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Virtue ethics and Moore's criticisms of naturalismByrd, Brandon Thomas. January 2007 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Georgia State University, 2007. / Title from title page. Andrew I. Cohen, committee chair; Andrew Altman, Andrew J. Cohen, committee members. Electronic text (52 p.) : digital, PDF file. Description based on contents viewed October 11, 2007. Includes bibliographical references.
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Den Neo-Aristoteliska dygdetiken och den rätta handlingenBülow, William January 2008 (has links)
<p>I denna uppsats presenterar och diskuterar författaren tre invändningar som riktats mot dygdetikern Rosalind Hursthouses förslag om vad som är en moraliskt riktig handling. Hursthouse menar att en handling är moraliskt riktig om den är vad en dygdig agent karaktärsenligt skulle göra i omständigheterna. Den form av invändningar som författaren presenterar och diskuterar i uppsatsen försöker visa på att Hursthouses förslag exkluderar handlingar som vanligen anses är rätt.</p><p>Författaren argumenterar för att en dygdetik lik den Neo-Aristoteliska dygdetik Hursthouse försvarar kan formuleras så att den undgår invändningar som presenteras i uppsatsen. Författaren föreslår att vi istället för att förstå Hursthouses förslag som om det gällde de faktiska handlingar som en dygdig agent gör, istället bör uppmärksamma att en dygdig agent följer handlingsmaximer vilka hon prövat under sin moraliska utveckling till att bli dygdig. Författaren föreslår vidare att det är huruvida en handling utgår från en maxim som karaktärsenligt kan ingå i ett dygdigt liv som är avgörande om den är moraliskt riktig eller inte.</p> / <p>In this paper the author presents and discusses three charges that have been raised against Rosalind Hursthouses virtue ethical account on what it takes for an action to be morally right. Hursthouse proposes that an action is right, if and only if, it is what a virtuous agent characteristically would to in the circumstances. All of the charges discussed and presented in the paper try to show that Hursthouses account excludes actions which we would like to say are morally right.</p><p>The author argues that a Neo-Aristotelian form of virtue ethics, like the one Hursthouse defends, can be formulated so that the charges can be avoided. The author proposes that, instead of understanding Hursthouses account as if it is only the very actions that virtuous agents perform that are morally right, we should observe that the virtuous agents are acting from maxims that they have tested during their development towards becoming virtuous agents. The author then proposes that an action is right if it can be traced from a maxim that can be a characteristic part of a virtuous life.</p>
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Den Neo-Aristoteliska dygdetiken och den rätta handlingenBülow, William January 2008 (has links)
I denna uppsats presenterar och diskuterar författaren tre invändningar som riktats mot dygdetikern Rosalind Hursthouses förslag om vad som är en moraliskt riktig handling. Hursthouse menar att en handling är moraliskt riktig om den är vad en dygdig agent karaktärsenligt skulle göra i omständigheterna. Den form av invändningar som författaren presenterar och diskuterar i uppsatsen försöker visa på att Hursthouses förslag exkluderar handlingar som vanligen anses är rätt. Författaren argumenterar för att en dygdetik lik den Neo-Aristoteliska dygdetik Hursthouse försvarar kan formuleras så att den undgår invändningar som presenteras i uppsatsen. Författaren föreslår att vi istället för att förstå Hursthouses förslag som om det gällde de faktiska handlingar som en dygdig agent gör, istället bör uppmärksamma att en dygdig agent följer handlingsmaximer vilka hon prövat under sin moraliska utveckling till att bli dygdig. Författaren föreslår vidare att det är huruvida en handling utgår från en maxim som karaktärsenligt kan ingå i ett dygdigt liv som är avgörande om den är moraliskt riktig eller inte. / In this paper the author presents and discusses three charges that have been raised against Rosalind Hursthouses virtue ethical account on what it takes for an action to be morally right. Hursthouse proposes that an action is right, if and only if, it is what a virtuous agent characteristically would to in the circumstances. All of the charges discussed and presented in the paper try to show that Hursthouses account excludes actions which we would like to say are morally right. The author argues that a Neo-Aristotelian form of virtue ethics, like the one Hursthouse defends, can be formulated so that the charges can be avoided. The author proposes that, instead of understanding Hursthouses account as if it is only the very actions that virtuous agents perform that are morally right, we should observe that the virtuous agents are acting from maxims that they have tested during their development towards becoming virtuous agents. The author then proposes that an action is right if it can be traced from a maxim that can be a characteristic part of a virtuous life.
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The Promise and Limits of Natural Normativity in a Neo-Aristotelian Virtue EthicsClewell, Timothy J. 15 April 2011 (has links)
In this thesis I distinguish between two conceptions of naturalism that have been offered as possible starting points for a virtue based ethics. The first version of naturalism is characterized by Philippa Foot’s project in Natural Goodness. The second version of naturalism can be found, in various forms, among the works of John McDowell, Martha Nussbaum, and Rosalind Hursthouse. I argue that neither naturalistic approach is entirely successful on its own, but that we can fruitfully carve a path between both approaches that points the way to a positive ethical account. I then conclude with a brief sketch of what such a positive account of a virtue ethics may look like.
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Rationality and the Human Characteristic Way in Hursthouse’s <i>On Virtue Ethics</i>Shonberg, Jordan D. 25 August 2015 (has links)
No description available.
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Virtue Ethics and Moore's Criticisms of NaturalismByrd, Brandon Thomas 03 August 2007 (has links)
Several contemporary virtue ethicists have provided systematic presentations of normative virtue ethics. The virtue ethical literature, however, does not contain much information on the meta-ethical roots of virtue theories. The present paper seeks to address this deficiency by examining the neo-Aristotelianism of Rosalind Hursthouse in an effort to ascertain what meta-ethical commitments are most consistent with her theory; these commitments are shown to be cognitivism, objectivism, and (in some form) naturalism. These positions are then put into dialogue with Moore’s seminal metaethical arguments against naturalism and agent-relative value. Ultimately I show that the literature on normative virtue ethics is rich enough to provide powerful responses to Moorean criticisms.
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The Moral Constraint on Political Principles in Bernard Williams’s Political RealismSundman, Hugo January 2023 (has links)
This essay argues that Bernard Williams’s political realism presupposes a moral constraint on the political principle of legitimacy, and that Williams’s realism does not articulate a distinctive political normativity. To critically engage with the ethical idea of a moral constraint on political principles, Williams’s ethics is contrasted with Rosalind Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics. Williams’s critique of objectivity in Aristotelian virtue ethics says that we have no reason to believe that an individual can harmonise personal needs with capacities to achieve an objectively virtuous character. This is an idea which has not received much attention from neither the political realists themselves nor their critics, and it can be called Williams’s empirical premise. The thesis first criticises the empirical premise from Hursthouse’s neo-Aristotelian perspective which defends the idea that it is not irrational to believe in the harmony of needs and capacities and avoid the empirical premise. The thesis also defends a broader critique of the premise. The broad critique focuses on that even if the empirical premise cannot be refuted, it should be questioned for pragmatic reasons, since specific negative consequences follow from embracing it. Both counterarguments provide good reasons to question Williams’s ethics, and in extension, his political realism.
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Neo-Aristotelian Flourishing and Tragic DilemmasSangha, Sangeeta 22 November 2011 (has links)
No description available.
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