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Lee King Hang Roger. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 143-144). / Abstract also in Chinese. / Chapter 0 --- INTRODUCTION / Chapter 0.1 --- Why Study Thomas Nagel? / Chapter 0.2 --- The Contribution of Nagel / Chapter 0.3 --- Why do we need such Reformulation? / Chapter 0.4 --- The Approach of This Paper / Chapter 1 --- INTUITION / Chapter 1.1 --- Rorty's Argument against Intuitive Realism / Chapter 1.2 --- The Priority of Intuition / Chapter 2 --- VIEWPOINTS / Chapter 2.1 --- The Nature of Viewpoints / Chapter 2.2 --- The Subjective and the Objective Viewpoints / Chapter 2.3 --- The Existence of the Two Viewpoints as a Fundamental Fact of Reflective Human Beings / Chapter 3 --- REALITY / Chapter 3.1 --- Reconsidering Reality / Chapter 3.2 --- Subjective Reality / Chapter 3.3 --- Objective Reality / Chapter 3.4 --- The Inescapabilily of the Idea of Subjective and Objective Reality / Chapter 4 --- THE CONFLICT / Chapter 4.1 --- Subjective and Objective Reconsidered / Chapter 4.2 --- The Nature of the Conflict / Chapter 4.3 --- The Significance of Nagel's Reformulation / Chapter 5 --- CONCLUSION: THE ULTIMATE MYSTERY

Diss.--Philosophische Fakultät IV--Regensburger Universität, 1994. / Bibliogr. p. 333-352.

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Jody Nagel completed his first piano concerto in 2005. I will discuss technical challenges within the piece and practice techniques to overcome these challenges so that one can perform the work successfully. I cover fingering, pedaling, texture, character, and harmonic issues. I also give performance advice to make the orchestral reduction more pianistic while still honoring the orchestra’s influence within the work.

In his article What is it like to be a bat? Thomas Nagel defines consciousness by subjective character of experience. An organism is conscious if there is something that it is like to be that organism. Science describes the world objectively, from the third person perspective. That is the reason why it fails to cope with consciousness - it misses the subjective character of experience. In spite of that, Nagel proposes a new method for studying subjectivity of consciousness, which he calls "objective phenomenology". In my thesis, I want to find out if Daniel Dennett's heterophenomenology is or could be that method. Key words: Nagel, Dennett, consciousness, subjective character of experience, heterophenomenology.

This thesis offers an analysis of the possible harm of death, posing three questions: Who is the subject of the harm? What is the nature of the harm? And, when does the harm take place? Epicurus demonstrates on hedonistic grounds that given the irreversible annihilation of the subject and the impossibility of experience, death cannot harm the one who dies at any time. The experience condition is central to this claim, stating that experience is necessary for harm. Despite the strength of the Epicurean inspired No- Subject Thesis, it remains counter to pretheoretical intuitions regarding the harmfulness of death. This thesis proposes an alternative justification for the belief that death is harmful by extending the possible subjects of harm to include the bereaved. It is my view that the No-Subject Thesis successfully shows that death is not harmful to the one who dies, and in support of the Epicurean position, it will be defended against variations of Thomas Nagel’s antithetical position. Nagel’s view is motivated by the belief that death is bad because it deprives the deceased of some good he or she could have had, had death taken place at a later time. Criticisms of the Deprivation Thesis relate to the effectiveness of counterexamples to the experience condition, and the challenge of the temporal location problem, given that we will assume, along with Epicurus, that death annihilates the subject. However, this thesis argues that it is a restricted understanding of the possible subjects of harm that causes the counter-intuitive conclusion of the No-Subject Thesis. By extending the possible bearers of harm to include the bereaved, and characterising the nature of the harm as the loss experienced by the bereaved, one can posit an unproblematic account of the nature and subject of the harm of death. Indeed, by identifying a living person as the subject of harm, the experience condition can be satisfied. Furthermore, a clearly delineated temporal location of the harm can be identified insofar as the bereaved are harmed from the time at which he or she learns of the death of the loved other. However, it will be argued that the harm diminishes over time, reflecting the experience of the bereaved that he or she can recover after the loss of the beloved. A defence of this position will be offered, responding to the Epicurean claim that the death of a loved other does not constitute a significant loss in virtue of the belief that individual subjects are replaceable. By extending the scope of the possible harm of death to account for the social context within which death occurs, one can retain the logical strength of the Epicurean inspired No-Subject Thesis, and yet justify the intuition that death remains a bad thing for the bereaved, giving rational grounds for fearing death in terms of social deprivation.

In this thesis, I argue against a claim about pain which I call the "Minimization Thesis" or MT. According to MT, pain is objectively unconditionally intrinsically bad. Using the case of grief, I argue that although MT may be true of pain as such, it is not true of particular pains. I then turn to an examination of the justification provided by Thomas Nagle for offering the MT and find that his argument is inadequate because it depends on an implausible phenomenology of pain experience. I argue it is more plausible to claim, as Kant does, that pain has desire-conditional badness. Finally, I present a Nietzschean argument for the irreducible complexity of badness. I suggest we may be willing to concede pain's badness so readily only because it has not been specified what kind of badness it actually has.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Chicago, Department of Philosophy, 2001. / Includes bibliographical references. Also available on the Internet.

Thèse (M.A.)--Université Laval, 1998. / Bibliogr.: f. [143]-145. Publié aussi en version électronique.