This thesis analyzes the dialectical relations of economic liberalism and nationalism. Four arguments are made: (1) the international economic order is the product of the intercourse between liberalism and nationalism; (2) world trade expansion is conditioned by the rise of protectionism; (3) the formation of regional trading blocs sets up a bridge between regional liberalism and GATT (General Agreement on Trade and Tariff); (4) the success of development is determined by the results of the crystallization of the nation-state. The arguments of this paper develop from abstract to specific. In the first part, the philosophical foundations of liberalism and nationalism are given attention. Both forces are regarded as the foundations of modern international relations, the success of one side depending on the other. In this connection, Ruggie's (1982) "embedded liberalism" is extended to the whole range of modern history. The three theories are also reviewed with respect to their ideologic commitments. The rapprochement of nationalism and liberalism implies that their originally one-sided standpoints need modification. In the second part of this thesis, empirical analyses are introduced. The different state patterns, such as free capitalism and state socialism, are regarded as the results of crystallization (Mann, forthcoming). The rise of protectionism and regionalism reflect the erosion of the existing international relations. Successful nationalism could set up the foundation for the solid development of liberalism under the political framework of democracy, which could alter the existing international relations.

This thesis is a critical examination of Fukuyama's "end of history" version of liberalism, in which he announces the triumphant emergence of liberal democracy as a universal form of governance. The thesis seeks to investigate Francis Fukuyama's notion of liberal democracy and his arguments for it, in order to assess the normative impact of market driven political and economic outcomes on the human context or life satisfaction, especially recognition. This is contrasted with Amartya Sen's notion of well-being in order to show that Fukuyama does not pay attention to some of the basic moral demands of human life. The thesis is comprised of an introduction and six chapters. The contents of these chapters can be presented briefly as follows: • The first chapter looks at how Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant use the theory of social contract to explain the genesis and justification of the state. Featuring prominently in all their versions of social contract are the values of freedom, equality, and independence of the individual, the process of consensus, the primacy of self-preservation and the necessity of the state. Together these laid the basis for a philosophically reasoned and progressive theory of politics. This chapter also looks at the theory of laissez-faire, which paved the way for a free market economy. This doctrine was developed in the thought of Adam Smith, Ricardo, Mill and Bentham. For Fukuyama these thinkers inaugurated a tradition of political thought that ultimately led to liberalism and democracy. • The second chapter discusses the teleological view of history underlying the philosophical theories of history advanced by Kant, Hegel, and Marx. Each of these thinkers assumes that history is moving towards an end point or goal. It is from these philosophers that Fukuyama appropriates the idea of universality to envisage the universality of liberal democracy. • The third chapter analyzes Fukuyama's "end of history" claim and his arguments for it. When communism finally collapsed, liberal democracy was the only remaining option, he claims. Drawing on Kant's idea of universal history, Hegel's notion of a universal and homogeneous state and Marx's materialist interpretation of history, Fukuyama envisages a global order that will be ushered in by the universal and homogeneous liberal state which is the ultimate goal of liberal democracy. It is the duty of the liberal state to ensure equal and mutual recognition and affirmation of its citizens' freedom. • The fourth chapter stages a debate between Fukuyama and Sen in which the question of life satisfaction and its achievability is addressed. Fukuyama claims that human-beings desire recognition, and can best satisfy this desire through liberal democracy. Sen for his part claims that people need well-being, and can only achieve it through democracy, which he views as a universal value. The discussion shows that although Fukuyama and Sen may share similar political values they differ ideologically and in historical vision. • The fifth chapter deals with the critical evaluation of liberal democracy. Several issues present major problems for liberal democracy. These issues are liberal individualism as the central focus of liberalism and liberal democracy; the global trend against gender bias; the political and cultural homogenization of the world; the problem of parallel histories versus a single inclusive history; desire-satisfaction versus need-satisfaction, and the cultural preconditions of liberal democracy. • The sixth chapter recapitulates the preceding chapters and spells out the conclusion reached in the course of the thesis. The findings on the notion of the "end of history" show that Fukuyama wishes the equal and mutual recognition of the freedom and dignity of all individuals as well as the affirmation of their individual rights. This concern for the individual is laudable. However, excessive individualism threatens the fabric of every society, and Fukuyama realizes that this threat is especially strong in liberal democracy. His suggested solution is to cultivate social capital in the form of trust. This thesis concludes that Fukuyama's medicine is no match for the disease; the whole thrust of the intellectual tradition leading to liberal democracy - and of much else in Western culture since Hobbes - is in the direction of excessive individualism and the withering of community. Moreover, where Fukuyama sees isothymia - the desire for equal recognition, the psychological truth is probably that people desire to be recognized as superior - mega/othymia, again making individualism intrinsically more threatening to a sense of community than Fukuyama seems to realize. Fukuyama suggests that an international consensus in favour of liberal democracy is emerging. But it appears that such a consensus is unlikely to arise nation- states fear disenfranchisement and assimilation and thus insist on their sovereignty, effectively blocking any shift from the nation-state to a homogeneous and universal liberal state. It is difficult to generate the consensus needed to receive it as a universal system, because not all people subscribe to its cultural preconditions. The satisfaction of human desire of any kind cannot be universalized since human existence is centrally characterized by diversity of context, culture, and perception. Any attempt to impose cultural or ideological homogeneity requires conquest - cultural or military imperialism. The triumphant emergence of liberal democracy cannot be the ultimate end of the whole of human history. If this were the case, it would no longer be worth trying to increase human knowledge, since knowledge always points to an open future in terms of how it will be used for further advancement. Due to its internal contradictions, such as the tension between excessive individualism and community, liberal democracy has unintended negative consequences. Liberal democracy is not yet the final ideology leading to human satisfaction at a global level for this generation and generations to come as long as human thought evolves. This will remain the case as long as Fukuyama's admission that liberal democracy only works where its cultural preconditions are met, remains true. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2003.

