This study explores corporate governance (CG) structures and practices in Jamaica to fill theoretical, practical and public policy gaps. The study is organized into four parts and nine chapters. Part one is an introduction to the thesis and the contextual setting. Part two explores the theoretical and methodological framework via an in-depth review of the social science literature on CG and sets out the research strategy and methodology. Part three analyses and discusses the findings from the fieldwork, and part four examines gaps, proposes recommendations for reform, discusses conclusions, limitations of the study, and suggestions for future research. The study assumes a two-fold hypothesis of a CG problem and public policy problem. The CG problem is characterised by a dearth of empirical literature, a lack of CG awareness, and inadequate and poor CG practices among public bodies. The public policy problem is defined by a weak regulatory framework, systemic weaknesses in the financial sector, and pervasive corporate and political corruption. In seeking solution to the problems under review, the study adapts the interviewer’s administered survey method supported by three in-depth case studies and two focus groups. The views of about 100 respondents were sought and an additional unspecified number of informal informants. This multi-technique approach ensured that the weaknesses of a given technique were compensated for by the counterbalancing strengths of other techniques. The key themes of focus were regulation, corruption, ownership and control, stakeholder relations, perceptions and role of institutional investors, board characteristics and processes and the board’s role in strategic decision-making and corporate disclosures. The findings revealed that while Jamaica has implemented several laws and regulations, there are still gaps in coverage, content and effectiveness of implementation. Corruption is still rampant in spite of evidence of a reduction since 2006 (TI 2008 Report). Ownership and control of Jamaican firms are highly concentrated and mainly by oligarchic groups giving way to such problems as an under-developed new issues market, a high degree of insider boards, inadequate minority protection, poor information disclosure, and incentives are aligned to dominant shareholders. There is a lack of representation and voice of employee and trade union representatives in the Jamaican boardrooms and institutional investors (II), while controlling approximately 75% of listed companies, are not interested in promoting CG reform over and above the extent to which such efforts would redound to their self-interest. IIs play influential roles in financing Jamaican politics and control large distribution channels, and determine who gets large private sector contracts. While much is being done internationally to achieve gender balance in the boardroom, the mean number of females on Jamaican corporate boards is 1.8 (or 19.8%) with an average board size of 9.1 Directors. Cross-tabulation analyses were conducted and tests for relationships between and within groups of key variables (board size, Chair/CEO duality, NEDs vs. EDs, number of female Directors with listed and unlisted firms and dominant ownership dispersed vs. closely held) and nothing of significance was found. The study has concluded that reform is needed in several areas. These include increase of coverage and content of legislation and enforcement mechanisms to improve CG and fight corruption; reform of corporate boards - director selection and appointments, board’s role and conduct of Directors, training and board performance evaluation. Future research is directed at more emphasis on CG in developing countries, SMEs, public bodies and non-profit organizations, the role and contribution of employees and trade unions, the board’s role in influencing strategy, and the role of risk management. The study seeks to contribute to the growing body of international literature on emerging CG and targets primarily academics, practitioners and policymakers.

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Ao redor do mundo, a maioria das companhias listadas de grande porte tem acionista controlador, à exceção dos EUA e do RU, em que o comando da atividade empresarial é exercido, de fato, pelos administradores. A conformação de controle dominante em cada país resulta de uma série de fatores, muitos deles de ordem jurídica, os quais levam ao surgimento e permanência de uma dessas variantes, ao mesmo tempo em que parecem inibir o desenvolvimento da estrutura alternativa. A gradativa convergência global dos padrões de propriedade acionária a um denominador comum, aparentemente em curso - dos extremos da dispersão e concentração absolutas para o cenário intermediário dos blocos de participação minoritária relevante detidos por investidores institucionais não tem sido acompanhada de transformações significativas nas estruturas de poder de controle interno dominantes em cada país, as quais, em essência, continuam as mesmas. Isso significa que os fatores (jurídicos, especialmente) que levam à predominância de tais estruturas continuam em atuação, não obstante modificações havidas no grau de dispersão do capital com direito a voto de companhias listadas. Este trabalho visa apresentar um conjunto mais específico de fatores jurídicos que, ao mesmo tempo e de modo decisivo, favorecem a proliferação de uma dentre as duas estruturas de controle consideradas (controle acionário ou gerencial) e inibem o desenvolvimento de outra. Trata-se dos instrumentos jurídicos de dissociação entre representatividade política e participação econômica de acionistas, os quais exercem papel central na conformação do regime jurídico das companhias abertas com elevada dispersão do capital votante, integrantes do Novo Mercado da BVSP. / Most of the large listed companies outside USA and UK have a controlling shareholder. The dominant control structure in each country is the result of multiple determinants, many of them arising from the legal system. The gradual convergence of ownership patterns around the world from the extremes of the total concentration and separation of ownership and control to the intermediate scenario of significant blockholdings held by institutional investors - has not been accompanied by a relevant shift in the control structures in listed companies of most of the countries, specially those in the Brazilian Novo Mercado. This Doctorate Thesis presents a specific subset of legal factors contributing for that outcome: the legal instruments separating voting rights from cashflow rights.

