In this thesis I compare the work of Ronald Dworkin and John Rawls within the context of the 'equality of what?' debate. I argue that the Rawlsian paradigm offers a much more flexible defence of a resourcist approach to egalitarianism than Dworkin's theoI)' of' equality of resources'. I argue that Dworkin's fundamental distinction between persons and circumstances is flawed because it involves commitment to a view of the person which belongs in the realm of' comprehensive moral doctrines', rather than in the realm of a political theory of justice. I also argue that an alternative distinction between choice and luck, expressed in the 'luck-neutralising aim' of egalitarianism, is inappropriate since it too involves transgressing political constraints on theories of justice. Rawls's utilisation of primary goods in his theory of justice is supported by considerations derived from the work of Thomas Scanlon. The schematic picture of relative urgency which Scanlon advances provides the rationale for the use of primary goods, and also allows us to discriminate . between compensation for handicaps and compensation for expensive tastes. Scanlon's schematic picture also frees the utilisation of primary goods from criticisms raised by Amartya Sen. Lastly, I discuss arguments advanced by Susan Hurley which enable an interpretation of Rawls's original position device which is independent of the luck-neutralising aim. Her arguments are extended as a criticism of Dworkin's hypothetical insurance market.

Elementos pré-textuais: 10 f. Elementos textuais: 139 f. / Submitted by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura (anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2013-05-24T18:37:59Z No. of bitstreams: 2 DISSERTACAO - ELEMENTOS PRE-TEXTUAIS.pdf: 129760 bytes, checksum: a56e0fbc2be2f7cc03d77e54ff95dbf8 (MD5) DISSERTACAO.pdf: 1659020 bytes, checksum: 672d706aa0c5cd71d86419a0dc087a6c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Ana Valéria de Jesus Moura(anavaleria_131@hotmail.com) on 2013-05-24T18:39:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 DISSERTACAO - ELEMENTOS PRE-TEXTUAIS.pdf: 129760 bytes, checksum: a56e0fbc2be2f7cc03d77e54ff95dbf8 (MD5) DISSERTACAO.pdf: 1659020 bytes, checksum: 672d706aa0c5cd71d86419a0dc087a6c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2013-05-24T18:39:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 DISSERTACAO - ELEMENTOS PRE-TEXTUAIS.pdf: 129760 bytes, checksum: a56e0fbc2be2f7cc03d77e54ff95dbf8 (MD5) DISSERTACAO.pdf: 1659020 bytes, checksum: 672d706aa0c5cd71d86419a0dc087a6c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / O objetivo deste trabalho é oferecer uma contribuição ao estudo da discricionariedade administrativa no direito brasileiro. A pesquisa possui natureza bibliográfica e empírica na medida em que propõe uma revisão da literatura jurídica sobre o tema até o momento atual e utiliza a análise de casos concretos a partir da análise da legislação vigente e o enfrentamento pela jurisprudência a fim de demonstrar o alcance da teoria proposta. O trabalho utiliza da tecnologia desenvolvida pela teoria dos sistemas de Niklas Luhmann por entender que suas ferramentas ampliam as condições de possibilidade de compreensão do papel da administração pública na contemporaneidade além de permitir uma sofisticada uma observação e descrição do tratamento da discricionariedade administrativa na contemporaneidade. Em seguida ao expor os desafios a serem enfrentados pela teoria jurídica em uma sociedade complexa, propõe-se a revisão de um enfoque sob o método fenomenológico. A teoria dos sistemas certamente não esgota as possibilidades propositivas do tema, pois, seus conceitos utilizados neste trabalho servem a uma descrição da situação e a demonstração dos limites que se impõem aos demais modelos explicativos existentes, contudo, se propõe uma nova interpretação para a atuação discricionária da administração pública, vista por uma perspectiva ontológica. Por esta razão, a proposta é complementada a partir das contribuições da fenomenologia existencial por considera-la uma ferramenta interessante e capaz de permitir uma revisão dos pressupostos da discricionariedade da administração no pensamento contemporâneo. / Salvador

Jurisprudence / (LL.D.)

The aim of this thesis is to investigate and further the understanding of the interaction between law, technology and society. My original contribution to this understanding lies in an account and analysis of the process of emergence (or potential emergence) of new legal concepts and of how new and developing technologies and social responses influence that process. Specifically, the work focuses on identity, which I argue is a currently emerging legal concept, and the ways in which identity, variously understood, is impacted by new technologies and changes in the social landscape, what those impacts on identity might be, and the relationship of those changes to the representation (or otherwise) of identity in law. In the literature looking at law and technology and the legal responses to the issues of regulating technology, I critique the conceptualisation of law as “lagging behind” novel advances in technology. By drawing upon work in philosophy of technology, sociology and science and technology studies it is argued that emerging technologies have a modulating effect upon social values and moralities and that equally the modulation of society by technology and the complex dynamics of social change or resistance may also have an impact upon the law itself. In turn developments in law may be part of the ongoing process of the identification, conceptualisation, recognition and contestation over specific social issues and the way in which they should be addressed. Such dynamics and conflicts can lead to the shifting of accountability regimes and the recognition of new values, harms and interests and their own conceptualisation and justification. Studying the emergence of new legal concepts provides a link in to understanding this mutual coproducing relationship between law/regulation, technology and society. My approach to this study seeks to better understand the factors that precipitate formal recognition in law of specific concepts, an aspect of legal development that is not well considered by the existing literature in law and that in Science and Technology Studies (STS). In so doing it contributes a novel conceptualisation of an “emerging legal concept” and a conceptual analysis of identity as an emerging legal concept specifically as currently modulated by novel biotechnologies.

