Magister Legum - LLM / The concept of transitional justice keeps changing as the concept of conflict changes. The paper analyses the transitional justice process in Kenya after the 2007-2008 Post-Election Violence. Very little has been written on the success or failure of transitional justice in Kenya after eight years of the implementation of transitional justice mechanisms which included truth commission, criminal prosecutions and recommendations on reparations. Furthermore, the architects of Kenya’s transitional justice process failed to put in place a mechanism against which the progress of transitional justice could be measured. It was therefore necessary to analyse the overall transitional justice process in Kenya to determine its efficacy. Kenya’s transitional justice process seemed to be a stand-alone occurrence with no ties to the laws or the various institutions in the country compared to Uganda's national transitional justice policy. The transitional justice process as a whole did not assign rights and responsibilities to the public, the three arms of government, the devolved governments, civil society or non-governmental organisations so that the various stakeholders could then check and balance each other with the aim of ensuring that transitional justice would be implemented. To date, there are still calls for the full implementation of the transitional justice processes especially in light of the International Criminal Court having terminated the last case in relation to the post-election violence as well as Kenya’s impending general elections in 2017. This paper begins by introducing transitional justice in Kenya and providing the 2007-2008 PEV as a background. The paper then investigates the ideal circumstances for implementing transitional justice mechanisms. In the case of Kenya, it is concluded that the situation in 2007-2008 PEV did not conform to the traditional context of societies in transition. Whereas there was no regime change that preceded the 2007-2008 PEV, there were human rights violations which were ethnically driven. The study illustrates how the violation of human rights depended on the ethnic tribe the person belonged to, hence identifying the main problem in the 2007-2008 PEV as negative ethnicity. Looking at the contextual precedence set by Latin American countries and later followed by other countries undergoing change, ethnicity has not been dealt with and to this extent Kenya presents a unique situation. The paper concludes that each of the transitional justice mechanisms implemented in Kenya had no impact on Kenya and as a result, the whole transitional justice process had failed. The paper recommends that stakeholders address and solve the inter-tribal fears and suspicions in order to create an opportunity for the different tribes to establish a relationship based on transparency. In the alternative, the paper recommends the adoption of the Territorial Self-Governance (TSG) which allows ethnic groups in a particular sovereign region to regulate their own affairs thus reducing the risk of ethnic tensions on account of one group's concerns not being addressed adequately. Ultimately, the paper recommends that the Truth Justice and Reconciliation report be tabled before Parliament for approval in order for the transitional justice mechanisms to be implemented fully. / German Academic Exchange Service ( DAAD)

"It is noted that special measures are always necessary in post-conflict situations to bring about the restoration of normalcy to societies. Truth commissions have been identified as a key to uniting, reconciling and helping the people to confidently deal with their past. Whilst these are noble notions, practically, truth commissions face serious challenges. The dissertation shall seek to highlight these problems and offer recommendations. ... The dissertation is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the general introduction. It gives a brief political history of Ghana and South Africa and their impact on the enjoyment of human rights. The chapter shall also discuss the need for national reconciliation in both countries. Chapter two discusses truth commissions in contemporary societies. It briefly discusses the establishment of national reconciliaton commissions and their mandates. Chapter three focuses on the laws establishing the TRC and NRC of South Africa and Ghana respectively. These legislation shall be considered in detail in order to analyse their objectives to know whether or not thet are achievable within their stated mandates. Chapter four discusses the challenges truth commission poses to international law and its implications on rule of law. The chapter shall discuss the issue of amnesty to perpetrators of gross human rights and the perpetuation of the culture of impunity in the light of international law. Chapter five considers the way forward and suggest recommendations." -- Chapter 1. / Thesis (LLM (Human Rights and Democratisation in Africa))--University of Pretoria, 2003. / http://www.chr.up.ac.za/academic_pro/llm1/dissertations.html / Centre for Human Rights / LLM

This dissertation project develops a theoretical understanding of how truth commissions achieve legitimacy and thus contribute to peace and stability in the aftermath of major traumatic events (e.g. civil war, mass killings, regime changes). I identify three components of truth commission legitimacy---authority, fairness, and transparency---that facilitate beneficial outcomes for societies emerging from a period of severe human rights repression or civil war. I theorize and test how institutions with these legitimacy characteristics contribute to an increase in respect for human rights and decrease political violence in transitioning societies, thus contributing to peace and stability. In order to test the hypothesized relationships, I create a truth commission characteristic dataset that provides greater detail than existing datasets. This project is a contribution to our understanding of the relationships between human rights, institutions, conflict, and international law. It provides one explanation for the inconsistent findings of extant work concerning the impact of transitional justice, generally and truth commissions, specifically. I provide evidence that there are identifiable "best practices" that truth commissions should consider adopting. This information can assist states, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations alike in making difficult decisions regarding the transitional justice process, which is expensive and time consuming further necessitating an understanding of what practices are most crucial for achieving peace and stability.

