Children's narrative language plays a critical role in guiding the transition between oral language and literacy (Roth & Spekman, 1989; Westby, 1989). Narrative comprehension and production by normally achieving and language delayed school-aged children have been studied. Many of these studies have involved story retellings. Few have studied how spontaneously produced narratives are organized especially by young children.

This thesis looks at the functions and effects of the ‘second-person’ pronoun in narrative prose fiction, with particular focus on the fluidity and ambiguity of the mode that I will call Protean-'you.' It is a mode in which it is unclear whether the ‘you’ is a character, the narrator, a reader/narratee, or no-one in particular—or a combination of these—so that readers find ‘second-person’ utterances at once familiar and deeply strange. I regard the ‘second person’ as a special case of narrative ‘person’ that, at its most fluid, can produce an experience of reading quite unlike that of reading traditional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. Essentially, this unique experience comes about because Protean-‘you’ neglects to constitute the stable modes of subjectivity that readers expect to find within narrative textuality. These stable modes of subjectivity, modelled on what I will refer to as Cartesianism’s hegemonic notion of the self, have been thoroughly formalised and naturalised within the practices of ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narrative. The Protean-‘you’ form of ‘second-person’ narrative, conversely, is a mode of narrative discourse that puts readers in a place of doubt and uncertainty, its unsettling equivocations forcefully disrupting accustomed, mimetic explanations of narrative and denying us access to the foundational, authorising subject of classical Cartesian thought. Rather than founding a notion of ‘second-person’ narrative and narrative ‘person’ generally on Cartesianism's ‘self-ish’ logic of unified, privatised identity, I turn to C.S, Peirce's notion of the semiotic self and to developments in post-structuralist thought. Essentially, the conception of subjectivity underpinning my arguments is Peirce's proposition that the self is to be conceived of not as a cogito, but as a sign by which the conscious entity knows itself. It is a sign, moreover, that is constantly being re-read, reinterpreted, so that identity is never self-complete. This reconception of subjectivity is necessary because 1 will argue that the effects of Protean-‘you’ arise in some part from a tension between Cartesianism's hegemony and what philosophical pragmatism and post-structuralism glimpse as the actual condition of the human subject—the subject as dispersed and contingent rather than unified and authoritative. Most discussions of ‘second-person’ narrative conceive of the mode in terms of implicit communicative relations, in some measure instituting Cartesianism's notion of the intentionalist self at the centre of literary meaning. I contrast the paradigmatic address model that arises from this conception against a model that approaches the analysis of ‘second-person’ narrative modality in terms of a referential function, that is, in terms of the object or objects referred to deictically by the ‘second-person’ pronoun. Two principal functions of ‘second-person’ textuality are identified and discussed at length. The first is generalisation, which is rarely dissipated altogether, a situation that contributes to the ambiguities of the pronoun's reference in much ‘second-person’ fiction. The second principal function is that of address, that is, the allocutionary function. Clearly, although stories that continually refer to a ‘you’ can seem quite baffling and unnatural, not all ‘second-person’ narratives unsettle the reader. In order to make the ‘second person's’ outlandish narratives knowable and stable, we bring to bear on them in our habits of reading whatever hermeneutic frames, whatever interpretive keys, come to hand, including a large number of unexceptional forms of literary and ‘natural’ discourse that employ the ‘second-person’ pronoun. These forms include letter writing and internal dialogue (i.e., talking to one's self), the language of the courtroom, the travelogue, the maxim, and so on. In looking at the ways in which the radicalising potentials of ‘second-person’ discourse are contained or recuperated, I focus on issues of vraisemblance and mimesis. Vraisemblance can be described as the ‘system of conventions and expectations which rests on/reinforces that more general system of ‘mutual knowledge’ produced within a community for the realisation and maintenance of a whole social world’. All of the forms of the vraisemblable are already instituted within social, cultural relations, so that what vraisemblance describes is the way we fit the inscriptions we read-that is, the way in which we naturalise what we read-into those given cultural and social forms. I also look at the conventionalising and naturalising work done by notions of mimesis in explaining relations between the world, our being in it, and texts, proposing that mimesis provides a principle buttress by which the good standing of the metaphor of ‘person’ is preserved in traditional and pre-critical modes of analysis. Indeed, the critic’s recourse to ‘person’ is in some measure always an engagement with mimesis. Any discussion that maintains that mimesis is in some way productive of meaning-which this thesis in fact does-must identify mimesis as a merely conventional category within practices of reading and semiosis more generally, and at the very least remove that term from its traditional position of transparent primacy and authority. Some of the most interesting and insightful arguments about ‘second-person’ narrative propose that the ‘second person’s’ most striking effects derive from the constitution of an ‘intersubjective’ experience of reading in which the subject positions of the ‘you’-protagonist, reader-narratee and narrator are combined into a fluid and indeterminate multiple subjectivity. Notions of intersubjectivity frequently position themselves as liberating the reader from Cartesianism's fixed, authoritative modes of subjectivity, Frequently, however, they tend implicitly to reinstate Cartesianism's notion of the self at the centre of textual practice and subjectivity. I look at Daniel Gunn's novel ‘Almost You’, at length in this context, illustrating the constant overdetermination of the ‘you’ and the novel's narrating voice, and demonstrating that this overdetermination leaves the origin of the narrative discourse, the identity of the narrator, and the ontological nature of both principal protagonists utterly ambiguous. The fluidity and ambiguity of Protean-‘you’ in ‘Almost You’ is discussed in terms of ‘second-person’ intersubjectivity, but with a view to demonstrating the indebtedness by the notion of intersubjectivity to Cartesianism's hegemony of ‘person’. I then turn to a discussion of what might be a more ‘old fashioned’ if perhaps ultimately more far-reaching approach to the ‘second person’s’ often startling ambiguities. This is Keats's notion of negative capability, a capacity or quality in which a person ‘is capable of being in uncertainties, Mysteries, doubts, without any irritable reaching after fact and reason.’ I suggest that Protean-‘you’ texts will license all of the readings of ambiguity and fluidity proposed in my discussion of ‘Almost You’, but conclude that the instances of indeterminacy illustrate no more than that: the fluidity and deep ambiguity, and thus, finally, the lack of coherence, of Protean-‘you’ discourse. This has particular implications for how we are to consider readers’ experiences of narrative texts. More fundamentally, it has implications for how we are to consider readers as subjects. I suggest that unstable, ambiguous instances of ‘second-person’ narrative can tear the complex and systematic embroidery of ideological suture that unifies Cretinism’s experience or sense of subjectivity, leaving the reader in a condition of epistemological and ontological havoc. I go on to argue that much of the deeply unsettling effect of Protean-‘you’ discourse anises because its utterances explicitly gesture towards Cretinism’s notion of self. Protean-‘you’ involves a sense of address that is much more pronounced than we are accustomed to facing when reading literary narrative, alerting us to the presence of inscribed anthropomorphic subjects. At the very same time, protean-‘you’ leaves its inscribed subjects indeterminate, ambiguous. This conflict generates a tension between the anticipation of the emergence of speaking and listening selves and our inability to find them. I go on to propose that Protean-‘you’ narrative's lack of coherence is also to be understood as the condition of narrative actuality generally, but a condition that is vigorously mediated against by dominant practices of reading and writing, hocusing my discussion in this respect on the issue of narrative ‘person,’ I argue that narrative ‘person’ is constituted within texts as an apparent unity, but that it is in fact, produced as unitary solely within the practice of making sense, that is, Within our habits of reading, and so is never finally unified. I propose that this is the case for ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ modes no less than for the ‘second.’ Where ‘second-person’ narrative at its most radical and Protean differs from conventional ‘first-‘ and ‘third-person’ narratives is the degree to which each has been circumscribed by practices of tantalization, containment and limit, and, in particular, Cretinism’s hegemony of ‘person.’ It may be that the most significant insights ‘second-person’ narrative has to offer are to be found within its capacity to reveal to the engaged reader the underlying condition of narrative discourse, and more generally, its capacity to reveal the actual condition of the human subject-a condition in which, exactly like its textual corollary of narrative ‘person,’ the self is glimpsed as thoroughly dispersed and contingent.

