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「兵役制度」為國民至軍隊服役制度，是保障國家安全之武裝力量，平時以法律規範，完成兵員補充、武裝組織、軍事訓練，使人民依法履行義務。「兵役制度」依國家安全環境考量，由戰略家與兵力規劃者權衡戰事，反覆檢視安全環境、戰略目標、可利用資源，從整體戰略來決定兵力結構，以合理有效訓練方式提升兵力水準，以支撐軍事戰略。 兩岸為創造有利之安全環境與挑戰內外競敵，不斷在軍事戰略思維實施調整。中共已賦予解放軍保障國家安全利益之任務與角色，並自1949年建政以來，持續運用針對性之軍事演習或武力展示威懾台灣，以達其政治目的，並於1985年大裁軍後，以量小質精、齊全、強大的軍兵種常規武裝力量，遂行立體作戰整備。台灣軍事戰略從「反攻大陸」－「攻守一體」－「防衛固守」－「防衛固守，有效嚇阻」－「有效嚇阻，防衛固守」，各階段戰略決策有所不同，依當時國防威脅逐年修正，台澎防衛作戰又將作戰區區分安全警戒區、主要戰鬥區、後方區域，以提高作戰層次與建軍備戰。台灣如何於獲得先進武器後，搭配組建優質兵力，以形成整體軍力優勢，為維護整體國防安全之碁石。為因應台海快速變化的戰爭型態，台灣之國防組織必須採「平戰一體」，才能因應未來戰事。然而，台灣目前國防設計則偏向平戰轉換，在國防體制上是「常後分立」，戰時才將後備動員轉換為戰力．台灣軍方較迷失動員人力「到召率」，認為到召率數提高，戰力便從而昇起，而因應台海戰爭發展迅速，如完全仰賴動員，戰事亦可能告敗結束。 / The “Conscription System” is a military service scheme ordinarily enforced by law，through which the citizens of a country are called up for obligatory military service.It is the basic formation of armed forces to safeguard the national security，so that supplement of military manpower，organization of armed services，arrangement of military training，and exertion of authority over the citizens for observance of the obligatory duties can be undertaken without hindrance .Based on the consideration of national circumstantial security，the blueprint of conscription system，including the size of military forces，strategic structure of armed forces，elevation of the standard of armaments to support the decided military strategy is entrusted to groups of military strategists and planners to formulate and decide after their repeated careful surveyals of the national security circumstances，strategic aims and national resources available.The opponents on opposite coasts of Taiwan Strait for creating environments，advantageous to their own potentials and challenging their hostiles，either extrinsic or intrinsic，unremittingly adjust and readjust their thoughts of military strategy to suit the alterations of situations.The Communist China has long since bestowed upon its “Liberation Army” the role and task of safeguarding national safety and benefits，and indeed since its accomplishment of civil administration in 1949，it persistently manipulates purposeful military maneuvers or military displays to threaten Taiwan to effectuate its political aims.On the side of Taiwan，the military strategy has been modified from “Restoration of Mainland” at the beginning to “Unification of Attack and Defensive Holdout” and then to “Defensive Holdout and Effective Deterrence” by the Department of Defense，year in，year out，based on the altering strategic situation at various stages.With respect to the Taiwan-Penghus Defense in case of war，the entire war theater is divided into safe surveillance zone，main or major combat zone and rear zone so as to elevate the orders of warfare and raise weapons for war. How to acquire modern weapons to incorporate the raising of a military force of high quality to create military supremacy，is the solution or cornerstone of safeguarding the overall safety of defense.To be able to cope with the war in the Taiwan strait，which， in general assumption，could change rapidly in pattern，the coustitution of national defense must be based on a conception of ‘war and peace alike” .Nevertheless，at present，the design of national defense inclines to be based on a theory of ‘peace and war switchover” .In the structure of defense，regulars and reservists are independent and individualized without intimate and close linkage，and in case of war，the reservists are then called up to form combatant units.The higher military echelons，owing to being bewildered by high summon or attending rate of the called－up reservists，are of the opinion that if the summon rate is raised，the combative strength is also elevated.Since the fashion of war of the Taiwan Strait could be swift，should meeting the enemy solely rely on mobilization of reservists，the war might end in defeat.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited / An increasing number of unmanned vehicles (UV) are being incorporated into maritime operations as organic elements of Expeditionary and Carrier Strike Groups for development of the recognized maritime picture. This thesis develops an analytically-based planning aid for allocating UVs to missions. Inputs include the inventory of UVs, sensors, their performance parameters, and operational scenarios. Operations are broken into mission critical functions: detection, identification, and collection. The model output assigns aggregated packages of UVs and sensors to one of the three functions within named areas of interest. A spreadsheet model uses conservative time-speed-distance calculations, and simplified mathematical models from search theory and queuing theory, to calculate measures of performance for possible assignments of UVs to missions. The spreadsheet model generates a matrix as input to a linear integer program assignment model which finds the best assignment of UVs to missions based on the user inputs and simplified models. The results provide the mission planner with quantitatively-based recommendations for unmanned vehicle mission tasking in challenging scenarios. / Lieutenant, United States Navy

