Why do some individuals choose to participate in rebellion, and what recruitment tactics can rebel groups use to affect this decision? These questions are central to the study of civil war because rebel groups must raise troops in order to challenge the government and to survive as an organization. Indeed, much of the civil war literature builds on participation as a key causal mechanism, yet it is rarely specified in theoretical or empirical models. The dissertation attempts to open this black box by tackling three sets of gaps in the existing literature; these relate to the assumptions made in most studies, the theoretical bases for understanding participation and recruitment, and the record of empirical testing. Essay I examines whether a particular type of recruitment practice, ethnic mobilization, is associated with higher levels of violence. The results show that when rebel groups mobilize along ethnic lines, there is a higher risk for intensified violence. Essay II employs new data on rebel troop size to study what factors affect participation in rebellion. The findings indicate that concerns over personal security rather than economic and social incentives best explain participation. Essay III addresses coerced recruitment, positing that conflict dynamics affect whether rebel groups shift from voluntary to coerced recruitment. Using micro-level data on the conflict in Nepal, the results show that the more losses rebels suffer on the battlefield, the greater the number of individuals they subsequently abduct. Finally, the Nepal case study presented in Essay IV suggests that indoctrination as a recruitment strategy was more important to rebel leaders than other facets of the insurgency. Taken together, this dissertation indicates that there is analytical leverage to be had by examining not only the individual’s decision to participate, but also the rebel group’s recruitment strategy, and that these rebel strategies are flexible and contingent on conflict dynamics.

<p>Rebel attacks on civilians constitute one of the gravest threats to human security in contemporary armed conflicts. But why do rebel groups kill civilians? The dissertation approaches this question from a strategic perspective, trying to understand when and why rebel groups are likely to target civilians as a conflict strategy. It combines quantitative studies using global data on rebel group violence with a case study of the civil war in Mozambique. The overall argument is that rebel groups target civilians as a way of improving their bargaining position in the war relative to the government. The dissertation consists of an introduction, which situates the study in a wider context, and four papers that all deal with different aspects of the overall research question. Paper I introduces new data on one-sided violence against civilians, presenting trends over time and comparing types of actors and conflicts. Paper II argues that democratic governments are particularly vulnerable to rebel attacks on civilians, since they are dependent on the population. Corroborating this claim, statistical evidence shows that rebels indeed kill more civilians when fighting a democratic government. Paper III argues that rebels target civilians more when losing on the battlefield, as a method of raising the costs for the government to continue fighting. A statistical analysis employing monthly data on battle outcomes and rebel violence, supports this argument. Paper IV takes a closer look at the case of Mozambique, arguing that the rebel group Renamo used large-scale violence in areas dominated by government constituents as a means for hurting the government. Taken together, these findings suggest that violence against civilians should be understood as a strategy, rather than a consequence, of war.</p>

<p><p>Syftet med uppsatsen är att belysa de tre olika religionernas roll på Balkan ur ett historiskt perspektiv, för att vidare kunna besvara frågeställningen, på vilket sätt gav den religiösa pluraliteten upphov till kriget i Bosnien och Hercegovina?</p></p>

<p>This composite dissertation explores mediation in internal armed conflicts from a bargaining perspective. Four separate essays investigate why mediation occurs, why it is successful, and why peace guarantors’ commitments are credible. Essay 1 examines the conditions under which mediation takes place. The study argues that whereas it is costly for governments to accept international mediation, it is a less costly intervention tool for potential third parties. This argument implies that mediation will be more likely when and where negotiated settlements are least likely to be reached, a contention that is supported by empirical tests. Essay 2 reviews the contemporary debate on what types of mediators that can disseminate information in a credible manner, and formulates a set of testable hypotheses on mediation partiality. The analysis shows that negotiated settlements are more likely if biased or interested mediators intervene, while neutral mediators are not associated with mediation success. Essay 3 elaborates on the role of biased mediators. It proposes that rebels face a commitment problem when negotiated settlements are to be reached, which government-biased mediators can mitigate. The study finds that such types of mediators outperform rebel-biased mediators in terms of helping combatants to settle the armed conflict. Essay 4 deals with the commitment problem that comes to pass between, on the one hand the primary parties, and on the other, the potential peace guarantors. The study probes the requests and promises for third-party security guarantees and suggests that the reputation of the United Nations (UN) enhances its credibility as peace guarantor compared to non-UN actors. It finds that although the UN is more restrictive with its promises, it is more likely that peacekeeping forces will be provided if the UN is one of the guarantors. In sum, utilizing unique data from two time-periods (post World War II and post Cold War), this dissertation arrives at new insights on the role of mediators in bringing about negotiated settlements of internal armed conflicts.</p>

