This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

This thesis examines the ability of the European Union (EU) to impact on the Palestinian people and their institutions. Before using the formal concept of actorness to examine the extent of this impact, it presents a model of actorness that synthesises aspects of Bretherton and Vogler’s and Sjösjedt’s models. It uses the components of this model as a series of lenses through which to focus on and examine various facets of the EU’s influence. The analysis deals with diplomacy, aid, and the effects of the unexpected Hamas victory in the 2006 Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) elections. The thesis finds that the EU’s early lack of diplomatic direction improved for a period but was limited by its consistent inability to have an effect if it ignored the US. In the field of aid, the EU has been a more successful actor. However, the EU’s best efforts in these spheres have been undone by two EU blunders. First, it classified Hamas as a terrorist organisation and subsequently felt unable to provide aid to a Hamas-run government. Second it joined the Quartet in the hope of increasing its own diplomatic clout, but found that it had given the US the opportunity to erode its ability to act as an independent financial agent.

The main purpose of this study was to develop an analytical framework for the study of terrorism, and secondly to apply it on the Israel/Palestine conflict. To achieve the first purpose, I examined the history and background of the conflict. The purpose of the study has been achieved by using a qualitative text analysis. The questions that were requested answers in this study are: - What are the main reasons that might trigger terrorism?- What are the main reasons that might triggered the terrorism in this case? The outcome of this study is that the cause-factors to the terrorism appearance is modernisation and urbanisation, social tolerance of political violence, revolutionary ideologies and beliefs, powerless states and state response, the lack of political participation and minorities and terror-leader dissatisfaction. I developed the theory that I used and added other factors like occupation, strive for independence and self-sufficiency, and other like the diplomatic impasse, provocative event and religion that have characterised the conflict from the beginning.

John Warden är en inflytelserik luftmaktsteoretiker som låg bakom koalitionens luftkampanj mot Irak 1991. Han menar att luftmakt bör användas för att slå ut motståndarens motståndskraft genom att rikta anfall mot kritiska tyngdpunkter. Han illustrerar tyngdpunkterna genom att måla upp motståndaren som ett system bestående av fem ringar som visar hur systemet bör angripas. Shaun Clarke menar att småstater inte kan använda Wardens luftmaktsteori eftersom det kräver stor massa och därför en stormakts resurstillgångar. Han lanserar därför SPOT-paradigmet som en väg för småstaten att anamma strategisk bombning på ett resurseffektivt sätt. Denna studie prövar Wardens och Clarkes förklaringskraft genom en fallstudie på Israels luftmaktsutövande under operation Protective Edge 2014, för att se om Clarkes påstående är giltigt och om SPOT-paradigmet är användbart för småstaten.Studien visar att femringsmodellen har låg förklaringskraft på Israels nyttjande av luftmakt. Man har i huvudsak inte följt Wardens rekommendationer. SPOT-paradigmet har däremot hög förklaringskraft och studien förefaller stärka teorin i småstatens luftanfall mot en svagare motståndare.

Military conflicts are not only an occurrence on the battlefield, but also in communication. This is why it is important for a state to communicate a narrative that supports the state’s interests, a so-called strategic narrative. And when that narrative is focused to either promote the own state or demote its opponents, antagonistic narrative strategies - a theory made by Wagnsson and Barzanje- can be used for creating a successful strategic narrative.    In this paper the Israeli-Hamas case was studied in the United Nations General Assembly. This report aims to contribute to the research on strategic narratives in the context of armed conflict by analyzing Israel’s strategic narrative in The UN General Assembly regarding the ongoing conflict with Hamas, by analyzing how the strategic narrative can be understood by using antagonistic narrative strategies. A narrative analysis is used to interpret the speeches and the strategic narratives they were built upon, and also whether or not Israel used some kind of antagonistic narrative strategies in their speeches.    The results which were found was that Israel used all three of the antagonistic strategic narratives but to a different extent, in which the strategy suppression was used the most to change the status of states. It also showed that antagonistic narrative strategies are an effective way of describing and analyzing strategic narratives in the United Nations General Assembly.