[pt] Em fins de 2016 o conceituado Dicionário Oxford elegeu e divulgou que pós-verdade seria sua palavra do ano. A escolha teria se baseado no singular aumento de uso da palavra e seria relativa ao agitado panorama macropolítico que havia dominado a discussão pública, nos contextos aos quais se refere o dicionário, naquele ano. Sua definição remeteria a uma perspectiva na qual a emoção seria mais importante ao apelo público que referências aos fatos, tal como uma crescente desvalorização da verdade. A palavra, então, passou a ser bastante tematizada e discutida publicamente nesta chave. Partindo deste contexto, o presente trabalho chega à seguinte pergunta: por que se preteriria e defenderia, axiologicamente falando, uma afirmação enquanto verdadeira mesmo que epistemologicamente tais afirmações procedam ou não? A partir do debate acerca desta questão, o trabalho desloca seu olhar de uma vontade de verdade para uma vontade de identidade, pensando os processos pelos quais indivíduos ou grupos criam identificações acerca de certas verdades, em seu sentido axiológico. Assim, passa a indagar os mecanismos da identidade e consolidação de tais verdades; para isto, recorre aos postulados filosóficos de Friedrich Nietzsche e Jacques Derrida e estabelece uma narrativa, a partir da pergunta sobre a noção de pós verdade e seus limites, que se segue da vontade de verdade de acordo com o postulado por Nietzsche para as discussões acerca de identidades e identificações nos postulados de Derrida. Pergunta-se então, se em sentido axiológico se poderia falar de uma hipertrofia da verdade. / [en] At the end of 2016 the prestigious Oxford Dictionary has elected and announced that post-thuth was his word of the year. The choice was based on the significantly increase of the use of the word and it would be related to the main politics landscape that had been on the spots of the public discussion that year, about the contexts referred by the dictionary. His definition (of post-truth) would refer to a perspective where emotion was more important to the public appeal than references to facts, just as a growing devaluation of truth too. The word, then, got more themed and publicly discussed in this key. From this context, this text comes to the following question: why it would be preferred, pointed and defended, axiologically speaking, a statement as true even if epistemologically these statements proceed or not? From this debate, this text turns his view from a will to truth to a will to identity, thinking the processes in witch individuals or groups creates identifications about certain truths in their axiological sense. Thus, it begins to inquire the mechanisms of identity and the consolidation of those truths; in this purpose it resorts to the philosophical postulates of Friedrich Nietzsche and Jacques Derrida and establishes a narrative starting from the question about the notion of post-truth, its limits, which follows from the will to truth according to postulates of Nietzsche to the discussions about identities and identifications on Derrida s postulates. So, it s possible to outline the possibilities, in an axiological sense, of a discuss about a hypertrophy of truth.

No description available.

No description available.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-08-10T10:46:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 JULIANO BARRETO RODRIGUES.pdf: 4748723 bytes, checksum: 897811779f15cd31a4f855eea2660a10 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2013-06-28 / This paper presents the differences between the truth of the facts and truth that remains in the written records of the criminal process after the production of evidence indicating that one is not identical to another. The fact that writing is an end refiguring contaminated by numerous interpretations of actors, a reductionist historiographic discourse that denies the acts outside the standards and ignores the complexity of a criminal act. It also studies the juridical reason, based on the topical-rhetorical and prudential judgments, showing its fragility, justifying numerous judicial errors. With a focus on disciplinary Discourse Analysis, also uses concepts and theories of Historiography, Psychology, Linguistics and Publicity to treat under new angle, already much discussed topic of the strictly legal point of view. With this diverse perspective, demonstrates the countless acting interfering in the formation of versions ranging registered in the records, emphasis how can (the interfering) distance them (the records) of the real truth. Engages primarily of justice derived from the truth that it capable of producing in the process and will be, as proof, always more or less different from the facts as exactly occurred. Proved this part, we analyze the degree of acceptance of this model by jurisdictional. / O texto apresenta as diferenças entre a verdade dos fatos e a verdade que resta escrita nos autos do processo criminal após a persecução penal, indicando que esta não corresponde fielmente àquela, sendo uma refiguração, contaminada por interpretações de inúmeros atores, um discurso historiográfico reducionista que nega os discursos discrepantes e a complexidade do fato criminoso. Estuda a razão jurídica, lastreada na tópica-retórica e no juízo prudencial, demonstrando sua fragilidade, justificadora de inúmeros erros judiciários. Com foco disciplinar na Análise do Discurso, coteja também conceitos e teorias da Historiografia, da Psicologia, da Linguística e da Publicidade para tratar, sob ângulo novo, tema já muito discutido do ponto de vista estritamente jurídico. Com esta óptica diversa, demonstra os incontáveis interferentes que atuam na formação das versões que vão registradas nos autos, destacando o quanto podem (os interferentes) afastá-los (os autos) da verdade real. Trata, essencialmente, da justiça obtida a partir da verdade que se consegue produzir no processo e que será, conforme comprova, sempre mais ou menos diferente dos fatos como exatamente ocorridos. Provada esta parte, é analisado o grau de aceitação deste modelo pelos jurisdicionados.

