenska företagare, genom att bedriva sin verksamhet i ett engelskt aktiebolag, kan undgå det svenska kravet på tillskjutande av ett minsta aktiekapital vid bildandet av ett privat aktiebolag. Det svenska kapitalkravet kan därmed sägas vara underminerat. Blott det faktum att det svenska kapitalkravet underminerats innebär att dess existens bör ifrågasättas. Syftet med kapitalkravet är främst att skydda borgenärernas intressen i bolagen. Mot bakgrund av vad som framkommer i denna uppsats kan det svenska kapitalkravets effektivitet betvivlas. Alternativet, den engelska bolagsrätten, kan ur en rad aspekter sägas vara mer ändamålsenlig.

On July 1 2010 new rules regarding cross-border group deductions came into force in Sweden. The rules are based on a series of judgements which were delivered by the Court of Justice of the European Union and subsequent rulings deriving from the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court. The new set of rules is supposed to make the Swedish group consolidation system in line with EU law in the area of cross-border group consolidations. The new rules allow a resident parent to deduct the losses stemming from its non-resident subsidiary but only if the subsidiary has exhausted all the possibilities to take those losses into account in its own state of origin and the losses cannot be utilized in the future by the subsidiary or a third party. Furthermore, the non-resident subsidiary needs to be liquidated for the parent to be able to show that the possibilities have been exhausted. However, before even considering whether the subsidiary has exhausted the losses there is one criterion that need to be fulfilled; the criterion of a wholly owned subsidiary. The criterion of a wholly owned subsidiary requires a resident parent to directly own its non-resident subsidiary without any intermediate companies and that shareholding must correspond to more than 90 percent. It is the requirement of a direct shareholding which post a concern to whether that criterion can be seen as in compliance with the case-law stemming from The Court of Justice of the European Union and the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court. After revising and analysing the case-law stemming from the Court of Justice and the Swedish Supreme Administrative Court it is the author’s belief that the criterion of a wholly owned subsidiary, due to the requirement of a direct shareholding, is not in conformity with EU law and cannot be justified by the justification grounds put forward by the Swedish government.

<p>The harmonization within EC Company Law has been relativley successful. Despite its relative success; important differences still remains in European company law.</p><p>The freedom of establishment itself, and the ECJ’s interpretation of the freedom provides European companies with a substantial cross-border mobility. As a consequence of this mobility, together with the differences in national legislation; mandatory rules in company law can be easily evaded. A typical example of this is that a Swedish enterprise, by running their business through a British private limited company, can escape the Swedish legislation on capital contributions when forming a company with limited liability for its members. These rules are thereby undermined.</p><p>The fact that these, otherwise mandatory, rules can be evaded should result in a questioning of their existence. The main purpose of rules on minimal capital contributions is to safeguard the interests of the creditors of the company. The analysis in this thesis shows that the Swedish legal capital regime is very unlikley to fulfill its purpose. The alternative, English company law, can in various aspects be seen as more efficient.</p> / <p>Den gemenskapsrättsliga harmoniseringsprocessen har på bolagsrättens område varit relativt framgångsrik. Trots detta går det i dagsläget inte att tala om någon konform europeisk bolagsrätt. Betydande skillnader kvarstår mellan de nationella bolagsrättsliga regelverken.</p><p>Den EG-rättsliga etableringsfriheten, och EG-domstolens tolkning av densamma, innebär att de europeiska företagen ges ett relativt stort mått av gränsöverskridande rörelsefrihet. En följd av denna mobilitet tillsammans med skillnaderna i de nationella regelverken är att tvingande nationell bolagsrättslig lagstiftning relativt</p><p>enkelt kan kringgås. Ett typexempel på detta är att svenska företagare, genom att bedriva sin verksamhet i ett engelskt aktiebolag, kan undgå det svenska kravet på tillskjutande av ett minsta aktiekapital vid bildandet av ett privat aktiebolag. Det svenska kapitalkravet kan därmed sägas vara underminerat.</p><p>Blott det faktum att det svenska kapitalkravet underminerats innebär att dess existens bör ifrågasättas. Syftet med kapitalkravet är främst att skydda borgenärernas intressen i bolagen. Mot bakgrund av vad som framkommer i denna uppsats kan det svenska kapitalkravets effektivitet betvivlas. Alternativet, den engelska bolagsrätten, kan ur en rad aspekter sägas vara mer ändamålsenlig.</p>

Summary: Private international law from a comparative perspective (comparison of a particular segment in Czech law and the law of a selected country): International company law in the Czech Republic and in the Federal Republic of Germany The purpose of this thesis to familiarize reader with the regulation of companies in private international law in the Czech Republic and in the Federal Republic of Germany. This thesis primarily compares the approaches of these two states to the methods of determining the personal status of the company and to the regulation of companies in general. Significant part of this thesis is therefore being focused on to the incorporation theory and real seat theory. Due to the membership of both of the states in the European Union, this thesis also deals with the European regulation of companies and analyzes the case law relating to the personal status and relocation of companies within European Union. This thesis is divided in six chapters. The first chapter explains the concept of international private law and international company law. The second chapter discusses the status of the company and basic theoretical approaches to its determination. This chapter is mainly dedicated to the incorporation theory and real seat theory. The third chapter is devoted to the Czech regulation...

