Labor share in the neoclassical context is perceived as a share of the labor income in GDP. A very basic way to compute the labour share simply entails dividing compensation of employees by gross value added. After a series studies and the rise of neoclassical economics, the assumption of labor share stability over time was introduced. With the publication of Kaldor's theory of growth, the assumption of labor share stability became a generally accepted fact. The aim of this thesis is to answer the question on how the labor share and its individual characteristics evolved in the Czech Republic in the years 1993-2015 and whether its average level and the overall trend in this period corresponds to the neoclassical labor share theories.

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This paper estimates the effects of imports on employment, wages, and the wage share in Austria for the period of 1990-2005 using panel data of manufacturing industry. Imports are disaggregated according to their origin and as final vs. intermediate imports. There is evidence of significant negative effects of imports on employment, wages and the wage share. Particularly workers in high skilled sectors experience negative effects. Offshoring to both Eastern Europe and the developed countries have a negative impact on employment, whereas offshoring to the East has a positive effect on wages, indicating the dominance of scope effects. (author´s abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

This paper estimates the effects of outward Foreign Direct Investment (employment in the affiliates abroad) on employment, wages, and the wage share in Austria using panel data for the period of 1996-2005. There is evidence of significant negative effects of FDI on both employment and wages, and consequently on the wage share. The results are not limited to workers in low skilled sectors or blue collar workers. The negative employment effect is primarily due to the rise in the employment in the foreign affiliates in Eastern Euope. The negative wage effects are originating from affiliate employment in both the East and the developed countries in industry, but no effect is found in the total economy. (author´s abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

This paper estimates the effects of capital accumulation on industry labor shares by taking account of capital heterogeneity. Using a cross-country, cross-industry dataset covering 15 European countries over 38 industries, I take advantage of a detailed breakdown of the capital stock distinguishing between physical, ICT and intangible assets. The results suggest that, over the 1995-2015 period, capital accumulation has not been a driving force of declining labor shares - if anything the opposite. Performing a cross-section regression analysis on the relationship between long differences in capital intensities and industry labor shares, I find that accumulation of physical capital in general, and Machinery & Equipment in particular, are the only asset types showing a statistically significant correlation with the labor share, suggesting a positive association. In contrast to previous research, I do not document a negative relationship between ICT capital and labor shares. I do, however, find evidence suggesting that it might be investments in Software & Databases that explain these earlier findings.

Chapter One: I contribute to the literature on the decline of the labor share in the United States by proposing a channel through which increasing household debt can lead to the decline of the labor share. Specifically, workers with lower net worth have lower reservation wages. Thus, workers in debt spend less time job-searching and accept lower-paying jobs. Focusing on the period between 1982 and 2016 - a time during which the labor share declined and household debt rose as a proportion of GDP - I describe a model which demonstrates that the lowering of household net worth may have caused a 12 percent decrease in mean wages, and caused the labor share to decline by 0.081 points. Since the labor share actually fell by 0.057 points in that period, the model ``over-explains'' the decline of the labor share. Chapter Two: What effect do labor-restricting policies have on how much people drive, and on carbon emissions? I model the effect of labor-restricting policies in the following way: I calibrate a model to match the United States in 2018, and also calibrate the model counterfactually to simulate what would have occurred had other policies been in effect. I compare the carbon emissions that result from the original calibration to the carbon emissions that result from the counterfactual-policy calibrations. The labor-restricting policies I consider are wage taxes, retirement mandates, and restrictions on time spent working. I find that, for all policies considered, reductions in work are associated with increases in driving but nonetheless lead to reductions in carbon emissions, due to overall declines in economic activity. Chapter Three: For the model introduced previously, I study transition paths for the following case: The model is originally in a steady-state and the agents expect the current policy regime to last forever; then they are surprised when the government announces and immediately enacts a policy change; they then expect the new policy regime to last forever. The policy changes I study are wage taxes and emissions taxes (either spent by the government or rebated). For each of these policy changes, the model economy begins in a baseline steady-state, then enters a transition lasting several periods, and eventually arrives at a new steady-state. During the transition, aggregate wealth gradually moves to its new steady-state value. Jump variables - such as aggregate consumption, driving, leisure, labor, and emissions - at first jump and then gradually move to their new steady-state values. Labor and emissions generally move in opposite directions, which apparently contradicts the idea that more work leads to more pollution. However, this contradiction is merely the temporary result of the fact that agents are spending down their aggregate wealth; thus they are consuming goods and services produced elsewhere, and are paying for labor to be done outside the model using wealth that was built up previously. / Economics