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / The main objective of this work consists in investigating the relationship between Frege s conception of truth and the so called Identity Theory of Truth . An identity theory of truth is described in literature as the thesis sustaining that truth consists, fundamentally, in the identity between the content of a judgment or proposition and a fact. The proposition expressed by a sentence, as in Aristotle was a disciple of Plato , is true if, and only if, it is a fact that Aristotle was a disciple of Plato. Thus, the contents of the sentences would be in a relation of identity towards the facts, and would not be in a relation of correspondence, as classic theories of truth sustain. In Der Gedanke, published in 1918, Frege seems to sustain this theory, even though his conception of truth is much larger than that. On the article, he explicitly affirms that a fact is a thought that is true. Such affirmation fits perfectly in the identity theory of truth s slogan. Nevertheless, there s plenty of discussion on the subject in secondary literature. Authors such as Baldwin, Dodd, Kemp, Horsnby and Sluga have discussed the identification between facts and true thoughts, and have given explanations that are sometimes rather antagonistic. That is why it is of great value the reconstruction and the discussion of such interpretations, in the attempt to clarify Frege s purpose on the referred affirmation. Along with that, it is necessary to review other aspects of Frege s philosophy, since his conception of truth in general, and, particularly, the identity theory of truth, are connected to the whole of his philosophy. / A presente dissertação tem como objetivo central investigar a relação entre a concepção fregeana de verdade e a chamada teoria da verdade como identidade (Identity Theory of Truth). Uma teoria da verdade como identidade é caracterizada na literatura como a tese segundo a qual verdade consistiria, fundamentalmente, na identidade entre o conteúdo de um juízo ou proposição e um fato. A proposição expressa por uma sentença, como Aristóteles foi discípulo de Platão , é verdadeira se, e somente se, é um fato que Aristóteles foi discípulo de Platão. Assim sendo, os conteúdos das sentenças estariam em uma relação de identidade com fatos e não em uma relação de correspondência, como as teorias clássicas da verdade irão defender. Em Der Gedanke de 1918, Frege parece defender essa teoria, mesmo que a concepção fregeana de verdade seja muito mais ampla do que isso. Neste artigo, ele explicitamente afirma que um fato é um pensamento que é verdadeiro. E tal afirmação encaixa-se perfeitamente no slogan da teoria da verdade como identidade. Não obstante, na literatura secundária existe uma série de discussões sobre esse tópico. Autores como Baldwin, Dodd, Kemp, Horsnby e Sluga irão discutir essa identificação entre fatos e pensamentos verdadeiros dando respostas por vezes antagônicas. Por isso, é de grande importância reconstruir e discutir essas interpretações na tentativa de esclarecer o propósito de Frege ao fazer tal afirmação. Conjuntamente, outros aspectos da filosofia fregeana necessitam ser explicitados, pois a concepção fregeana de verdade em geral e a teoria da verdade como identidade, em particular, estão ligadas ao restante de sua filosofia.

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1985 W547 / Master of Science

My model-theoretic realist account of science places linguistic systems and the corresponding non-linguistic structures at different stages of the scientific process. It is shown that science and its progress cannot be analysed in terms of only one of these strata. Philosophy of science literature offers mainly two approaches to the structure of scientific knowledge analysed in terms of theories and their models, the "statement" and the "non-statement" approaches. In opposition to the statement approach's belief that scientific knowledge is embodied in theories (formulated in some (first-order) symbolic language) with direct interpretative links - via so-called "bridge principles" - to reality, the defenders of the non-statement approach believe in an analysis where the language in which the theory is formulated plays a much smaller role than the (mathematical) structures which satisfy that theory. The model-theoretic realism expounded here retains the notion of a scientific theory as a (deductively closed) set of sentences, while simultaneously emphasising the interpretative role of the conceptual (i.a. mathematical) models of these theories. My criticism against the non-statement approach is based on the fact that merely "giving" the theory "in terms of' its mathematical structures leaves out any real interpretation of the nature and role of general terms in science. Against the statement approach's "direct" linking of general theoretical terms to reality, my approach interpolates models between theories and (aspects of) reality in the interpretative chain. The links between the general terms of scientific theories and their interpretations in the various models of the theory regulate the whole referential process. The terms of a theory are "general" in the sense that they are the result of certain abstractive conceptualisations of the object of scientific investigation and subsequent linguistic formulations of these conceptualisations. Their (particular) meanings can be "given back" only by interpreting them in the limited context of the various conceptual models of their theory and, finally, by finding an isomorphic relation between some substructure of the conceptual model in question and some empirical conceptualisation (model) of relevant experimental data. In this sense the notion of scientific "truth" becomes inextricably linked with that of articulated reference, as it - given its model-dependent nature - should be. / Philosophy, Practical & Systematic Theology / D.Litt. et Phil. (Philosophy)