Dans son œuvre, notamment dans The View From Nowhere, Thomas Nagel propose une réflexion unifiée sur certains problèmes philosophiques fondamentaux tels que la relation corps-esprit, l’identité personnelle, la liberté, la connaissance, la relation entre la raison et le réel. Il les comprend comme diverses formes d’un problème unique : le conflit entre certains aspects de notre conception subjective de la réalité, celle que nous développons spontanément depuis notre point de vue de créature particulière dans le monde, et certains aspects d’une conception objective de la réalité, indépendante de nos caractères particuliers, dont la recherche s’impose à nous et que nous tentons de développer. Nous avons mené un double travail : exposer les conceptions de Nagel à propos de la nature et de l’origine des problèmes philosophiques en question, prolonger ces réflexions. En effet, les conceptions de Nagel permettent de proposer une définition nouvelle et féconde de la métaphysique comme réflexion sur les conflits entre les points de vue interne et externe, d’élaborer une typologie a priori des solutions qui peuvent être apportées aux problèmes métaphysiques, de comprendre la nature et le ressort commun, de type idéaliste et anti-métaphysique, des courants dominants de la philosophie qu’ont été, durant la première partie du vingtième siècle, la phénoménologie et la philosophie de Wittgenstein. Enfin, cette typologie permet de clarifier la réflexion à propos des problèmes métaphysiques particuliers et de mesurer la portée des arguments en jeu. Nous avons établi ce point en abordant deux problèmes métaphysiques particuliers, celui de la relation corps-esprit et celui de la perception. / In his works, especially in The View From Nowhere, Thomas Nagel offers a unified reflection on some philosophical fundamental issues such as the mind-body link, the personal identity, the liberty, the knowledge and the relationship between reason and reality. He sees these matters as various forms of a sole issue: The conflict between certain aspects of our subjective understanding of reality - the one resulting from our spontaneous reflection as particular beings - and other aspects of an objective one - independent from our specific nature and which science facts imposed on us and that we try to develop. We have led a double task: first, to put forward Nagel’s conceptions of nature and of the origin of the philosophical issues at stake, then, to elaborate on these thoughts. Nagel’s conceptions allow, indeed, to give a new and fruitful definition of metaphysics as a reflection on the conflicts between the internal and external point of views. It also theoretically allows, to develop a typology of the possible solutions that can be brought to metaphysical concerns, to understand nature and the common responsibility - the idealistic and anti-metaphysical ones - of the main philosophical movements of the first part of the twentieth century. Wittgenstein’s phenomenology and philosophy that is. Eventually, this typology helps clarifying the reflection upon specific metaphysical issues and measuring the impact of the arguments at stake. We have came to this point by taking into consideration two specific metaphysical issues : the mind-body link and the perception.