京都大学 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(経済学) / 甲第23669号 / 経博第652号 / 新制||経||300(附属図書館) / 京都大学大学院経済学研究科経済学専攻 / (主査)教授 山田 憲, 教授 西山 慶彦, 准教授 高野 久紀 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当 / Doctor of Economics / Kyoto University / DGAM

Cette thèse contribue à la compréhension des frictions liées aux politiques environnementales et à la manière dont ces frictions affectent la dynamique des industries polluantes ainsi que les agrégats macroéconomiques tels que la productivité. Elle examine également de manière critique comment différents aspects de ces politiques influencent la distribution des entreprises en termes d’emploi, de tailles et d’émissions. Dans le premier chapitre, j’examine les effets à long terme des politiques d’exemption basées sur des seuils dans la réglementation environnementale, qui consistent à exonérer les émetteurs en dessous d’un certain seuil d’émissions. En utilisant des données sur la pollution provenant de divers établissements participant au programme de plafonnement et d’échange de la Californie, j’ai découvert que 40% des entreprises bénéficient de cette exemption, avec une concentration notable autour du seuil, en particulier parmi les nouveaux entrants. Pour comprendre les implications plus larges, j’ai développé un modèle dynamique industriel qui prend en compte des entreprises hétérogènes et un système de tarification du carbone avec des exemptions spécifiques au seuil. En simulant le programme californien de plafonnement et d’échange, j’ai constaté que la suppression de l’exemption conduit à une augmentation de 0,05% de la production en raison du déplacement des ressources vers des entreprises plus productives. Pour mesurer l’impact de la politique d’exemption sur l’allocation des ressources, j’ai analysé la dispersion de la productivité totale des facteurs basée sur les revenus (TFPR) au niveau de l’entreprise. L’analyse a révélé que la volatilité de la TFPR est influencée par la dispersion entre les catégories d’entreprises. Les entreprises ayant une productivité intermédiaire et regroupées autour du seuil ont une moyenne et une dispersion de TFPR plus élevées comparées aux grandes entreprises productives qui supportent les coûts des émissions. Dans le deuxième chapitre, j’examine les implications macroéconomiques de l’utilisation complémentaire des instruments de tarification traditionnels avec les Crédits de Compensation (OCs), dont le prix est négocié par les entités couvertes auprès des entreprises non couvertes. Ce processus de négociation peut entraîner un coût marginal d’émission différent par rapport aux instruments de tarification traditionnels. En utilisant les données des entreprises sur les émissions et les modalités de conformité du programme de plafonnement et d’échange de la Californie, j’ai montré trois faits. Premièrement, l’utilisation des OCs augmente avec la taille des émissions des entreprises ; la proportion des entreprises se conformant aux OCs et la proportion des émissions compensées augmentent avec les groupes de quintiles d’émissions. Ainsi, les OCs agissent comme une réduction implicite de la taxe carbone pour les grands émetteurs. Deuxièment, les entreprises établies se conforment plus intensivement aux OCs par rapport aux nouveaux entrants et aux entreprises sortantes. Enfin, le taux de retrait des OCs disponibles diminue progressivement après la réglementation. Pour expliquer ces résultats, j’étends et calibre un modèle de dynamique industrielle incorporant un système de plafonnement et d’échange où les entreprises choisissent entre les permis traditionnels et les OCs, considérés comme des substituts parfaits, le prix de ces derniers étant obtenu par un protocole de négociation de Nash. Je montre quantitativement que compléter le plafonnement et l’échange (enchères) avec des OCs peut affecter positivement les résultats environnementaux et entraîner un gain de bien-être positif (0,021%), bien qu’à un coût léger pour les résultats économiques tels que la productivité totale des facteurs (0,002%). L’effet sur le bien-être lorsque la taxe carbone est combinée avec des OCs est plus faible (0,019%) et est accompagné d’une baisse plus importante du taux d’imposition moyen. Qualitativement, j’ai dérivé les conditions dans lesquelles les taux d’imposition au niveau des entreprises et en moyenne varient en fonction de trois allocations de permis : enchères, attribution gratuite et rabais basé sur la production, en lien avec la conformité aux OCs. Le troisième chapitre examine l’impact des incitations fiscales pour les investissements en dépollution sur la part du travail et l’investissement total en dépollution dans les industries manufacturières en Colombie. En utilisant des données au niveau microéconomique, je constate une forte corrélation négative entre l’investissement en dépollution et la part du travail. En revanche, il n’y a pas d’association significative entre l’investissement en capital et la part du travail. Pour comprendre ces observations, j’étends et calibre un cadre de dynamique industrielle incluant des entreprises hétérogènes investissant dans des mesures de contrôle de la pollution. Les expériences politiques montrent que le passage à des incitations pour le contrôle de la pollution avec une déduction fiscale de 20% réduit la part du travail dans l’industrie de 20% en raison de l’augmentation de la part de marché des entreprises intensives en capital. De plus, l’investissement en dépollution augmente de 45% en raison de l’effet d’équilibre général. Les changements dans les instruments fiscaux créent une corrélation négative entre la part du travail des entreprises et l’investissement en dépollution aux niveaux de l’entreprise et de l’agrégat. Une augmentation de la taxe carbone réduit la part du travail dans l’industrie mais augmente