Thesis (M.Ed.)--University of Hong Kong, 1992. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 161-164). Also available in print.

<p>The purpose of this essay has been to do a study on narration as a strategy in history education. By taking a starting point in the perspective that Shulman calls “wisdom of practice” and other studies I interviewed three teachers that were all experts in narration. This to have an insight in how they looked at the oral narration and on its role in history education. Is there a common view among the interviewed techers and to what extent are the traits and qualities of story telling described in litterature linked to the teachers’ answers?</p><p>My results show that the oral narration is not a straight and exclusive teaching strategy; it differs from teacher to teacher. The decisive factor that makes the difference is their main view point on story telling. These three teachers show three different styles of narration; the narrative subject, the above narrator and the anecdotic narrator.</p><p>Furthermore, I found that the main argument for the use of narration in history education is that oral narration has a great capacity when it comes to passing on information and making the students remember it. But how ever strong the arguments are for using one special strategy of teaching, variation is very important; not only because of the risk of making student bored, but also because it isn’t possible to stay in line with the national guidlines that the teachers must follow.</p><p>In the process of this study, I have concretisised four advantages and three disadvantages of narration.</p><p>1. It is easier to remember information passed on in stories because it creates a context.</p><p>2. Oral narration creates an interest in students due to an internal and external meaning.</p><p>3. Stories fulfil fundamental needs because of its ability to explain.</p><p>4. Oral narration differs from other teaching strategies and creates a creative variation.</p><p>1. Narration has the ability to affect students, which may lead to a less critical approach to information sources.</p><p>2. Illusory coherence may appear in a story because narration strives to create coherence.</p><p>3. When creating a story meant to be told orally you risk loosing focus because of an indistinct purpose.</p>

