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Wetgewing wat onbestaanbaar is met die bepalings van Wet 200 van 1993 as die hoogste reg is nietig tensy geoorloof volgens die maatstawwe van art 33 (1) 1 en die Konstitusionele Hof en die provinsiale en plaaslike afdelings van die Hooggeregshof is bevoeg om dit ongeldig te verklaar. Die beoordeling van die geldigheid van wetgewing waardeur inbreuk gemaak word op 'n Fundamentele Reg of Vryheid in Hoofstuk 3 verleen 1 vereis in eerste instansie die vertolking van die betrokke bepaling van die Hoofstuk. In die lig van die besondere karakter van 'n grondwet en die gebrek aan omlyning van die verleende regte en vryhede 1 moet die vertolking nie volgens geykte metodes geskied nie I maar wel doelgerig aan die hand van die waardes onderliggend tot die Handves as geheel. Waardes wat nie herleibaar is tot die grondwet self nie en die persoonlike filosofiee van die regters behoort die howe egter nie te beinvloed nie. / Legislation inconsistent with the provisions of Act 200 of 1993 as the supreme law is of no force and effect and the Constitutional Court and the provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court may declare it invalid, unless it complies with the criteria of a permissible limitation under sec 33(1). Before the validity of legislation impinging upon a Fundamental Right or Freedom conferred in Chapter 3 can be considered, the relevant provision of the Chapter must first be interpreted. In view of the special nature of a constitution and the generality of the conferred rights and freedoms, the ordinary methods of interpretation should not be applied. Chapter 3 must be interpreted purposively taking into account the values underlying the Bill of Rights as a whole. Values not founded in the Constitution and the personal philosophies of the judges ought not to influence the courts. / Private Law / LL.M.

The main problem posed in this thesis is an epistemological one to do with what counts as knowledge in the organisation/management and management accounting areas of scholarship. This question arose regarding discrepancies between an original text, Burns and Stalker's The Management of Innovation (1961, 1966, 1994), and longstanding representations in the mainstream literature. The discrepancies were between the largely objectivist representations focussing on the relationship between organisation structure and environmental contingency, while omitting subjectivist factors and organisational processes, also significant in Burns and Stalker's analysis. The analysis in this thesis is concerned with two main questions: the similarities and differences between The Management of Innovation and mainstream representations; and explanations for these, particularly for the differences. The analytical framework is critical realist theory underpinned by an Hegelian dialectical methodology, looking at phenomena from different perspectives with inconsistencies addressed by a more holistic analysis. This thesis is based on a non-linear, multi-angled approach, which examines each of the two questions from different perspectives through two dialectical circles. A detailed analysis of Burns and Stalker's work and mainstream representations enabled clarity regarding the different foci in the two sets of texts. The absenting of human factors and organisational processes in much mainstream scholarship was found to extend beyond representations of Burns and Stalker's work to orthodox scholarship more widely, despite strong and persistent critiques from within the field. The dialectical opposition constructed between objectivist and subjectivist factors was investigated further and linked to attitudes regarding the commensurability of different approaches in the social sciences, particularly in the organisation/management and management accounting fields. It is suggested that this opposition is based on a particular view of science and scientific method. A broader interpretation however shows that science is also influenced by researchers' subjectivities. This has led to an argument for the complementary, more holistic approaches already present in the field becoming more widespread in the interests of more sustainable and emancipatory knowledge.