<p>Orsakerna till andra världskriget är väl analyserade och finns berättat om i många verk. Det här arbetet applicerar två klassiska teorier, realism och liberalism på de orsaker till krig som Stephen Van Everas bok ”<em>Causes of War”</em> förtäljer. Syftet med arbetet är att undersöka, om det är möjligt, vilken av två utvalda teorier som bäst förklarar orsakerna <em>till krigen</em> under andra världskriget. Min problemformulering är: <em>Vad har realismen och liberalismen för syn på orsakerna till varför ett krig bryter ut och hur förklarar de i sådana fall orsakerna till andra världskriget?</em></p><p>  För att ge svar på de här frågorna kommer jag att använda mig av en kvalitativ textanalys. Metoden har två syften i arbetet. Det första är att ta reda på vad liberalismen och realismen har för syn på orsaker till krig. Det andra syftet är att utifrån <em>”Causes of War” </em>finna orsakerna till krigen som utspelades under det andra världskriget.</p><p>  De slutsatser jag kommit fram till genom appliceringen av teorierna på orsaker till krig, är att stater agerade utifrån ett realistiskt säkerhetspolitiskt tänk, vilket även bekräftar tidigare forskning inom ämnet. Det finns dock en spårbarhet av liberalism i orsakerna till varför länderna gick i krig med varandra. De liberalistiska förklaringarna av orsaker till krig har visat sig bestå av kollektiv säkerhet eller ett misslyckande i överstatliga överenskommelser. De realistiska förklaringarna av orsaker till krig utgörs av den egna statens säkerhet gentemot andra stater.</p> / <p>The causes of the Second World War are well analyzed and are described in several literatures. In this study two classical theories, realism and liberalism, are applied on the causes of war described in Stephan Van Everas book “<em>Causes of War”</em>. This essay aims to examine, if possible, which one of the above mentioned theories that best describes what caused the Second World War.</p><p>  Presentation of the problem: <em>What are the causes of war from a realistic and liberal perspective, and how can the theories explain the causes of the Second World War?</em></p><p>In order to answer these questions I use a qualitative text analysis. In the essay this method has two purposes. The first is to find out what realism and liberalism describes as causes of war. The second purpose is to find out, on basis of Stephen Van Everas <em>“Causes of War”,</em> what caused the wars during the Second World War.</p><p>  My conclusion is that states act on a basis of realism when they justify an act of war. This conclusion corresponds with former studies. However, there are also conclusions based on liberalism that describes causes of war between countries. These conclusions constitute collective security and failure of international agreements between states. According to the realist theory, the security of the state versus other states is a possible cause of war.</p>

<p>I uppsatsen som följer har jag använt mig av David Galulas COIN teori. Jag har sedan använt den teorin och analyserat kriget mellan Israel och Libanon 2006. Kriget blev känt som ett misslyckande ur israelisk synpunkt, då de inte lyckades att besegra Hezbollah eller stoppa deras raketskjutningar in i Israel. Detta trots att de har den mest högteknologiska armen i mellanöstern och hade luftoperativkontroll. I denna uppsats så har jag fört ett resonemang för att svara på frågeställningen: Går Galulas teorier att använda mot en organiserad motståndare som Hezbollah? Efter att ha skrivit denna uppsats så har jag inte kommit fram till ett absolut svar, men är personligen övertygad om att det går. I fallet Hezbollah är det väldigt problematiskt i och med att de var så väl förberedda på att det skulle bli krig. Det faktum att Israel dessutom hade skurit ner på sitt försvar och inte hade utbildat sina soldater och chefer inför denna typ av krig gjorde att de inte kunde strida på ett effektivt sätt. För att Israel skulle ha lyckats vinna, tror jag att en större markoperation hade varit nödvändig då Hezbollah var så väl förberedda. Detta är i linje med det första steget i Galulas COIN teori där man med truppnärvaro strävar efter att separera befolkningen från insurgenterna i detta fall Hezbollah.</p> / <p>In the essay that follows I have used David Galulas COIN theory. I have then used Galulas theory and analyzed the war between Israel and Lebanon in 2006. The war from the Israeli point of view was a failure, as they failed to defeat Hezbollah and stop their rockets from firing into Israel. Despite the facts that the Israel had the most technologically advanced army in the Middle East and that they had air superiority in the area. In this essay I have discussed the following question: Are Galulas theories usable against an opponent like Hezbollah? After having written this essay, I have not beenable to conclude a definite answer, however I am convinced that it is possible. The reason for the Israeli failure was the fact that the Hezbollah were so well prepared for war. Whereas the Israeli forces were ill-prepared because of a substantial decrease in numbers compared to earlier years, and because the Israeli soldiers and officers were not trained for this type of war. In my opinion, the Israeli forces would have needed to focus much more on ground operations because the Hezbollah were so well prepared. This is exactly what stage one in Galulas COIN theory advises, where through military presence, separate the civilian population from the insurgents.</p>