The theme of truth in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre has rarely been developed. The present thesis aims at filling this lack. In a long first part the goes in details through the whole of MacIntyre’s work with a special attention to the item of truth, which is omnipresent. This heuristic part leads to a hermeneutic part, in which the thought of the Anglo-Saxon philosopher is compared with that of Hans-Georg Gadamer - to whom he affirms to be widely indebted - in order to discern the proper of the Macintyrian researcher and that of his access to truth, which he considers as absolute. The unifying thread of it is the dichotomy Aristotle vs. Heidegger in Gadamer’s work. This dichotomy, which is suggested by the Anglo-Saxon philosopher, proves to be an important key of interpretation of his thought in the field of hermeneutic. In a third part the author studies a diversity of themes for a right understanding of the Macintyrian conception of truth: today’s context of plurality of traditions and civilisations, Macintyrian Thomism, the absolute and what is relative and truth as a good. This thematic part is built upon a confrontation with the thought of the second Hilary Putnam, that of "Reason, Truth and History", which is used as a safeguard in the work of MacIntyre when he tries to define the conception of truth in the tradition rationality. The author makes some critics of MacIntyre’s thought, notably on the credit given to human rationality: the Anglo-Saxon philosopher does not seem to understand the limits proper to it, on theoretical level and practical level as well. / Le thème de la vérité chez Alasdair MacIntyre restait trop peu connu. Cette thèse entend contribuer à combler ce manque. Dans une longue première partie, l’ensemble de l’œuvre macintyrienne est épluché en suivant le thème de la vérité, qui y est omniprésent. Cette partie heuristique débouche sur une partie herméneutique, où la pensée du philosophe anglo-saxon est confrontée à celle de Hans-Georg Gadamer, envers lequel il reconnaît une dette importante, afin de discerner quelle est la part propre de la situation de l’investigateur macintyrien et celle de son accès à la vérité, qu’il considère finalement comme étant absolue. La dichotomie Aristote vs Heidegger chez Gadamer en constitue le fil rouge. Cette dichotomie, suggérée par le philosophe anglo-saxon, s’avère être une clé d’interprétation importante de sa pensée dans le champ de l’herméneutique. Dans une troisième partie sont étudiés divers thèmes importants pour une juste compréhension de la conception macintyrienne de la vérité : le contexte contemporain de la pluralité des traditions et des civilisations, le thomisme macintyrien, le relatif et l’absolu, et la vérité comme (un) bien. Cette partie thématique est charpentée par une confrontation avec la pensée du second Hilary Putnam, celui de "Reason, Truth and History", qui sert en quelque sorte de garde-fou dans l’œuvre macintyrienne quand il s’agit de définir la conception de la vérité impliquée dans la tradition rationality. Certaines critiques de la pensée d’Alasdair MacIntyre sont faites, notamment en ce qui concerne le crédit qu’il accorde à la rationalité humaine : le philosophe anglo-saxon ne semble pas prendre la mesure des limites qui lui sont propres, tant au niveau théorique qu’au niveau pratique.

