O propósito deste trabalho é examinar a recolocação e a transformação da questão da harmonia entre linguagem, pensamento e realidade na segunda fase da produção filosófica de Wittgenstein. A fim de cumprir esse propósito, discutem-se, no primeiro capítulo, a formulação dessa questão na fase inicial de sua reflexão, que culmina no Tractatus logico-philosophicus, e sua vinculação com as concepções de filosofia e método apresentadas nesse livro. Em seguida, discutem-se as modificações de tais concepções a partir do início da década de 1930 e a necessidade de reformulação da questão examinada. No segundo e terceiro capítulos, comentam-se as duas principais facetas que ela assume na segunda fase da produção de Wittgenstein: 1. o exame de alguns trechos dos manuscritos do chamado período intermediário e das seções 428-465 das Investigações filosóficas revelam sua vinculação com a noção de intencionalidade e noções correlatas; 2. o exame dos textos dedicados à noção de seguir regras, sobretudo as seções 185-242 das Investigações, permite reconsiderar as relações entre as regras e a prática de sua aplicação. Esse percurso visa mostrar, por um lado, que, mesmo depois do abandono do projeto do Tractatus, Wittgenstein ainda considera filosoficamente legítima a questão da harmonia entre linguagem, pensamento e realidade, desde que posta em outros termos; e, por outro lado, que as relações entre nossas formas de representação e a realidade são mais complexas do que pensara. / The aim of this work is to examine the replacement and transformation of the question of the harmony between language, thought and reality in the second phase of Wittgensteins philosophical production. In order to fulfill this aim we discuss in the first chapter the formulation of the question in the initial phase of his reflections, which culminates in the Tractatus logico-philosophicus, and its connection with the conceptions of philosophy and method presented in the book. Then, we discuss the modifications in these conceptions since the beginning of the 1930s and the necessity of reformulating the question we approach. In the second and third chapters we comment on the two main sides of the question in the second phase of Wittgensteins production: 1. the examination of some passages of the manuscripts of the so-called middle period and of the §§428-465 of the Philosophical Investigations reveal its connection with the notion of intentionality and correlated notions; 2. the examination of the texts dedicated to the notion of following a rule, mainly the §§185-242 of the Philosophical Investigations, allows to reconsider the relations between the rules and the application practices. This path is intended to show, on the one hand, that even after the abandonment of the Tractarian project, Wittgenstein still considers the question of the harmony between language, thought and reality as a legitimate philosophical question, provided that it is put in other terms; and, on the other hand, that the relations between our forms of representation and reality are more complex than he once thought.

Esta pesquisa constrói o argumento de que a indústria lítica de Abrigos Vermelhos não corresponde à falta de padronização técnica ou a degeneração das habilidades dos artesãos ocorridas a partir de repertórios tecnológicos líticos do início do Holoceno. Em interface com a Arqueologia de Lugar, a noção de contexto é utilizada para substituir esta argumentação, pela noção de intencionalidade de produção deste conjunto artefatual em meio à relação estabelecida com outros vestígios arqueológicos no sítio, preferivelmente à noção de informalidade, de oportunismo e de irregularidade dos procedimentos técnicos atribuídos habitualmente à produção lítica do período de transição entre horizontes caçadores-coletores e ceramistas. / This research builds the argument that the lithic industry from Abrigos Vermelhos does not correspond with a lack of technical standardization or with the degeneration of the ability of the craftsmen that occurred since the lithic technological repertories of the beginning of the Holocene. Interfacing with the Archaeology of Place, the idea of context is used to replace this reasoning with the idea of intentionality of production of this set of artifacts amidst the stablished relation with other archaeological remains on the site, preferably to the notion of informality, opportunism and unevenness of the technical procedures usually assigned to the lithic production of the transition period between the hunter-gatherer and potter horizons.

