In recent years, the use of the mode of regional trade liberalisation has proliferated, while the multilateral talks through the WTO have proceeded slowly, resulting in a debate on the role of bilateral and multilateral trade liberalisation. This thesis aims to provide new insights to this debate by studying the welfare effects of different types of trade agreements and the equilibrium outcome(s) of trade negotiation. We apply the three-country and three-good “competing-exporters model" developed by Bagwell and Staiger (1999) as our basic trade framework. By comparing the equilibrium welfare of each country under different structures of trading blocs, we clarify the welfare impacts of each trade agreement. Then we model the process of trade negotiation as a trade negotiation game, in which each country endogenously decides whether to negotiate through multilateral or bilateral trade liberalisation. By solving the equilibrium of the game, the stable structure of trading blocs and the path(s) to reach it can be found. We start with a framework in which all countries are welfare maximising. We find that at the early stage of trade negotiation, a free trade agreement (FTA) is Pareto welfare improving, despite the fact that member countries benefit more than any non-member. Although being the hub is the best position, a spoke is in a worse position than being outside a single FTA. Thus, a “hub-and-spoke" structure cannot be achieved and the unique equilibrium outcome of trade negotiation is given by multilateral free trade (MFT) through a multilateral trade agreement (MTA). The welfare-maximising analysis is followed by the examination of cases in which each government is politically motivated. The political structure we use is similar to Ornelas (2005), which follows the basic framework developed by Grossman and Helpman (1995), emphasising the interaction between lobby groups representing the special interest of one industry and the government in their home country. We first consider a circumstance where the political pressures are only from the import- competing sector. It is then generalised to a case in which all sectors are allowed to lobby the local government. Furthermore, the analysis is extended into an asymmetric world that includes two big countries and one small country. Our results show that political economy forces usually reduce the likelihood of forming trade agreements and that when the political concerns are sufficiently large, all trade agreements can be prevented by political pressures. Also, our findings suggest that the option of bilateral FTAs does not cause an initially infeasible MFT to become feasible, while a previously feasible MFT is likely to be blocked by the option of FTAs. Thus, our thesis provides some evidence to support the argument that the formation of FTAs can be a “stumbling block" for global trade liberalisation. / Thesis (Ph.D.) - University of Adelaide, School of Economics, 2009

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A discussão dos elementos políticos, econômicos e financeiros relacionados ao debate sobre bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento (BMDs) se tornou ainda mais interessante com o surgimento de novas instituições multilaterais, como o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento do BRICS (NBD). Apesar de ainda não ter realizado empréstimos, o NBD desperta expectativas com relação a mudanças tanto em termos de método operacional como também de resultados. No entanto, pouco se sabe a respeito do significado da criação e da possibilidade de crescimento de um novo BMD governado por esses países emergentes. Quais são os desafios que o NBD irá enfrentar? Qual a sua capacidade de superar essas dificuldades? Quão distinta do Banco Mundial esta nova instituição será? Essas são as questões que norteiam esta dissertação, cujo objetivo geral é identificar e analisar os principais dilemas e obstáculos políticos e institucionais que os BMDs em geral, e em particular o NBD, encontram em suas trajetórias e a capacidade de superação dessas instituições. Esta pesquisa é desenvolvida através de um método que combina elementos teóricos e históricos, e avalia informações extraídas de documentos oficiais e discursos dos líderes dos BMDs estudados. A pesquisa é estruturada em cinco capítulos, além da introdução e das conclusões. A dissertação inicia com uma discussão teórica a respeito dos propósitos e processo decisório dos BMDs. O segundo capítulo é dedicado às questões financeiras referentes à captação de recursos, gestão de riscos e concessão de crédito dos BMDs. No terceiro capítulo, o objetivo é descrever a evolução do capital, da governança e do crescimento do Banco Internacional para Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (BIRD), mais conhecido como Banco Mundial, durante o período que se estende desde sua fundação até o presente. O quarto capítulo discute a forma como o BIRD administrou os riscos apresentando as principais características das suas políticas financeiras e de crédito ao longo da sua existência. O objetivo do quinto capítulo é analisar a criação do NBD, as características da sua estrutura de capital e de governança, as prováveis políticas financeiras e de crédito e as possibilidades de crescimento desta nova instituição, estabelecendo sempre um paralelo com