Conselho Nacional de Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico / In the present work, we seek to elucidate the relations between the problem of moral luck and our assignments of responsibility. The problem of moral luck emerges from two dimensions of human life. On the one side, we are autonomous and rational beings, we have control over our actions and are moral agents. On the other side, we are vulnerable to every sort of external contingency that eliminates the complete control we have over our actions and their results. The contingency, also, has a significant weight on the formation of our character and personality. Therefore, the problem of moral luck takes a real importance: how can we assign responsibility to the agents, given that a lot of what configures a moral action are contingent elements? The research was elaborated based on Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel s articles on Moral luck. Williams, in his article, seeks to show that morality, as we conceive it, is (in fact) distant from our moral evaluations. Williams introduces the role of regret and recognizes the need to understand moral justification as retrospective. Nagel, in turn, finds the center of the moral luck problem in the control principle. In trying to understand how we assign responsibility to an agent for things beyond his control, Nagel defines four methods in which luck influences our moral judgements, and lists the kinds of moral luck: resultant, circumstantial, constitutive and causal luck. Finally, we take a look at critiques pertinent to the moral luck and responsibility problem, both negating and accepting the influence of luck in moral responsibility. From the epistemic argument and Zimmerman s postulates to Walker s pure agency critique and Otsuka s strawsonian considerations about reactive attitudes. / No presente trabalho, buscamos elucidar as relações entre o problema da sorte moral e nossas atribuições de responsabilidade. O problema da sorte moral emerge a partir de duas dimensões da vida humana. Por um lado, somos seres autônomos e racionais, temos o controle sobre nossas ações e somos agentes morais. Por outro, somos vulneráveis a toda espécie de contingência externa que elimina o controle total que temos de nossas ações e de seus resultados. A contingência, também, tem um peso significativo na formação de nosso caráter e personalidade. Por isso, o problema da sorte moral assume importância real: como podemos atribuir responsabilidade aos agentes, visto que muito do que configura uma ação moral são elementos contingentes? Elaboramos esta pesquisa a partir dos artigos Moral luck de Bernard Williams e Thomas Nagel. Williams, em seu artigo, busca mostrar que a moralidade, como a concebemos, mostra-se distante de nossas avaliações morais. Williams introduz o papel do arrependimento e reconhece a necessidade de entendermos a justificação moral como retrospectiva. Nagel, por sua vez, encontra no princípio do controle o centro do problema da sorte moral. Na tentativa de entender como atribuímos responsabilidade a uma agente por coisas além de seu controle, Nagel define quatro meios pelos quais a sorte influencia nossos juízos morais e elenca os tipos de sorte moral: sorte resultante, circunstancial, constitutiva e causal. Por fim, procuramos as críticas pertinentes ao problema da sorte moral e responsabilidade, as quais neguem ou aceitem a influência da sorte na responsabilidade moral, indo do argumento epistêmico e os postulados de Zimmerman à crítica da agência pura de Walker e as considerações strawsonianas de Otsuka sobre as atitudes reativas.

Název diplomové práce: Mysl a vědomí u zvířat Vedoucí práce: prof. Karel Thein, Ph.D. Vypracovala: Bc. Klaudie Richterová Abstract This thesis examines the issue of cognition, mind and consciousness of living beings other than humans. It starts with the attitudes of two contemporary thinkers: Thomas Nagel and Daniel C. Dennett. In connection with their opinions, this thesis examines a certain number of questions: Might there be something like a subjective experience of life or being? How can one know that others have mental states that are like one's own? How important is a fact that nonhuman animals cannot describe their mental states in language? Is it possible to connect the observable characteristics of animals (behavioral or neurological) to consciousness? Nagel assumes that individuals have a proprietary perspective on their own perceptual, cognitive and emotive processes. Dennett argues that consciousness is essentially an illusion created by language, which is why he concludes that consciousness is uniquely human. What complicates the whole issue is the essential inwardness of the conscious experience. We objectivize this inwardness per our aim to know, and thus deprive it of its essence. Thereby, very often, we lose sight of what we want to examine.

In der vorliegenden Studie wurde isoliert der biomechanische Effekt einer zusätzlichen, nicht-winkelstabil verriegelten, inferomedialen Kalkarschraube bei nagelosteosynthetischer Versorgung einer instabilen 2-Segment-Fraktur am proximalen Humerus im Vergleich zu einer Nagelosteosynthese ohne Kalkarschraube untersucht. Weiterhin wurde die Knochenmineraldichte in der inferomedialen Region des Humeruskopfes mit sechs umliegenden Regionen verglichen.16 Humeri von weiblichen Spendern waren in zwei Gruppen zu je acht Humeri aufgeteilt. Alle Präparate wurden mit dem MultiLoc® Humerusnagelsystem (DePuy Synthes, West Chester, USA) versorgt. Während die eine Gruppe (Basic) eine „Standardbesetzung“ mit drei proximalen und zwei distalen Bolzen aufwies, kam in der anderen Gruppe (Calcar) zusätzlich eine nicht-winkelstabil verriegelte Kalkarschraube zur Anwendung. Die Proben erfuhren Torsions- und Kompressionsbelastungen zur Ermittlung der Steifigkeiten, wurden zyklischen Belastungen ausgesetzt und unterlagen abschließend einer Belastung bis zum Versagen. Ein Vergleich der Gruppen ergab keine signifikanten Unterschiede. In Anbetracht einer verhältnismäßig hohen Knochenmineraldichte in der inferomedialen Region des Humeruskopfes erscheint das Konzept der zusätzlichen inferomedialen Abstützung als eine prinzipiell sinnvolle Methode. Allerdings erwies sich die Verwendung einer zusätzlichen nicht-winkelstabil verriegelten inferomedialen Kalkarschraube bei instabiler subkapitaler 2-Segment-Fraktur des proximalen Humerus als nicht biomechanisch vorteilhaft.

