In this thesis, I analyze the classical tripartite definition of knowledge. According to this definition there are three conditions for a knowledge claim to arise, namely, belief, truth and justification conditions. The main problem with this definition is even if these three conditions are satisfied one may not know a proposition p because of the fact that the justification of the proposition p may not be relevant in showing that p is true. Therefore, my primary purpose is to establish a strong conceptual connection between justification and truth conditions. To realize this, first, I defend a three-way interrelation between these three conditions. Second, I inquire as to which kind of justification should lead us to which kind of truth. To answer to this question, I postulate three kinds of realities, namely, Subjective Reality, Inter-Subjective Reality, and Allegedly Pure Reality. Furthermore, I re-define the justification condition in such way that there is a kind of whole justification and it requires both internal and external justification. According to this conception of reality and re-definition of justification there already exists a strong conceptual connection between internal justification and Subjective Reality which is completely subject-relative. And I defend the existence of such a connection also between the whole justification and Inter-Subjective Reality. Finally, I argue that no conception of justification can lead us to an Allegedly Pure Reality that the hardest version of skepticism claims to exist.

This thesis examines the relationship between truth, justice, and reconciliation by comparing the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Rwandan Gacaca Court System. / Graduate

This exegesis examines how a writer can effectively negotiate the relationship between author, character, fact and truth, in a work of Creative Nonfiction. It was found that individual truths, in a work of Creative Nonfiction, are not necessarily universal truths due to individual, cultural, historical and religious circumstances. What was also identified, through the examination of published Creative Nonfiction, is a necessity to ensure there are clear demarcation lines between authorial truth and fiction. The Creative Nonfiction works examined, which established this framework for the reader, ensured an ethical relationship between author and audience. These strategies and frameworks were then applied to my own Creative Nonfiction.

Thesis (D.Min.)--South Florida Center for Theological Studies, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University, 2003. / Advisor: Rhoda E. Howard-Hassmann. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 285-303). Also available via World Wide Web.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2561.pdf: 1772597 bytes, checksum: b436e70ace58d964350583051111b8b2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-08-24 / Financiadora de Estudos e Projetos / The objective of this dissertation is analyze the problem of truth as presented by Alfred Tarski in his essay The Semantic Conception of Truth . Other theories of truth are considered, explained and classified in the first chapter. The second chapter attempts provide a general characterization of correspondence theories of truth. Tarski s essay is discussed in the third, and, finally, in the fourth chapter, the semantic and correspondence theories are compared, and the philosophical importance of the former is evaluated. / Esta dissertação tem por finalidade analisar o problema da verdade no trabalho apresentado por Alfred Tarski, chamado de Concepção Semântica da Verdade . Mas esta discussão não será apresentada isolada das pesquisas sobre as diferentes concepções da verdade, mas inserida em um contexto mais amplo das teorias da verdade. Assim, no primeiro capítulo, serão abordadas as diversas teorias e suas classificações. O segundo capítulo descreve as características principais de uma teoria da verdade-como-correspondência, visando à possível comparação com a concepção tarskiana. O terceiro capítulo discute filosoficamente a Concepção Semântica da Verdade apresentada por Tarski. E, finalmente, o quarto capítulo compara a concepção semântica da verdade com a concepção da verdadecomo- correspondência e busca descrever seu valor filosófico.

Truth and Justification in Donald Davidson’s Philosophy”. In this paper, I attempt to discuss the tensions that exist in Davidson’s work between hisconception of beliefs as veridical by nature and its radical opposition to epistemictheories of truth. With this purpose, I introduce two modalities of philosophicalelucidation: analytic non-reductive elucidation and connective elucidation. I alsoclaim that these two modalities are characteristic of two periods of Davidson’sway of dealing with the concept of truth. I attempt to show that the considerationof these two types of elucidation allows shedding light on the way in whichDavidson’s work deals with the problem of truth and on the particular abovementionedtension. / En este artículo me propongo tratar la tensión existente en la obra deDavidson entre su concepción de las creencias como verídicas por naturaleza ysu radical oposición a las teorías epistémicas de la verdad. Para ello introduzcodos modalidades de elucidación filosófica, elucidación analítica no reductiva yelucidación conectiva y sostengo que caracterizan dos periodos en el tratamientode Davidson del concepto de verdad. Me propongo mostrar que la consideraciónde estos dos tipos de elucidación permite echar luz sobre el tratamientodel problema de la verdad en la obra de Davidson y sobre la particular tensiónanteriormente mencionada.

The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the adherence to absolute truth and moraluniversalism is compatible with democracy. The starting point is that there is absolute truthand absolute values.My thesis is that democracy in the form of universal suffrage is not necessarily in the wayof truth, but rather party politics and representative democracy. Abolishing the parties may besufficient to overcome both truth relativism and moral relativism, and thus provide analternative to abolishing universal suffrage. I suggest the problem lies in party politics, andthe way in which political talks are conducted, rather than in the right to vote.The investigation shows that democracy only have instrumental value. It shall be judgedbased on how well it promotes absolute truth and absolute values. Furthermore, representativedemocracy does not promote absolute truth and absolute values. One alternative isepistocracy. Another option is to abolish the parties, preserve universal suffrage, and createconditions for a new form of political dialogue. The conclusion is that the latter option is bestfor promoting the absolute truth.

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / A presente dissertaÃÃo objetiva fornecer uma interpretaÃÃo acerca do conjunto de reflexÃes desenvolvidas pelo filÃsofo alemÃo Friedrich Nietzsche em torno da noÃÃo de verdade. Tal reflexÃo à realizada a partir dos diferentes pontos de vista presentes em sua obra, procurando observar como se articulam as ideias de verdade e de vida, tendo como fio condutor a noÃÃo de âvontade de verdadeâ. Procuro, por um lado, articular os momentos em que o filÃsofo empreende crÃticas à noÃÃo de verdade, direcionadas primeiramente Ãs verdades da metafÃsica, mas que apontam e investigam, ao mesmo tempo, para a noÃÃo de veracidade, na medida em que esta passa a ser entendida como a provÃvel origem daquela. Em seguida, intento entender, na esteira da reflexÃo sobre a veracidade, como Nietzsche desenvolve esta crÃtica e dà a ela um novo direcionamento com um sentido existencial e normativo (uma vez que elege um critÃrio a partir do qual à possÃvel avaliar o valor dos valores morais), a partir da elaboraÃÃo do seu procedimento genealÃgico. O resultado de tais reflexÃes sÃo essenciais para a compreensÃo da ideia de vontade de verdade e, igualmente, de um sentido possÃvel da noÃÃo verdade para o filÃsofo. / This dissertation aims to provide an interpretation about the set of reflections developed by the German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche around the notion of truth. Such reflection is carried out from different points of view present in his work, trying to observe how articulate the ideas of truth and life, with the thread of the notion of "will to truth". I seek, on the one hand, articulate the moments in which the philosopher undertakes criticism of the notion of truth, first directed to the metaphysical truths, but pointing and investigating at the same time, to the notion of veracity, as it passes the it is understood as the likely source of that. Then attempt to understand, in the wake of reflection on the veracity, how Nietzsche develops this critical and gives it a new direction with an existential and normative sense (since elects a criterion from which to assess the value of moral values), from the preparation of its genealogical procedure. The result of such reflections are essential to understanding the âwill to truthâ idea and also a possible sense of the truth to the philosopher.

<p>HT 2017</p>