l’investissement total en dépollution, car la part de production des entreprises très intensives en facteurs de production augmente, tandis que les entreprises ayant une intensité de travail médiane perdent du terrain. À l’inverse, une augmentation de l’impôt sur les sociétés réduit l’investissement total en dépollution et augmente la part du travail dans l’industrie, reflétant les changements de distribution observés en l’absence de déduction fiscale. Cette étude met en lumière comment les incitations au contrôle de la pollution par des déductions fiscales influencent la distribution conjointe de la part de production et de l’intensité des facteurs des entreprises. Les résultats soulignent la nécessité de concevoir des incitations fiscales équilibrées pour atteindre les objectifs économiques et environnementaux. / This thesis contributes to the understanding of the frictions associated with environmental policies and how these frictions affect the dynamics of polluting industries and their impact on macroeconomic aggregates such as productivity. It also critically examines how different aspects of these policies influence the distribution of firms in terms of employment, firms size and emissions. In the first chapter, I examine the long run effects of threshold-based exemption policies in environmental regulation, which involve exempting emitters below a certain emission threshold. Using pollution data from various establishments under California’s Cap-and-Trade program, I found that 40% of firms benefit from this exemption, with many clustering around the threshold, particularly new entrants. To understand the broader implications, I developed an industry dynamic model that considers heterogeneous firms and a carbon pricing system with threshold-specific exemptions. When simulating California’s Cap-and-Trade, I found that removing the exemption leads to a 0.05% increase in output due to resources shifting towards more productive firms. To measure the impact of the exemption policy on resource allocation, I analyzed the dispersion of Total Factor Productivity Revenue-based (TFPR) at the firm level. The analysis revealed that TFPR volatility is influenced by the dispersion between firm categories, particularly those relative to the exemption threshold. Firms with intermediate productivity, clustered around the threshold, showed higher average and dispersion of TFPR compared to productive firms that bear emission costs. In the second chapter, I quantify the macroeconomic implications of complementing the use of traditional pricing instruments with Offset Credits (OCs), whose price is negotiated by covered entities from non-covered firms. This bargaining process may result in a different marginal emission cost compared to traditional pricing instruments. Using firm data on emissions and compliance modalities from California’s Cap-and-Trade program, I show three facts. First, OC usage increases with firm emission size; the proportion of firms complying with OCs and the proportion of emissions offset increase with emission quintile groups. Thus, OCs act as an implicit carbon tax reduction for large emitters. Second, incumbent firms comply more intensively with OCs compared to new entrants and exiting firms. Lastly, the retirement rate of available OCs drops gradually after the regulation. To explain these findings, I extend and calibrate an industry dynamics model incorporating a cap-and-trade system where firms choose between traditional permits and OCs, viewed as perfect substitutes with the price of the latter obtained through a Nash bargaining protocol. I quantitatively show that complementing cap-and-trade (auction) with OCs can positively affect environmental outcomes and yield a positive welfare gain (0.021%), albeit at a slight cost of total factor productivity (0.002%). The welfare effect when complementing a carbon tax with OCs is smaller (0.019%), accompanied by a larger average tax rate decrease compared to cap-and-trade. Qualitatively, I derived conditions under which firm-level and average tax rates vary depending on three permit allocations: auction, grandfathering, and output-based rebate, in line with the compliance with OCs. The third chapter investigates the impact of tax incentives for investment in abatement on the labor share and aggregate abatement investment in Colombia’s manufacturing industries. Using micro-level data, I find a strong negative correlation between abatement investment and labor share. However, there is no significant association between capital investment and labor share. To understand these facts, I extend and calibrate an industry dynamics framework that includes heterogeneous firms investing in pollution control investments. Policy experiments show that switching to pollution control incentives with a 20% income tax deduction reduces the industry labor share by 20% due to an increase in capital-intensive market share. Additionally, abatement investment rises by 45% due to the general equilibrium effect. Changes in tax instruments create a negative correlation between firms’ labor share and abatement investment at both firm and aggregate levels. An increase in carbon tax reduces the industry labor share but boosts aggregate abatement investment, as the output share of extremely factor-intensive firms grows, while firms around the median labor intensity lose share. Conversely, an increase in corporate tax reduces aggregate abatement investment and raises the industry labor share, mirroring the distribution changes seen with no income tax deduction. This study highlights how pollution control incentives through income tax deductions affect the joint distribution of firms’ output share and factor intensity. The findings emphasize the need for well-designed tax incentives to balance economic and environmental goals.

