• Refine Query
  • Source
  • Publication year
  • to
  • Language
  • 6
  • 5
  • 2
  • 2
  • 1
  • Tagged with
  • 24
  • 9
  • 9
  • 6
  • 6
  • 5
  • 4
  • 4
  • 4
  • 4
  • 3
  • 3
  • 3
  • 3
  • 3
  • About
  • The Global ETD Search service is a free service for researchers to find electronic theses and dissertations. This service is provided by the Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations.
    Our metadata is collected from universities around the world. If you manage a university/consortium/country archive and want to be added, details can be found on the NDLTD website.
21

L’intuitionnisme de Huemer : une solution au scepticisme moral?

Pelchat, Karl-Antoine 08 1900 (has links)
Situé à l’intersection de grands mouvements en philosophie morale, comme la renaissance du réalisme non naturaliste et l’affirmation d’un scepticisme épistémologique moral, ce mémoire se propose d’interroger la fiabilité des intuitions morales à la lumière des récentes découvertes effectuées en neuroscience, psychologie morale et théorie de l’évolution. Ne pouvant recouvrir l’intégralité des conceptions de l’intuition et de la justification morales, ce mémoire se penchera prioritairement sur l’intuitionnisme éthique prôné par Michael Huemer. Solution alléguée au scepticisme épistémologique moral, l’intuitionnisme de Huemer garantit une justification prima facie aux énoncés moraux, une propriété conférée par le principe du conservatisme phénoménal. Profitant aux intuitions morales de tous niveaux de généralité, cette justification prima facie peut toutefois être défaite, comme le supposent les arguments étiologiques proximaux et distaux. Au cours de ce mémoire, je défendrai l’idée qu’une majorité d’intuitions morales, telles que conçues par Huemer, sont effectivement défaites par la voie étiologique. D’une part, je tenterai de montrer que l’hypothèse du double système, bénéficiant désormais d’un vaste soutien empirique, n’est pas compatible avec la conception huemérienne des intuitions morales. En l’occurrence, la « trolleyologie » de Joshua Greene, le « Modèle intuitionniste social » de Jonathan Haidt ainsi que les procédés heuristiques seront mobilisés à des fins argumentaires. D’autre part, je tenterai de montrer que la critique généalogique évolutionnaire de Street jette le doute sur une grande partie des intuitions morales, principalement les intuitions morales substantives (non formelles). Comme le soutient Street, l’incapacité du réaliste à rendre compte de la relation entre les vérités évaluatives postulées et les pressions évolutives constitue une raison convaincante d’abandonner le réalisme moral. Ayant présenté deux types d’arguments étiologiques, l’un psychologique et l’autre évolutionnaire, je conclus que seules les intuitions morales formelles et métadiscursives sont réellement susceptibles d’éviter la charge du sceptique épistémologique. / Located at the intersection of a great many philosophical movements, such as the rebirth of non-naturalist realism and the affirmation of moral epistemological skepticism, this master’s thesis interrogates the reliability of moral intuitions in light of recent advancements in neuroscience, moral psychology and evolutionary theory. While there are various ways to conceive of moral intuition and justification, this thesis will prioritize a version of ethical intuitionism defended by Michael Huemer. Put forward as a solution to moral epistemological skepticism, Huemer’s intuitionism guarantees prima facie justification to moral propositions, a property conferred by the principle of phenomenal conservatism. While intuitions of every level of generality can benefit from such prima facie justification, this very type of justification is susceptible to defeat, as suggested by proximal and distal debunking arguments. Throughout this master’s thesis, I will defend the claim that a majority of moral intuitions, as conceived by Huemer, are effectively defeated by means of debunking arguments. On the one hand, I will try to demonstrate that the dual-process hypothesis, which is widely supported, is not compatible with Huemer’s conception of moral intuitions. In order to substantiate this view, I will draw from Joshua Greene’s “trolleyology”, Jonathan Haidt’s “Social Intuitionist Model” and recent work on moral heuristics. On the other hand, I will attempt to show that Street’s evolutionary debunking argument throws significant doubt on a large portion of moral intuitions, mostly the ones which are substantial (non-formal). As Street purports, the realist’s incapacity to explain the relation between posited evaluative truths and evolutionary pressures constitutes a strong reason to reject moral realism. Having presented two types of debunking arguments, one psychological and the other evolutionary, I conclude that only formal and metadiscursive moral intuitions are really susceptible to avoid the charge of the epistemological sceptic.
22