Military command is the single most important factor in the conduct of warfare. To understand war and military success and failure, historians need to explore command structures and the relationships between commanders. In World War I, a new level of higher command had emerged: the corps commander. Between 1914 and 1918, the role of corps commanders and the demands placed upon them constantly changed as experiences brought illumination and insight. Yet the men who occupied these positions were sometimes unable to cope with the changing circumstances and the many significant limitations which were imposed upon them. Of the World War I corps commanders, William Birdwood was one of the longest serving. From the time of his appointment in December 1914 until May 1918, Birdwood acquired an experience of corps command which was perhaps more diverse than his contemporaries during this time. He is, then, an ideal subject for a prolonged assessment of this level of command. This thesis has two principal objectives. The first is to identify and assess those factors which limited Birdwood???s capacity and ability to command. The second is to explore the institutional constraints placed on corps commanders during the 1914-1918 war. Surprisingly, this is a comparatively barren area of research. Because very few officers spent much time as corps commanders on their way to higher command appointments and because the role of the corps commanders in military planning and in the conduct of operations was not immediately apparent, their role has been practically ignored. Historians have tended to concentrate on the Army and divisional levels creating a deficient view of higher military command in World War I. However, corps commanders could and did play an important part in planning operations and in military affairs generally. Birdwood???s experience at Gallipoli and in France reflect some of the changes to command structures that were prompted by the successes and failures of operations directed at the corps level. In as much as these two theatres of war were vastly different and Birdwood was confronted with dissimilar problems, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about the evolution of higher command after 1914. Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources located in Australian and British archives, this thesis traces Birdwood???s career as a corps commander at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. It also examines his tenure as G.O.C. of the A.I.F.

Military command is the single most important factor in the conduct of warfare. To understand war and military success and failure, historians need to explore command structures and the relationships between commanders. In World War I, a new level of higher command had emerged: the corps commander. Between 1914 and 1918, the role of corps commanders and the demands placed upon them constantly changed as experiences brought illumination and insight. Yet the men who occupied these positions were sometimes unable to cope with the changing circumstances and the many significant limitations which were imposed upon them. Of the World War I corps commanders, William Birdwood was one of the longest serving. From the time of his appointment in December 1914 until May 1918, Birdwood acquired an experience of corps command which was perhaps more diverse than his contemporaries during this time. He is, then, an ideal subject for a prolonged assessment of this level of command. This thesis has two principal objectives. The first is to identify and assess those factors which limited Birdwood???s capacity and ability to command. The second is to explore the institutional constraints placed on corps commanders during the 1914-1918 war. Surprisingly, this is a comparatively barren area of research. Because very few officers spent much time as corps commanders on their way to higher command appointments and because the role of the corps commanders in military planning and in the conduct of operations was not immediately apparent, their role has been practically ignored. Historians have tended to concentrate on the Army and divisional levels creating a deficient view of higher military command in World War I. However, corps commanders could and did play an important part in planning operations and in military affairs generally. Birdwood???s experience at Gallipoli and in France reflect some of the changes to command structures that were prompted by the successes and failures of operations directed at the corps level. In as much as these two theatres of war were vastly different and Birdwood was confronted with dissimilar problems, it is possible to draw some general conclusions about the evolution of higher command after 1914. Using a wide range of primary and secondary sources located in Australian and British archives, this thesis traces Birdwood???s career as a corps commander at Gallipoli and on the Western Front. It also examines his tenure as G.O.C. of the A.I.F.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 1, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.

