Yes

This thesis focuses on the role foreign policy played in legitimizing the early French Fifth Republic from 1958 to 1960. I argue that President Charles de Gaulle employed foreign policy in the service of gaining public support for his new government and the new republic. Many historians have argued previously that his foreign policy of grandeur, as it came to be called, was used to recast international politics and France's role in them. My work diverges from these previous interpretations by arguing that Gaullist foreign policy served, in many instances, overarching domestic goals, not French international interests. I see foreign policy as inseparable from the broader domestic ambition to craft a persuasive narrative of renewal and national unity under Gaullist stewardship. In the process, my study puts de Gaulle's foreign policy into the context of his larger aspiration to precipitate constitutional reform and, thereafter, ensure popular support. De Gaulle exploited opportunities to use foreign policy in order to shape public opinion, both domestically and internationally. These efforts, as my research reflects, helped foster public support for the new regime and, by portraying national renewal, further discredited the preceding Fourth Republic.

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Canada took part in NATO's mission to restructure Afghanistan. The coalition removed the Taliban Government and made-way for a new Afghan Authority. Canada and its NATO allies identified the predominant issues it considered in the planning and implementation of its intervention. This thesis analyzes these assumptions and the influence they had on the construction of the intervention. It problematizes the concept of security, and builds a matrix of security concerns based on the social structures that compose the local and international actors in Afghanistan: namely NATO, Canada, and local Afghan perspectives. It seeks to outline the shared understanding and expectations of the Alliance, the resources which it has allocated, and the practices that have resulted from the intervention to this day. The analysis aims to identify which sectors are primarily made referents of security policies in the context of Canada's renewed role in international relations and the duality of humanitarian development and military intervention. The study will take into consideration the experience and interests of the observed actors and ask whether the reference of an international actor to the security concerns of a domestic actor is adequate. This research seeks to showcase the utility of the constructivist framework in understanding the plurality of identities. It identifies the fault lines between outsiders and insiders within the context, and the ways by which the construction of security changes from one social-structure to another. It considers the interaction issues related to the agent-structure question, by identifying issues of dominance by specific actors, the militarization of the context, and the ordering of security-values by different actors.

What is NATO? This diplomatic history reveals that NATO and its meaning were contingent and never static. Instead, NATO was a machine the allies sought to adapt and use to achieve their national interests. NATO was shrouded in an "Atlantic mystique," the suggestion that the allies practiced a unique and exceptional type of cooperation based on shared values and common heritage. But this mystique did not define or ensure NATO's longevity; in fact NATO was thought necessary because of differences between the allies. The allies' national interests did converge on fundamental points, like the need for security. But they rarely agreed on specifics. And when they disagreed on basic questions, like NATO's relationship to the rest of the world, the role of Europe in NATO, and the American commitment to the continent, sparks flew. But because NATO was not static, it could adapt. And the hope held by each ally that they could convince their allies to change NATO to meet their needs - the hope inherent in a dynamic NATO machine - kept the allies working together. From 1955 to 1968, both the allies and the world situation changed dramatically. So to did the allies' plans and uses they saw for NATO. The primary interest of allies was protection from the Soviet Union. But the allies - even some in the Federal Republic of Germany - also believed NATO protected them from a resurgent Germany. Just how to defend against either threat was never agreed. But the allies believed that NATO, by keeping the Cold War cold, and by fostering cooperation between the western European states, established a Pax Atlantica. In this Atlantic peace the allies prospered. They cooperated and they competed, but peacefully. By the end of the 1960s, the allies believed NATO was necessary to maintaining the Pax Atlantica, even if - especially if - the Soviet empire collapsed. Amidst the crises of the 1950s and 1960s, the allies came to believe NATO was guaranteed a long future. / History

In December 1979, NATO adopted Dual Track. This resolution had two tracks: the modernisation of NATO’s Theatre Nuclear Forces and an offer to arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union. At the time, the Netherlands conditionally accepted Dual Track. Dutch opposition to nuclear modernisation was too great. The government postponed the decision for two years, linking it to the results of arms control negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union. In the end, the postponement would last for six years. The crisis that followed the Dual Track decision would become known as the Euromissile Crisis. The goal of this thesis is two-fold. On the one hand, the goal is to explore the reasoning behind this postponement. It will look into the domestic and international factors that influenced Dutch decision-making. The Dutch public did not want to deploy new missiles, whereas the NATO allies pressured the government to make a decision. This thesis has shown that domestic pressures were incredibly influential at the beginning of the crisis. That is why Dual Track was conditionally accepted. However, international factors, such as the need for solidarity within NATO, increased significantly over time. On the other hand, it researches how Dutch margins for manoeuvre were increased during the Euromissile Crisis. In line with New Cold War History, this thesis argues that the Netherlands was not just a small state that had to follow the path the bigger NATO states decided. There was the opportunity to push its own agenda.

No / The military dimension of the Cold War was characterised by the strategic nuclear stand-off between the United States and the Soviet Union as well as the large-scale regional military confrontation in Central Europe. As part of the process of East-West détente there was an effort to address the risks of war in Europe by means of an arms control process referred to as MBFR (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions). The true purposes and intentions of both sides (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) in these negotiations has so far not been fully understood. This book is based on path-breaking archival research that clarifies the objectives and tactics of the parties to the negotiations and the reasons for why the negotiations ended without an agreement. It makes a major new contribution to the understanding of Cold War History.

In this study, I analyze NATO's internal cohesion against the backdrop of the war in Ukraine. By examining the differing support levels from its member states to Ukraine, utilizing quantitative methods, I explore the correlation between the support and previously existing groupings within NATO. My findings reveal persistent divisions, suggesting that alliance cohesion has not significantly improved. The study offers crucial insights for Swedish and NATO policymakers, highlighting the strategic importance of understanding alliance dynamics during global crises. It underscores the necessity for policies that enhance unity and effectiveness in international alliances.