a discussão anterior sobre os BMDs e com a história do BIRD. Na conclusão, são apresentados resultados que indicam potencial do NBD para crescer e contribuir com o financiamento do desenvolvimento a partir de um modelo diferente do que tem sido praticado historicamente pelo BIRD. / The discussion regarding the political, economic, and financial aspects related to multilateral development banks (MDBs) has become more interesting with the appearing of new multilateral institutions, such as the New Development Bank (NDB). Despite still not having a history with lending, the NDB is expected to bring some changes in terms of operational method and results. Yet, the real meaning about the creation and possibility of growth of this new MDB, governed by emerging countries, is unknown. What are the challenges the NDB is going to face? What is its capacity to overcome the difficulties ahead? How different from the World Bank this new institution will be? These are the questions that guide this dissertation, whose general goal is to identify and analyse the main dilemmas and political and institutional obstacles that MDBs in general, and the NDB in particular, find in their trajectories and the capacity of these institutions to overcome the challenges. This research is developed through a method that combines theoretical and historical elements, and evaluates information gathered from official documents and speeches of leaders of the MDBs studied. The research is structured in five chapters, besides the introduction and the conclusions. The dissertation begins with a theoretical discussion about the purposes and decision process of MDBs. The second chapter is dedicated to financial questions regarding borrowing of resources, risk management, and lending. In the third chapter, the objective is to describe the evolution of the capital, governance, and loans growth of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), more commonly known as the World Bank, during the period which extends since its origins until the present. The fourth chapter discusses the way the IBRD managed its risks, presenting the main characteristics of its financial and credit policies. The objective of the fifth chapter is to analyse the creation of the NDB, the characteristics of its capital and governance structure, its most probable financial and credit policies, and the chances of growth of this institution, always establishing a parallel with the previous discussion regarding the MDBs and the IBRD. In the conclusion, the results are presented indicating the NDB potential to grow and contribute to development finance with a model that has some differences in relation to the historical practices of the IBRD.

A discussão dos elementos políticos, econômicos e financeiros relacionados ao debate sobre bancos multilaterais de desenvolvimento (BMDs) se tornou ainda mais interessante com o surgimento de novas instituições multilaterais, como o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento do BRICS (NBD). Apesar de ainda não ter realizado empréstimos, o NBD desperta expectativas com relação a mudanças tanto em termos de método operacional como também de resultados. No entanto, pouco se sabe a respeito do significado da criação e da possibilidade de crescimento de um novo BMD governado por esses países emergentes. Quais são os desafios que o NBD irá enfrentar? Qual a sua capacidade de superar essas dificuldades? Quão distinta do Banco Mundial esta nova instituição será? Essas são as questões que norteiam esta dissertação, cujo objetivo geral é identificar e analisar os principais dilemas e obstáculos políticos e institucionais que os BMDs em geral, e em particular o NBD, encontram em suas trajetórias e a capacidade de superação dessas instituições. Esta pesquisa é desenvolvida através de um método que combina elementos teóricos e históricos, e avalia informações extraídas de documentos oficiais e discursos dos líderes dos BMDs estudados. A pesquisa é estruturada em cinco capítulos, além da introdução e das conclusões. A dissertação inicia com uma discussão teórica a respeito dos propósitos e processo decisório dos BMDs. O segundo capítulo é dedicado às questões financeiras referentes à captação de recursos, gestão de riscos e concessão de crédito dos BMDs. No terceiro capítulo, o objetivo é descrever a evolução do capital, da governança e do crescimento do Banco Internacional para Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (BIRD), mais conhecido como Banco Mundial, durante o período que se estende desde sua fundação até o presente. O quarto capítulo discute a forma como o BIRD administrou os riscos apresentando as principais características das suas políticas financeiras e de crédito ao longo da sua existência. O objetivo do quinto capítulo é analisar a criação do NBD, as características da sua estrutura de capital e de governança, as prováveis políticas financeiras e de crédito e as possibilidades de crescimento desta nova instituição, estabelecendo sempre um paralelo com a discussão anterior sobre os BMDs e com a história do BIRD. Na conclusão, são apresentados resultados que indicam potencial do NBD para crescer e contribuir com o financiamento do desenvolvimento a partir de um modelo diferente do que tem sido praticado historicamente pelo BIRD. / The discussion regarding the