States have traditionally dealt with foreign companies on their territory within their private international law. The arrival of European law and enactment of freedom of establishment though considerably constrained capabilities of member states, whereas companies gained the right of establishment. The aim of this thesis is characterization and specification of the relationship between the freedom of establishment, member states and companies incorporated under laws of member states. The main focus of this thesis is analysis of ten most important cases by the Court of Justice of the European Union concerning the freedom of establishment of companies, which significantly transformed mentioned relationship. Subsequently the thesis summarizes the conclusions of analyzed cases by subject of evolution of primary and secondary freedom of establishment, standing of pseudoforeign companies, conformity with incorporation theory and real seat theory and lastly ways of statutory and/or real seat transfer. The main contribution of the thesis is the very detailed case law analysis, including the newest case Vale from July 12th 2012, and also the case law classification by object.

The purpose of the paper is to contribute to the scientific research field by explaining whether, and if so on what grounds, the Swedish targeted interest deduction limitation legislation can be tested in the European Court of Justice against the free movement of capital. In addition, the study examines whether there can be considered a mutual priority regarding the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment. The study conducted in the paper is based on the Swedish law, the preparatory work and doctrine, which is combined with case law. Initially, the meaning of the targeted interest deduction limitation rules is presented as well as the theoretical scope of the legislation in relation to its scope in practice. The targeted interest deduction limitation rules are specific provisions addressing the deductibility of interest incurred by certain companies as a result of intra-group financing. The theoretical scope differs from the practical scope due to the vague conceptual definitions in both the legislative text and the preparatory works. Furthermore, it is analysed which determines when the free movement of capital and the freedom of establishment should be applied, based on the EU case law. The study indicates that the controlling interest must be given a significant weight when considering the purpose of the national legislation, but it is difficult to interpret exactly when such an interest occurs in practice. Lastly, it is studied whether it might be possible to review the targeted interest deduction limitation rules against the free movement of capital, and if so, on which grounds. The study shows that there are possibilities to review the targeted interest deduction limitation rules against the free movement of capital. There are incentives that indicate that such a review is possible if both Swedish and EU law practice is interpreted in a fairly narrow way. / Syftet med uppsatsen är att bidra till det vetenskapliga forskningsfältet genom att redogöra för huruvida, och i så fall på vilka grunder, de svenska riktade ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna kan prövas gentemot den grundläggande EU-rättsliga fördragsfriheten beträffande fri rörlighet för kapitalrörelser. Därutöver undersöks om det kan anses föreligga en inbördes prioritet beträffande den fria rörligheten för kapital och etableringsfriheten. Den utredning som genomförs i uppsatsen tar avstamp i lagtext, förarbeten och doktrin, vilket kombineras med rättspraxis. Inledningsvis presenteras innebörden av de riktade ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna och hur lagreglernas teoretiska tillämpningsområde förhåller sig till dess tillämpningsområde i realiteten. De riktade ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna utgörs av särskilda bestämmelser vilka behandlar vissa företags avdragsmöjligheter beträffande räntor uppkomna till följd av, inom en intressegemenskap, intern finansiering. Det teoretiska tillämpningsområdet skiljer sig från tillämpningsområdet i realiteten till följd av vaga begreppsdefinitioner i såväl lagtext som i förarbeten. Vidare analyseras vad det är som avgör när fördragsfriheten den fria rörligheten för kapital respektive etableringsfriheten skall tillämpas, vilket tar avstamp i EU-rättslig praxis. Av utredningen framgår att det bestämmande inflytandet skall tillerkännas stor vikt vid beaktandet av de nationella lagreglernas ändamål, exakt när ett sådant inflytande föreligger är dock svårt att tyda i praxis. Avslutningsvis undersöks om det bör vara möjligt att göra en prövning av de riktade ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna gentemot den fria rörligheten för kapital, och i så fall på vilka grunder. Studien visar att det finns möjligheter att för att pröva de riktade ränteavdragsbegränsningsreglerna gentemot fördragsfriheten om fria kapitalrörelser. Det finns incitament som tyder på att en sådan prövning är möjlig under förutsättning att såväl svensk som EU-rättslig praxis tolkas på ett tämligen snävt sätt.