Cooperative learning is a pedagogic approach that is prevalent in all levels of education as it is seen to yield higher learning outcomes than individual learning (Johnson & Johnson, 2009). In the global university, it is believed to have the potential of increasing intercultural contact since students work together in small groups to conduct projects related to their discipline. The assumption is that students will learn the intercultural skills they need for an interconnected world by studying and learning in groups with linguistically and ethnically diverse others (Association of Community Colleges Canada, 2010). Although cooperative learning is based on social interdependence in which group members work together for the mutual benefit of their group, there has been very little research conducted into the relationships that the group members actually have with each other. It is the aim of this study to examine these relationships and find out their impacts on cooperative learning experiences. Drawing upon insights from pragmatism and dialogism, in this thesis, learning is conceptualised as an embodied, socially situated, and relational process. This means that the key to learning is the relationships that learners can construct with others. An integral part of forming relationships is the negotiation of identities in which people see themselves and others as certain kinds of people. In learning in cooperative groups, the ability to negotiate legitimate, competent identities is regarded as essential. For this reason, the study reported in this thesis uses a view of identity as socially constructed as a lens though which to analyse relationships in cooperative learning. The study focuses on the experiences of 12 students participating in group learning projects in first year business courses. Narrative inquiry is the methodology used as it is ideal for highlighting the complexities in human relationships and issues of power. The narratives of four international, four Canadian immigrant, and four Canadian-born students are analysed. A key finding from the analysis is that the relationship students are able to negotiate in cooperative groups and the types of identities they are able to construct with others strongly impacts their learning. There appeared to be a hierarchical order to student identities in groups with Canadian-born students assuming more powerful identities. Frequently these students are results oriented showing only interest in achieving high marks in their group projects. This leads to an absence of emotional connectedness amongst students and a disregard for the process aspect of working together which is core to cooperative learning. The thesis concludes with a discussion of the ways that cooperative learning could be changed to make it more process oriented. Finally, I make recommendations for further research which can build on the findings from this study.

Este trabalho analisa o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin. Enquanto Dworkin desenvolveu uma abordagem da prática jurídica como a continuação de uma grande teoria baseada em valores morais, Sunstein recomenda um caminho supostamente mais modesto, baseado em passos obtidos em acordos que pudessem ser alcançados por pessoas com convicções morais diversas. A escolha por esse caminho é justificada não só por razões institucionais, mas também por razões morais e políticas substantivas. A crítica central de Sunstein a Dworkin é um suposto ponto cego quanto às questões de capacidade institucional. Sunstein pode ser lido de duas maneiras: como um autor essencialmente pragmático (e incompatível com Dworkin) ou como um interpretativista ao modo Dworkiniano. Conforme o caso, os contornos do seu diálogo com Dworkin são diferentes. De acordo com a primeira leitura, o argumento do ponto cego levantado por Sunstein tem o objetivo de desqualificar todo o projeto teórico Dworkiniano, na medida em que o problema das capacidades institucionais seria tomado como fundamento para um tipo específico de ceticismo moral, o que inutilizaria o critério de correção moral que embasa o interpretativismo Dworkiniano. Essa visão considera que o debate entre Sunstein e Dworkin seria um capítulo do debate entre Dworkin e os pragmatistas céticos. Nos termos da segunda leitura, Sunstein não é um cético na verdade, ele pressupõe um interpretativismo Dworkiniano e sua posição é complementar à obra de Dworkin. No capítulo I, analiso alguns trabalhos centrais de Sunstein e concluo que ele é melhor lido como um Dworkiniano, visto sua teoria pressupõe valores independentes. No capítulo II, estudo os principais pontos da teoria do direito de Dworkin e sugiro que o conceito de integridade, entendido como um conceito corretivo que serve para construir um sistema judicial no qual os juízes podem barganhar uma concepção de justiça ideal por outros fatores do mundo real, indica que a teoria Dworkiniana pode sim ser sensível às questões empíricas e de capacidade institucional. No capítulo III, identifico os pontos do confronto direto entre Sunstein e Dworkin e exponho o proveito que pode ser extraído do estudo desse debate. / This dissertation analyzes the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. While Dworkin developed an approach that sees the legal practice as a continuum of a greater theory based on moral values, Sunstein recommends a supposedly more modest approach, based on steps obtained in agreements which could be achieved by people holding different moral convictions. The choice of this path is justified not only for institutional reasons, but also for moral and political reasons. The central criticism of Sunstein against Dworkin is a \"blind spot\" with respect to the institutional capacities of judges. Sunstein can be read in two ways: as an essentially pragmatist author (and incompatible with Dworkin) or as an interpretative Dworkinian. As the case may be, the contours of his debate with Dworkin are different. Under to the first reading, the \"blind spot\" argument raised by Sunstein aims to disqualify any Dworkinian theoretical project to the extent that the problem of institutional capacities should be taken as the basis for a specific type of moral skepticism, which would deny the claim to moral correctness that supports Dworkinian interpretativism. In this case, that the debate between Dworkin and Sunstein should be seen as a chapter of the debate between Dworkin and the skeptic legal pragmatists. Under the the second reading, Sunstein is not a skeptic - in fact, he presupposes a Dworkinian interpretativism and his position is complementary to Dworkins work. In Chapter I, I analyze Sunsteins central work on legal interpretation and conclude that he is best read as a Dworkinian, as his theory assumes independent values. In Chapter II, I study the main points of Dworkins jurisprudence and I suggest that the concept of integrity, understood as a \"corrective\" concept used to build a judicial system in which judges can bargain an ideal conception of justice by other factors of the real world, indicates that Dworkin´s theory can be sensitive to the empirical institutional capacities raised by Sunstein. In Chapter III, identify the points of direct confrontation between Sunstein and Dworkin and explain the agenda that can be extracted from the debate.

