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A universal human dignity, conceived as an inherent and inalienable value or worth in all human beings, which ought to be recognised, respected and protected by others, has become one of the most prominent and widely promoted interpretations of human dignity, especially in international human rights law. Yet, it is also one of the most difficult interpretations of human dignity to justify and ground. The fundamental problem rests on how one can justify bestowing an equal high worth to all human lives, whilst also attributing to all human life a worth that is superior to all non-human animal life. To avoid the speciesist charge it seems necessary to provide further reasons, over and above species membership, for why all humans have a unique worth and dignity. However, intrinsic capacities, such as autonomy, intelligence or language use, are too demanding for many humans (including foetuses or the severely cognitively disabled) to meet the required minimum standard, whilst also being obtainable by some non-human animals, regardless of where the level is set. This thesis offers a solution to this problem by turning instead to the significance of the relational ties between individuals or groups that transcend individual capacities and abilities, and consequently does not require that all individuals in the group need meet the minimum required capacity for full moral status. Rather, it is argued that a universal human dignity could be grounded in our social nature, the interconnectedness and interdependence of human life and the morally considerable relationships that can and do arise from it, especially in regards to our shared vulnerability and dependence, and our ability to engage in caring relationships. Care represents the antithesis to the dehumanizing effects of humiliation, and other degrading and dehumanizing acts, and as a relational concept, human dignity is often best realised through our caring relationships. The way that individuals and groups treat each other has a fundamental role in determining both an individual’s sense of self-worth and well-being, as well as their perceived public value and worth. Thus, whilst species membership is not in itself morally fundamental or basic, it often shapes the nature of our social and moral relations. These relational ties between humans, it is argued, distinguish us most clearly from other non-human animals and accord human relationships a special moral significance or dignity.

Dans un contexte où la reconnaissance de droits légaux à certaines entités non humaines apparaît comme une évolution juridique de plus en plus plausible, ce mémoire se veut une exploration de la littérature philosophique et juridique en faveur de l’octroi de la personnalité juridique aux animaux. Tout d’abord, nous offrirons un bref tour d’horizon historique de la notion de personne et pourrons constater que si celle-ci a fortement été associée à l’autonomie morale dans l’histoire du droit et de la philosophie, cette définition de la personnalité souffre d’importantes incohérences lorsque vient le temps de justifier l’extension de la personnalité aux êtres humains dépourvus de cette autonomie morale. C’est le cas, par exemple, des enfants, des êtres humains plongés dans le coma, des handicapés mentaux ou encore de certaines personnes âgées. Nous pourrons également constater que le geste qui consiste à octroyer des droits légaux à ces individus tout en refusant de reconnaître ces mêmes droits aux animaux repose sur des bases théoriques fragiles qu’il convient de revoir l’aide d’une analyse approfondie des théories des droits des animaux proposées depuis les années 1970. Ces théories, et plus particulièrement celles proposées par Peter Singer, Tom Regan et Gary Francione, feront l’objet d’un examen qui permettra de faire ressortir leurs forces et faiblesses respectives. Enfin, dans le dernier chapitre de ce mémoire, nous nous pencherons sur le rôle que peuvent jouer les appels aux droits moraux dans l’attribution de droits légaux. Nous y brosserons aussi une esquisse des différentes formes de personnalité juridique et de statut politique que pourraient se voir octroyer les animaux non humains. / In a context where the recognition of legal rights to certain nonhuman entities appears to be an increasingly plausible legal development, this master’s thesis proposes an exploration of the philosophical and legal literature in favor of granting legal personhood to animals. First, I will provide a brief historical overview of the notion of “person.” I will also note that, while it has been strongly associated with moral autonomy in the history of law and philosophy, this definition of personhood suffers from substantial inconsistencies in justifying the granting of legal personhood to non-autonomous human beings. It is the case, for instance, of children, comatose human beings, the mentally disabled, and the elderly. We will also see that granting legal rights to these individuals while refusing to recognize these same rights to nonhuman animals is based on fragile theoretical foundations that need to be rectified with a thorough analysis of the theories of animal rights proposed since the 1970s. These theories, specifically the ones put forward by Peter Singer, Tom Regan, and Gary Francione, will be examined to identify their respective strengths and weaknesses. Finally, the final chapter of this research will examine the decisive role that appeals to moral rights can play in granting legal rights to animals. It also outlines the various forms of legal personhood and political status that might be attributed to nonhuman animals.