Magister Economicae - MEcon / The "new" South Africa faces a big challenge. Unemployment, poverty and economic hardship still characterise the life of the majority of South Africans. Most people expect this to change under democracy. This will only be possible, however, if the economy can grow fast enough. What type of economic policies can a future government adopt to bring about economic growth and the reduction of poverty? More specifically, can the government raise taxes in order to spend more on the poor without reducing economic growth? The increased expenditure, given the existing deficit, will pressurise government to increase taxes. If this were to happen, the question that comes to mind is whether a savings constraint will develop. At the moment South Africa is not experiencing a savings constraint. This can be attributed to the fact that investment declined more than saving over the past few years. However, if investment has to increase over the next few years to achieve higher economic growth, the question arises whether domestic saving will increase enough to finance it. This will be difficult if an increasing tax burden has a negative impact on saving. Saving has long been recognized as a major factor in the process of economic development, directly by its diversion of resources into the formation of capital, and indirectly through changes in technology which are implemented when new capital is put to use. Few would dispute that domestic saving is important for the financing of development and it is evident that a country will require higher saving rates if it wants to invest more.

The overall goal of the dissertation is to contribute to the growing literature on multiple discrete-continuous (MDC) choice models. In MDC choice situations, consumers often encounter two inter-related decisions at a choice instance – which alternative(s) to choose for consumption from a set of available alternatives, and the amount to consume of the chosen alternatives. In the recent literature, there is increasing attention on modeling MDC situations based on a rigorous underlying micro-economic utility maximization framework. Among these models, the multiple-discrete continuous extreme value MDCEV model (Bhat, 2005, 2008) provides a number of advantages over other models. The primary objective of this dissertation is to extend the MDCEV framework to accommodate more realistic decision-making processes from a behavioral standpoint. The dissertation has two secondary objectives. The first is to advance the current operationalization and the econometric modeling of MDC choice situations. The second is to contribute to the transportation literature by estimating MDC models that provide new insights on individuals’ travel decision processes. The proposed extensions of the MDCEV model include: (1) To formulate and estimate a latent choice set generation model within the MDCEV framework, (2) To develop a random utility-based model formulation that extends the MDCEV model to include multiple linear constraints, and (3) To extend the MDCEV model to relax the assumption of an additively separable utility function. The methodologies developed in this dissertation allow the specification and estimation of complex MDC choice models, and may be viewed as a major advance with the potential to lead to significant breakthroughs in the way MDC choices are structured and implemented. These methodologies provide a more realistic representation of the choice process. The proposed extensions are applied to different empirical contexts within the transportation field, including participation in and travel mileage allocated to non-work activities during various time periods of the day for workers, participation in recreational activities and time allocation for workers, and household expenditures in disaggregate transportation categories. The results from these exercises clearly underline the importance of relaxing some of the assumptions made, not only in the MDCEV model, but in MDC models in general. / text

The first chapter reports experiments with payoff-equivalent public good and common pool games. Behavior of high-caste and low-caste Indian villagers is compared with behavior of American students in terms of economic surplus foregone or destroyed by failure of cooperation in the public good and common pool games. When information about caste is withheld no significant difference is observed in the efficiency of play between villagers and student subjects at American universities for both the public good game and the payoff-equivalent common pool game. Providing caste information leads to: (i) the lowest level of efficiency when low-caste first movers interact with a low-caste second mover, and (ii) the highest levels of efficiency when high-caste first movers engage with a high-caste second mover. Cross-caste play generates intermediate levels of efficiency. In my second chapter I examine competition and cooperation across genders and castes in India and compare the data with incentivized laboratory experiments across genders and races in the US. High-caste males (India) and White males (U.S.) choose to compete the most and are universally cooperative. In India females compete more and cooperate less when they are paired with other females but not with males. The level of cooperation among the females of either race (US) is lower than that of the White males but is insignificantly different from the level of cooperation among the African American males. In my third chapter I conducted artifactual field experiments in rural India with variations of dictator and ultimatum games. Eight treatments are played: in four we provide information that the other player is the spouse and in the remaining four variations spouse information is not provided. When subjects are unaware of playing with their spouses, they choose to keep the dictator role for themselves or not empower the other player. Male spouses make higher offers in general relative to female spouses. The divisions in these games (no spouse information) are far less equitable than in dictator games with student subjects. We find more concern for procedural fairness when subjects know they are playing with their spouses than when they do not have this information.

