Diss. Univ. Tübingen, 2007.

La pensée nietzschéenne a souvent été soumise à un découpage intellectuel. Une première période schopenhauerienne avec l’écriture de La naissance de la tragédie, une deuxième proche de Voltaire et des Lumières débutant par Humain, trop humain, et enfin une troisième période, celle du Gai savoir, du Zarathoustra jusqu’aux terribles Dithyrambes de Dionysos. Cependant certains auteurs, comme Granier ou Fink, ont remarqué la résurgence des premiers thèmes dans cette dernière période dite exclusivement dionysiaque. Ces problématiques, ces interrogations, ce sont celles qui gravitent autour du problème de la tragédie. Or reconnaître que Nietzsche n’a de cesse de revenir, à la fin, vers cette « première transvaluation de toutes les valeurs », c’est reconnaître un lien indéniable entre La naissance de la tragédie et le Zarathoustra. Nous proposons par conséquent d’interroger la figure apollinienne de l’individuation et celle du Tout dionysiaque au-delà de cette première publication. La tragédie n’est-elle pas alors le cœur de la pensée nietzschéenne ? la cohérence qui lui fait si souvent défaut ? Cependant cette lecture va bien souvent à l’encontre de l’héritage nietzschéen, qu’il s’agisse d’un romantisme atavique (Bertram) ou de l’hégémonie conceptuelle (Deleuze). Si bien que penser le retour d’Apollon sur la scène tragique, penser l’individuation au travers du Zarathoustra et des dithyrambes, c’est repenser le fondement mythique chez Nietzsche, non pas à la manière d’une anecdote, ni dans l’assimilation d’un cliché à abattre, mais dans la problématique de l’ego fatum et de l’affirmation illimitée du surhomme. Reconnaître dans la volonté de puissance la puissance du mythe, c’est donc indéniablement se confronter à la violence du nihilisme, tant d’un point de vue schopenhauerien, que d’un point de vue parfaitement moderne. C’est le problème politique de la révolte (Camus), de la résurrection (Franck), de la chair (Stiegler). Dans le dilemme d’un passé victorieux, d’un Nietzsche wagnérien, ou d’un plan d’immanence révolutionnaire, le concept comme meurtre des identités, n’est-il pas nécessaire de recadrer la volonté de puissance au sein d’un Éternel retour tragique plutôt qu’au sein d’un Éternel retour sélectif et meurtrier ? N’est-il pas indispensable de recouvrer l’identité d’Apollon pour admettre sa nécessaire extinction, la « mort volontaire » ? / Nietzsche's thought has often been submited to an intellectual split. The first period Schopenhauerian with the writing of "The birth of tragedy", a second one close to Voltaire and the Lumières starting with "Human, all to human", and finally a third period, "The gay science" one, from "Zarathustra" to the terrible "Dithyrambs of Dionysus". Some authors, like Granier or Fink, have however noticed the first themes resurgence during the last period said to be exclusively dionysian. Those issues, those questions, are the ones spinning around the tragedy problematic. But admitting that Nietzsche doesn't stop from coming back, at the end, to this "transvaluation of values", is admitting the undeniable link between "The birth of tragedy" and the "Zarathustra". And so we suggest to question the Apollonian figure of individuation and the one of the All dionysian over this first publication. Isn't the tragedy the heart of the Nietzsche thought? The consistency that he is often missing? This reading however often goes against the Nietzsche legacy, it being atavistic romanticism (Bertram) or a conceptual hegemony (Deleuze). To a point where thinking the Apollon's come back on the tragic scene, thinking individuation through "Zarathustra" and some dithyrambics, is re-thinking the Nietzsche's mythic base, not in a anecdotal way, neither in a way to kill a cliché, but in a problematic of the "ego fatum" and the unlimited overman affirmation. Recognizing the myth power in the willingness of power, is definitely coming against the nihilism violence, as much as from a Schopenhauerian's point of view, as from a modern one. This is the political issue of the revolt (Camus), the resurrection (Franck), the flesh (Stiegler). In the victorious past dilemma of a wagnerian Nietzsche, or a revolutionary immanence plan, the concept of identity murder, isn't it necessary to focus the willingness of power inside an everlasting tragic return rather than a everlasting selective and murderer return? Isn't it necessary to recover Appolon's identity to admit its necessary extinction, the "voluntary death"?