political, economic, and financial aspects related to multilateral development banks (MDBs) has become more interesting with the appearing of new multilateral institutions, such as the New Development Bank (NDB). Despite still not having a history with lending, the NDB is expected to bring some changes in terms of operational method and results. Yet, the real meaning about the creation and possibility of growth of this new MDB, governed by emerging countries, is unknown. What are the challenges the NDB is going to face? What is its capacity to overcome the difficulties ahead? How different from the World Bank this new institution will be? These are the questions that guide this dissertation, whose general goal is to identify and analyse the main dilemmas and political and institutional obstacles that MDBs in general, and the NDB in particular, find in their trajectories and the capacity of these institutions to overcome the challenges. This research is developed through a method that combines theoretical and historical elements, and evaluates information gathered from official documents and speeches of leaders of the MDBs studied. The research is structured in five chapters, besides the introduction and the conclusions. The dissertation begins with a theoretical discussion about the purposes and decision process of MDBs. The second chapter is dedicated to financial questions regarding borrowing of resources, risk management, and lending. In the third chapter, the objective is to describe the evolution of the capital, governance, and loans growth of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), more commonly known as the World Bank, during the period which extends since its origins until the present. The fourth chapter discusses the way the IBRD managed its risks, presenting the main characteristics of its financial and credit policies. The objective of the fifth chapter is to analyse the creation of the NDB, the characteristics of its capital and governance structure, its most probable financial and credit policies, and the chances of growth of this institution, always establishing a parallel with the previous discussion regarding the MDBs and the IBRD. In the conclusion, the results are presented indicating the NDB potential to grow and contribute to development finance with a model that has some differences in relation to the historical practices of the IBRD.

abstract: One theoretical research topic in organizational economics is the information issues raised in different organizations. This has been extensively studied in last three decades. One common feature of these research is focusing on the asymmetric information among different agents within one organization. However, in reality, we usually face the following situation. A group of people within an organization are completely transparent to each other; however, their characters are not known by other organization members who are outside this group. In my dissertation, I try to study how this information sharing would affect the outcome of different organizations. I focus on two organizations: corporate board and political parties. I find that this information sharing may be detrimental for (some of) the members who shared information. This conclusion stands in contrast to the conventional wisdom in both corporate finance and political party literature. / Dissertation/Thesis / Ph.D. Economics 2014

Submitted by Irene Nascimento (irene.kessia@ufpe.br) on 2016-06-22T17:04:20Z No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Utilizando o Protocolo Bitcoin para Condução de Computações Multilaterais Seguras e Justas.pdf: 1665447 bytes, checksum: 2ff437be55e080c80d97e0d6582cb360 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-22T17:04:20Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license_rdf: 1232 bytes, checksum: 66e71c371cc565284e70f40736c94386 (MD5) Utilizando o Protocolo Bitcoin para Condução de Computações Multilaterais Seguras e Justas.pdf: 1665447 bytes, checksum: 2ff437be55e080c80d97e0d6582cb360 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2016-02-02 / Suponha que dois milionários desejam descobrir quem é o mais rico sem que, para isso, um descubra o valor da fortuna do outro. Esse problema pode ser facilmente resolvido se ambos concordarem sobre um juiz a quem eles possam confiar a tarefa de calcular a resposta sem quebrar a privacidade de nenhum dos dois. O desafio, no entanto, é substituir esse juiz por uma interação multilateral, ou protocolo, que alcance o mesmo grau de segurança. Isso significa conduzir uma computação multilateral segura. Esse exemplo é conhecido como o problema dos milionários de Yao e foi proposto por Andrew Yao em um dos primeiros esforços para desenvolver uma forma geral de se conduzir computações multilaterais seguras. Desde lá, na década de 1980, vários avanços foram feitos nesse sentido e, hoje, já é um resultado bem estabelecido que qualquer função multilateral pode ser computada de maneira segura. Esse importante resultado, no entanto, vem com uma importante ressalva: a justiça não pode ser alcançada de maneira geral. Entende-se por justiça a garantia de que, no final de uma computação, ou todos os participantes recebem suas respostas ou nenhum deles recebe. Motivadas por esse resultado de impossibilidade, várias definições alternativas de