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xiii, 230 p. : ill. (some col.) / I develop a model in which a representative consumer selects an affordable consumption bundle, not as a single choice, but as the end result of a series of smaller, incremental purchase decisions. If the array of such incremental choices facing the consumer is sufficiently complex relative to the consumer's computational abilities, then the consumer may choose to employ a simplifying heuristic or rule-of-thumb to guide her behavior. I demonstrate the existence of a simple and well-defined example of such a strategy, based upon a satisficing decision rule. I further show that in the strategic setting defined by the interaction between consumers and firms that compete in prices, this satisficing strategy can form part of a Nash equilibrium, despite being ex ante only boundedly rational. The use of this satisficing demand strategy fundamentally alters the nature of price competition between firms (relative to the standard Bertrand model), changing the shape of the firm best response functions. The use of a satisficing strategy alters the incentives of firms, and these altered firm incentives lead to pricing behavior which has the effect of rationalizing the satisficing consumption strategy, so that a truly novel class of Nash equilibria in price-competing markets can be shown to exist under certain conditions. We explore the nature of this new class of equilibria, and find that equilibrium prices may be higher than those which would be obtained in the standard Bertrand case. In general, demand curves for each distinct good will have a kinked shape, similar to those found in 1939 papers by both Sweezy and Hall & Hitch. The Nash equilibrium profile will involve the kink in each demand curve coinciding with the equilibrium price for the corresponding good. The equilibrium price vector will therefore be robust to "small" fluctuations in cost (since marginal revenue is discontinuous at the equilibrium price), and under certain conditions, we find that prices may be upwardly flexible but downwardly rigid. We make an argument that the main results of the paper generalize from a representative agent setting to one with a population of heterogeneous consumers. / Committee in charge: Dr. Van Kolpin， Chairperson； Dr. Christopher J. Ellis， Member； Dr. Jeremy Piger， Member； Dr. Renee Irvin， Outside Member

Magister Public Health - MPH / This secondary data study, framed in social constructionism theory, descibes and analyses the "pull" factors influencing migration of health professionals developing to developed countries. The literature review sets the context withing which international migration takes place and explores relevant aspects of the G8, globalisation, and the General Agreement on Trade in Services. The research demonstrates that temporary or permanent international migration occurs for employment or study purposes. It further confirms that, despite the lack of accurate data from African counties, the number of health professionals leaving the continent has increased significantly during the 1990's. / South Africa

The aim of this work is to create a concept that should strenghthen competitiveness of the company based on analyses of microeconimic and macroeconomic elements. This work further deals with evaluation of the current situation of company Brewery Černá Hora a.s. in the world of small and average breweries. Theoretical part describes knowledge about competitiveness and its strengthening. In practical part are these knowledge put in use. This work examines competitiveness of the company based on analysis of microeconimic and macroeconomic elements. Outputs from these analyses are used to create a concept, that should help the company increase the competitiveness.