Good Parents, Better Babies : An Argument about Reproductive Technologies, Enhancement and Ethics / Bra föräldrar, bättre barn : Ett argument om reproduktionstekniker, förbättring och etik

Malmqvist, Erik January 2008 (has links)
This study is a contribution to the bioethical debate about new and possibly emerging reproductive technologies. Its point of departure is the intuition, which many people seem to share, that using such technologies to select non-disease traits – like sex and emotional stability - in yet unborn children is morally problematic, at least more so than using the technologies to avoid giving birth to children with severe genetic diseases, or attempting to shape the non-disease traits of already existing children by environmental means, like education. The study employs philosophical analysis for the purpose of making this intuition intelligible and judging whether it is justified. Different ways in which the moral problems posed by reproductive technologies are often framed in bioethical debates are criticised as inadequate for this task. In particular, it is argued that the intuition cannot fully be made sense of in terms of harm to the children that such technologies help create. The study attempts to elaborate an alternative to that broadly consequentialist approach, by drawing on Martin Heidegger’s philosophy of technology, Hans Jonas’s ethics, and Aristotle’s practical philosophy, as it has been received and developed in the hermeneutical tradition. It is suggested that reproductive choices, unlike decisions for already born children, are characterised by a peculiar one-sidedness: the future child appears to the parents as something wholly theirs to decide about, not as a concrete other with whom they must interact in a responsive and attuned way. This is problematic because it means that such choices cannot call upon the particularised moral understanding only gained in interpersonal encounters. In particular, it makes them easily shaped by various tendencies, to which parents are always susceptible, to relate to children in instrumentalising ways, and at risk of reinforcing such tendencies. However, this does not mean that all uses of reproductive technologies are equally troubling. When selecting against severe disease the parents can rely on a widely shared illness experience to escape the dangers that one-sidedness involves. It is concluded that the intuition under discussion, thus explicated and in some ways qualified, makes sense morally. / Avhandlingen är ett bidrag till den bioetiska debatten om olika reproduktionstekniker som antingen nyligen blivit tillgängliga eller som kan komma att utvecklas i framtiden. Utgångspunkten är en intuition som många verkar dela, nämligen att användningen av sådana tekniker i syfte att välja icke-sjukdomsegenskaper – som kön och känslomässig stabilitet – hos framtida barn, är mer moraliskt problematiskt än både att forma sådana egenskaper hos redan existerande barn genom exempelvis utbildning och att använda teknikerna för att undvika att barn föds med svåra sjukdomar. Studien är ett försök att genom filosofisk analys begripliggöra denna intuition och avgöra om den är berättigad. Olika sätt på vilka man i den bioetiska debatten ofta gestaltar de moraliska problem som reproduktionstekniker ger upphov till kritiseras som otillräckliga för denna uppgift. I synnerhet framhålls att intuitionen inte helt kan förstås som en oro över att de barn som sådana tekniker sätter till världen kan komma till skada. Med avsikt att utveckla ett alternativ till detta konsekvensorienterade synsätt söker sig författaren till Martin Heideggers teknikfilosofi, Hans Jonas etik och Aristoteles praktiska filosofi, som den tolkats och utvecklats i den hermeneutiska traditionen. Med hjälp av dessa teorier betonas hur reproduktiva val, till skillnad från beslut gällande redan existerande barn, kännetecknas av en slags ensidighet. Det framtida barnet framstår för föräldrarna som föremål för beslut som är odelat deras, snarare än som en konkret andre som de måste interagera med på ett lyhört, noga avpassat sätt. Detta är problematiskt eftersom det innebär att sådana val inte kan ledsagas av det slags partikulära moraliska förståelse som bara uppnås i möten mellan människor. I synnerhet innebär det att valen lätt formas av, och i sin tur riskerar att underblåsa, olika för föräldraskapet karaktäristiska tendenser som ständigt riskerar förmå föräldrar att förhålla sig till sina barn på ett instrumentaliserande sätt. Men detta betyder inte att alla användningar av reproduktionstekniker är lika problematiska. Val som syftar till att undvika svåra sjukdomar kan undgå de faror som ensidigheten öppnar för genom att åberopa en gemensam mänsklig sjukdomserfarenhet. Avhandlingens slutsats är att intuitionen som diskuteras är berättigad, med vissa reservationer, om den förstås på detta sätt.
23