<p>Постојеће законодавство ЕУ не пружа довољан правни основ за слободно кретање привредних друштава међу државама чланицама ЕУ из разлога недовољне легислативне активности органа ЕУ. Одредбе о слободи настањивања из Уговора о функционисању Европске уније не дају јасну слику о томе коју теорију о припадности привредних друштава треба примењивати како би привредна друштва несметано уживала слободу настањивања &ndash; теорију оснивања, теорију стварног седишта или, пак, неку трећу. Вишегодишњи неуспеси органа ЕУ да правно уреде питање припадности привредних друштава дали су слободу Суду ЕУ да буде веома активан у креирању судске праксе поводом припадности привредних друштава, а путем тумачења слободе настањивања. Видна је разлика између либералистичког приступа Суда са једне стране и протекционизма ког поједине државе чланице ЕУ потенцирају у својим националним правима, као и кроз органе ЕУ.<br />Пракса Суда ЕУ показала је да се разлике између теорија о припадности привредних друштава могу премостити, а да при томе не дође до напуштања једне од њих. Тако би се из теорије оснивања прихватило начело аутономије воље оснивача, док би се из теорије стварног седишта прихватио став да државе чланице имају право да интервенишу у одређеним питањима из домена права привредних друштава, када је то потребно ради заштите одређеног општег интереса. Разлике између теорије оснивања и теорије стварног седишта суштински представљају разлике у поимањима обима државног суверенитета од стране различитих држава чланица ЕУ. Тако се оне државе које желе да стимулишу развој привреде привлачењем страних инвеститора одлучују за прихватање теорије оснивања, док са друге стране теорију стварног седишта прихватају оне државе које желе да остваре што је могуће већу контролу привредних активности које се врше на њеној територији.<br />Иако су и Суд ЕУ и правна теорија покушавали да реше питање сукоба између две преовлађујуће теорије о припадности привредних друштава &ndash; теорије оснивања и теорије стварног седишта &ndash; то се до данашњег дана није догодило, превасходно јер су наведене теорије засноване на двема супротстављеним филозофијама. Филозофија којом се води теорија оснивања потиче из држава које имају традиционално јаку међународну трговину и које, стога, проблему прилазе на један отворенији и флексибилнији начин, стављајући у први план пре свега слободу трговине и принцип сигурности у привредним односима. Теорија стварног седишта проблему прилази сагледавајући стварну везу између одређеног привредног друштва и одређене државе.&nbsp;<br />Из скоријих пресуда Суда ЕУ може се закључити да право ЕУ све више иде ка прихватању теорије оснивања као преовлађујуће теорије о припадности привредних друштава, која, међутим, не може бити примењивана без корективних мера којима би се штитила права трећих лица. Оно што би требало да буде повезујући чинилац и за теорију оснивања и за теорију стварног седишта јесте управо то што је њихов коначан циљ исти, а то је што мање ограничење слободе настањивања привредних друштава.</p> / <p>Postojeće zakonodavstvo EU ne pruža dovoljan pravni osnov za slobodno kretanje privrednih društava među državama članicama EU iz razloga nedovoljne legislativne aktivnosti organa EU. Odredbe o slobodi nastanjivanja iz Ugovora o funkcionisanju Evropske unije ne daju jasnu sliku o tome koju teoriju o pripadnosti privrednih društava treba primenjivati kako bi privredna društva nesmetano uživala slobodu nastanjivanja &ndash; teoriju osnivanja, teoriju stvarnog sedišta ili, pak, neku treću. Višegodišnji neuspesi organa EU da pravno urede pitanje pripadnosti privrednih društava dali su slobodu Sudu EU da bude veoma aktivan u kreiranju sudske prakse povodom pripadnosti privrednih društava, a putem tumačenja slobode nastanjivanja. Vidna je razlika između liberalističkog pristupa Suda sa jedne strane i protekcionizma kog pojedine države članice EU potenciraju u svojim nacionalnim pravima, kao i kroz organe EU.<br />Praksa Suda EU pokazala je da se razlike između teorija o pripadnosti privrednih društava mogu premostiti, a da pri tome ne dođe do napuštanja jedne od njih. Tako bi se iz teorije osnivanja prihvatilo načelo autonomije volje osnivača, dok bi se iz teorije stvarnog sedišta prihvatio stav da države članice imaju pravo da intervenišu u određenim pitanjima iz domena prava privrednih društava, kada je to potrebno radi zaštite određenog opšteg interesa. Razlike između teorije osnivanja i teorije stvarnog sedišta suštinski predstavljaju razlike u poimanjima obima državnog suvereniteta od strane različitih država članica EU. Tako se one države koje žele da stimulišu razvoj privrede privlačenjem stranih investitora odlučuju za prihvatanje teorije osnivanja, dok sa druge strane teoriju stvarnog sedišta prihvataju one države koje žele da ostvare što je moguće veću kontrolu privrednih aktivnosti koje se vrše na njenoj teritoriji.