The thesis addresses the puzzle of the differential integration of former communist states in the Euro-Atlantic community of nations between 1989 and 2000. Notwithstanding the predominant universalist-rationalist assumption that the adoption of an institutional-administrative blueprint for reform could lead to convergence between East and West, countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Russia did not converge similarly (or at all) on the West European normative model and framework of international relations. To account for this divergence, the thesis examines the impact of the culturally-historically informed, Polish, Bulgarian and Russian identities and conceptions of 'Europe' (as opposed to the formal-institutional transition from one system to another) on the process of foreign policy transformation. The doctoral research employs Constructivism, Social Psychological insights and an interpretivist methodology, drawing on 75 elite interviews. The main argument states that differential Europeanisation can be understood on the basis of differentiated levels of inclusion and establishment of relations of mutual recognition and belongingness - substantiated by a differentiated extent of ideational affinity (i.e., normative compatibility), which are (re)enacted in the interactive, mutually constitutive process of identification between Self and Other (i.e., between Poland, Bulgaria and Russia and (Western) Europe). Three propositions of 'thick', 'ambivalent' and 'thin' Europeanisation are derived from the argument (whereby the comparative benchmark of Europeanisation is an ideal-typical model of European-ness). Key contributions focus on the development of a refined Constructivist theory and a systematic empirical comparison of Polish, Bulgarian and Russian foreign policy identities. Also, the study's conclusions reinvigorate and reconfirm the importance of the continuity (rather than just constant flux) of culturally-historically shaped patterns of group self-understandings and sub-regional identifications as well as Constructivism's greater plausibility in accounting for the research puzzle than (Neoclassical) Realism through the stipulation of a mutually constitutive relationship between international and domestic factors and between ideational and interest-based considerations.

Este trabalho analisa o diálogo entre Cass Sunstein e Ronald Dworkin. Enquanto Dworkin desenvolveu uma abordagem da prática jurídica como a continuação de uma grande teoria baseada em valores morais, Sunstein recomenda um caminho supostamente mais modesto, baseado em passos obtidos em acordos que pudessem ser alcançados por pessoas com convicções morais diversas. A escolha por esse caminho é justificada não só por razões institucionais, mas também por razões morais e políticas substantivas. A crítica central de Sunstein a Dworkin é um suposto ponto cego quanto às questões de capacidade institucional. Sunstein pode ser lido de duas maneiras: como um autor essencialmente pragmático (e incompatível com Dworkin) ou como um interpretativista ao modo Dworkiniano. Conforme o caso, os contornos do seu diálogo com Dworkin são diferentes. De acordo com a primeira leitura, o argumento do ponto cego levantado por Sunstein tem o objetivo de desqualificar todo o projeto teórico Dworkiniano, na medida em que o problema das capacidades institucionais seria tomado como fundamento para um tipo específico de ceticismo moral, o que inutilizaria o critério de correção moral que embasa o interpretativismo Dworkiniano. Essa visão considera que o debate entre Sunstein e Dworkin seria um capítulo do debate entre Dworkin e os pragmatistas céticos. Nos termos da segunda leitura, Sunstein não é um cético na verdade, ele pressupõe um interpretativismo Dworkiniano e sua posição é complementar à obra de Dworkin. No capítulo I, analiso alguns trabalhos centrais de Sunstein e concluo que ele é melhor lido como um Dworkiniano, visto sua teoria pressupõe valores independentes. No capítulo II, estudo os principais pontos da teoria do direito de Dworkin e sugiro que o conceito de integridade, entendido como um conceito corretivo que serve para construir um sistema judicial no qual os juízes podem barganhar uma concepção de justiça ideal por outros fatores do mundo real, indica que a teoria Dworkiniana pode sim ser sensível às questões empíricas e de capacidade institucional. No capítulo III, identifico os pontos do confronto