Cheat, a kind of crime, happens in the classroom. This paper is purposed to find how to reduce the probability of cheating, how the policy can make an effect on teachers and students, and how to achieve the best interaction between them. The best interaction is that teachers put in high effort and students choose the strategy which is not to cheat. In the beginning, we assume the game is static. Under the mixed strategy equilibrium, the punishment to cheat has nothing to do with reducing the probability of cheating, but it has a trade-off relation with the probability of teachers to put in high effort. If we add peer pressure into the students¡¦ utility, it will take more probability of teachers to put in high effort to avoid cheating. However, if the policy which is to reward teachers who put in high effort brings into effect, it helps not only reduce the probability of cheating but also achieve the best interaction. After the mixed strategy equilibrium, I release two assumptions. One is to transform the game from static into dynamic, and the other is to make the effort function become continuous. Teachers then become first mover. At this moment, teachers have first-move advantage. When teachers put in some effort more than the level mentioned in the article, students do not have the incentive to cheat. In this case, it is easier to achieve the best reaction.

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Game theory outlines optimal response strategies during mixed-strategy competitions in which available actions are selected probabilistically. The neural processes involved in choosing individual strategic actions, however, remain poorly understood. Here, actions need to be selected (1) in the absence of sensory instruction or reward cues and (2) independent of previous events. This thesis examines the neural processes involved in action selection during mixed-strategy competition. To do so, we both measured and manipulated presaccadic activity in the primate superior colliculus (SC), a structure involved in the generation of orienting saccadic eye movements, during a strategic game. The first study tested whether the SC is involved in choosing saccades under strategic conditions. Monkeys were free to choose either of two saccade targets as they competed against a computer opponent during the mixed-strategy game ‘matching-pennies’. The accuracy with which pre-saccadic SC activity predicted upcoming choice gradually increased in the time leading up to the saccade. Probing the SC with supra-threshold stimulation demonstrated that these evolving signals were functionally involved in preparing strategic saccades. Finally, sub-threshold stimulation of the SC increased the likelihood that contralateral saccades were selected. In the second study, we compared the influence of previous actions and rewards on updating premotor activity in the SC in the strategic condition where eliciting stochastic responses was optimal and in a non-strategic condition where stochastic responses were also elicited but through explicit instruction. To avoid exploitation by opponents during mixed-strategy competitions one should select behaviors unpredictably, that is, independent of previous choices and their outcomes. The iterative updating of neural processes involved in selecting actions to produce mixed-strategy behaviors, however, remain poorly understood In both tasks, premotor activity and behavior were shaped by past actions and rewards with more recent events exerting the largest influence. Importantly, these sequential effects were attenuated under strategic conditions suggesting that updating of selection processes is not entirely automatic but can be tailored to different decision-making contexts. Together our results highlight the active role played by the brain in choosing strategic actions. / Thesis (Master, Neuroscience Studies) -- Queen's University, 2009-01-30 17:11:21.002

The fact that we have entered turbulent times has been a central theme in the recent strategy literature. Turbulent environments are commonly described by increased competitive intensity, disruptive changes in the industry structure, volatility of demand, and unpredictability of customer behaviour, alongside instability of economic, social and political factors. In such a context, the adoption of traditional approaches to strategy, which assumes a relatively stable world, have been questioned by new approaches. Mixed strategy, which emerged as a contingency option to Porter's generic strategies model, defends that in a turbulent environment the simultaneous pursuit of the low-cost and differentiation approaches is fundamental for the short-term performance and long-term survival of the firm. A vast corpus of literature supports the benefits of adopting a mixed approach strategy: several empirical studies have proved that a combination of low-cost and differentiation strategic elements establishes a firm's performance superiority over the pure strategy choice. The mixed literature has concentrated on the performance linkage and on the debate countering the pure strategy approach, however very little attention has been paid to the challenges presented by the mixed strategy implementation. In fact, despite the rich empirical literature, it is still not clear how firms that adopt a mixed strategy may successfully integrate the inherent contradiction of the low-cost and differentiation approaches. The aim of this study is to investigate how a firm has been implementing the mixed strategy approach, unveiling its managerial characteristics and to generate a proposed managerial framework that could serve as a guide for further implementation. This study approaches the subject of mixed strategy implementation on three levels: environment, strategy definition and making process, and value chain activity. After having elucidated several ambiguities related to the concept of mixed strategy present in the literature and having proposed a normalized definition, this study investigates through a unique case study approach, an in-depth explorative process using causal process methods the managerial implication of the mixed strategy. Several characteristics are revealed from the unique case study and represent a major contribution to the field of strategy management. Furthermore, a managerial framework is proposed which could serve as support in the implementation of a mixed strategy.