On the evaluation of temporally extended experiences

Cojuharenco, Irina 27 June 2007 (has links)
La evaluación de las experiencias extendidas en el tiempo se puede hacer de muchas formas. El paradigma --hedometer' en economía sugiere que la evaluación global de la experiencia se puede explicar por las impresiones de satisfacción durante la experiencia. Hay una creciente evidencia empírica sobre una simple ley de Pico-Final. Se ha demostrado que el Pico (la impresión mas extrema) y el Final (la ultima impresión) pueden explicar la evaluación global de la experiencia sin tener en cuenta las demás impresiones. Presento pruebas empíricas de la ley de Pico-Final utilizando datos recolectados en estudios de campo en aulas universitarias y en estudios de laboratorio con imágenes afectivas, e investigo, además, la capacidad de esta ley de explicar la intensidad del estado de animo posterior a la experiencia. Revelo, utilizando una novedosa tarea de estimación intuitiva, las opiniones de las personas sobre la composición de las evaluaciones globales de las experiencias. Finalmente, demuestro las condiciones que dificultan el aprendizaje de la ley Pico-Final, lo que explica porque las personas creen que sus evaluaciones globales representan el promedio de todas las impresiones sin excepción. / There are different ways of evaluating experiences lived across time. The --hedometer' paradigm in economics suggests that momentary impressions determine overall evaluations of experiences. There is a mounting empirical evidence for a simple Peak-End rule. Peak (the most extreme) and End (the very last) impressions have been shown to explain overall evaluations without the need to account for other impressions. I test the Peak-End rule using field data from university classrooms and lab data from image-viewing experiments, as well as explore its ability to predict post-experience mood valence. I elicit, using a novel guessing task, lay intuitions about overall evaluations of experiences. Finally, I demonstrate why decision-makers may find it difficult to learn the Peak-End rule and believe rather, that overall evaluations reflect average impressions.
24

Posvítit si do tmy / Supply Your Own Light

Lukášová, Veronika January 2019 (has links)
My disertation theses explores the intricate relationship between art, science and photography in the framework of the contemporary culture. Clearly outlined research areas open up the subject to a broader theoretical examination to underpin the artistic strategies that can be employed in the practial research. The resulting artwork interprets the domain of particle physics in a series of artworks. First area of the research delves into the domain of images and seeks to understand the relationship between the images of art and science in a broader sense. Second area investigates ambiguous medium of photography as both tool of science and art. Third area is an overview of the history of representation of the subatomic world and issues related to representing what is in fact unrepresentable. Fourth seeks to find epistemic and conceptual connection between art and science and their interdisciplinary dialogue as Sci-Art. The fifth part introduces artworks that reflect the critical egangement with the theoretical research and the scientific method by building the instrument for the observation of the cosmic rays. Sources for the theoretical framework are largely drawn from the academic literature written in the UK and USA where the topics explored in the theses have been studied in depth. The time scope considered in the theses encompasses 1990's of the 20. century up utill the present day.

Page generated in 0.09 seconds