Den här uppsatsen kommer att behandla fenomenet moralisk slump (moral luck). Uppsatsen är till största del av undersökande karaktär och till dels av argumenterande karaktär. Uppsatsen huvudfrågor är vad moralisk slump är för någonting, vad det finns för olika typer av respons kring problemet med moralisk slump och slutligen vad jag anser är den mest trovärdiga lösningen på problemet med moralisk slump. Uppsatsen utgångspunkt ligger I Nagels och Williams berömda artiklar som anses vara startskottet för den moderna debatten angående moralisk slump, även om området i sig har diskuterats sen länge. Utifrån detta undersöks flera olika teorier i detalj som fungerar som svar på framför allt den utmaning som Nagel målade upp i sin artikel. Svaren som redogörs för kan kategoriseras i två breda kategorier, de som förnekar att slumpen kan orsaka en moralisk skillnad och de som accepterar slumpens betydelse för moral.

This thesis presents a two part criticism to Liam Murphy and Thomas Nagel’s book, The Myth of Ownership, in which they attempt to argue that it is logically impossible that one can have any entitlement to their pretax income. The first criticism addresses their claim that based on a politically charged understanding of human nature you cannot have property without government. Through the fields of psychology, biology and anthropology, an overlap is found that presents human nature in such a way that presents a serious hurdle to the Murphy and Nagel position. The second criticism addresses their failure to define the scope of government in their book. In light of cultures that have a strong conception of property, Murphy and Nagel are charged with equivocating on the definition of government in order to make their argument hold. The conclusion reached is that based on current research pertaining to human nature and a brief anthropological study, the existence of government is not needed in order to have property within a community.

The field of Logistics Management increasingly becomes a more critical field of activity in almost every industry. Diminishing margins, rising costs and every increasing client expectations demand a strong focus on client retention in order to reap the full benefits from efficient client-supplier relationships. This dissertation delivers the tools to improve the client retention rate at Kuehne & Nagel, South Africa, by measuring the present clients perception of service levels experienced. The survey furthermore takes into account how important clients rate different service criteria and how Kuehne & Nagel's performance compares to the perceived performance of competitor firms. / Thesis (MBA)-University of Natal, Durban, 2002.

The purpose of this study was to provide an analysis of the major arias and ensembles of Jody Nagel's Fifty-Third Street for performance practice, drawing upon a case study of the premiere. The opera Fifty-Third Street was composed in 1992 by Nagel for his dissertation project at the University of Texas at Austin. The librettist is Seth Wolitz, then a University of Texas faculty member. The opera examines the lives of two homeless men on 53rd Street in New York City, between 5th and 6th Streets, and the reactions toward them from various facets of society, including the church, art institutions, businesses and tourists. The opera was premiered at Sursa Performance Hall on the campus of Ball State University on April 12, 2007 with a subsequent performance on April 15, 2007.Both the piano/vocal score and the chamber orchestra score from the premiere have been examined in the analysis of the opera, in addition to the original treatise by Jody Nagel. The analysis is conducted from a performer's perspective and examines vocal aspects, including potential technical challenges, range and tessitura; musical aspects, including formal analysis, tonality, melody, harmony and rhythm in relation to the text; drama and staging, and character motivation for each of the major arias and ensembles. Suggestions are offered for practice and performance based upon the analysis and informal interviews with the composer, conductor, directors, cast and crew of the premiere performance. Appendices include scene charts, costume lists, lighting and projection cues, original set and publicity materials, and a DVD recording of the world premiere performance.Many composers throughout the centuries have used opera as a way to comment on the world in which they lived and to challenge the status quo: Mozart, Le nozze di Figaro; Verdi, Un ballo in maschera; Berg, Wozzek; Britten, Peter Grimes. Jody Nagel has continued this tradition in a way that is powerful and compelling. Future directors will discover that Fifty-Third Street offers an invaluable tool for the musical development of students and professionals, for the growth of the American opera repertory, and for challenging the American way of life. / School of Music