<br />Iako su i Sud EU i pravna teorija pokušavali da reše pitanje sukoba između dve preovlađujuće teorije o pripadnosti privrednih društava &ndash; teorije osnivanja i teorije stvarnog sedišta &ndash; to se do današnjeg dana nije dogodilo, prevashodno jer su navedene teorije zasnovane na dvema suprotstavljenim filozofijama. Filozofija kojom se vodi teorija osnivanja potiče iz država koje imaju tradicionalno jaku međunarodnu trgovinu i koje, stoga, problemu prilaze na jedan otvoreniji i fleksibilniji način, stavljajući u prvi plan pre svega slobodu trgovine i princip sigurnosti u privrednim odnosima. Teorija stvarnog sedišta problemu prilazi sagledavajući stvarnu vezu između određenog privrednog društva i određene države.&nbsp;<br />Iz skorijih presuda Suda EU može se zaključiti da pravo EU sve više ide ka prihvatanju teorije osnivanja kao preovlađujuće teorije o pripadnosti privrednih društava, koja, međutim, ne može biti primenjivana bez korektivnih mera kojima bi se štitila prava trećih lica. Ono što bi trebalo da bude povezujući činilac i za teoriju osnivanja i za teoriju stvarnog sedišta jeste upravo to što je njihov konačan cilj isti, a to je što manje ograničenje slobode nastanjivanja privrednih društava.</p> / <p>The current EU legislation does not provide a sufficient legal basis for the free movement of companies within the member states of the EU, due to insufficient legislative activities of the EU institutions. The provisions on the freedom of establishment contained in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union do not show a clear picture on which of the theories on the nationality of companies ought to be applied in order for companies to enjoy the freedom of establishment without a hindrance &ndash; the incorporation theory, the real seat theory or some other theory. Perennial failures of the EU authorities to put in order the legislation pertaining to the question of the nationality of companies have resulted in wide discretion of the Court of Justice of the European Union to actively create the case-law in regards to the nationality of companies, by means of interpretation of the freedom of establishment. The difference between the liberal approach adopted by the Court, on one side, and the protectionism that some member states are so prone to in their national laws and which they eagerly advocate via the institutions of the EU, on the other side, is blatant.&nbsp;<br />The case-law of the Court of Justice of the EU has shown that the differences between theories for establishing the nationality of companies could be overcome, without abandoning one or the other. This could be done by accepting the principle of autonomy of will, characteristic for the incorporation theory, whereas the stance that member states are entitled to intervene in certain matters of company law, if necessitated by the protection of certain public interests, could be harvested from the real seat theory. The distinction between these two theories basically stems from divergent conceptions of the scope of state sovereignty advanced by different member states of the EU. This means that states keen to stimulate industry growth opt for the incorporation theory, while on the other hand, the real seat theory is adopted by those states avid to control, to the fullest possible extent, the economic activities performed on their territory.<br />Although both the Court of Justice of the EU and the doctrine have attempted to resolve the contention between the two dominant theories on the nationality of companies&nbsp; &ndash; the incorporation theory and the real seat theory &ndash; no solution has hitherto been found, mainly because the two theories are strongly based on two opposing philosophical viewpoints. The mindset that navigates the incorporation theory is derived from states with traditionally substantial international trade and which states, accordingly, approach the pertinent problem in a more open and flexible manner, putting first and foremost the freedom of trade and the principle of certainty in economic relations. The real seat theory, however, approaches the issue by contemplating the actual connection between a company and a certain state.<br />&nbsp; It can be deduced from recent judgments of the Court of Justice of the European Union that the law of the European Union is more and more inclined to adopt the incorporation theory as the dominant theory on the nationality of companies; this theory, however, cannot be implemented without applying corrective measures to safeguard the rights and freedoms of third persons. What ought to be the connecting factor for both the incorporation theory and the real seat theory is precisely the fact that their final goal is identical &ndash; that is to reduce, to the fullest possible extent, the limitations on the freedom of establishment of companies.</p>