direto entre Sunstein e Dworkin e exponho o proveito que pode ser extraído do estudo desse debate. / This dissertation analyzes the dialogue between Cass Sunstein and Ronald Dworkin. While Dworkin developed an approach that sees the legal practice as a continuum of a greater theory based on moral values, Sunstein recommends a supposedly more modest approach, based on steps obtained in agreements which could be achieved by people holding different moral convictions. The choice of this path is justified not only for institutional reasons, but also for moral and political reasons. The central criticism of Sunstein against Dworkin is a \"blind spot\" with respect to the institutional capacities of judges. Sunstein can be read in two ways: as an essentially pragmatist author (and incompatible with Dworkin) or as an interpretative Dworkinian. As the case may be, the contours of his debate with Dworkin are different. Under to the first reading, the \"blind spot\" argument raised by Sunstein aims to disqualify any Dworkinian theoretical project to the extent that the problem of institutional capacities should be taken as the basis for a specific type of moral skepticism, which would deny the claim to moral correctness that supports Dworkinian interpretativism. In this case, that the debate between Dworkin and Sunstein should be seen as a chapter of the debate between Dworkin and the skeptic legal pragmatists. Under the the second reading, Sunstein is not a skeptic - in fact, he presupposes a Dworkinian interpretativism and his position is complementary to Dworkins work. In Chapter I, I analyze Sunsteins central work on legal interpretation and conclude that he is best read as a Dworkinian, as his theory assumes independent values. In Chapter II, I study the main points of Dworkins jurisprudence and I suggest that the concept of integrity, understood as a \"corrective\" concept used to build a judicial system in which judges can bargain an ideal conception of justice by other factors of the real world, indicates that Dworkin´s theory can be sensitive to the empirical institutional capacities raised by Sunstein. In Chapter III, identify the points of direct confrontation between Sunstein and Dworkin and explain the agenda that can be extracted from the debate.

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Purpose: The purpose of this study is to explore organizational identity as a potential process.   Design/Methodology/Approach: We applied a qualitative method and followed an inductive approach that was applied to a multiple-in-depth-case study for which we conducted semi-structured interviews with 26 members of two organizations, the Swedish consulting company REACH and the Swiss digital agency WONDROUS. Following a narrative approach, both for structuring the empirical findings, as well as conducting the analysis, we used over 16 hours of interviews to create company narratives and subsequently analyzed them in multiple steps in the fashion of a narrative analysis.   Findings: Based on our empirical findings and the empirical analysis, we developed a conceptualization, the Flux Model. We contribute to the existing body of literature by proposing that the Flux Model visualizes the dynamics of how organizational members socially construct organizational identity on the premise of their own (self-)perceptions. By presenting the different parts of the model and their multiple layers, the process of how organizational identity is continuously becoming is illustrated.   Research Limitations/Implications: The scope of our study is restricted to the two case companies in question. If our abstractions from the cases in form of the Flux Model help to better understand the process of organizing, managers become liberated to make deliberate choices about their organizations’ identities. For research this means an even tighter connection to individual psychology and a deepening of the perspective that organizational identity can not only be viewed as something companies have.   Originality/Value: Out of skepticism towards the usefulness of viewing organizational identity as a process, we applied a symbolic interpretivist perspective and allowed for the possibility that we might not find a process after all. The primary value of this study we believe to be found in the extensive presentation of empirical data, together with our narrative analysis and our conceptual contribution (the Flux Model).