Este estudo teve como objetivo obter evidências sobre a relação entre a política de dividendos adotada pelas empresas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA e as suas respectivas estruturas de propriedade e de controle. Adicionalmente, buscou-se identificar possíveis alterações ocorridas no tempo no que se refere às estruturas de propriedade e de controle e aos níveis de dividendos pagos pelas companhias. Para tanto, foram analisadas 297 companhias abertas no período de 2005 a 2012, cujos dados estavam disponíveis no banco de dados Economática, através da aplicação do modelo Tobit. Os resultados apontam que empresas com estruturas de controle e de propriedade concentradas tendem a distribuir menos dividendos. Também foi constatado que houve redução nos níveis de alavancagem de controle (diferença entre concentração de controle e de propriedade) nos últimos anos, mas isso não resultou em níveis mais altos de distribuição de dividendos. De modo geral, os resultados confirmam a existência de conflitos entre controladores e minoritários no Brasil. / This study aimed to obtain evidence on the relationship between the dividend policy adopted by companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA and their respective ownership and control. In addition, the study sought to identify possible changes in time with respect to the ownership and control and the levels of dividends paid by the companies. For this, 297 public companies were analyzed in the period from 2005 to 2012, using data available in Economática and applying the Tobit model. The findings point that firms with concentrated ownership and control tend to distribute less dividends. It was also found that there was a reduction in leverage levels of control (difference between concentration of ownership and control) in recent years, but this has not resulted in higher levels of dividend payments. Overall, the results confirm the existence of conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in Brazil.

Este estudo teve como objetivo obter evidências sobre a relação entre a política de dividendos adotada pelas empresas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA e as suas respectivas estruturas de propriedade e de controle. Adicionalmente, buscou-se identificar possíveis alterações ocorridas no tempo no que se refere às estruturas de propriedade e de controle e aos níveis de dividendos pagos pelas companhias. Para tanto, foram analisadas 297 companhias abertas no período de 2005 a 2012, cujos dados estavam disponíveis no banco de dados Economática, através da aplicação do modelo Tobit. Os resultados apontam que empresas com estruturas de controle e de propriedade concentradas tendem a distribuir menos dividendos. Também foi constatado que houve redução nos níveis de alavancagem de controle (diferença entre concentração de controle e de propriedade) nos últimos anos, mas isso não resultou em níveis mais altos de distribuição de dividendos. De modo geral, os resultados confirmam a existência de conflitos entre controladores e minoritários no Brasil. / This study aimed to obtain evidence on the relationship between the dividend policy adopted by companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA and their respective ownership and control. In addition, the study sought to identify possible changes in time with respect to the ownership and control and the levels of dividends paid by the companies. For this, 297 public companies were analyzed in the period from 2005 to 2012, using data available in Economática and applying the Tobit model. The findings point that firms with concentrated ownership and control tend to distribute less dividends. It was also found that there was a reduction in leverage levels of control (difference between concentration of ownership and control) in recent years, but this has not resulted in higher levels of dividend payments. Overall, the results confirm the existence of conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in Brazil.

Este estudo teve como objetivo obter evidências sobre a relação entre a política de dividendos adotada pelas empresas listadas na BM&FBOVESPA e as suas respectivas estruturas de propriedade e de controle. Adicionalmente, buscou-se identificar possíveis alterações ocorridas no tempo no que se refere às estruturas de propriedade e de controle e aos níveis de dividendos pagos pelas companhias. Para tanto, foram analisadas 297 companhias abertas no período de 2005 a 2012, cujos dados estavam disponíveis no banco de dados Economática, através da aplicação do modelo Tobit. Os resultados apontam que empresas com estruturas de controle e de propriedade concentradas tendem a distribuir menos dividendos. Também foi constatado que houve redução nos níveis de alavancagem de controle (diferença entre concentração de controle e de propriedade) nos últimos anos, mas isso não resultou em níveis mais altos de distribuição de dividendos. De modo geral, os resultados confirmam a existência de conflitos entre controladores e minoritários no Brasil. / This study aimed to obtain evidence on the relationship between the dividend policy adopted by companies listed on BM&FBOVESPA and their respective ownership and control. In addition, the study sought to identify possible changes in time with respect to the ownership and control and the levels of dividends paid by the companies. For this, 297 public companies were analyzed in the period from 2005 to 2012, using data available in Economática and applying the Tobit model. The findings point that firms with concentrated ownership and control tend to distribute less dividends. It was also found that there was a reduction in leverage levels of control (difference between concentration of ownership and control) in recent years, but this has not resulted in higher levels of dividend payments. Overall, the results confirm the existence of conflicts between controlling and minority shareholders in Brazil.