This dissertation consists of four self-contained essays primarily concerned with incorporating the objectives of real world top managers, as revealed by the available empirical evidence, in supergame-theoretic analyses of long-term competition between oligopolistic firms. The first essay, "Ownership, Control, and Collusion", considers how the separation between ownership and control affects firms' competitive attitudes when top managers have the preference for smooth profit streams revealed by the evidence on "income smoothing" and when managerial compensation has the low pay-performance sensitivity found in many empirical studies. In a similar fashion, the second essay, "Stock-Related Compensation and Product-Market Competition", deals with the effects of the apparently more aggressive managerial incentives linked to stock price (e.g. stock options), which have become increasingly common in the U.S., on long-term oligopolistic competition. In the third paper, "Debt as a (Credible) Collusive Device", shareholders’ commitments to reduce conflicts with debtholders by choosing a top manager with a highly valuable reputation or with "conservative" incentives are considered. These forms of commitment have been shown to reduce the (agency) cost of debt finance; this paper characterizes their effects on the relation between firms' capital structure and product market competition. The fourth paper, "Multimarket Contact, Concavity, and Collusion", addresses the relation between multimarket contact and firms’ ability to sustain collusive behavior in repeated oligopolies. It explores how this relation is affected by the strict concavity of firms’ objective function induced by managerial objectives and by other features of reality, discusses the effects of conglomeration and horizontal mergers, and extends the results to non-oligopolistic supergames. / <p>Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 1999</p>

Diss. (sammanfattning) Göteborg : Univ., 2004. / Härtill 4 uppsatser.

Ao redor do mundo, a maioria das companhias listadas de grande porte tem acionista controlador, à exceção dos EUA e do RU, em que o comando da atividade empresarial é exercido, de fato, pelos administradores. A conformação de controle dominante em cada país resulta de uma série de fatores, muitos deles de ordem jurídica, os quais levam ao surgimento e permanência de uma dessas variantes, ao mesmo tempo em que parecem inibir o desenvolvimento da estrutura alternativa. A gradativa convergência global dos padrões de propriedade acionária a um denominador comum, aparentemente em curso - dos extremos da dispersão e concentração absolutas para o cenário intermediário dos blocos de participação minoritária relevante detidos por investidores institucionais não tem sido acompanhada de transformações significativas nas estruturas de poder de controle interno dominantes em cada país, as quais, em essência, continuam as mesmas. Isso significa que os fatores (jurídicos, especialmente) que levam à predominância de tais estruturas continuam em atuação, não obstante modificações havidas no grau de dispersão do capital com direito a voto de companhias listadas. Este trabalho visa apresentar um conjunto mais específico de fatores jurídicos que, ao mesmo tempo e de modo decisivo, favorecem a proliferação de uma dentre as duas estruturas de controle consideradas (controle acionário ou gerencial) e inibem o desenvolvimento de outra. Trata-se dos instrumentos jurídicos de dissociação entre representatividade política e participação econômica de acionistas, os quais exercem papel central na conformação do regime jurídico das companhias abertas com elevada dispersão do capital votante, integrantes do Novo Mercado da BVSP. / Most of the large listed companies outside USA and UK have a controlling shareholder. The dominant control structure in each country is the result of multiple determinants, many of them arising from the legal system. The gradual convergence of ownership patterns around the world from the extremes of the total concentration and separation of ownership and control to the intermediate scenario of significant blockholdings held by institutional investors - has not been accompanied by a relevant shift in the control structures in listed companies of most of the countries, specially those in the Brazilian Novo Mercado. This Doctorate Thesis presents a specific subset of legal factors contributing for that outcome: the legal instruments separating voting rights from cashflow rights.