Diese Dissertation besteht aus vier Aufsätzen, die sich mit der funktionalen Einkommensverteilung beschäftigen und leistet einen Beitrag in den Bereichen Arbeitsmärkte und Makroökonomie. Der erste Aufsatz ist ein Literaturüberblick über den Einkommensanteil von Arbeit am Gesamteinkommen. Der zweite Aufsatz analysiert den Einfluss von Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien (IKT) auf den relativen Lohnanteil von hoch-, mittel- und niedrig qualifizierten Arbeitnehmern. Die Ergebnisse der Untersuchung legen nahe, dass IKT die relativen Lohnanteile beeinflusst, dieser Einfluss jedoch nicht im gleichen Maße über Zeit und Länder auffindbar ist. Einzelne Industrien werden aufgezeigt, in denen Investitionen in IKT den relativen Lohnanteil hochqualifizierter Arbeitnehmer steigern. In anderen Industrien führen Investitionen in IKT zu einer Polarisierung am unteren Ende der Verteilung. Der dritte Aufsatz untersucht die Einflüsse auf die Lohnquote in Westeuropa. Die Studie zeigt einen großen und persistenten negativen Einfluss von internationaler wirtschaftlicher Integration auf die Lohnquote über die mittlere Frist. Starke Arbeitsmarktinstitutionen steigern die Lohnquote. Der vierte Aufsatz untersucht durch welchen Kanal IKT die Lohnquote beeinflusst. Das Modell von Bental und Demougin (2010), welches die Hypothese aufstellt, dass die Lohnquote fällt da IKT die Beobachtbarkeit von Anstrengung erhöht und so die Informationsrente der Arbeitnehmer bei gleicher Anstrengung senkt, wird zu Daten von neun Westeuropäischen Ländern kalibriert. Dies zeigt, dass das Modell die Trends der Lohnquote als auch die der Reallöhne in Effizienzeinheiten und der Arbeit in Effizienzeinheiten durch den Kapitalstock, replizieren kann. Desweiteren zeigt die Analyse von Individualdaten aus dem Deutschen Sozio-Ökonomischen Panel, dass die gefühlte Beobachtung der Arbeitsleistung im Durchschnitt zwischen 1985 und 2001 gestiegen ist. / This dissertation consists of four essays on the functional distribution of income and contributes to the body of research on labor markets and macroeconomics. The first essay reviews the literature on the income share of labor. The second essay analyzes empirically the impact of investments into information and communication technology (ICT) on the relative compensation of high-, medium-, and low-skilled workers. The results imply that, although ICT investments influence the relative demand of workers by skill, this impact is not persistent over time and across countries. Nevertheless, individual industries are identified in which ICT investments increase the relative compensation of high-skilled workers and industries in which ICT investments polarize compensation at the bottom of the skill distribution. The third essay investigates the empirical influences on the labor share in Western Europe. The results show a large and persistent negative impact of economic integration on the labor share in the medium-run for an industry-level measurement. Stronger labor market institutions increase the labor share. Furthermore, the results suggest a common negative impact of ICT and economic globalization on labor share, while ICT itself seems complementary to labor in production. The fourth essay assesses empirically through which channel ICT decreases the labor share. The model of Bental and Demougin (2010), which argues that ICT reduces the labor share by improving monitoring technology and therefore lowering the workers rent at every level of output, is calibrated and simulated using data from nine OECD countries. The results show that the model can generate the observable trends in the labor shares as well as real wages in efficiency units and labor in efficiency units over capital. Furthermore, an analysis of micro data from the German Socio-Economic Panel indicates an overall average increase of perceived monitoring of workers between 1985 and 2001.