Depression is uniformly identified as psychopathology by diagnostic systems such as the DSM-IV-TR and the ICD-10 and is viewed as a negatively biased perception by cognitive theories. However, a number of psychological and spiritual perspectives propose that the experience of depression may have positive outcomes for some individuals in the form of psychological growth and individuation, including theories from within the psychodynamic and humanistic traditions. These perspectives informed the formulation of the individuation theory of depression explored in this thesis. One empirically based perspective from which growth is considered as a potential outcome of depression, is that of depressive realism. This psychological stance of diminished self-deception in depressed individuals compared with non-depressed individuals is viewed as an opportunity for new levels of self-awareness and growth. The newly burgeoning field of posttraumatic growth research provides another empirical model from which the individuation theory of depression is explored in this thesis. The current research examined the relationships among depression, selfdeception and psychological growth in two studies. The first study used selfreport methodology, incorporating measures of prior and current depression, selfdeception (in the form of denial and positive illusions) and psychological growth (in the form of self-actualisation, adversarial growth and level of egodevelopment). The sample consisted of 132 women and 58 men (M=36 years, SD=14.4) who were divided into previously depressed (n=51), currently depressed (n=45), and never depressed (n=87) groups. The hypotheses regarding the individuation theory of depressive realism were partially supported by the enduring nature of diminished denial and a greater sense of positive personal change as sequelae of depression. Results suggest that the patterns of negative thinking and diminished use of positive illusions that are typically found in depressed individuals, subside after recovery from depression, but that the diminished use of denial endures. Also as predicted, a sense of positive personal change was significantly greater in the previously depressed group as compared with the never depressed group, particularly in the forms of personal strength and appreciation of life. Self-actualisation scores, however, were similar between the two groups. Contrary to expectations, no sex differences were evident for either the self-deception or the growth variables. Self-actualisation was significantly higher at the highest levels of ego development compared with the lowest as expected, yet levels of growth and self-deception were not significantly different between the levels of ego development. Preliminary analysis of qualitative data derived from responses to open-ended questions about change as a result of depression, reflected predominately positive themes of adversarial growth and benefit from the experience, especially in those of high ego-development. This formed the basis for the focus of the second study, which was an in-depth qualitative investigation. The second study examined the individuation theory of depression further via interviews with 10 women and 6 men of high ego development who had experienced a significant depression in their lives. After describing their experiences of depression, the respondents were asked to elaborate upon the ways in which they felt they had been changed by their depression. Themes were overwhelmingly positive and the most commonly reported responses were those of a changed perception of self through a newfound inner strength, greater selfworth and self-acceptance. Enhanced empathy and compassion were also reported, as were changed priorities and a greater appreciation of life, especially in aspects of simplicity. Recognition of choices and acceptance of personal responsibility for the choices made were prominent themes in some accounts, and a number of interviewees reported the need to revise their approach to spirituality. Although less prominent in their accounts, negative changes included an increased sense of vulnerability and sensitivity as a mixed blessing, and the need for ongoing management of the risk factors for depression in their lifestyle. Some degree of cynicism about aspects of life was evident in a few respondents. Paradoxes emerged in the interviewees� material congruent with high levels of ego development. For example, some individuals� accounts included perceptions of increased strength in parallel with awareness of greater degrees of vulnerability. Results from the two studies provide plausible evidence for the notion that growth is not only possible, but is also a commonly experienced outcome of depression, especially in those at higher levels of ego development. The salutary nature of depression is discussed in relation to the theories presented and an argument is made for a more developmentally defined and differentiated understanding of depressive experience than cognitive definitions and pathological labels generally afford. Suggestions are made for directions for further research into the individuation theory of depression, including deepening our understanding of the potential for growth as a result of depression at other levels of ego-development.