Syfte: Syftet med studien är att ur ett agentteoretiskt perspektiv skapa förståelse för hur separationen av ägande och kontroll ter sig i ett svenskt kundägt bolag samt vilka konsekvenser detta medför och vilka lösningar bolaget arbetar med. Metod: Studien präglas av en abduktiv forskningsansats. Studien är en fallstudie där vi syftar i att undersöka en specifik organisation. Data är insamlad med hjälp av semistrukturerade intervjuer som bearbetats genom tematisk analys. Resultat &amp; slutsats: Vi ser tendenser till en stor separation av ägande och kontroll likaväl som en mindre. Den större separationen beror främst på spritt ägande och resulterar i en hög grad informationsasymmetri. Separationen tenderar dock även att minskas till följd av användning av fullmäktige, lokal placering samt återinvesteringar i länet. Förslag till fortsatt forskning: Förslag till vidare forskning är att skapa förståelse för vilken effekt kundägda bolag upplever till följd av att de två parterna kund och ägare innehas av samma person. Uppsatsens bidrag: Studiens teoretiska bidrag är att öka kunskapen om kundägda bolag och dess hantering av separation av ägande och kontroll. Det praktiska bidraget för studien är att bidra med kunskap till intervjuernas respondenter samt övriga intressenter till organisationen vi undersökt. Vår ambition är även att öka intresset för engagerade ägare. Nyckelord: kundägda bolag, agentteori, separation av ägande och kontroll, informationsasymmetri, intressekonflikt / Aim: The aim for this study is from an agent theoretical perspective generate comprehension of how the separation of ownership and control seems in a Swedish mutual organization as well as what consequences this leads to and what solutions the organization is working with. Method: The study is characterized by an abductive approach. The study takes the form of a case study aimed for research of a specific mutual organization. The collected data is a result of semi-structured interviews that has been analyzed with a thematic analysis. Result &amp; conclusions: We anticipate both a large separation of ownership and control as well as a small one. The larger one is due to a scattered ownership that results in a greater extent of information asymmetry. The separation also tends to get smaller due to the establishment of the council, that the organization operates locally and due to the reinvests in the local community. Suggestions for future research: Suggestions for future research is to generate comprehension of which impact mutual organizations experiences from the fact that two parties, customer and owner, are held within the same individual.   Contribution of the thesis: The theoretical contribution is to increase knowledge about mutual organization and their management of separation of ownership and control. The practical contribution is to distribute knowledge to the respondents as well as other stakeholders of the examined organization. Our ambition is also to increase interest for committed owners. Key words: mutual organization, Agent theory, separation of ownership and control, information asymmetry, conflict of interest

This dissertation consists of three papers. In the first paper, I study firms' capital raising decisions in a two-stage signaling game. In the model, firms can issue debt or equity to finance sequentially arriving investment projects. Management is assumed to have an initial information advantage over investors. However, when a firm's decision in the first stage can change investors' beliefs and, consequently, impact the security issuance in the second stage, its optimal choice differs significantly from the strict debt-equity preference in a comparable one-stage model. In equilibrium, a dynamic pecking order arises, suggesting that the information friction can solely explain various aspects of observed corporate financing behavior. The second paper is coauthored with Hans Haller. In this paper, we model how different wealth constraints among investors affect an entrepreneur's way of raising capital, his share of project NPV, and his ownership of the new firm. Combining cooperative and noncooperative approaches, we develop and analyze a bargaining framework and demonstrate cases in which a fair division cannot be achieved when sharing of cost and sharing of return are jointly considered. Our results cover conditions on how the entrepreneur can strategically achieve larger net wealth accumulation, and when he can obtain control of the firm. We further discuss the entrepreneur's preferences on the firm's ownership dispersion level under public financing. The third paper argues that although innovation is costlier than imitation, the incumbent firm is endowed with an advantage of enhancing its product ahead of potential competitors. In a model that connects consumers' utility with firms' production, I show that the incumbent's product enhancement decision can foster the creation of a better product, improve consumers' utility, and deter entrance from competitors. The pace of creative activities is determined by the incumbent's potential of improving its product quality and the nature of product differentiation in the industry. Thus, creative destruction may not manifest itself as new firms replacing the incumbent, but as the incumbent constantly renovating its product. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation consists of three papers. In the first paper I study the adverse selection problem faced by firms in a dynamic information environment, the difference between incentives provided by debt and equity securities, and how different contracts and model settings affect the equilibrium outcome, investment efficiency, and social welfare. The premise of the first paper is that dynamic elements of information asymmetry are key to better understanding how firms raise capital. This study aims to provide a more complete description and improve our understanding of the role of information in capital markets and how asymmetric information might interact with other market frictions. In the second paper I study the origin of the firm and the bargaining problem between entrepreneurs and investors. This second paper intends to provide one possible answer for the question why firms do exist. The main point in the paper is that even when we abstract away from standard frictions like adverse selection or moral hazard, an entrepreneur still has to bargain with investors to raise the required amount of capital. The firm has to be established to enforce the bargaining outcome, which takes the form of an ownership contract, because there is a time gap between conducting the investment and when the proceed can be realized. Another purpose of this second study is to investigate fairness instead of efficiency. Finally, in the third paper, I address the question how and when an incumbent monopolist can deter entry by means of investment in product quality enhancement. In some industries, creative destruction can be frequently observed: Incumbent firms are replaced by new firms that offer slightly different but better products. On the other hand, in a number of industries incumbent firms are at the forefront of innovation and stay ahead of potential entrants. I consider a model that allows for the latter fact combined with another frequent fact: that potential entrants more or less copy the incumbent's prior product, regardless of existence and enforcement of intellectual property rights. This third paper offers predictions on product innovation and market failure across firms and industries.

