Zugl.: München, Univ., Diss., 2009

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Paulo Vieira Neto / Dissertaçao (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Setor de Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Defesa: Curitiba, 10/04/2015 / Inclui referências / Área de concentração: Filosofia / Resumo: A pergunta pela felicidade é essencial na filosofia imanente de Spinoza, a qual é apresentada como o gozo de uma alegria eterna e estável com Deus, causa de todas as coisas. São três âmbitos que constituem a questão da felicidade nesta filosofia: afetivo, cognitivo e ético. Assim, é na vivência dos afetos e no conhecimento deles que o conatus de cada modo finito será capaz de afirmar-se como autônomo e potência plena de autoperseveração na existência. O percurso que conduz à conquista da felicidade envolve necessariamente a experiência da alegria, visto que a alegria favorece nossa potência pois é aumento de perfeição para a ação e o pensamento. O homem que regozija de alegria é forte e ativo, compreende a si próprio e aos seus afetos, assim como compreende os demais modos de maneira adequada; é sábio e sua atenção e cuidado são dirigidos à vida e tudo o que possa contribuir com a sua expansão. Filosofia da ação, a felicidade é, portanto, a atividade vital de fruição desta alegria concomitante ao conhecimento intuitivo de terceiro gênero, ou seja, o sentimento de eternidade e união com Deus. Palavras-chave: afetos, alegria, conatus, conhecimento, Deus, felicidade. / Abstract: The question of happiness is essential in the immanent philosophy of Spinoza. Happiness is therein presented as a kind of joy resulting from an eternal, stable joy with God, who is the cause of everything. There are three areas, which build the basis of this thought about the question of happiness: affective, cognitive and ethical. So, in the experience of the affects and with the understanding of such, the conatus of every single, finite mode will be able to affirm his autonomy as well as to assert himself as full potentiality of self-persistence. The way leading to conquest of happiness requires in any case the experience of joy, since it promotes our own potentiality by being the enhancement of the perfection of acting and thinking. The man exulting from joy is strong and active, he understands himself and his affects, as well as in an appropriate way he understands the further modes. He is wise and carefully pays attention to life and everything else that may contribute to the enhancement of life potentiality. As a result and practice of a philosophy of acting happiness namely is the essential action of this joy, which presents itself on occasion of the intuitive knowledge of the third kind, which means, with the feeling of eternity and unification with God. Key words: affects, joy, conatus, knowledge, God, happiness

This study is an attempt to trace a particular theme of analysis throughout John Stuart Mill's economic theory and to discover what light such a procedure sheds on our knowledge of Mill's work and on our understanding of his historical role. The main concern of the study is with Mill's system of analysis as such, and not, except incidentally, with the history of the ideas which found expression in his work. After a preliminary examination of Mill's position in the evolution of economic theory, a first step is taken towards establishing what were the properties and assumptions of the model of the economic system adopted by Mill in his major work in the field, the Principles of Political Economy (1848). The assumptions necessary for a consistent model are outlined and the argument then proceeds with a detailed discussion of Mill's four fundamental propositions on capital. These theorems are taken to be the principal foundation on which the remainder of Mill's analysis of production, distribution and capital accumulation is based. An attempt is made to show that these theorems are to be considered as an interdependent group which have relevance only for the system in which they stand.

Orientador: Prof. Dr. Pedro Costa Rego / Co-orientador: Prof. Dr. Marco Antonio Valentim / Dissertaçao (mestrado) - Universidade Federal do Paraná, Setor de Ciências Humanas, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia. Defesa: Curitiba, 16/12/2006 / Inclui referências / Área de concentração: Filosofia / Resumo: Nessa dissertação, investigamos o desenvolvimento e a fundamentação daquilo que, em nossa compreensão, melhor caracteriza a forma como Kant compreende a moralidade, a saber, a incondicionalidade necessária do princípio moral, que precisa ser, por sua vez, fundada na possibilidade de liberdade transcendental. A questão que surge a partir desse percurso é relacionada à inclusão de um sentimento nessa concepção moral que se pretende independente da sensibilidade, não-patológica, e do estatuto que ele passa a ter. Realizamos então uma exposição acerca do modo como este sentimento específico, o respeito, é trabalhado por Kant em obras de sua filosofia prática, e como alguns comentadores compreendem seu papel. Finalmente, colocamos nosso posicionamento acerca dessa discussão, compreendendo o respeito como, primeiramente, não possuindo o papel de validar a moralidade, mas apenas o de motivo moral enquanto efeito necessário da lei na sensibilidade de seres finitamente racionais, como o homem. / Abstract: We started our work by investigating what we understand as the crucial aspect of Kant's conception of morality, that is, the unconditional character of the moral principle, which requires the possibility of transcendental freedom, at least from a practical point of view. We discussed, first, the way Kant deals with this point in different texts, and grounds, or at least expects to ground, this possibility. The question of how a feeling finds a place in a moral theory that defines itself by the exclusion of every element of sensibility imposed itself, and, to examine it, we presented the way Kant and some interpreters understand the matter. Finally, we stated our interpretation of the role of this feeling, as a necessary effect of the moral law in our sensibility.