abstract: Given the success of science, weak forms of mind-brain dependence are commonly treated as uncontroversial within contemporary philosophies of mind. More controversial are the different metaphysical claims inferred from this dependence, many ascribing ontological priority to the brain. Consider the following three propositions: (i) neurological events are essentially identified by their role in material systems, laws, and causes that are constitutively non-rational; (ii) at least some mental events are essentially identified in virtue of their role in the use of reason; (iii) all mental events are realized by, identical to, or composed out of, neurological events. (i) is uncontroversial. However, (iii) is strictly materialistic. (i), (ii) and (iii) taken together appear incoherent. A fruitful task for philosophy is to resolve this apparent incoherence. In his 1997 book The Last Word Thomas Nagel offers an explication of reason that conceptually transcends the nature of material substrate. In his 2010 article "Modest Dualism" Tyler Burge offers reasons to think of propositional thought as irreducible to the concepts of the material sciences. Both focus on rationality as a unique form of intentionality. Both philosophers also reject materialism (iii). On their accounts it's reasonable to take 'rational intentionality' as exhibiting a logical priority of the mind with respect to the brain in inquiries into the nature of mind. Granting this, the diminished conception of mind presupposed by prevailing contemporary theories is seen to be the result of a more general failure to recognize the logical priority and intricate nature of rationality. The robust views of rationality expressed by Nagel and Burge constitute grounds for argument against even the weakest form of materialism. I develop such an argument in this thesis, showing that the propositional attitudes exhibited in thought and speech preclude all materialistic notions of mind. Furthermore, I take the nature of propositional attitudes to suggest a perspective for exploring the fundamental nature of mind, one that focuses not on composition but on rational powers. / Dissertation/Thesis / M.A. Philosophy 2011

Este trabalho visa apresentar uma metodologia para modelagem de motoristas a serem utilizados em simulações de tráfego veicular discreto. Além da metodologia, será apresentada uma plataforma para implementação de motoristas, chamada DRIVER-DFW, baseada neste conceito. Inicialmente, serão apresentados alguns modelos de movimentação de veículos baseados no modelo de autômato celular Nagel–Schreckenberg. O modelo básico será apresentado juntamente com alguns de seus aperfeiçoamentos, que são os modelos utilizados no simulador ITSUMO, que por sua vez é utilizado como base para o trabalho. Além dos modelos de autômato celular, serão apresentados modelos de planejamento de rota, que se utilizam de várias heurísticas para a tomada de decisão dos motoristas. Destes, selecionou-se um para implementação e demonstração. Mostradas as etapas para composição do modelo completo de motorista, isto é, movimentação e planejamento, será apresentada a plataforma para implementação de motoristas desenvolvida neste trabalho. Esta separação é a base da plataforma DRIVER-DFW que é discutida com mais detalhes para auxiliar a compreensão do seu funcionamento. Além disso, é mostrado como a metodologia é aplicada na plataforma para implementação de motoristas DRIVER-DFW. Por fim, conclui-se que este trabalho apresenta uma alternativa bastante atraente para a implementação de modelos de motoristas, com uma metodologia e uma plataforma de desenvolvimento. Também são apresentadas as diretrizes para dar prosseguimento a este.