Thesis advisor: Uzi Segal / This collection of papers examines applications of microeconomic theory to practical problems. More specifically, I identify frictions between theoretical results and agent behavior. I seek to resolve these tensions by either proposing mechanisms to more closely capture the theoretical environment of interest or extending the model to more closely approximate the world as individuals perceive it. In the first chapter, "Compensation without Distortion,'' I propose a new mechanism for compensating subjects in preference elicitation experiments. The motivation for this tool is the theoretical problem of incentive compatibility in decision experiments. A hallmark of experimental economics is the connection between a subject's payment with their actions or decisions, however previous literature has highlighted shortcomings in this link between compensation and methods currently used to elicit beliefs. Specifically, compensating individuals based on choices they make increases reliability, however these payments can themselves distort subjects' preferences, limiting the resulting data's usefulness. I reexamine the source of the underlying theoretical tension, and propose using a stochastic termination mechanism called the "random stopping procedure'' (RSP). I show that the RSP is theoretically able to structurally avoid preference distortions induced by the current state of the art protocols. Changing the underlying context subjects answer questions—by resolving payoff uncertainty immediately after every decision is made—the assumed impossibility of asking multiple questions without creating preference distortions is theoretically resolved. To test this prediction, I conduct an experiment explicitly designed to test the accuracy of data gathered by the RSP against the current best practice for measuring subject preferences. Results show that RSP-elicited preferences more closely match a control group's responses than the alternative. In the second chapter, "School Choice and Class Size Externalities,'' I revisit the many-to-one matching problem of school choice. I focus on the importance of problem definition, and argue that the "standard'' school choice model is insufficiently sensitive to relevant characteristics of student preferences. Motivated by the observation that students care about both the school they attend, and how over- or under-crowded the school is, I extend the problem definition to allow students to report preferences over both schools and cohort sizes. (Cohort size is intended as a generalization of school crowding, relative resources, or other similar school characteristics.) I show that, if students do have preferences over schools and cohort sizes, current mechanisms lose many of their advantageous properties, and are no longer stable, fair, nor non-wasteful. Moreover, I show that current mechanisms no longer necessarily incentivize students to truthfully report their preferences over school orderings. Motivated by the observation that students care about both the school they attend, and how over- or under-crowded the school is, in "School Choice and Class Size Externalities'' I extend the standard school choice problem to incorporate both of these elements. I show that, if students do have preferences over schools and cohort sizes, current mechanisms are no longer stable, fair, nor non-wasteful. In response, I construct an alternative matching mechanism, called the deferred acceptance with voluntary withdrawals (DAwVW) mechanism, which improves on the underlying (unobserved) manipulability of "standard" mechanisms. The DAwVW mechanism is deterministic and terminates, more closely satisfies core desirable matching properties, and can yield substantial efficiency gains compared to mechanisms that do not consider class size. In the third chapter, I provide an overview of the history of decision experiments in economics, describe several of the underlying tensions that motivate my other projects, and identify alternative potential solutions that have been proposed by others to these problems. In this project, I add context to the larger field of experimental economics in which my research is situated. In addition to the mechanisms discussed by prior literature reviews, I incorporate and discuss recently developed payment and elicitation methods, and identify these new approaches' advantages and drawbacks. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2022. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Economics.

<p>This study examines several emerging topics in strategic communication and information design. The first chapter studies the role of verification in persuasion and its interaction with commitment in a Bayesian persuasion framework in which the sender is not fully bound by the committed plan. Both theoretically and experimentally, we demonstrate that making verification easier can significantly improve information transmission when commitment is low, but its effect is limited when commitment is high. However, empirically receivers do not respond as strongly as predicted by theory, which is consistent with base-rate neglect and conservatism. On the other hand, senders generally anticipate receivers' actions and best respond to the empirical behavior of receivers. We provide empirical implications for cases where verification is instrumental in improving information transmission and where it is not. </p> <p><br></p> <p>The second and third chapters are based on joint work with Dr. Collin Raymond. In the second chapter, we investigate how increasing the complexity of the message space in the presence of limited memory can reduce misrepresentation in strategic communication. We enrich a standard cheap talk game so that senders must communicate not just a payoff-relevant state, but also payoff-irrelevant attributes correlated with the state.  We show that increasing the set of attributes that may need to be reported (i.e., the complexity of the game) improves the amount of information transmitted in equilibrium. Our findings demonstrate that the reporting of redundant information may induce equilibria that feature improved outcomes compared to simpler, more direct reporting systems, and point out the importance of complexity when trying to induce truthful information revelation.</p> <p><br></p> <p>In the third chapter, we analyze some extensions on the effect of complexity. We present experimental evidence which shows that  too much of an increase in complexity leads to a reversal of those gains. Limited memory on the part of players, as well as the relative complexity faced by senders and receivers, drives these changes, and individuals experience cognitive costs when dealing with complex environments that they are willing to pay to avoid. </p> <p><br></p>

Heterogeneous consumers make the decision to buy a durable good or to download a replica, and a monopolist chooses to price and protect their intellectual property in the form of an authentication cost. An optimal price and authentication cost is derived, and shown to be higher than the efficient outcome for a uniform distribution of consumers. The optimal selection of price and protection are shown to be commensurate with his authenticating technology, and the searching ability of consumers. As an extension, a layout for a monopolist problem where consumers have different searching abilities is shown to be indistinct from a homogeneous case when consumers are uniformly distributed.