A dissertação examina o paradigma racionalista, o paradigma da ciência moderna, dum panorama histórico em que se resgatam seus traços iniciais, na linha de historicidade e perlustra, criticamente, a sua influência no Direito, notadamente, no processo brasileiro. A abordagem realizada do tema foi repartida em duas partes, nas quais são diferentes os métodos empregados, sendo que na primeira foi utilizado o método hermenêutico-histórico, reservando-se para a segunda o emprego do método heurístico-crítico. O trabalho examina a formação do paradigma moderno, compreendido a partir da análise dos pressupostos epistemológicos que o substanciam, demonstrando que foram desenvolvidos nas ciências ditas naturais e, posteriormente, transplantados ao Direito. A sistematização oriunda, pioneiramente, da biologia, mas que, enquanto imposição científica se propaga aos demais ramos do saber como caminho necessário ao status de ciência / The dissertation exams the rational paradigm and the modern science paradigm, in a historic overview that redeems its initial draft, in the historical line and observes, critically, its influence in Law, specially, in Brazilian procedure laws. The approach take on this subject was divided in two different parts, differ by its utilized methods, at first the historic-hermeneutic and secondly critic-hermeneutic. The paper exams the creation of a modern paradigm, originally understood upon the analysis of epistemological assumptions that forms it, demonstrating that they were developed in the so called natural science and afterwards became parts of foundations of a legal system. The systematization originally from Biology, as scientific rule, propagates to the fellow knowledgeable paths, as a necessary pathway to all status of science

This thesis examines the role of emotion in the criminal law. It identifies the current understanding of emotion in the law, and challenges this understanding as it is revealed in the rules of criminal liability. It offers a new approach to understanding emotion which has important implications for the grounds of legal knowledge, the structure of the rules of criminal liability, and the process of judgment. Chapter One reviews theoretical approaches to understanding emotion in philosophy, psychology and law. The chapter introduces a number of theoretical approaches to analyzing emotion, focusing particularly on the development in the understanding of the relationship between emotion and reason. Chapter Two examines models of moral and legal responsibility to identify their implicit understanding of emotion. Chapter Three focuses on the role of emotion in the rules of criminal liability, and, in particular, in the criminal defences of provocation, duress and self-defence. The law understands emotion to be an entity explainable in terms of the 'mechanisms' of'cognition' and 'affect' which underpin it. The chapter argues that the law adopts a different and conflicting understanding of these mechanisms in the rules of criminal liability, and that these differences have important normative implications. Chapter Four challenges the grounds of knowledge upon which assessments of criminal liability are based. Emotion becomes a metaphor for the need to reconceive the rules of criminal liability and the process of judgment. The chapter adopts a social constructionist approach to understanding emotion. Using this approach, it reassesses the role of emotion in the criminal defences of provocation, self-defence and duress, and explains the process of judgment as an emotional phenomenon. The thesis concludes that a constructionist approach to understanding emotion is well suited to the assessment of conduct in its spatial, historical and cultural context; and for this reason ought to be emphasized in the legal assessment of liability and punishment. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Orientador: Gilda Figueiredo Portugal Gouvea / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciências Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-24T10:18:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Nascimento_JoeltonCleisonArrudado_D.pdf: 2670229 bytes, checksum: 55d7f091c219cd3fd9f048782af6014d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013 / Resumo: A crise capitalista em curso, disparada em 2007, colocou novamente no centro do debate político a questão das relações entre a regulação jurídico-estatal e a economia capitalista de mercado. Neste contexto, o problema das relações multiformes entre direito e capitalismo pode ser colocado em nova perspectiva. Nesta tese, por intermédio de uma leitura da crítica da economia política marxiana orientada pela análise da forma valor, buscou-se repropor uma versão radicalizada da crítica marxista do direito, concebendo este como uma instância reguladora intrinsecamente atada ao destino da socialização produtora de mercadorias / Abstract: The ongoing capitalist crisis, triggered in 2007, put back in the center of the political debate the issue of the relations between state-law regulation and capitalist market economy. In this context, the problem of the manifold relations between law and capitalism can be put into new perspective. In this thesis, through a reading of the Marxian critique of political economy driven by an analysis of value-form, we sought to re-propose a radicalized version of the Marxist critique of law, conceiving it as a regulator inextricably tied to the fate of commodities producer socialization / Doutorado / Sociologia / Doutor em Sociologia

No description available.

