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My dissertation consists of two chapters which explores various aspects of empirical corporate finance and institutional ownership. In the first chapter, I examine whether common owners – an institution with holdings in both the distressed and the lending firm – ameliorates this conflict given that common owners should seek to maximize the equity value of both firms. The results show that when a common owner holds a stake in both the borrowing and lending firm, distressed firms are over 3.3-times more likely to file for Chapter 11 freefall bankruptcy (rather than prepack) as compared to borrowing-lending firms without a common owner. Using ownership of passive funds as an instrument for the presence of a common owner, I provide evidence of a causal relation between common ownership and bankruptcy filing choice. Overall, the analysis indicates that common ownership in both financially distressed borrowing firms and their lending firms leads to a greater likelihood of Chapter 11 freefall bankruptcy filing; suggesting that common owners typically side with creditors to maximize their combined equity value in both the borrowing and lending firm. Next, I examine the effect of CEO social connections on stock returns. An equally weighted (value weighted) long-short portfolio strategy earns investors excess returns of 5.39% (4.44%) per year. Three potential reasons explain the relation between CEO social connections and excess returns; better firm performance, investor information asymmetry, and/or greater investor risk-bearing. Our analysis provides evidence consistent with CEO connections both increasing firm risk and improving firm performance. / Business Administration/Finance

This dissertation, empirically examines ownership structure and its impacts on shareholder wealth. In the first chapter I examine the relation between ownership structure and M&A target selection when family firms purse acquisitions, focusing on the factors that influence family selection of targets. My results indicate that family firm acquirers select targets that are smaller and have low growth potential. I focus on short- and long-run stock market reactions to merger and acquisition announcements of family versus nonfamily bidders and their associated targets. I find that acquirers with family ownership have better cumulative average abnormal returns in the short run and higher buy-and-hold abnormal returns up to one year after the acquisition. Family firms also take a greater share of the merger synergy than do nonfamily bidders while the overall merger synergy is invariant to ownership structure. These results suggest that family firms pick different targets than nonfamily firms and benefit minority shareholders when they acquire. This chapter provides evidence that family ownership does not destroy value during M&A transactions; instead, the analysis indicates that family owners appear to choose better targets. In the second chapter I examine firms with dual class structures. Firms with limited voting shares, dual class firms, persist over time in spite of the widespread view that they embody a “corruption of the governance system” (Calpers, 2011). I find that founders and their heirs control 89% of dual class firms, making it difficult to disentangle family control and voting rights. I document that family owners hold 30% greater economic exposure in dual class firms than in single class family firms. Investors place lower values on both single and dual class family firms relative to non-family firms. In contrast, non-family dual class firms exhibit a 19% premium relative to single class firms. Further analysis shows that 8 industries contain 58% of these limited voting share firms - industries that require high brand maintenance and intangible assets. Strikingly, I find that outside shareholders of dual class firms earn excess returns of about 350 basis points per year relative to single class nonfamily firms. Additional tests reveal that institutional investors hold more of the floated equity of dual class family firms than found in single class nonfamily firms. Exploring a succession risk premium perspective, I discover these lower values and greater excess returns primarily occur in descendent-controlled firms. Overall, my analysis suggests that limited voting shares provide an important mechanism used by controlling shareholders that arise in industries with specific characteristics. / Business Administration/Finance

Foreign policy is the nexus between domestic and international political systems. Studies in Canada have so far produced mixed findings related to the role of political parties in foreign policy. Drawing from campaign promise, issue ownership and foreign policy decision-making literature, this dissertation investigates whether there is a foreign policy domain consistently dominated by a particular political party in the Canadian context. Part I uses data from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) combined with manually coded foreign policy promises to determine the content and scope of foreign policy-related election promises in Canada. Part II follows the well-established pledge approach to measure promise fulfilment of foreign policy promises of Canadian governing parties following elections. This dissertation not only seeks to determine whether parties matter in the context of foreign policy, but also whether one party consistently “owns” the foreign policy domain or specific foreign policy issues. Findings from this research will fill an existing gap in the literature related to policy-specific promise fulfillment in Canada and will bridge existing theoretical assumptions related to political party behaviour and foreign policy decision-making. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA)

The research investigates the praxis of companies going collective in Italy. Since the 1950s, scholars have debated the whys and hows of labour-manged firms around the globe. Such a debate articulates around the central question of this research domain: Why are labour-manged firms rare compared to traditional, investor-owned companies? To offer possible explanations for such a scarcity, this research analyses mechanisms, rationales and resources underneath the emergence of worker takeovers, namely labour-managed firms. Empirical evidence on the emergence of labour-managed firms and, specifically, worker takeovers is limited. At the scholarly level, there is little evidence on the praxis of creating labour-manged firms and turning companies collective in the form of worker takeovers. Little is known about who leads and guides worker takeover operations, little is known about which resources are employed, which pieces of legislation are leveraged and who is co-opted in the governance of novel labour-manged firms. This research offers exploratory insights into the whys, hows, who and when of going collective in Italy. Specifically, it delves into the norms, steps, procedures, resources and stakeholders of takeover operations in the country. Via critical approaches and a mix of methodologies, this research aims at unfolding the functioning of takeover strategies, and the relationship of workers with institutional investors, banks and trade unions, among many different stakeholders.