The ability to individuate objects is one of our most fundamental cognitive capacities. Recent research has revealed that, when objects vary in color or luminance alone, infants fail to individuate until 11.5 months. However, color and luminance frequently co-vary in the natural environment, and color and luminance interact in pattern detection, motion detection, and stereopsis. For this reason, we propose that infants may be more likely to individuate when objects vary in both color and luminance. Using the narrow-screen task of Wilcox and Baillargeon, Experiments 1 and 2 assessed 7.5-month-old infants’ ability to individuate uniformly colored objects that either varied in both color and luminance or varied in luminance alone. The results indicated that infants used these features to individuate only when the objects varied in both color and luminance. Thus, when color and luminance co-varied, infants used these features to individuate objects a full 4 months earlier than infants use either feature alone. Experiment 3 further explored the link between color and luminance by assessing 7.5-month-old infants’ ability to use pattern differences to individuate objects. Although infants use pattern differences created from a combination of luminance and color contrast by 7.5 months, results from Experiment 3 indicated that when pattern was created from either color contrast or luminance contrast alone, infants fail to individuate based on pattern. The results of Experiment 3 suggest that it is not the number of feature dimensions that is important, but the unique contribution of both color and luminance that is particularly salient to infants. These studies add to a growing body of literature investigating the interaction of color and luminance in object processing in infants, and have implications for developmental changes in the nature and content of infants’ object representations.

This project is about the distinction between universals and particulars. The fundamental claim I defend is this: The distinction between universals and particulars can be vindicated via the fact that universals are identical if indiscernible while particulars are not identical if indiscernible. This way of "making" the universal-particular distinction is "extensionally" adequate--it (by and large) gets the pre-theoretical extensions of 'universal' and 'particular' right. The entities that one would ordinarily classify as universals get classified as universals, and the entities that one would ordinarily classify as particulars get classified as particulars. Furthermore, this way of making the distinction is "intensionally" adequate--it situates smoothly in the theory of universals and particulars motivated independently of the need to vindicate the distinction. The natures that universals and particulars must have if they are to play their respective theoretical roles require that universals are identical if indiscernible and that particulars are not. No more can reasonably be asked of a proposed universal-particular distinction. / text

I defend the claim that every individual must have existed; or, in other words, that every individual is a necessary existent. Henceforth, I shall take the expression 'necessary existence' to abbreviate this claim, and I shall take 'contingent existence' to abbreviate the negation of this claim. In order to defend necessary existence, I clarify what I mean by 'exists'. I argue that there are many different senses of 'exists', and exactly one of these senses is appropriate for the purposes of philosophical logic and modal metaphysics. Making essential use of this sense of 'exists', I defend necessary existence against various objections embodied in several arguments for contingent existence. Having responded to these arguments, I then outline the requirements for a convincing case for necessary existence. Specifically, I argue that a metaphysical case must be made for the acceptance of this claim. This metaphysical case for necessary existence is embodied in an argument I present from the metaphysics of propositions. The premises of this argument concern the conditions under which a proposition is true and a proposition exists. Given these premises, it follows that everything is a necessary existent. I defend this argument from a number of objections to the metaphysics of propositions presented here. I then present and defend three arguments from formal, logical considerations for necessary existence. These three arguments make use of three common axioms or rules of inference. I defend each of these three principles from the objections posed by Saul Kripke, Kit Fine, and Arthur Prior. I then defend necessary existence from the challenges posed by Alvin Plantinga's modal theory of essences, David Lewis's counterpart theory, and Alan McMichael's role semantics. This completes my defence of the three arguments from formal considerations and the argument from metaphysical considerations.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Texas at Austin, 2008. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Michigan State University. Dept. of Philosophy, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed on June 19, 2009) Includes bibliographical references (p. 155-161). Also issued in print.

Zugl.: Kassel, Univ., Diss., 2007

Thesis--Wisconsin. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 177-197).