The overall aim of this thesis is to assess the legitimacy of constitutional laws and bills of rights within the framework of procedural epistemic democracy. The thesis is divided into three sections. In the first section, I discuss the relevance of an epistemic argument for democracy under the circumstances of politics: I provide an account of reasonable disagreement and explain how usual approaches to the authority of decision-making procedures fail to take it seriously. In the second part of the thesis, I provide an account of the epistemic features of democracy and of the requirements of democratic legitimacy. I develop a revised pragmatist argument for democracy which relies on three presumptive aims of decision-making: justice, sustainability and concord. In the third and last section, I first argue for the desirability of constitutionalism. I then explain why constitutionalism, as it is usually understood, is incompatible with my procedural epistemic account of democratic legitimacy. In the last chapter, I offer a two-pronged solution to the apparent incompatibility of constitutionalism and epistemic democracy. I first argue for the appropriateness of political constitutionalism, as opposed to legal constitutionalism, in understanding the relationship between rights and democracy. I then provide an account of rights protection and judicial review compatible with epistemic democratic legitimacy. Finally, I use the notion of pragmatic encroachment to explain how constitutional laws can achieve normative supremacy through the increased epistemic credentials of the procedure.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2018-04-11T11:51:16Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo José Rafful.pdf: 1264577 bytes, checksum: 48941699ba0e98c577a29912286be6cf (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2018-04-11T11:51:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Leonardo José Rafful.pdf: 1264577 bytes, checksum: 48941699ba0e98c577a29912286be6cf (MD5) Previous issue date: 2018-03-08 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / This dissertation has the scope of the analysis of the paper: "An introduction to the principals of morals and legislation" by the philosopher Jeremy Bentham, the discussion of his theory and the application of it within a system in which legal positivism prevails. For this purpose, the descriptive method was used, based on an accurate bibliographic analysis of national and foreign papers about the author’s masterpiece and backbone of his work. We started from the hypothesis that the application of this theory could result in greater legal certainty. The application of utilitarianism in our legal system would remove arbitrariness and insecurity from the application of law as it does in the common law system. As so, the concepts of hedonistic and eudaimonist happiness were studied in order to verify what kind of individualistic happiness, utilitarianism can be embedded. In the following act, David Hume's principle of causality was analyzed in order to integrate those concepts, since Jeremy Bentham, in the first chapter of the work under analysis, states textually that the human being would be inextricably linked to the chain cause and effect. Finally, in order to insert in this research a counterpoint to the thought of Jeremy Bentham, the theory of Hebert Hart was analyzed, in his paper: "The concept of right", being verified that, while the first one takes care of the construction of a theory which would guarantee the elaboration of norms that lead to happiness, the second concerns about the application of law, concluding that utilitarianism is a theory directed to the legislators with the application in a positivist system, so that through it, society can achieve happiness without compromising legal security, social order, and caring, on the other hand, for causal relations / Esta dissertação tem por escopo a análise da obra: “An introduction to the principals of morals and legislation” da lavra do filósofo Jeremy Bentham, a discussão de sua teoria e a aplicação da mesma dentro de um sistema em que prevalece o positivismo jurídico. Utilizou-se, para tanto, o método descritivo, a partir da efetivação de uma acurada análise bibliográfica de obras nacionais e estrangeiras que comentam a obra mestra e espinha dorsal deste trabalho. Parte-se da hipótese de que a aplicação desta teoria traria, como conseqüência, uma maior segurança jurídica. A aplicação do utilitarismo em nosso sistema jurídico afastaria a arbitrariedade e a insegurança da aplicação do direito tal como ocorre no sistema do common law. Para tanto, foram estudados os conceitos de felicidade hedonista e eudaimonista com a finalidade de se verificar em qual tipo de felicidade individualista, o utilitarismo pode ser encaixado. Em ato seguinte, analisou-se o princípio da causalidade, defendido por David Hume, com o objetivo de integrar esses conceitos, uma vez que Jeremy Bentham, no primeiro capítulo da obra sob análise, afirma textualmente que o ser humano estaria ligado indissociavelmente da cadeia de causa e efeito. Por derradeiro, visando inserir na pesquisa um contraponto ao pensamento de Jeremy Bentham, analisou-se a teoria de Hebert Hart, em sua obra: “O conceito de direito”, constatando-se que, enquanto o primeiro cuida da construção de uma teoria que venha a garantir a elaboração de normas que acarretem a felicidade, o segundo preocupou-se com a aplicação do direito, concluindo-se que o utilitarismo é uma teoria direcionada aos legisladores com a aplicação em um sistema positivista, para que por meio dela, a sociedade possa alcançar a felicidade sem comprometer a segurança jurídica, a ordem social e cuidar, em contrapartida, das relações causais