The Subjection of Women was the last book by John Stuart Hill published during his lifetime. It presented a philosophical analysis of the position of women in society, as unrecognised individuals both in public and domestic roles. Mill exposed the moral and ethical shortcomings' of a system which denied women legal status or moral equality, and he made a number of specific suggestions for reform, particularly respecting legal and educational rights for women. During the following sixty years in Britain, almost all of his suggested reforms were achieved. Because Mill' s specific pleas were answered, the Subjection of Women has come to be regarded as an out-of-date argument for conditions which have been corrected. The moral philosophy contained in the book received little or no attention. The knowledge of a present-day reader about John Stuart Mill is based chiefly upon his Autobiography and the essay On Liberty. The works which made Mill famous, his textbooks upon logic and political economy, are now read only by students of those fields. Readers of the Autobiography are not generally aware how skillfully Mill and his wife edited that book to remove most of the domestic circumstances of Mill's family, and to construct a textbook account of his education. Since the tone of the Autobiography is austere and rational, there has been a tendency to transfer these qualities to Mill himself. In fact, Mill has misled his readers. In The Subjection of Women, Mill reveals opinions about the social world and makes comments about family life which are the natural complement to his Autobiography. Like most major figures of the Victorian period, John Stuart Mill was a man of many abilities and interests—a 'generalist’, rather than a specialist—and any specialist view of his work is apt to be only a partial view of the man and his work. Often these partial views become the whole view. Even Mill's biographers have been unable to avoid this difficulty. Students of Mill's essays sometimes detect inconsistencies in thought, others assert that Harriet Taylor, later Mrs. Mill, dominated his later work. However, beyond the assumption that she suggested the topic to Mill, there is very little examination of the Subjection of Women and its ideas by modern critics or biographers. This study of the Subjection of Women argues for a line of consistent and continuous development in John Stuart Mill, and suggests that the book is pertinent to his biography. Various evidence in the thesis explains why it is not possible to accept the currently published views of the man. Accordingly Mill's family background and early training have been rehearsed from the unfamiliar domestic viewpoint, and the development of his ideas traced from his earliest writings the production of The Subjection of Women. / Arts, Faculty of / English, Department of / Graduate

No description available.

No description available.

Este trabalho tem por objetivo provar que há mais espaço para elaboração de regras morais no utilitarismo de Mill quando comparado ao utilitarismo de Bentham. Para que esta tese seja provada é necessário comprovar que a concepção de natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Mill é mais complexa do que a concepção de natureza humana de Bentham, pois é a ciência da natureza humana que constitui o fundamento das prescrições da moralidade. Esta tese provará que a natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Bentham resume-se a uma natureza humana dotada, principalmente, de uma razão capaz de formular cálculos complexos entre prazer e dor (que inclui a intensidade, proximidade, longinquidade, etc) para decidir sobre a melhor ação (aquela que aponta para o prazer, no cômputo geral do balanço). Em outras palavras, um apelo ao primeiro princípio, ao princípio de utilidade é efetuado a cada ação, questionando as regras do costume e reduzindo o espaço da moral a apenas ao princípio de utilidade. Para Mill, ao contrário, a natureza humana é mais complexa. Ela é composta, de leis da mente ou leis psicológicas, da tese hedonista (que significa que os indivíduos buscam prazer e evitam a dor, assim como para Bentham) e subteses da tese hedonista, como o fato de que os indivíduos, por natureza, agem por hábito, possuem faculdades elevadas das quais derivam prazeres de qualidade superior e possuem a capacidade de se transformar ao longo do tempo. Essas características da natureza humana do indivíduo teórico de Mill permitem converter um princípio de utilidade mais complexo que prescreve que é correto buscar o prazer e fugir da dor como característica central, mas que ressalta que mais elementos precisam ser aventados para que se compreenda a busca do prazer ou a busca da felicidade. É precisamente quando a formulação do princípio de utilidade de Mill abre espaço para que mais elementos precisem ser expostos para que se entenda a busca do prazer ou a maximização da felicidade, que surge a possibilidade de elaboração de regras morais, preceitos ou princípios secundários que permitem que o agente guie-se no mundo prático. Em outras palavras, a natureza mais complexa do indivíduo teórico de Mill admite a elaboração de um princípio de utilidade mais complexo que dá margem à elaboração de uma moralidade também mais complexa, com mais regras morais (ainda que inicialmente embasadas em um cálculo de prazer) relativamente à moral de Bentham. / This work aims to prove that there is more place for the elaboration of moral rules in Mills utilitarianism when compared to Benthams utilitarianism. To prove this thesis it is necessary that Mills conception of human nature be more complex than Benthams conception of human nature, given the fact that it is science of human nature which holds the foundation of morality. This thesis will prove that human nature of Benthams individuals is resumed to a human nature which main feature is an instrumental reason, able to formulate complex calculations between pleasure and pain (which includes intensity, proximity, duration, etc of the pleasures and pains) to decide about the best action (the one which decides for pleasure, once made the balance). In other words, an appeal to the first principle, to the principle of utility is done in each action, questioning customary rules and reducing morality to the principle of utility. For Mill, on the contrary, human nature is more complex. It consists of laws of mind or psychological laws, of hedonistic thesis (which means that individuals look for pleasure and avoid pain in the same sense as Benthams individuals) and sub-thesis of hedonistic thesis, such as the fact that individuals act by habit, they have elevated faculties which derive pleasures of higher qualities and they hold the capacity of transforming themselves through time. Those human nature features of Mills individuals permits to formulate a more complex principle of utility which determines that it is right to look for pleasure and right to avoid pain as the main feature, but many more elements need to be sustained in order to achieve a better understanding of happiness. It is precisely when the formulation of Mills principle of utility opens room for more elements to explain the search of pleasure and the avoidance of pain or the maximization of happiness, that the possibility of formulation of moral rules becomes plausible. Secondary principles are necessary in Mills system to be formulated, so the agent can guide himself in the practical world without an appeal to the first principle in each action. In other words, Mills more complex individuals nature permits the elaboration of a more complex principle of utility which opens place for the elaboration of a more complex morality with more moral rules (even if, initially, those moral rules are grounded on a calculation between pleasure and pain) when compared to Benthams morality.

Not available / text

Zugl.: Giessen, Universiẗat, Magisterarbeit.