This dissertation examines Richard Rorty's liberalism, especially as articulated in Contingency, irony, and solidarity, from a perspective which is sympathetic to the broad features of his pragmatism. I argue that Rorty's liberalism is, in the first instance a moral, rather than a political project and I begin this dissertation by examining in Chapter One, the basis of this moral project in his rejection of any notion of human nature in favour of a focus on the individual as a contingent, self-creating vocabulary. The moral core of Rorty's work is found in the vision of the liberal self who abhors cruelty. His politics extends outward from one variant of this type, the liberal ironist, who tries to balance her liberal commitments with a disposition to radical doubt. In his attempt to secure society for, and from, the liberal ironist, Rorty constructs a vision of society based in a strong division between public and private. In Chapter Two I argue that we should reject this move, and I argue instead for a vision of society based in conversation. In Chapter Three, I argue that this conversational understanding offers us an increased chance to attain the sort of cosmopolitan community to which Rorty aspires. In particular, I argue that we should see conversation, rather than imagination and reading, as the best means to develop and extend our sense of solidarity. One of the biggest obstacles to our increasing solidarity through conversation is the way in which power operates to sustain existing social and political arrangements by setting the conversational agenda. Rorty, unfortunately, says little about the workings of power and so, in Chapter Four, I propose the use of Iris Marion Young's thought on oppression and domination as a means to illuminate the issue of power at work, and to help us in finding ways to deal with it. In the final chapter I look to the particular role of the intellectual in the conversation. I examine Rorty's rejection of philosophy-as-epistemology in favour of what he calls pragmatism, and how this move combines with a variety of other strategies to apparently silence intellectuals. I argue that in spite of these moves, Rorty's philosophy and his own example actually extend the space from which and through which intellectuals can participate in the conversation and its transformation. / Thesis (Ph.D.)-University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, 2010.

Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal

In Derek Attridge's J.M. Coetzee and the Ethics of Reading (2004), the novel is referred to as "an ethically charged event, one that befalls individual readers and, at the same time, the culture within which, and through which, they read" (xii). The ethical positions of individuals, communities and cultures are addressed through one of the most explosive issues in imaginative fiction: "the right to speak." What happens when a novelist not only encroaches on the values of an ethnic group or religion but also speaks on their behalf, as if from within that community or belief? This question has become especially charged with the emergence since the 1960s of "cultural politics": the identification of a political viewpoint within each discrete community in a multicultural society, and the resolute claim by each community to represent its history and values in its own terms. I consider this question by way of the responses to two novels: William Styron's The Confessions of Nat Turner (1967) and Salman Rushdie's The Satanic Verses (1988). Both of these novels were highly controversial when they were released, inciting anger among minority groups because they transgressed the limits of representation. Styron's novel challenged the right to speak because, as a White man, he attempted to portray the consciousness of a Black slave. The African-American community, during a time of upheaval, radicalism and assertion of their power, responded with vitriol, arguing that Styron's novel was a racist, stereotypical, appropriation of Black history. The allegedly blasphemous portrayal of Islam in Rushdie's Satanic Verses created even greater controversy throughout the Islamic world and British Muslim community - their anger amplified by a feeling of betrayal by one of their own. These novels illustrate the ethical dilemmas of the representations of minority groups and make urgent the question of whom has the right to speak for them in literature. Increasingly the tensions between individualistic White liberal ideology and communitarian sensitivities about the representation of their cultures, religions, histories and identities are being contested through the site of the novel. Satanic Verses and Nat Turner demonstrate the challenges faced by multicultural societies when liberals and communitarians force themselves into a manufactured binary through which no effective debate can take place. While the novelist's right to speak should be defended precisely because of the ethical dilemmas that can be presented by literature, freedom of speech is never absolute. The "ethical event" of the novel requires a more nuanced response, which recognises both the valuable and the potentially destructive nature of literature.

This project seeks to critically examine the hegemony and imperialism of liberal-democratic modernity, and the possibilities for forms of politics that are rooted in subaltern difference. I argue that one of the great challenges in resisting the hegemony of liberal-democracy is that it offers a broad family of both conservative and progressive/critical languages that can be adopted and used by elite and subordinate groups alike. The availability of critical or dissenting languages that are internal to liberal-democracy often entices subordinate groups to make use of them, but this only furthers the subalternization of other distinct normative or practical traditions. I aim to articulate an alternative form of politics that remains rooted in subaltern difference, and is not simply based on an internal or immanent critique of liberal-democracy. This is a type of ethico-politics that seeks to actualize subaltern goods and traditions in its very practice or way of life, and to build its forms of resistance and transformation upon this practice. This dissertation (a) explores some of the key features of this kind of subaltern ethico-politics; (b) examines the ways in which contemporary modes of postcolonial and political thought, especially those with critical or emancipatory intent, often serve to contain and/or efface this form of subaltern praxis; and (c) addresses some of the broader questions and challenges this praxis poses for resistance to imperialism and coalition-building among diverse social movements today.

This project seeks to critically examine the hegemony and imperialism of liberal-democratic modernity, and the possibilities for forms of politics that are rooted in subaltern difference. I argue that one of the great challenges in resisting the hegemony of liberal-democracy is that it offers a broad family of both conservative and progressive/critical languages that can be adopted and used by elite and subordinate groups alike. The availability of critical or dissenting languages that are internal to liberal-democracy often entices subordinate groups to make use of them, but this only furthers the subalternization of other distinct normative or practical traditions. I aim to articulate an alternative form of politics that remains rooted in subaltern difference, and is not simply based on an internal or immanent critique of liberal-democracy. This is a type of ethico-politics that seeks to actualize subaltern goods and traditions in its very practice or way of life, and to build its forms of resistance and transformation upon this practice. This dissertation (a) explores some of the key features of this kind of subaltern ethico-politics; (b) examines the ways in which contemporary modes of postcolonial and political thought, especially those with critical or emancipatory intent, often serve to contain and/or efface this form of subaltern praxis; and (c) addresses some of the broader questions and challenges this praxis poses for resistance to imperialism and coalition-building among diverse social movements today.