justiça foram concebidas. Uma delas considera uma computação como sendo justa se os participantes que agirem desonestamente forem monetariamente penalizados. Ou seja, se alguns participantes receberem o resultado da computação e privarem os demais de receberem, então esse conluio é penalizado e os demais participantes, compensados. Com essa definição, uma computação justa pode ser vista como o cumprimento de um contrato, no qual cada participante se compromete a agir honestamente ou a pagar uma multa. Sob essa perspectiva, trabalhos recentes mostram como criptomoedas podem ser utilizadas para escrever esses contratos e, portanto, servir para condução de computações multilaterais seguras e monetariamente justas. Uma criptomoeda é um sistema monetário que se baseia em princípios criptográficos para alcançar segurança e controlar a taxa de emissão de novas moedas. O Bitcoin, criado em 2008 por Satoshi Nakamoto, foi a primeira realização dessa ideia. Ele se baseia em uma estrutura de dados pública chamada blockchain, que armazena o histórico de todas as transações já realizadas. A segurança da blockchain, incluindo sua não-maleabilidade, é garantida pela dificuldade da prova de trabalho exigida para que novas informações sejam adicionadas nessa estrutura. Cada transferência de moedas no Bitcoin é feita de maneira que um usuário só pode recebê-las mediante a apresentação de uma entrada que satisfaça um script especificado pelo remetente. Contratos escritos através desses scripts se fazem cumprir sem a necessidade de intervenção de uma parte confiável externa. Essa característica é o que faz o Bitcoin ser adequado e atrativo para se conferir justiça para computações multilaterais seguras. Um dos nossos objetivos neste trabalho é a realização de um estudo sobre os resultados que permitem a computação segura de uma função qualquer e dos que estabelecem a impossibilidade de se alcançar justiça de maneira geral. Tentaremos manter o rigor matemático para evitar uma apresentação estritamente panorâmica. Além disso, analisaremos criticamente uma construção proposta para utilizar o Bitcoin como plataforma para condução de computações multilaterais seguras e justas. Por fim, a partir dos pontos positivos e negativos levantados, apresentaremos uma proposta nossa com a mesma finalidade. / Suppose that two millionaires want to find out which one is the richest, but without revealing how much their fortunes are worth in the process. This problem can be easily solved if they trust a judge to compute the desired answer without compromising their privacy. The challenge, however, is to replace such a judge by a multiparty interaction, or protocol, that achieves the same level of security. That is, the challenge is to carry out a secure multiparty computation. The previous example is known as Yao’s millionaires’ problem and was stated by Andrew Yao in one of the first efforts to develop a general algorithm to carry out secure multiparty computations. Since then, in the 1980s, several advances were made to achieve this goal and, nowadays, it is a well-established result that any multiparty function can be securely computed. This important result, however, comes with an important restriction: fairness cannot be achieved in general. Fairness is the guarantee that, at the end of a computation, either all parties receive their outputs or none of them does. Motivated by this impossibility, several alternative definitions of fairness have been proposed. One of them considers a computation to be fair if the dishonest parties are monetarily penalized and the honest ones are monetarily compensated. According to this definition, a fair computation can be viewed as the enforcement of a contract, in which the parties agree on paying a penalty if they misbehave. Recent works have shown how cryptocoins can be used to write those contracts and, therefore, to be used for carrying out secure and monetarily fair multiparty computations. A cryptocoin is a monetary system that relies on cryptographic principles for achieving security and controlling the coin issuing rate. Bitcoin, created in 2008 by Satoshi Nakamoto, was the first practical realization of this idea. In its core, there is a publicly maintained data structure called blockchain, which works as a ledger and stores every transaction ever made. The security of the blockchain, including its non-malleability, is guaranteed by the difficulty of the proof of work required to add new data to it. A Bitcoin transaction can only be redeemed by a user that presents an input satisfying a script specified by the issuer of the transaction. Contracts written on these scripts are enforced without an external trusted third-party to intervene. This makes Bitcoin suitable and interesting to confer monetary fairness to multiparty computations. One of the goals of this work is to present the results that allow any function to be securely computed and the ones that show the impossibility of achieving fairness in general. We will try to present these results with the appropriate mathematical rigor to avoid giving just an overview of them. We will also analyze a recently proposed construction that uses Bitcoin as a platform to carry out fair multiparty computations. Finally, based on its positive and negative points, we will propose a construction with the same goal.