The dissertation empirically examines the efficacy of internal control mechanisms by analyzing 94 forced turnovers of chief executive officers (CEOs). It seeks to answer two primary questions: One, do governance-related characteristics influence the promptness with which poorly-performing CEOs are removed from office; and two, are removals of CEOs followed by changes in internal control mechanisms? The results suggest that poorly performing managers are removed more quickly in firms that have a larger percentage of independent outside directors on their board, that have higher equity ownership by the non-CEO directors and lower equity ownership by the CEO, and that separate the positions of CEO and chairperson. The results also suggest that the removal of the CEO provides both the opportunity and the incentive to alter internal governance systems. There is significant turnover of board members and the new boards generally have a higher fraction of independent outside directors and are more likely to separate the positions of CEO and chairperson. In addition, the sensitivity of CEO compensation to firm performance increases significantly following turnover. These post-turnover improvements in monitoring and incentive schemes are more significant in those firms that require a crisis in the product and/or capital market before they remove their CEOs. However, there is no evidence of short-term improvement in operating performance following changes in CEOs and governance systems. Overall, the results suggest that board and ownership characteristics do influence the effectiveness of internal monitoring systems and that CEO turnover is associated with broad changes in monitoring and incentive systems. / Ph. D.

I analyze the relationship between insider trading outcomes and insiders' information environment within a network. While most existing studies rely on one dimension of commonality (e.g., personal ties, professional ties, geographic proximity) to construct the social network, I document the formation of the institutional investor groups (cliques) that exogenously connect firm-level insiders within the social network. Using difference-in-differences designs examining changes in clique size, I provide empirical evidence on the information dissemination channels within a network in which its members are quasi-randomly selected. Insider transactions in larger cliques exhibit lower abnormal trading profits, higher level of trading frequency, and larger amount of trade size, suggesting information dissemination is increasing in clique size. Then, I provide empirical evidence that the association between the value of information and the information dissemination rate is monotonic, consistent with prior theoretical studies. / Doctor of Philosophy / People communicate and are influenced by other people when they reside in a social network. I analyze how corporate insiders' trading outcomes are influenced by their information environment within a network. Most current research rely on one specific type of connection (e.g., personal relationships, professional relationships, geographic proximity) to build the social network, I provide evidence that firm-level insiders are involuntarily connected by the institutional investor social network (cliques). Using archival study approach, I document that insider transactions in larger cliques exhibit lower abnormal trading profits, higher level of trading frequency, and larger amount of trade size, suggesting information dissemination is increasing in clique size. Then, I provide empirical evidence that the association between the value of information and the information dissemination rate is linear, consistent with prior theoretical studies.

Yes / The International Centre for Participation Studies and Sharing Voices Bradford (for information on these organisations, see Appendices 3 and 4) maintain that participation is an important part of a healthy democracy, with benefits for all. However, participation can be anything from empowering to tokenistic, and must be critically examined if we are to understand how to use it effectively. This paper considers the contribution of participation to improved service delivery in the health service. For beneficiaries, participation can be about ownership and responsibility for the services we use, as well as rights and the chance to express what we want from them. For service providers, participation is widely recognised as an effective way of tailoring services to the needs of the different communities they serve. The NHS and other service providers have made great strides in developing mechanisms for participation by service users. However, these do not always reach all sections of the community. Many individuals feel sceptical about getting involved, unconvinced that their contribution could make a real difference. Through the Participation ¿ Why Bother? workshops, we set out to explore these feelings, to reflect on perceived barriers and identify changes that might help overcome them. The aim was not to look at the substance of service delivery issues, but to try and work out how the process of involving people in decision-making in the NHS could be improved, to make it easier for voices from Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) communities to be heard. / Bradford District Care Trust; South and West PCT; City tPCT

Yes / This paper outlines the development of a new scale to measure adolescent selfesteem. The new scale addresses weaknesses in existing measures which have failed to consider the growth of the consumer society in the western world and the impact of this on the formation of adolescent self-esteem. The development of this scale includes extensive qualitative research with over 100 high school pupils, which led to a series of quantitative data collection and analysis processes to develop the scale. In the final stage, data was collected from 889 pupils and analysed to confirm the validity and reliability of the new measure. The result of this work is a 21 item self-esteem scale comprising of 4 distinct, yet interrelated factors: self-evaluation; social ability; social comparison effects and notably, brand ownership. The findings provide an updated and upgraded measure of self-esteem which takes into consideration the specific audience of adolescents living in a consumer culture. The scale development process demonstrates that when considering the formation of self-esteem, the influence of the use and possession of commercial brands is as relevant as the traditional factors/components such as academic achievement or sporting prowess.