In Canada, the growth and intensity of neo-liberal governance and philosophy, which includes idealizing a self-sufficient and independent citizenry continues to inform public policies at the federal and provincial levels. These policies, in turn, have implications for individuals’ health and well-being. Health implications are further visible and intensified along gender, class and ethnic lines. In this study, in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted with eight low income single mothers who had been affected by employment and assistance policies and regulations in British Columbia. The findings revealed the ways in which these women were affected by neo-liberal policy initiatives that held them individually accountable and responsible for managing their life circumstances in order to achieve the expectations bestowed upon them as citizens. It also revealed the inequalities that existed at the intersection of gender, class and ethnicity. The findings point to the need to address the policy barriers that confront lone mothers. / Graduate / 2015-02-12 / 0630 / 0628 / amyh@uvic.ca

The thesis argues that the development of the New Liberalism in the late nineteenth century was opposed from the standpoint of a more "traditional" conception of liberalism by a group of political theorists who owed their inspiration to the work of Herbert Spencer. Despite the protestations of these self-styled "Individualists" that they were the true heirs of mid-century liberalism, it is argued that their political theory represented as much a transformation of Benthamite Radicalism as did that of the New Liberals. The Individualists developed raid-century liberalism in a conservative direction, arguing that social change was not to be attained by conscious design and developing an ethical justification for the actual distribution of property and power in late Victorian Britain. The thesis establishes this claim by examining six Individualist arguments derived from Spencer's Synthetic Philosophy: (1) the argument from the biological theory of evolution; (2) the argument from psychological theory; (3) the sociological conception of society as an "organism"; (4) the theory of historical development; (5) the doctrine of utility; and (6) the theory of justice and property rights.

Orwell often treats liberal and radical figures sympathetically and explores his own political position through them. He discriminates between types of liberalism and strongly prefers nineteenth-century liberalism and radicalism to contemporary liberalism. His patriotism, and its distinction from nationalism, are influenced by G.K. Chesterton and by the 'Little England' section of the late nineteenth-century Liberal Party. Many of Orwell's other values, freedom of expression, privacy, and individual autonomy, are part of liberalism. He attacks Marxist forms of socialism which threaten liberal values, and becomes committed to socialism where it promises to protect or fulfil them, although such a form of socialism remains only a possibility. He is best described as a liberal committed to socialism. Orwell was dissatisfied with the exclusion of historical considerations from most contemporary literary criticism. Marxism was an exception to this. He is influenced by Marxist criticism in his treatment of proletarian literature, and in his critical method of analysing a writer's work in terms of its political tendency and the writer's position in society. His knowledge of passages of Marx's work itself can be traced to The Adelphi. Orwell argues that the writer must be a liberal, and that prose literature is associated with liberalism, yet also admits the Marxist case that liberalism is a product of capitalism. He then doubts whether the culture of liberalism will continue to exist if capitalism is replaced by socialism, and finds it definitely incompatible with the growth of totalitarianism. An uneasy resolution of these dilemmas is reached in the distinction between a man as a writer and as a citizen, the preservation of the writer's liberal mind in a separate compartment from his activity as a man in an increasingly non-liberal society. The witness-narrator of Orwell's reportage of the 1930s can be compared to the autonomous self preferred by liberalism. These works were not directly influenced by the contemporary documentary movement. Orwell's tendency to appeal to common sense and to argue from observation and experience can be connected with liberalism, as can his view of language as an instrument, and the validation of personal identity by sensation and memory in his work. The distance of the observing subject of his reportage from the observed person can disrupt attempts at empathy and run counter to his expressed socialism. A sequence of composition is established for the essays in Inside the Whale.