Orienté vers le libre-échange, le droit de l’Organisation Mondiale du Commerce est basé sur plusieurs principes fondamentaux : la non-discrimination, la réciprocité et la réduction progressive des obstacles au commerce. Il existe des mécanismes répondant à l’impératif d’adaptabilité nécessaires aux membres pour faire face à des situations exceptionnelles afin d’intégrer de la souplesse dans l’application du droit de l’OMC et de déroger aux principes et règles régissant le commerce international. Cela vaut aussi bien en période de crise qu’indépendamment de l’environnement économique général, dès lors que les conditions sont réunies pour que les membres les mettent en œuvre. La crise économique de 2008 a fait craindre un recours accru, voire abusif, à ces instruments d’exception, de dérogation, de sauvegarde, ce qui signifierait un retour à des pratiques protectionnistes. La réflexion sur l’utilisation de ces outils permet la mise en évidence des instruments proposés par le droit de l'OMC pour faire face à des situations qui nécessitent un frein au libre-échange. Elle précise également les pratiques des Membres, la logique générale de ces mécanismes de flexibilité et l’équilibre entre les principes orientés vers le libre-échange et les exceptions qui supposent des restrictions au commerce. Les questions qui se posent doivent conduire à étudier l’ensemble de ces instruments de flexibilité, l’articulation entre ces instruments et ceux des autres organisations internationales en lien avec l’OMC, le rôle du juge de l’OMC dans les différends liés à l’utilisation de ces mécanismes et les perspectives d’évolution ou de réformes des instruments de flexibilité du droit de l’OMC / Oriented toward free trade, the World Trade Organization law is based on several fundamental principles: non-discrimination, reciprocity and the gradual reduction of trade barriers. There are mechanisms that respond to the need for adaptability necessary for Members to deal with exceptional situations in order to incorporate flexibility in the application of WTO law and depart from the principles and rules governing international trade. This applies both in times of crisis, and irrespective of the general economic environment, as soon as the conditions seem to require Members to implement them. The economic crisis of 2008 has raised fears of increased use or abuse of these instruments of exception, derogation (waivers), or safeguard, all of them constituting actions that would mean a return to protectionist practices. Reflection on the use of these tools allows the identification of instruments proposed by the WTO law to deal with crisis and more generally to situations that require a barrier to free trade. But beyond that, it specifies the practices of Members in the use of these tools, the general logic of these mechanisms for flexibility and the balance between the free-trade oriented principles and the exceptions that involve restrictions on trade. The questions then raised should lead to consider all of these instruments of flexibility, the articulation between these instruments and those of other international organizations in connection with the WTO, the judge's role in WTO disputes related to the use of these mechanisms, and the prospects of change or reform of flexibility instruments WTO law

The uppermost goal of this diploma thesis is aimed at identification and evaluation of the current trends in one of the largest segments of financial markets. Special attention has been devoted to the regulatory changes, which have not been completely implemented in all major jurisdictions so far. The introductory part deals with the nowadays situation and explanation of post-crisis measures leading to a higher level of transparency and system stability. The following chapters analyze the key elements contributing to specific trends whereby those findings are based on research studies published by the world leading universities and central banks. The author also observes alternative functional concepts in the market and potential impacts affecting real transactions. The final portion has been dedicated to analysis of practical implications in terms of increased costs related to the trades and possible prospective outlook of the OTC derivatives market. The whole text is accompanied by authors personal reflections and comparison between the most important trading regions in respect to the value of underlying assets.

Vortrag anlässlich des Doktoranden-Kolloquiums des UNESCO-Lehrstuhls für Internationale Beziehungen am 23. Juli 2012 im Lingnerschloss Dresden. Die westliche Gesellschaft befindet sich im Übergang von der Industrie- zur Wissensgesellschaft – so lautet eine der bekanntesten Thesen der aktuellen Gesellschaftstheorie. Dabei ist es in erster Linie der Umgang mit Wissen, der die Grundlage für die Bearbeitung aktueller Herausforderungen auf nationaler wie internationaler Ebene darstellt.

Magister Legum - LLM / Sugar, bananas, beef and cotton are some of the few products, which are the primary commodities in many African, Caribbean and Pacific countries (ACP).2 Many are highly vulnerable small islands, landlocked and least developed states,' thus rendering the above-mentioned sectors, of great importance to their economies." In these countries, for instance, the sugar producers often provide housing, health care, education and other benefits.i