This composite dissertation explores mediation in internal armed conflicts from a bargaining perspective. Four separate essays investigate why mediation occurs, why it is successful, and why peace guarantors’ commitments are credible. Essay 1 examines the conditions under which mediation takes place. The study argues that whereas it is costly for governments to accept international mediation, it is a less costly intervention tool for potential third parties. This argument implies that mediation will be more likely when and where negotiated settlements are least likely to be reached, a contention that is supported by empirical tests. Essay 2 reviews the contemporary debate on what types of mediators that can disseminate information in a credible manner, and formulates a set of testable hypotheses on mediation partiality. The analysis shows that negotiated settlements are more likely if biased or interested mediators intervene, while neutral mediators are not associated with mediation success. Essay 3 elaborates on the role of biased mediators. It proposes that rebels face a commitment problem when negotiated settlements are to be reached, which government-biased mediators can mitigate. The study finds that such types of mediators outperform rebel-biased mediators in terms of helping combatants to settle the armed conflict. Essay 4 deals with the commitment problem that comes to pass between, on the one hand the primary parties, and on the other, the potential peace guarantors. The study probes the requests and promises for third-party security guarantees and suggests that the reputation of the United Nations (UN) enhances its credibility as peace guarantor compared to non-UN actors. It finds that although the UN is more restrictive with its promises, it is more likely that peacekeeping forces will be provided if the UN is one of the guarantors. In sum, utilizing unique data from two time-periods (post World War II and post Cold War), this dissertation arrives at new insights on the role of mediators in bringing about negotiated settlements of internal armed conflicts.

Rebel attacks on civilians constitute one of the gravest threats to human security in contemporary armed conflicts. But why do rebel groups kill civilians? The dissertation approaches this question from a strategic perspective, trying to understand when and why rebel groups are likely to target civilians as a conflict strategy. It combines quantitative studies using global data on rebel group violence with a case study of the civil war in Mozambique. The overall argument is that rebel groups target civilians as a way of improving their bargaining position in the war relative to the government. The dissertation consists of an introduction, which situates the study in a wider context, and four papers that all deal with different aspects of the overall research question. Paper I introduces new data on one-sided violence against civilians, presenting trends over time and comparing types of actors and conflicts. Paper II argues that democratic governments are particularly vulnerable to rebel attacks on civilians, since they are dependent on the population. Corroborating this claim, statistical evidence shows that rebels indeed kill more civilians when fighting a democratic government. Paper III argues that rebels target civilians more when losing on the battlefield, as a method of raising the costs for the government to continue fighting. A statistical analysis employing monthly data on battle outcomes and rebel violence, supports this argument. Paper IV takes a closer look at the case of Mozambique, arguing that the rebel group Renamo used large-scale violence in areas dominated by government constituents as a means for hurting the government. Taken together, these findings suggest that violence against civilians should be understood as a strategy, rather than a consequence, of war.

While previous research shows that civil wars can spread to neighboring states, we do not know why certain neighbors are more at risk than others. To address this research gap, this dissertation proposes a contagion process approach that can identify the most likely targets of contagion effects from an ongoing conflict. Using data with global coverage, theoretical expectations about why and where civil wars would have contagion effects, are examined in a series of statistical analyses. Paper I argues and empirically supports that a country is more susceptible to contagion effects when it is characterized by ethnic polarization, where few ethnic groups form a delicate balance. Paper II argues and provides evidence that the involvement in conflict by an ethnic group in one country increases the likelihood of ethnic conflict erupting in a neighboring country that shares the same ethnic group. Paper III suggests and finds support that the arrival and long-term hosting of refugees from states in civil conflict make host states more likely to experience civil conflict. Paper IV examines the common notion that the granting of autonomy or independence to separatist groups may spur other ethnic groups to violently pursue similar demands, starting off a domino effect. Using new global data on such territorial concessions, the analysis does not support this version of the “domino theory,” which is popular among policy-makers. In sum, this dissertation contributes by demonstrating the usefulness of the contagion process approach. It offers a more comprehensive view of contagion among neighbors, and as such is able to specify arguments and intuitions in previous research.

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