<p>The Swedish Tax Agency is a government authority whose mission is to collect taxes and fees for financing the public sector and welfare in Sweden. Under the last decade the tax gap in Sweden has been constant and small businesses with a max turnover of 25 millions Swedish crowns are the biggest group in the tax gap. In the government inquiry about abolishment of statutory audit for small businesses (2008) there has been laid some proposals that the Swedish Tax Agency should get new control tools and increased rights to control small businesses tax accounts. In the science some controversies exists about tax authority’s ability to get taxpayers to pay taxes and fees to the society through using deterrence and compellence control methods versus more service? This ground has guided us to our presentation of a problem: “How the Swedish Tax Agency works with influencing small businesses behaviour through preventive actions and controls?” The purpose of this study is to research and understand how the Swedish Tax Agency works in their control activities to influence small businesses behaviours regarding taxes and fees. From this base we have also taken in consideration how an eventual abolishment of the audit statutory for small businesses, will affect control activities in the Swedish Tax Agency from a social behaviour approach. For getting answer to this question we have done a qualitative research with an abductive approach. The study is based on data materials from interviews within the Swedish Tax Agency and the four respondents who we interviewed worked in both strategic- and operative level. The Conclusions from this study shows that today’s control activities work majorly towards small firms who share social norms with the Swedish Tax Agency. This study shows also that abolishment of the audit statutory will inflect eventual consequences for the Swedish Tax Agency and lead in increasing of the present tax gap. This make the Swedish Tax Agency forced to change their work methods towards small businesses.</p>

The Swedish Tax Agency is a government authority whose mission is to collect taxes and fees for financing the public sector and welfare in Sweden. Under the last decade the tax gap in Sweden has been constant and small businesses with a max turnover of 25 millions Swedish crowns are the biggest group in the tax gap. In the government inquiry about abolishment of statutory audit for small businesses (2008) there has been laid some proposals that the Swedish Tax Agency should get new control tools and increased rights to control small businesses tax accounts. In the science some controversies exists about tax authority’s ability to get taxpayers to pay taxes and fees to the society through using deterrence and compellence control methods versus more service? This ground has guided us to our presentation of a problem: “How the Swedish Tax Agency works with influencing small businesses behaviour through preventive actions and controls?” The purpose of this study is to research and understand how the Swedish Tax Agency works in their control activities to influence small businesses behaviours regarding taxes and fees. From this base we have also taken in consideration how an eventual abolishment of the audit statutory for small businesses, will affect control activities in the Swedish Tax Agency from a social behaviour approach. For getting answer to this question we have done a qualitative research with an abductive approach. The study is based on data materials from interviews within the Swedish Tax Agency and the four respondents who we interviewed worked in both strategic- and operative level. The Conclusions from this study shows that today’s control activities work majorly towards small firms who share social norms with the Swedish Tax Agency. This study shows also that abolishment of the audit statutory will inflect eventual consequences for the Swedish Tax Agency and lead in increasing of the present tax gap. This make the Swedish Tax Agency forced to change their work methods towards small businesses.

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SKV and Tullverket have several important tools and methods available in each activity to ensure that taxes and fees are paid and charged rightfully. Among other things they use tax or customs surcharges, targeted and general third party injunctions or targeted and general third party audits. The targeted controls, ergo targeted injunctions and audits, are targeted towards specific persons or documents while during the general controls these are not specified. The methods have repeatedly been the subject of discussions and attempts to simplify the tax procedure and increase the Rule of Law for the individual. The government appointed a commission on March 8 of the year 2012 with the assignment to prepare proposals to increase the Rule of Law in the tax procedure. The assignment was therefore to analyze the areas of tax and customs injunctions, reimbursement because of expenses and agents and also third party controls. This study was delimited, partly due to space considerations, to examine the commission's proposals to increase the Rule of Law regarding third party controls as well as to SKV as the investigating authority. Consideration will therefore not be given to Tullverket as the investigating authority. The system concerning third party controls has repeatedly over the years been the subject of criticism and debate. Not least because of that the general third party controls are indistinct due to the fact that the person who is the subject of the control is not aware of the control and that the procedure is considered to contravene the protection of privacy in the RF and the right to private and family life of the ECHR. It has hence been considered that there is a need for change. The commission would thus investigate and make proposals to increase the Rule of Law but given the precondition that third party control, including general controls, would still remain as control methods. Therefore the commission had to consider a proportionality assessment between the protection of individual