A tese da equivalência afirma que as condicionais indicativas e a condicional material possuem condições de verdade equivalentes, i.e., elas são falsas quando possuem a antecedente verdadeira e a consequente falsa, mas são verdadeiras nas demais circunstâncias. Essa tese tem algumas consequências contra-intuitivas. Por exemplo, ela implica que qualquer condicional com uma antecedente falsa é verdadeira. Isso é estranho, pois não é intuitivo pensar que a condicional “Se a lua é feita de queijo, então 2 +2 = 4” é verdadeira somente porque a lua não é feita de queijo. Antes, pensamos que a constituição da lua não tem qualquer relação com as verdades da aritmética. Essa perplexidade é um dos paradoxos da condicional material. No primeiro e segundo capítulos apresento as duas tentativas mais influentes de defender a tese da equivalência face aos paradoxos, as propostas de Paul Grice e Frank Jackson. Argumento que elas são incapazes de eliminar os paradoxos, pois tentam explicar a sua origem em práticas linguísticas. No terceiro capítulo eu argumento que a real causa dos aspectos paradoxais da condicional material são intuições epistêmicas e metafísicas que devem ser recusadas, pois resultam de erros de raciocínio. / The equivalence thesis states that indicative conditionals and the material conditional have the same truth conditions i.e., they are false when they have a truth antecedent and a false consequent, but true in any other circumstances. This thesis has some counterintuitive consequences. For instance, it implies that any conditional with a false antecedent is true. This is odd, for it is not intuitive to think that the conditional “If the moon is made of cheese, then 2 + 2 = 4” is true solely in virtue of the moon not being made of cheese. We would rather think that the moon’s composition and arithmetic truths aren’t related to each other. This perplexity is one of the paradoxes of the material conditional. In the first and second chapters, I present the two most influential attempts of defending the equivalence thesis from the paradoxes: the proposals of Paul Grice and Frank Jackson. I argue that the attempts are nonetheless unable of dismissing the paradoxes, because they attempt to explain their origins as stemming from linguistic practices. In the third chapter, I argue that the real cause of the paradoxical aspects of the material conditional are epistemic and metaphysical intuitions that must be refused, for they result from flawed reasoning.

The diploma thesis deals with the analysis of particular detective and Gothic elements in Christopher Pike's adventurous series Remember Me. The main aim of the thesis is to analyse themes and motifs of Pike's work with respect to the Gothic tradition and the development of detective prose. The thesis is formally divided into theoretical and practical parts. The theoretical chapter is devoted to the genre of the detective and Gothic literature, as well as metaphysical detective story. The theoretical part is followed by the practical analysis of selected Pike's works. The practical analysis involves the characteristics of the main protagonists and the influence of horror and metaphysical detective elements on the search of individual identity.

尼采認為藝術的來源是自然中的兩種藝術衝動：戴奧尼索斯式的與阿波羅式的衝動。戴奧尼索斯式藝術是在生命原始的衝動所造成的「過度」中，沈浸在迷醉與狂喜的出神忘我狀態，是充滿力量的宇宙生機的流現。阿波羅式的藝術則提供一種夢幻似的美麗外觀，以幻象的形式遮掩生命本質的恐怖。而希臘悲劇可以作為藝術精神的最完美呈現的理由，就在於它結合了這兩種衝動。悲劇結合了藝術衝動的兩種積極力量，也就是變形(transfiguration)和超越(overcoming)；而悲劇的作用則在於提供尼采所謂的「形而上的安慰」。藝術不只是以美的形象掩蓋住生命令人畏懼的真實面貌，它更透過變形的作用來超越現實的恐怖，以美的形式展現自然豐沛的力量。因此，藝術指出了一種積極的面向：生命中的美學創造力使得人的生存儘管是充滿悲苦，但卻不是沒有價值而必須被否定的。生命的價值由藝術來支持，藝術的優劣也由它表現的生命力來評斷了。尼采在《悲劇的誕生》中呈出的藝術觀具有以下幾個特點： 　　(1)尼采放棄以主／客觀作為評判藝術品好壞的標準。他重新定義主觀是一種主體自我與自然融合的表現，這種主體才能分受自然源源不絕的創造生機，因而能表現出普遍性。 　　(2)藝術與生命的緊密連結使尼采反對以認知的態度看待藝術。蘇格拉底式的認知態度即是因為對生命的無知而產生不恰當的了解，也僵化藝術的創作力。 　　(3)自然孕育了創造與破壞兩種力量，為了吸納創造力，藝術同時也把醜放入它的表現內容裡，豐富了藝術的內涵。尼采並不像當時大部分美學家，把對藝術的討論局限在對美感的分析，但他也並未因此就認為藝術缺少美的形式還可以是藝術。 　　(4)以美的態度面對人生，說明生存的價值。這種態度不是把生命當成一種對象來欣賞，而是投注其中的創造精神；這是以創作者為中心的美學態度。生命價值就是建基在人對生存的苦痛不斷的超越，藝術一方面作為生命合理化的理由，同時自然的豐富創造力也使得藝術更形深刻。