The theme of truth in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre has rarely been developed. The present thesis aims at filling this lack. In a long first part the goes in details through the whole of MacIntyre’s work with a special attention to the item of truth, which is omnipresent. This heuristic part leads to a hermeneutic part, in which the thought of the Anglo-Saxon philosopher is compared with that of Hans-Georg Gadamer - to whom he affirms to be widely indebted - in order to discern the proper of the Macintyrian researcher and that of his access to truth, which he considers as absolute. The unifying thread of it is the dichotomy Aristotle vs. Heidegger in Gadamer’s work. This dichotomy, which is suggested by the Anglo-Saxon philosopher, proves to be an important key of interpretation of his thought in the field of hermeneutic. In a third part the author studies a diversity of themes for a right understanding of the Macintyrian conception of truth: today’s context of plurality of traditions and civilisations, Macintyrian Thomism, the absolute and what is relative and truth as a good. This thematic part is built upon a confrontation with the thought of the second Hilary Putnam, that of "Reason, Truth and History", which is used as a safeguard in the work of MacIntyre when he tries to define the conception of truth in the tradition rationality. The author makes some critics of MacIntyre’s thought, notably on the credit given to human rationality: the Anglo-Saxon philosopher does not seem to understand the limits proper to it, on theoretical level and practical level as well. / Le thème de la vérité chez Alasdair MacIntyre restait trop peu connu. Cette thèse entend contribuer à combler ce manque. Dans une longue première partie, l’ensemble de l’œuvre macintyrienne est épluché en suivant le thème de la vérité, qui y est omniprésent. Cette partie heuristique débouche sur une partie herméneutique, où la pensée du philosophe anglo-saxon est confrontée à celle de Hans-Georg Gadamer, envers lequel il reconnaît une dette importante, afin de discerner quelle est la part propre de la situation de l’investigateur macintyrien et celle de son accès à la vérité, qu’il considère finalement comme étant absolue. La dichotomie Aristote vs Heidegger chez Gadamer en constitue le fil rouge. Cette dichotomie, suggérée par le philosophe anglo-saxon, s’avère être une clé d’interprétation importante de sa pensée dans le champ de l’herméneutique. Dans une troisième partie sont étudiés divers thèmes importants pour une juste compréhension de la conception macintyrienne de la vérité : le contexte contemporain de la pluralité des traditions et des civilisations, le thomisme macintyrien, le relatif et l’absolu, et la vérité comme (un) bien. Cette partie thématique est charpentée par une confrontation avec la pensée du second Hilary Putnam, celui de "Reason, Truth and History", qui sert en quelque sorte de garde-fou dans l’œuvre macintyrienne quand il s’agit de définir la conception de la vérité impliquée dans la tradition rationality. Certaines critiques de la pensée d’Alasdair MacIntyre sont faites, notamment en ce qui concerne le crédit qu’il accorde à la rationalité humaine : le philosophe anglo-saxon ne semble pas prendre la mesure des limites qui lui sont propres, tant au niveau théorique qu’au niveau pratique.

The purpose of this essay has been to do a study on narration as a strategy in history education. By taking a starting point in the perspective that Shulman calls “wisdom of practice” and other studies I interviewed three teachers that were all experts in narration. This to have an insight in how they looked at the oral narration and on its role in history education. Is there a common view among the interviewed techers and to what extent are the traits and qualities of story telling described in litterature linked to the teachers’ answers? My results show that the oral narration is not a straight and exclusive teaching strategy; it differs from teacher to teacher. The decisive factor that makes the difference is their main view point on story telling. These three teachers show three different styles of narration; the narrative subject, the above narrator and the anecdotic narrator. Furthermore, I found that the main argument for the use of narration in history education is that oral narration has a great capacity when it comes to passing on information and making the students remember it. But how ever strong the arguments are for using one special strategy of teaching, variation is very important; not only because of the risk of making student bored, but also because it isn’t possible to stay in line with the national guidlines that the teachers must follow. In the process of this study, I have concretisised four advantages and three disadvantages of narration. 1. It is easier to remember information passed on in stories because it creates a context. 2. Oral narration creates an interest in students due to an internal and external meaning. 3. Stories fulfil fundamental needs because of its ability to explain. 4. Oral narration differs from other teaching strategies and creates a creative variation. 1. Narration has the ability to affect students, which may lead to a less critical approach to information sources. 2. Illusory coherence may appear in a story because narration strives to create coherence. 3. When creating a story meant to be told orally you risk loosing focus because of an indistinct purpose.

Ce mémoire se consacre à l'étude de la structure narrative des deux nouvelles de Marguerite Yourcenar (1903-1987) intitulées Un homme obscur et Une belle matinée [1982], mais aussi à l'étude des figures de la mémoire et de L'oubli mises en scène dans ces récits. La voix narrative, l'énonciation et la focalisation sont d'abord présentées dans leur fonction respective. Cette analyse s'inspire en premier lieu des travaux de Gérard Genette et d'Émile Benveniste, et a pour fonction de cerner certaines particularités de la construction narrative. La notion d'intertextualité mise en place par Kristeva permet ensuite de mettre en lumière un réseau de citations que ces textes tissent entre eux et avec d'autres textes. Les figures et métaphores qui relatent les épisodes qui marquent les temps forts de l'existence des protagonistes rappellent enfin certains phénomènes de la logique de la mémoire tels que Freud les a repérés, permettant ainsi d'observer un travail de symbolisation. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Yourcenar, Homme obscur, Belle matinée, Narration, Intertexte, Mémoire.