This essay analyses the speech of the Dalai Lama and suggests possible effects that core aspects of Tibetan Buddhist philosophy, such as the theory of selflessness, might have when a believer uses the personal pronouns I, you, he, she, we and they. Collected utterances of the Dalai Lama during the Charlie Rose Show has been used in order to conduct a threefold investigation, using pragmatic, discourse analytical and sociolinguistic backgrounds, aiming to understand these effects more thoroughly. Qualitative and quantitative approaches were used for this report based on previous studies with a data-based method. These approaches enabled the researcher to find, for instance, a consistent use of the first-person personal pronoun by the Dalai Lama in the material. Other findings include an acknowledgment of philosophical influence concerning the field of intentionality, when related to religious discourse, as Buddhism establishes religious discourse as being based on the speaker’s motivation alone. The status of the Dalai Lama notwithstanding, his use of personal pronouns was also not found to match the findings of previous research on status and the use of self-mention.

Doctorat en philosophie et lettres / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Cette recherche s’inscrit dans le cadre philosophique de l’analyse et de la réflexion concernant le fonctionnement de la conscience et ses effets sur nos comportements et notre mode de penser, de connaître le monde extérieur par le moyen de la représentation et par l’acte de conscience visant l’objet, qui aurait pour rôle de faire apparaître l’objet à la conscience. L’objectif est de donner un corps effectif à l’acte de percevoir et au fait que nous avons conscience de cet acte perceptif et de l’objet perçu, en analysant les activités « internes » de la perception et de la conscience, voire de la connaissance, de la mémoire, de la croyance, de l’attention et des activités logique, réflexive…etc. et en observant parallèlement le fonctionnement « objectivé » de la « conscience », dans une perspective neuropsycho-physiologique. L’hypothèse centrale cible deux notions, la représentation et l’intentionnalité qui figureraient le trait formel et le fonctionnement essentiel de la conscience et qui au final dégageraient la problématique portant sur le mode de compréhension du monde existential et scientifique, problématique mise en œuvre par des théorisations de la croyance effectuées selon la méthode empirique ainsi que par la saisie perceptuelle et conceptuelle du monde. / This research refers within the philosophical framework in order to analyse and to reflect about the conscious functionality and its effects on our behaviour, on our thinking mode to know the external world by means of the representation and of the conscious act which aim the object, which can let appear the object to the conscience. The objective is to give some consistence to the perceptive act and to the fact in which we have the conscience of this perceptive act and of the perceived object, by analysis of the internal activities of the perception and the conscience, that’s to say the knowledge, the memory, the belief, the attention and logic, reflexive activities…etc. in parallel by observation of the “conscious” “objective” functionality in a neuropsycho-physiological perspective. The central hypothesis is to aim the both notions, representation and intentionnality which mark the formal profile and the functionality of the “conscience”, which finally figure out the problems of the understanding mode about the existential, scientific world made by theorisations of the belief carried out by the empirical method and by the perceptual , conceptual capture of the world.

The main objective of this research is to look at the topic of everyday life from a dynamic perspective. The definition of everyday life that this thesis stands upon, i.e. the presence of a subject in the world with the other(s) outlines also two main sources of its dynamics: the world and the other. The essential aim of this thesis is to show that the different attitudes towards the world and the other in the works of Husserl and Lévinas consequently influence the understanding of the everyday life as such, as well as the requirements it imposes upon the subject. The chapter dedicated to Husserl presents his concept of the world as a horizon, the irreplaceable position of perception in our access to the world and the creation of the other within the subject itself. On the contrary, Lévinas stresses the separation of the subject and he understands the world and the other as inherently belonging to this never-ending process. The motive of dependence and responsibility of the subject for the other belongs to the most significant differences between the two philosophers. Whereas Husserl proposes us a subject in the world which he accesses via perception and in which he encounters the other, Lévinas shows us subject that is born to the pre-reflexive and intersubjective world from which he first has to...