This thesis seeks to realign Richard Crashaw’s aesthetic orientation with a broadly conceptualized genre of seventeenth-century devotional, or meditative, poetry. This realignment clarifies Crashaw’s worth as a poet within the Renaissance canon and helps to dismantle historicist and New Historicist readings that characterize him as a literary anomaly. The methodology consists of an expanded definition of meditative poetry, based primarily on Louis Martz’s original interpretation, followed by a series of close readings executed to show continuity between Crashaw and his contemporaries, not discordance. The thesis concludes by expanding the genre of seventeenth-century devotional poetry to include Edward Taylor, who despite his Puritanism, also exemplifies many of the same generic attributes as Crashaw.

This study is an attempt to explicate Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz&rsquo / s search for a way out of the labyrinth of the continuum in his early years of philosophizing. The main motive of the study is the belief that it would be worthwhile to see how Leibniz initially goes into the labyrinth and comes across with the riddles contained in it. Accordingly, this thesis is intended to discuss what the problem of the composition of the continuum is for the young Leibniz, which concepts and metaphysical problems are associated with the labyrinth, and what particular difficulties challenge Leibniz in his struggle. More importantly, the study seeks to delineate how Leibniz responds to these difficulties, what kinds of solutions he suggests, and how and why he changes his mind and offers different accounts concerning the composition of the continuum in his early writings. In this search for a way out of the labyrinth, some of the early writings of Leibniz written between 1666 and 1675 were studied with a particular emphasis on those directly related with the labyrinth of the continuum. During the study, the differences and transitions between geometrical, physical, and metaphysical accounts concerning the problem of the composition of the continuum were examined with a special focus on the bridging role of &lsquo / motion&rsquo / and the notion of &lsquo / conatus.&rsquo

A tese da equivalência afirma que as condicionais indicativas e a condicional material possuem condições de verdade equivalentes, i.e., elas são falsas quando possuem a antecedente verdadeira e a consequente falsa, mas são verdadeiras nas demais circunstâncias. Essa tese tem algumas consequências contra-intuitivas. Por exemplo, ela implica que qualquer condicional com uma antecedente falsa é verdadeira. Isso é estranho, pois não é intuitivo pensar que a condicional “Se a lua é feita de queijo, então 2 +2 = 4” é verdadeira somente porque a lua não é feita de queijo. Antes, pensamos que a constituição da lua não tem qualquer relação com as verdades da aritmética. Essa perplexidade é um dos paradoxos da condicional material. No primeiro e segundo capítulos apresento as duas tentativas mais influentes de defender a tese da equivalência face aos paradoxos, as propostas de Paul Grice e Frank Jackson. Argumento que elas são incapazes de eliminar os paradoxos, pois tentam explicar a sua origem em práticas linguísticas. No terceiro capítulo eu argumento que a real causa dos aspectos paradoxais da condicional material são intuições epistêmicas e metafísicas que devem ser recusadas, pois resultam de erros de raciocínio. / The equivalence thesis states that indicative conditionals and the material conditional have the same truth conditions i.e., they are false when they have a truth antecedent and a false consequent, but true in any other circumstances. This thesis has some counterintuitive consequences. For instance, it implies that any conditional with a false antecedent is true. This is odd, for it is not intuitive to think that the conditional “If the moon is made of cheese, then 2 + 2 = 4” is true solely in virtue of the moon not being made of cheese. We would rather think that the moon’s composition and arithmetic truths aren’t related to each other. This perplexity is one of the paradoxes of the material conditional. In the first and second chapters, I present the two most influential attempts of defending the equivalence thesis from the paradoxes: the proposals of Paul Grice and Frank Jackson. I argue that the attempts are nonetheless unable of dismissing the paradoxes, because they attempt to explain their origins as stemming from linguistic practices. In the third chapter, I argue that the real cause of the paradoxical aspects of the material conditional are epistemic and metaphysical intuitions that must be refused, for they result from flawed reasoning.

The PhD thesis studies the translations and the overall reception of John Donneʼs poetry in the Czech literary culture. Its introduction explains the choice of the topic, outlines the structure of the text and the main question to be answered: to what extent Donne has become a significant presence in the Czech cultural context and how his work has been transplanted through translations. The first chapter gives a brief overview of the historical changes in the appreciation of Donneʼs poetry and, drawing on a range of Donnean literature, attempts to define the main features of his poetics. The second chapter traces the gradual building of an awareness of Donneʼs poetry among Czech readers through translations, translation paratexts and references in the works of Czech literary scholars. It introduces the Czech translators of Donne and discusses their motives for translating his work where these could be ascertained. The first part of Chapter 3 describes the method used in analyzing the Czech translations. It introduces the model of translation criticism presented by Antoine Berman in his analysis of French Donnean translations (Pour une critique des traductions: John Donne, 1995) and comments on its application in the study of the Czech translations. The second part sums up the findings of two...