Submitted by Felipe Shalders (fshalders@fgvmail.br) on 2012-06-27T14:49:51Z No. of bitstreams: 1 tese.pdf: 364887 bytes, checksum: 1cfa0c6bf34299e43d33fa91d263b739 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Marcia Bacha (marcia.bacha@fgv.br) on 2012-08-16T13:50:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 tese.pdf: 364887 bytes, checksum: 1cfa0c6bf34299e43d33fa91d263b739 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2012-08-16T13:51:09Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 tese.pdf: 364887 bytes, checksum: 1cfa0c6bf34299e43d33fa91d263b739 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-05-16 / In oligopoly theories based on Nash Equilibrium and related concepts, free entry is associated with the coexistence of more than one rm. On the other hand, in the monopoly literature some reasons are identi ed as possible explanations to the permanence of a single pro table rm in the market, but usually do not rely on Nash Equilibrium concept. Here, we provide examples in a game-theoretical approach where randomization between monopoly prices is a new possible explanation for a pro table monopoly with free entry. We construct models where, due to the multidimensionality of goods and heterogeneity of consumers, more than one monopoly price arise, allowing randomization in equilibrium. / Em teorias de oligop olio baseadas em Equil brios de Nash e conceitos derivados, livre entrada e associada a coexist^encia de uma ou mais rmas. Por outro lado, teorias de monop olio que tentam explicar a aus^encia de concorrentes em ambientes com livre entrada n~ao se baseiam em equil brios de Teoria dos Jogos. Neste trabalho, usando um arcabou co de Teoria dos Jogos, apresento exemplos em que randomiza c~ao entre pre cos de monop olio e uma nova poss vel explica c~ao para a exist^encia de um monopolista com lucros positivos quando h a livre entrada. S~ao constru dos modelos onde, devido a multidimensionalidade dos bens e heterogeneidade dos consumidores, existe mais de um pre co de monop olio, possibilitando randomiza c~ao em equil brio.

Studien går ut på att analysera marknadsstrukturen för två industriföretag(Holmen och SCA) under antagandet att båda konkurrerar mot varandragenom att köpa rå material samt genom att sälja förädlade produkter.Produktmarknaden som undersöks är pappersmarknaden och antas varakoncentrerad. Rå materialmknaden som undersöks ärmassavedmarknaden och antas karaktäriseras som en duopsony. Detvisade sig att Holmen och SCA köper massaved från en stor mängdskogsägare. Varje företag skapar varje månad en prislista där de bestämmerbud priset föassaved. Priset varierar beroende på region. Både SCA ochHolmen väljer mellan två strategiska beslut, antigen att buda högt pris ellerlågt pris. Genom spelteori så visade det sig att båda industriföretagenanvänder mixade strategier då de i vissa tillfällen budar högt och i andratillfällen budar lågt. Nash jämviktslägen för mixade strategier räknades utmatematiskt och analyserades genom dynamisk spelteori.Marknadskoncentrationen för pappersmarknaden undersöktes viaHerfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Porters femkraftsmodell användes föratt analysera industri konkurrensen. Resultatet visade attproduktmarknaden är koncentrerad då HHI testerna gav höga indexvärdenmellan 3100 och 1700. Det existerade dessutom ett Nash jämviktsläge fö mixade strategier som gav SCA förväntad lönsamhet 1651 miljoner kronoroch Holmen 1295 miljoner kronor. Dynamisk spelteori visade att SCA ochHolmens budgivning följer ett mönster och att högt/lågt bud beror påavvikelser från Nash jämviktslägets sannolikhetsdistribution. Nashjämviktslägets råder ifall sannolikhetsdistributionerna vid låg budgivningär 68,6 procent för SCA och 66,7 procent för Holmen. Detta gav indikatore för icke samarbetsvilliga spel. Slutsatsen är att om två spelare (kvarnar) når / The research aims to analyze the market structure of two companies in th forest industry (Holmen and SCA) with the assumption that thes companies compete at buying raw materials and selling products. Theproduct market in this study is the paper market under the assumption thatboth companies operate in a concentrated product market. The rawmatial market that one investigates in this study is the pulpwood marketunder the assumption that it is a duopsony. What this study has concludedis that Holmen and SCA buy pulpwood from lots of different self-managingforest owners. Each company creates a monthly pricelist where they decidethe bid price of pulpwood. The amount varies depending on the region. Bot SCA and Holmen chooses between two strategic decisions, either to bid highor to bid low. Through game theory, it has been clear that each company usesmixed strategies as they sometimes give high bids and sometimes give lowbids. The Nash equilibrium for mixed strategies have been calculatedmathematically and analyzed through the dynamics of game theory. As fore market concentration, the product market has been investigatedthrough the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI). Porter's five-force modelwas used to analyze the industry competition. The results showed that theproduct market is concentrated as the HHI tests gave High index scoresbetween 3100 and 1700. In addition, there existed a Nash equilibrium in amixed strategy that gave SCA expected payoff 1651 million SEK and Holmen1295 million SEK. The dynamic game theory showed that SCA and Holmen'sbidding follows a repeating trajectory and that the high/low bidding is dueto deviations from Nash equilibrium probability distribution. The Nashequilibrium situation prevails if the probability distribution at low biddingis 68.6 percent for SCA and 66,7 percent for Holmen. This providedindicators for a non-cooperative game. The conclusion is that if two players