The study concentrates on possible connection between phenomenological thought of Edmund Husserl and Jean-Paul Sartre by focusing on the way by which each of them frames pre-reflexive self-awareness of consciousness and its role in the process of constitution of the identity of the "Ego" as a subjective pole. Essential motivation derives from the effort of highlighting those moments of Husserl's thinking, which might have been or actually were a source of inspiration for Sartre and the formulation of these concepts in the early stages of his career. Subsequently, the quest is to clarify the scale of this inspiration and to shed some light on the question whether Sartre did not push his constructions over the boundaries of the scientific field set by Husserl. The study also incorporates several of Husserl's works which are in their conclusions tending to go against those presented as a possible source of Sartre's inspiration. That is done in order not to simplify the ambivalence of Husserl's work over the acceptable limit as well as to emphasize the nature of the investigations preferred by Sartre. These investigations lead in his work to the conceptualization of human existence as necessarily free, which is the conclusion of the presented study. Key words: Husserl, Sartre, consciousness,...

Ce mémoire procède à une lecture critique du rôle du corps dans la théorie énactive d’Alva Noë. La première partie consiste essentiellement en un résumé des premiers chapitres d’Action and Perception (2004), tout en accordant une attention particulière à sa critique du représentationnalisme et à la réponse énactive au problème phénoménologique de la présence perceptuelle. En expliquant les grandes lignes de la théorie énactive de Noë, nous en soulignons également les points forts, notamment celui d’ouvrir un dialogue entre la phénoménologie et les sciences empiriques actuelles. La deuxième partie développe cependant une critique sévère de la théorie énactive de Noë en démontrant comment elle s’appuie sur une conception très pauvre du corps, ce qui nous permet d’avancer que la théorie énactive de Noë s’élabore à partir d’une incarnation à moitié assumée. En effet, mis à part le filon des schèmes de dépendance sensorimoteurs − qu’il exploite par ailleurs plutôt bien −, il passe sous silence plusieurs aspects de la perception que nous considérons pourtant très importants, comme l’affectivité et l’intersubjectivité, mais également la passivité et la temporalité. C’est principalement en nous appuyant sur les oeuvres Husserl, Merleau-Ponty et Gallagher que nous pointons vers les lacunes de la théorie énactive d’Alva Noë. / This thesis proceeds to a critical reading of the role of the body in the enactive theory of Alva Noë. The first part consists essentially of a summary of the first chapters of Action in Perception (2004), while paying particular attention to his critique of representationalism and the enactive response to the phenomenological problem of perceptual presence. While explaining the main lines of Noë’s enactive theory, we also underline its strengths, notably that of opening a dialogue between phenomenology and current empirical sciences. The second part, however, develops a severe criticism of Noë's enactive theory by demonstrating how it is based on a very poor conception of the body, which allows us to argue that Noë's enactive theory is developed from a half-assumed embodiment. Indeed, apart from the vein of sensorimotor dependence schemes ─ which he otherwise exploits rather well ─, he ignores several aspects of perception that we nevertheless consider very important, such as affectivity and intersubjectivity, but also passivity and temporality. It is mainly by relying on the works of Husserl, Merleau-Ponty and Gallagher that we point to the shortcomings of Alva Noë's enactive theory.

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We are used to regarding aesthetic experience from the point of view of a spectator, rather than something we actively provide and give. It is not common in the aesthetic debate to analyse what it is like to offer an aesthetic experience, but it is rather the opposite. Philosophers and aestheticians tend to study and focus on how the experience is perceived by someone, not on how it unfolds for the one who provides it. I believe that the experience of giving - especially when we give ourselves to others - is an aesthetic experience in itself. By "giving ouselves to others" I mean opening ourselves to others through acts of generous and disinterested service. In fact, it seems that we are truly and fully happy when we are willing to give ourselves to others in this way. Accordingly, the questions I am going to answer in this research are: why can we be happy by giving ourselves to another person? Can we be "gifts" for others without expecting something back? Is this experience aesthetic? I argue that love and disinterestedness are two key-concepts which help us understand how it is possible to selflessly give ourselves. In addition to that, I claim that such an act is aesthetic because we judge it as "beautiful" and not only as "good". The experience of self-giving is aeshetic because we invoke aesthetic concepts when we describe it.