A tese da equivalência afirma que as condicionais indicativas e a condicional material possuem condições de verdade equivalentes, i.e., elas são falsas quando possuem a antecedente verdadeira e a consequente falsa, mas são verdadeiras nas demais circunstâncias. Essa tese tem algumas consequências contra-intuitivas. Por exemplo, ela implica que qualquer condicional com uma antecedente falsa é verdadeira. Isso é estranho, pois não é intuitivo pensar que a condicional “Se a lua é feita de queijo, então 2 +2 = 4” é verdadeira somente porque a lua não é feita de queijo. Antes, pensamos que a constituição da lua não tem qualquer relação com as verdades da aritmética. Essa perplexidade é um dos paradoxos da condicional material. No primeiro e segundo capítulos apresento as duas tentativas mais influentes de defender a tese da equivalência face aos paradoxos, as propostas de Paul Grice e Frank Jackson. Argumento que elas são incapazes de eliminar os paradoxos, pois tentam explicar a sua origem em práticas linguísticas. No terceiro capítulo eu argumento que a real causa dos aspectos paradoxais da condicional material são intuições epistêmicas e metafísicas que devem ser recusadas, pois resultam de erros de raciocínio. / The equivalence thesis states that indicative conditionals and the material conditional have the same truth conditions i.e., they are false when they have a truth antecedent and a false consequent, but true in any other circumstances. This thesis has some counterintuitive consequences. For instance, it implies that any conditional with a false antecedent is true. This is odd, for it is not intuitive to think that the conditional “If the moon is made of cheese, then 2 + 2 = 4” is true solely in virtue of the moon not being made of cheese. We would rather think that the moon’s composition and arithmetic truths aren’t related to each other. This perplexity is one of the paradoxes of the material conditional. In the first and second chapters, I present the two most influential attempts of defending the equivalence thesis from the paradoxes: the proposals of Paul Grice and Frank Jackson. I argue that the attempts are nonetheless unable of dismissing the paradoxes, because they attempt to explain their origins as stemming from linguistic practices. In the third chapter, I argue that the real cause of the paradoxical aspects of the material conditional are epistemic and metaphysical intuitions that must be refused, for they result from flawed reasoning.

The thesis concerns an aspect of poetic imagination in the works of 17th century metaphysical poets and examines the way these poets were influenced by the Church of England. In addition, it identifies elements of Anglican spirituality in their works. The first section analyzes the concept of Christian spirituality and the specifics of Anglican spirituality. Anglican spirituality is closely linked with the historical origins and development of the Anglican Church. In the second section, there is a description of poetic imagination and the relationship between poetics and spirituality. The thesis describes the concept of so-called metaphysical poets. The works of three selected authors are examined to identify poetic expressions of general, theological issues. Theological themes emphasized in Anglican spirituality are compared with those expressed in metaphysical poetic imagination. The aim of this thesis is to find the role of poetics in general, theological discourse.

As the title suggests, this essay is a postmodern and autobiographical analysis of the three detectives in Paul Auster´s widely acclaimed 1987 novel The New York Trilogy. The focus of this study is centred on a comparison between the three detectives, but also on tracking when and why the detectives devolve into madness. Moreover, it links their descent into madness to the postmodern condition. In postmodernity with its’ incredulity toward Metanarratives’ lives are shaped by chance rather than by causality. In addition, the traditional reliable tools of analysis and reason widely associated with the well-known literary detectives in the era of enlightenment, such as Sherlock Holmes or Dupin, are of little use. All of this is also aggravated by an unforgiving and painful never-ending postmodern present that leaves the detectives with little chance to catch their breath, recover their balance or sanity while being overwhelmed by their disruptive postmodern objects. Consequently, the three detectives are essentially all humiliated and stripped bare of their professional and personal identities with catastrophic results. Hence, if the three detectives start out with a reasonable confidence in their own abilities, their investigations lead them with no exceptions to a point where they are unable to distinguish reality from their postmodern paranoia and madness. And in the meantime, no crime is resolved and no social order restored. The autobiographical back drop of the three detectives and protagonists in the three novellas is the author´s own life in the late seventies and early eighties. In that sense the three protagonists all illustrate the parallel lives the author could have had, if chance and trivial every day decisions had not turned Auster´s life around, at certain critical junctures during the darkest moments of his life in connection with the painful divorce from his first wife.