Ce mémoire vise à décrire et à analyser les récits -la part narrative -du Journal de Witold Gombrowicz afin de dégager les spécificités formelles et les enjeux de l'art narratif du diariste. Prenant place dans un ensemble textuel dominé par le mode/genre discursif, le récit est appelé à remplir des fonctions précises: l'usage qu'en fait l'écrivain laisse transparaître des motifs liés à une stratégie interlocutoire, à la représentation de soi et à l'interprétation du réel. La manière dont Gombrowicz exploite les différentes ressources du genre narratif n'est ni anodine ni gratuite, puisque les variations énonciatives, créées par l'alternance entre le discours et le récit, donnent à lire un jeu avec la Forme, aussi conscient que concerté. Une étude des diverses formes narratives du Journal et de leur dispositio -la façon dont elles sont réparties et organisées -permet de découvrir deux types de liaisons et d'interactions existant entre plusieurs récits, mais aussi entre la part narrative et la part réflexive-argumentative de l'ensemble. Le premier est d'ordre formel et se réalise à la faveur d'une imbrication textuelle et d'une hybridité générique (discours/récit) généralisée. Le second a trait au contenu -à l'objet, à la matière de l'écriture -et s'opère par le biais de correspondances thématiques. Ces deux types de liaisons et d'interactions énonciatives font place à un jeu interprétatif permettant au diariste de composer des variations sur un même thème. Par ailleurs, une analyse du statut autobiographique du Journal et des différents genres de récits qu'il renferme nous conduit à reconnaître un processus de fictionnalisation. Ce dernier se décline et s'observe sous trois aspects: l'ambiguïté référentielle, le traitement fictionnel de soi et la facture stylistique des récits -les procédés poétiques à l'oeuvre dans la mise en récit. Par la fictionnalisation, Gombrowicz donne voix à son projet de se créer, de s'expérimenter entre et parmi les hommes, et à son désir de pénétrer, et de nous faire pénétrer, un autre ordre de vérité -celui de l'être aux prises avec le réel -, s'inscrivant en marge de la « réalité des faits » et de la dichotomie du vrai et du faux. Puis, en considérant ce que réalise le récit dans son interaction avec la part discursive de l'oeuvre, il est possible d'y cerner trois grands rôles, soit les fonctions argumentative, biographique et agonistique. Il apparaît que certains récits du Journal ont pour tâche d'illustrer les idées du diariste, de les mettre en lumière et en perspective, en les intégrant à son histoire personnelle, à sa biographie. Par la voie narrative, Gombrowicz lie les grandes problématiques de son oeuvre à son vécu, jetant un pont entre le discours intellectuel et le langage ambivalent du corps, celui du désir, des passions et des affects. Le récit prend le relais là où le discours est jugé insuffisant, en prenant en charge ce qui excède ce dernier, en portant à l'écriture la dimension conflictuelle et agonique de l'existence de l'écrivain. À l'issue de notre réflexion, nous pouvons affirmer que le récit, loin de se borner à « raconter une histoire », est axé sur une complexification et une problématisation du vécu. Plus qu'à des impératifs d'ordre esthétique (de forme, de composition), les récits du Journal répondent à des exigences d'ordre éthique, à un souci permanent de justesse, d'équilibre et de nuance. Ils permettent à Gombrowicz d'opposer au discours raisonné la résistance du réel, le « dire » au « vivre », mais aussi de soumettre son image -son ethos -d'écrivain, et l'autorité qui s'y rattache, à la part de contradictions, de conflits et d'échecs que comporte son existence. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Gombrowicz, Journal, Énonciation, Récit, Discours, Forme, Genre, Fonction.

Notre projet consiste en la réalisation d'une machine à contenu accessible par le Web et permettant l'interaction de créateurs intéressés par le récit fictionnel ou la création collaborative d'une façon plus large. Essentiellement francophone, elle se particularise par ses deux modes de motorisation, blogue et wiki, permettant ainsi tous les degrés de collaboration d'une écriture à plusieurs mains. Dans son contenu elle se veut un tableau social contemporain et s'arrime à la production blogatoire actuelle. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Wikifiction, « Rue des plumes perdues », « Machine à contenu », Écriture, Création, Collaborative, Collective, Blogue, Wiki, Fiction, Récit, Poésie, Cinéma, Scénario, Vidéo, Forum, Cms, « Web 2.0 ».