Il lavoro stima il costo del capitale delle banche italiane alla luce di due antitetici comportamenti di investimento: diversificazione internazionale di portafoglio e concentrazione proprietaria volta alla detenzione di pacchetti azionari rilevanti. L'integrazione dei mercati finanziari e l'adozione della moneta unica determinano la necessità di allargare all'area valutaria il correlato empirico al portafoglio di mercato indicato dal CAPM. La verifica condotta su un campione di banche italiane evidenzia la riduzione dei Beta e del costo del capitale proprio a causa del limitato contributo fornito al rischio sistematico del portafoglio riferito all'area valutaria da parte del mercato azionario nazionale e delle banche italiane. La detenzione del potere decisionale consente agli azionisti rilevanti di ottenere, in termini di private benefits, un sovra-rendimento che giustifica strategie volte alla concentrazione di ricchezza. Questo genera per le banche italiane un incremento del costo del capitale. / This work analyses the techniques to assess the cost of equity of Italian banks in the light of two antithetical investment policies: international portfolio diversification and ownership concentration directed to hold large blocks of shares. Financial market integration and European Monetary Union involve using a broader index, referred to the Euro area, as the proxy for the market portfolio pointed out by CAPM. The analysis carried out on a sample of Italian banks shows this change brings about a reduction of both the estimated Beta and the cost of equity. This is due to the limited contribution that domestic market index makes to the systematic risk of the Euro portfolio. The control of the decision-making process enables the holders of large blocks of shares to extract private benefits and to obtain extra returns compared with other investors. This can explain an investment policy directed to wealth concentration. That causes a higher equity cost of equity.

Šiuo metu vyraujanti pasaulinė ekonominė krizė, taip pat ankstesni bendrovių bankrotų pavyzdžiai (tokių kaip Enron, Parmalat) signalizuoja apie būtinybę tinkamai sureguliuoti bendrovių valdymo teisinę bazę, o ypač aspektus susijusius su bendrovės akcininkų ir valdymo organo santykiais. Todėl šiame magistro darbe yra analizuojamos teisinės priemonės, kurios padeda sumažinti interesų konfliktus kylančius tarp bendrovių, kurių vertybiniais popieriais yra prekiaujama reguliuojamoje rinkoje, akcininkų ir valdymo organo. Šiam tikslui pasiekti yra išskiriamos penkios teisinio reguliavimo sritys: bendrovių kontrolės rinkos ir bendrovių perėmimo, informacijos atskleidimo, valdymo organo narių finansinio skatinimo, valdymo organo struktūros bei bendrovės akcininkų teisių teisinis reguliavimas. Kiekviena reguliavimo sritis yra aptariama dviem aspektais, pirmiausia, analizuojant Europos Sąjungos lygiu egzistuojantį teisinį reguliavimą, po to vertinant tokio reguliavimo įgyvendinimą Lietuvos Respublikoje bei pateikiant pastabas ir pasiūlymus. Darbe padaroma išvada, kad norint sumažinti neigiamas pasekmes atsirandančias dėl nuosavybės teisės ir valdymo atskyrimo bendrovėse, reikia, kad visos aukščiau išvardintos priemonės papildytų viena kitą ir būtų taikomos sistemiškai. / The ongoing economic crisis around the world and the recent events in corporate bankruptcy sector (including Enron and Parmalat cases) have shown a clear signal to regulate more efficiently the corporate governance laws and especially the relations between shareholders and the governance body of the company. This thesis paper addresses the regulatory framework issues, which mitigate the conflict of interests between the shareholders and the governance body of publicly traded companies. Five legal instruments are analyzed in order to achieve this objective: market for corporate control and takeovers, information disclosure, director remuneration, structure of governance body and shareholder empowerment. Each legal instrument is analyzed from two legal perspectives, first, the European Union legal framework is described and then analysis concentrates on the implementation of European law in the Republic of Lithuania. Comments and proposals are given to existing implementation problems. The conclusion emphasizes that a systematic use of all the above mentioned legal instruments is required in order to mitigate the costs of separation of ownership and control in publicly traded companies.