This study is motivated by one of the most prevalent properties of modern corporations: separation of ownership and control. Ownership concentration has been one of the corporate governance mechanisms to solve the agency problem between shareholders and management. Existing literature is mainly concerned with the impact of managerial ownership on firm performance. Little evidence is provided on the impact of general ownership concentration, including multiple large shareholders, on firm performance. This study aims to examine the efficiency of ownership concentration as a corporate governance mechanism, and to explore relevant policy implications to improve firm performance. Based on the company ownership data across a sample of 1291 European companies in the year of 2004, this study shows that European companies' ownership are highly concentrated with the largest three shareholders own more than 60% ownership of company. Industrial companies hold direct controls of European non-subsidiary companies, while private shareholders turn out to be the ultimate owners. On average, there is more than one large shareholder who owns more than 10% of the shares in a European company. A further sample of 655 European companies is used to investigate the relationship between ownership, control and firm performance. A significant non-linear impact of ownership concentration on firm performance with multiple turning points is confirmed. Specifically, Tobin's Q is highest when the Herfindahl index, which incorporates the degree of dispersion of shareholdings other than the largest one, reaches a value of 0.08. The largest shareholding of 10% might also be able to deliver relatively strong performance. Restructuring owner identities could be another efficient governance approach. Direct control from founder owners, ultimate control from insurance companies, and management ownership are beneficial for firm performance, while government, financial institutions except insurance companies and ultimate control of non-financial corporate owners are found to be detrimental for firm performance. Firm performance can also be improved by strengthening the contestability of the controlling coalition's power. The impacts of ownership and control on firm performance are found conditioned by country and industry. Therefore policies should be adjusted according to the companies' institutional environments. Although the endogeneity of ownership concentration and current firm performance is rejected in this study, past firm performance seems to affect current ownership concentration level. Higher accounting rates of return four years ago could result in lower current ownership concentration, while higher last year's Tobin's Q could result in higher current ownership concentration. Capital structure is found to be a significant substitute mechanism for ownership. These elements should be taken into account when the ownership governance mechanism is implemented.

Disclosure of accounting information is crucial in facilitating efficient contracts in the publicly listed firm and in reducing information asymmetries in capital markets. A well-known perception in disclosure literature is that, as the separation between managers and owners increases, so does the demand for publicly available disclosure. Many publicly listed firms around the world are controlled by a few large owners that obtain information through their insider positions in the firm. Thus, variations in ownership structures have a considerable effect on how firms’ disclosure practices are resolved. Despite the increased attention paid to the identity of controlling owners and their influence on financial reporting practices, little is known about how owner types and governance mechanisms influence corporate disclosures and capital-market effects. This thesis contributes to the disclosure literature by studying a context in which controlling owners have a large influence on the governance and disclosure practices of firms. This contrasts with the much-studied setting in which management influences the governance and reporting decisions of firms. Thus, the aim of this thesis is to examine the determinants and capital-market effects of Swedish listed firms’ annual report disclosure. This thesis uses a self-constructed disclosure index from manually gathered data from the annual reports of Swedish publicly listed firms during the years 2001 to 2013. This includes information on the notes to the financial statements, corporate governance and strategy. The findings of the four empirical studies show that the ownership structure of firms and the various contractual relationships that firms are engaged in, drive the disclosure practices. Additionally, the results indicate that higher levels of disclosure decrease information asymmetries between capital-market participants and increase trading activity. However, the findings also show that firms with controlling owners are less forthcoming with disclosure, even after a new disclosure reform. Considering the large influence of controlling owners in the studied context, these are important findings in the research field and in regulators’ processes of deriving disclosure regulation. The thesis concludes that the variety in firms’ disclosure incentives and local governance structures are important disclosure determinants to understand in framing international accounting standards.