This thesis examines the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) from 1947 until it ceased to exist under that name with the release of the report of the Millar Inquiry in 1974. This thesis examines three broad areas: the organizational changes that the CMF adopted or had imposed upon it; the political decision-making surrounding the CMF; and a social analysis of the CMF which questions the viability and validity of a number of the CMF???s long held precepts. The thesis will show that the majority of circumstances and decisions surrounding the CMF were beyond its control. For example, the CMF could not change the prevailing military thought of the post-war period which emphasized increasingly the role of smaller, professional, readily-available armies. The first three chapters recount the CMF???s ???heyday??? in which the Army, assisted by National Service after 1950, was based around it and its influence at the highest levels was strongest. The next two chapters chronicle the background to Australia???s adoption of the ???Pentropic??? organization and the repercussions this had on the CMF. Chapters Six and Seven examine the consequences of the introduction of a second compulsory service scheme and the concomitant result which precluded the CMF from operational service in Vietnam. Chapters Eight and Nine deal with the Millar Inquiry, which offered the CMF a new hope, but in some regards, brought forth little beneficial gains for the CMF. The final chapters analyze some of the characteristics unique to the CMF, such as territorial affiliation, high turnover rates amongst the rank and file and the concept of the ???brilliant amateur???. This thesis concludes that, despite the mixed performance of the CMF, there is still a place for the citizen soldier in contemporary warfare, but far more consideration at the highest political and military levels must be given to the peculiar and difficult, but by no means insurmountable, problems citizen soldiering encounters in Australia.

This thesis examines the Citizen Military Forces (CMF) from 1947 until it ceased to exist under that name with the release of the report of the Millar Inquiry in 1974. This thesis examines three broad areas: the organizational changes that the CMF adopted or had imposed upon it; the political decision-making surrounding the CMF; and a social analysis of the CMF which questions the viability and validity of a number of the CMF???s long held precepts. The thesis will show that the majority of circumstances and decisions surrounding the CMF were beyond its control. For example, the CMF could not change the prevailing military thought of the post-war period which emphasized increasingly the role of smaller, professional, readily-available armies. The first three chapters recount the CMF???s ???heyday??? in which the Army, assisted by National Service after 1950, was based around it and its influence at the highest levels was strongest. The next two chapters chronicle the background to Australia???s adoption of the ???Pentropic??? organization and the repercussions this had on the CMF. Chapters Six and Seven examine the consequences of the introduction of a second compulsory service scheme and the concomitant result which precluded the CMF from operational service in Vietnam. Chapters Eight and Nine deal with the Millar Inquiry, which offered the CMF a new hope, but in some regards, brought forth little beneficial gains for the CMF. The final chapters analyze some of the characteristics unique to the CMF, such as territorial affiliation, high turnover rates amongst the rank and file and the concept of the ???brilliant amateur???. This thesis concludes that, despite the mixed performance of the CMF, there is still a place for the citizen soldier in contemporary warfare, but far more consideration at the highest political and military levels must be given to the peculiar and difficult, but by no means insurmountable, problems citizen soldiering encounters in Australia.

Thesis (Master of Military Studies)-Marine Corps Command and Staff College, 2008. / Title from title page of PDF document (viewed on: Feb 8, 2010). Includes bibliographical references.