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1	A pluralistic solution to the relationalism versus representationalism debate Black, Paul Andrew January 2018 (has links) A great deal of philosophy of perception literature has been concerned with determining the fundamental philosophical account of perception. The overwhelming majority of contemporary work in this area has advocated for either a relational view of perception (broadly known as relationalism) or a representational view of perception (broadly known as representationalism). Each of these views is argued by its proponents to constitute the fundamental philosophical account of perception. These arguments are often framed in a manner suggesting that relationalism and representationalism are incompatible with one another on the grounds that if one theory explains all that we would like a philosophical theory of perception to explain, then the other theory is at best screened off as explanatorily redundant. This is known as a screening off argument, and has been utilised by both sides of the relationalism versus representationalism debate. The aim of this thesis is to demonstrate that both the utilisation of this argument in the philosophy of perception, as well as the explanatory methodology underpinning this utilisation, are misguided. This is accomplished by proposing instead that a methodology called explanatory pluralism, which holds that the best explanation of a given phenomenon is determined by what it is about that phenomenon one wishes to understand, should be applied to the debate in question. Once this plausible methodology is applied, I argue, instances that appeared to settle the relationalism versus representationalism debate decisively in favour of one view or the other instead become instances that shape the contours of a view according to which relationalism and representationalism are in fact compatible. I identify and argue for such instances, using them to support the conclusion that relationalism and representationalism are complementary explanations of perception and are, therefore, compatible.
2	ヒューム『人間本性論』における「知覚」的世界の自然主義的再構成 : 印象と観念の差異としての「生気」にかんする因果的解釈を軸として / ヒュームニンゲンホンセイロンニオケルチカクテキセカイノシゼンシュギテキサイコウセイ : インショウトカンネンノサイトシテノセイキニカンスルインガテキカイシャクオジクトシテ / ヒューム人間本性論における知覚的世界の自然主義的再構成 : 印象と観念の差異としての生気にかんする因果的解釈を軸として大槻晃右, Kosuke Otsuki 20 March 2021 (has links) 本論の目的は、「知覚」的世界の実相の解明を通じて、『人間本性論』におけるヒュームの哲学の基本的枠組みを闡明するところにある。本論文は、印象と観念の差異としての「生気」を因果的力能と捉える解釈を軸とし、次のように展開する。最初に、関係的知覚の構造と、因果の観念の知覚的起源を究明する。それに基づいて、「生気」にかんする因果的解釈を明確化する。最後に、この解釈に依拠して、観念の表象性および真理についての自然主義的な説明を試みる。 / The purpose of this dissertation is to make explicit the basic framework of Hume's philosophy, by clarifying the nature of Humean 'perceptions' upon which his arguments in Treatise are founded. I begin with the hypothesis that the liveliness of perceptions, to which Hume refers to differentiate impressions and beliefs from ideas, is a kind of causal power to produce certain effects. I firstly investigate Hume's view on the perceptions of relations and on the perceptual origin of causal ideas. I then articulate the causal interpretation of liveliness. Finally I pursue its consequences, reconstructing Hume's conception of ideas as representations from a naturalistic point of view about truth and inquiry. / 博士(哲学) / Doctor of Philosophy / 同志社大学 / Doshisha University デイヴィッド・ヒューム『人間本性論』自然主義懐疑主義経験主義知覚生気力と活気印象観念関係の知覚精神の被決定信念表象真理 David Hume A Treatise of Human Nature naturalism scepticism empiricism perception liveliness force and vivacity impression idea perception of relation determination of the mind belief representation truth

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A pluralistic solution to the relationalism versus representationalism debate