O modelo brasileiro de governança corporativa é caracterizado pela concentração na estrutura de propriedade e controle da maioria das companhias de capital aberto. Nesse contexto, a literatura acadêmica aponta a existência de um impacto positivo e outro negativo desse acúmulo de ações pelo (s) controlador (es) sobre o desempenho corporativo, conhecidos, respectivamente, como: efeito-incentivo (ou alinhamento); e efeito-entrincheiramento. Diversos estudos empíricos nacionais e internacionais testaram essas duas hipóteses, entretanto, dada a divergência entre seus resultados, ainda não há evidências conclusivas sobre a influência da concentração de propriedade sobre o valor das organizações. Diante desse problema, a presente dissertação teve dois objetivos principais: buscar possíveis determinantes corporativos da concentração de propriedade e controle, isto é, averiguar seu caráter endógeno (Parte 1); e testar se essa concentração influencia o valor de mercado corporativo (Parte 2). Para tanto, foi utilizado um painel não balanceado para o período de 2001 a 2010, composto por 237 empresas brasileiras não financeiras de capital aberto. Com o intuito de mitigar possíveis fontes de endogeneidade como a omissão de variáveis, o efeito feedback e a causalidade reversa, foram empregados modelos dinâmicos de regressão linear múltipla, estimados pelo Método dos Momentos Generalizado Sistêmico (MMG-Sis). Os resultados da primeira parte do estudo não sustentam a hipótese de que o caráter da estrutura de propriedade e controle é endógeno. Já na segunda parte da pesquisa, o efeito-incentivo foi captado pelo valor de mercado corrigido do total de ações do maior acionista. Enquanto a concentração no direito de voto e a separação entre propriedade e controle capturaram o efeito-entrincheiramento. / The Brazilian model of corporate governance is characterized by the ownership and control concentration of most publicly traded companies. In this context, the academic literature points to the existence of a positive and a negative impacts of this shares accumulation by controller (s) on corporate performance, known respectively as incentive effect (or alignment) and entrenchment effect. Several Brazilian and international empirical studies have tested these two hypotheses, however, given the divergence of their results, until now there is no conclusive evidence about the influence of ownership concentration on firm value. Faced with this problem, this thesis had two main goals: search for possible determinants of ownership and control concentration, i.e., test its endogenous character (Part 1); and test whether this concentration influences corporate market value (Part 2). For this purpose, an unbalanced panel for the period of 2001 to 2010 was used, comprising 237 Brazilian non-financial publicly traded companies. In order to mitigate potential sources of endogeneity like missing variables, reverse causality and feedback effect, dynamic models of multiple linear regression were employed, estimated by System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-Sys). The results of the study\'s first part do not support the hypothesis that the character of ownership and control structure is endogenous. In the second part of the research, the incentive effect was captured by adjusted market value of total shares of the largest shareholder. While the voting right concentration and the separation of ownership and control captured the entrenchment effect.

This research discussed the influence between directors and supervisors and the separation of ownership and control toward enterprise value according to the convergence of interest hypothesis and the entrenchment of interest hypothesis. The result indicated that, from 2003 to 2008, directors and supervisors¡¦ shareholding ratio and chair ratio of Taiwanese listed information service corporations had a negative relation with enterprise value. The shareholding ratio of substantial shareholders had a positive relation with enterprise value ¡V the shareholding ratio of directors and supervisors had the convergence and the entrenchment of interest effect on enterprise value. The more cash-flow rights the control shareholders owned, the higher the enterprise value was. When we used specific percentage to discuss the nonlinear relation between equity transparency and enterprise value, we discovered that the nonlinear relation between Proxy Q and the separation of ownership and control did not exist. However, there existed a ¡§W-shaped¡¨ nonlinear relation when the dependent variable was ROA or ROE. It can explain that the implementation of corporate governance on enterprise value has a certain degree of influence. Nonetheless, whether the effect is good or bad depends on what role one plays in the enterprise.

Past discussions about paradigm shift mostly put emphasis on evolution, exploiting paradigm shift or not and exist or not. Existence or not problem basically fall into block logic and expire the possibility of recombination. The dissertation explore the happening of paradigm shift according to the loading on China shipping forwarder market from 1987-2001 for Taiwan shipping forwarders, focus on exploring happening than evolution. In the second chapter about literature reviews, the dissertation explore merchant economy context analysis approach instead of usual industrial economy analysis more fit with the specialty of service industry about shipping forwarder industry. And make definition about paradigm and paradigm shift analysis in the merchant economy context. This dissertation build the methodology in oral history and action research. The third chapter introduce a case study to describe the 15 years loading on China shipping market process with the view of Taiwan shipping forwarders. The forth chapter explore the pre-loading on paradigm in Taiwan and the fifth one the post-loading on paradigm in China market. The opposite paradigm appreciate the difference and content. Then, according to merchant economy context analysis approach to create four propositions to present the happening of paradigm shift including the inspiration of paradigm shift, the progress of paradigm shift, the development of paradigm shift, and the fulfilling of paradigm shift. New findings take much look the inspiration of paradigm shift with truly recombination happened, secondly, entrepreneurial make the progress of paradigm shift as positive adjustment and adoption to fit with local law regulations instead of abidance. Keeping with competition and cooperation relationship apply further the new resources in the development of paradigm shift. Finally, entrepreneurial concentration the ownership and control will fulfill paradigm shift.