privacy and SKV:s control effectiveness. In this study focus was on SOU 2013:62 and the consultation bodies’ responses received on account of the proposals. The commission proposed that the decision making on general third party controls will stay with SKV as the decision making authority and that it should be clarified in the legislative text that SKV has to relate to the principle of proportionality when deciding on general third party controls. The commission also proposed that it should be clarified in the legislative text that SKV only may search for documents and information covered by the decision but that surplus information that was discovered spontaneously also may be used. The commission held that there is no need for clarification of the legislative texts regarding that SKV shall take into account the proportionality principle in the choice of method and choice of control object. The commission also held that there is no need to legislate any imposes for SKV towards the subject of control to inform about the control if the information gathered nevertheless is intended to be the basis for decisions on taxation. Furthermore it was proposed an imposition of legislative texts regarding that the controlled, in connection with the information about the control, should be given the opportunity to request documents and information excluded from the basis for decisions on taxation. That is, after the control is carried out and provided that the information will be added basis for decisions on taxation. The majority of the consultation bodies felt that the commission was inadequate, that the proposals did not add anything new on the merits and that a new commission should be appointed with the mission to increase the Rule of Law in the tax procedure. The studies’ concluding parts contain a pro et contra analysis of the proposals on the basis of the consultation bodies’ responses, my own conclusions and general concluding comments. In these parts my own proposals are submitted for improvement to further enhance the Rule of Law in tax procedures. My own proposals are due to that the commission in my opinion may be deemed deficient in several aspects. / SKV och Tullverket har flera viktiga metoder att tillgå i respektive verksamhet för att säkerställa att skatter och avgifter lämnas och tas ut rätteligen. Bland annat så kan kontrollmyndigheterna använda skatte- eller tulltillägg, riktade och generella tredjemansförelägganden eller riktade och generella tredjemansrevisioner. Vid riktade kontroller, ergo riktade förelägganden och riktade revisioner, är kontrollerna riktade mot specificerade personer eller handlingar och vid generella kontroller är dessa inte specificerade. Metoderna har upprepade gånger varit föremål för diskussioner och försök att förenkla skatteförfarandet och öka rättssäkerheten för den enskilde. Regeringen tillsatte den 8 mars år 2012 en utredning med uppgiften att framställa förslag för en ökad rättssäkerhet i skatteförfarandet. Uppdraget var att undersöka områdena skatte- och tulltillägg, ersättning för kostnader och ombud samt tredjemanskontroller. Denna studie har bland annat på grund av utrymmesskäl avgränsats till att undersöka utredningens förslag som avser ökad rättssäkerhet vid tredjemanskontroller samt till SKV som kontrollerande myndighet. Hänsyn kommer således inte tas till Tullverket som kontrollerande myndighet. Tredjemanskontrollförfarandet har upprepade gånger genom åren varit föremål för kritik och diskussioner. Inte minst för att generella tredjemanskontroller ansetts olämpliga på grund av att den kontrollerade inte har vetskap om att denna är eller har varit föremål för kontroll samt att förfarandet ansetts strida mot integritetsskyddet i RF och rätten till privat- och familjeliv i EKMR. Det har därav ansetts att behov av förändring föreligger. Utredningen skulle således undersöka och lämna förslag för att öka rättssäkerheten för den enskilde men med hänsyn till att tredjemanskontroller, i dessa inbegripet generella tredjemanskontroller, alltjämt skulle kvarstå som metod i SKV:s kontrollverksamhet. Det fordrades följaktligen av utredningen att genomföra en proportionalitetsavvägning mellan skyddet för den enskildes integritet och SKV:s kontrolleffektivitet. I denna studie har fokus lagts på SOU 2013:62 och de remissyttranden som inkommit med anledning av förslagen. Utredningen föreslog att beslutsordningen vid generella tredjemanskontroller ska stå oförändrad med SKV som beslutsfattande instans och att det ska förtydligas i lagtext att SKV ska förhålla sig till proportionalitetsprincipen vid beslut om generella tredjemanskontroller. Utredningen föreslog även att det ska förtydligas i lagtext att SKV endast får eftersöka handlingar och uppgifter som omfattas av beslutet men att överskottsinformation som anträffats spontant får användas. Vidare angav utredningen att det inte behövs något förtydligande i lagtext avseende att SKV ska beakta proportionalitetsprincipen vid val av metod och val av kontrollobjekt. Utredningen angav även att det inte behöver införas någon underrättelseskyldighet för SKV gentemot den kontrollerade om informationen som inhämtats ändå inte är avsedd att läggas till grund för beslut om beskattning. Vidare föreslogs ett införande i lagtext avseende att den kontrollerade ska ges möjlighet att begära handlingar och uppgifter undantagna från att läggas till grund för beslut om beskattning i samband med en underrättelse, det vill säga efter att kontrollen ägt rum och under förutsättning att informationen kommer läggas till grund för beslut om beskattning. Flertalet remissinstanser ansåg att utredningen var bristfällig, att förslagen inte innebar någonting nytt i sak samt att en ny utredning bör tillsättas med uppdrag att öka rättssäkerheten i skatteförfarandet. I studiens avslutande delar redovisas en pro et contra-analys av förslagen med utgångspunkt i remissyttrandena, egna slutsatser avseende förslagen samt allmänna avslutande kommentarer. I dessa delar lämnas egna förbättringsförslag för att ytterligare öka rättssäkerheten, eftersom utredningen enligt min mening får anses bristfällig i flera avseenden.