This thesis is a historical, sociological case-study of the movement for public control and land-use planning prior to WWII. The impetus for this movement came from a radicalized faction of the forestry profession. Radicalism in forestry centered around a group of professional foresters who were followers of Gifford Pinchot, the nation's Chief Forester from 1898-1910. Pinchot commenced the movement for public control over cutting on private forestlands in in the nineteen-teens. The emphasis in this case-study is on identifying social factors responsible for giving impetus to a movement for collective environmental planning, and the social and environmental possibilities of this subject. Three specific areas are studied: first radicalism in the forestry profession; second the vision of sustainability that emerged from radical forestry; and finally the relationship between the radical foresters and organized currents of the political Left. Findings: The understanding of the scientific conservation and land-use planning movement that has developed in scholarly literature does not provide an accurate characterization of this movement. The neglected vision of sustainability through public ownership and planning associated with radical forestry might be reconsidered in light of the present environmental problems. Despite the fact there was a radical presence in the forestry profession, norms of professional behavior are significant obstacles to radicalization, hence why Pinchotist conservation is anomalous in environmental history. Even though leading personalities in forestry took up the cause of public control, the institutional environmental movement remained aloof, giving indication that there are barriers to the development of an organized movement for environmental planning. Various radical political currents, however, demonstrated signs of receptivity to the scientific conservation movement.

O modelo brasileiro de governança corporativa é caracterizado pela concentração na estrutura de propriedade e controle da maioria das companhias de capital aberto. Nesse contexto, a literatura acadêmica aponta a existência de um impacto positivo e outro negativo desse acúmulo de ações pelo (s) controlador (es) sobre o desempenho corporativo, conhecidos, respectivamente, como: efeito-incentivo (ou alinhamento); e efeito-entrincheiramento. Diversos estudos empíricos nacionais e internacionais testaram essas duas hipóteses, entretanto, dada a divergência entre seus resultados, ainda não há evidências conclusivas sobre a influência da concentração de propriedade sobre o valor das organizações. Diante desse problema, a presente dissertação teve dois objetivos principais: buscar possíveis determinantes corporativos da concentração de propriedade e controle, isto é, averiguar seu caráter endógeno (Parte 1); e testar se essa concentração influencia o valor de mercado corporativo (Parte 2). Para tanto, foi utilizado um painel não balanceado para o período de 2001 a 2010, composto por 237 empresas brasileiras não financeiras de capital aberto. Com o intuito de mitigar possíveis fontes de endogeneidade como a omissão de variáveis, o efeito feedback e a causalidade reversa, foram empregados modelos dinâmicos de regressão linear múltipla, estimados pelo Método dos Momentos Generalizado Sistêmico (MMG-Sis). Os resultados da primeira parte do estudo não sustentam a hipótese de que o caráter da estrutura de propriedade e controle é endógeno. Já na segunda parte da pesquisa, o efeito-incentivo foi captado pelo valor de mercado corrigido do total de ações do maior acionista. Enquanto a concentração no direito de voto e a separação entre propriedade e controle capturaram o efeito-entrincheiramento. / The Brazilian model of corporate governance is characterized by the ownership and control concentration of most publicly traded companies. In this context, the academic literature points to the existence of a positive and a negative impacts of this shares accumulation by controller (s) on corporate performance, known respectively as incentive effect (or alignment) and entrenchment effect. Several Brazilian and international empirical studies have tested these two hypotheses, however, given the divergence of their results, until now there is no conclusive evidence about the influence of ownership concentration on firm value. Faced with this problem, this thesis had two main goals: search for possible determinants of ownership and control concentration, i.e., test its endogenous character (Part 1); and test whether this concentration influences corporate market value (Part 2). For this purpose, an unbalanced panel for the period of 2001 to 2010 was used, comprising 237 Brazilian non-financial publicly traded companies. In order to mitigate potential sources of endogeneity like missing variables, reverse causality and feedback effect, dynamic models of multiple linear regression were employed, estimated by System Generalized Method of Moments (GMM-Sys). The results of the study\'s first part do not support the hypothesis that the character of ownership and control structure is endogenous. In the second part of the research, the incentive effect was captured by adjusted market value of total shares of the largest shareholder. While the voting right concentration and the separation of ownership and control captured the entrenchment effect.