The writer expresses the hope that this treatment of an important subject may be found interesting--he knows this it can scarcely be found pleasant reading. It is our purpose to treat of the "eschatological views of the fate of the wicked"--Hell ideas entertained--"in human history". These are many. While most of them agree at some points, the range of ideas is broad, and "human history" is broad. We wish to emphasize our disinterest, for the purpose of this thesis, in eschatological views of the reward of the "good," save to say that, generally, this is but 'the other side of the shield,' having a definite correspondence to its opposite. We make no claim to give either an exhaustive or erudite treatment of our subject, but attempt rather to outline the major views of the field, relating them to, and in some instances tracing their influence upon, human history.

No description available.

The title of this thesis, "The Philosophy of Paul," makes the assumption that Paul had a philosophy. Because this assumption is not universally acoepted oy students of the life of Paul, as noted above, we shall endeavor to show that Paul had a philosophy. In other words, we shall show that our assumption is valid. Our second purpose shall be to identify Paul's philosophy.

No abstract available / Systematic Theology and Ethics / D. Th.(Systematic Theology)

No description available.

Partimos nesta pesquisa tentando entender parte do pensamento de Friedrich Nietzsche: sua crítica à Religião cristã, no tocante a seu discurso acerca da morte de Deus, e a recepção da sua filosofia no cenário religioso pós-moderno. Buscamos apresentar o seu discurso da morte de Deus partindo da obra Gaia Ciência, discurso que relaciona-se com a desvalorização do mundo metafísico e a perda de crédito no Deus cristão. A fé em Deus perdeu plausibilidade, instaurando o niilismo. Problematizamos a crítica de Nietzsche a Religião cristã, mas, sobretudo, crítica à cultura de sua época. Ele critica uma sociedade edificada sob o ideário cristão que está amparado em uma moral que, por séculos, foi usada como mecanismo de domínio e manutenção de poder. Nietzsche entende o Cristianismo enquanto negação da vida e/ou Religião da decadência. A crítica de Nietzsche ao Cristianismo tem como alvo o sujeito enquanto agente moral. Todavia, não é necessariamente uma crítica a Jesus, o Cristo, visto que, Nietzsche considerava Paulo o verdadeiro fundador do Cristianismo. Nesta pesquisa analisamos alguns aspectos da Religião na pós-modernidade e a recepção do pensamento de Nietzsche neste cenário. Hoje, com a pós-modernidade, a Religião, ao menos suas representações institucionais, tornou-se coadjuvante no debate sobre temas relevantes, porém, a humanidade prossegue vivendo dimensões religiosas, cada vez mais particulares e subjetivas. Dialogamos no decorrer da pesquisa com vários autores que discorrem sobre a Religião na pósmodernidade de forma positiva e que, de alguma forma, dialogam com Nietzsche. Com a pós-modernidade e seu processo de secularização, a Religião não se encerra, ao contrário, ela ressurge e se difunde. Mesmo não tendo o protagonismo que exercia antes, a Religião continua exercendo papel importante na pós-modernidade, estando presente em todas as áreas do desenvolvimento humano.

The purpose of this dissertation is to defend Pierre Fermat and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz against the charge of error made against them by Pierre Maupertuis that they errantly applied final causes to physics. This charge came in Maupertuis’ 1744 speech to the Paris Academy of Sciences, later published in different versions, entitled Accord Between Different Laws Which at First Seemed Incompatible. It is in this speech that Maupertuis lays claim to one of the most important discoveries in the history of physics and science, The Principle of Least Action. From the date of this speech up until the end of the twentieth century, Maupertuis was credited with this discovery. Fermat discovered least time in optical physics, and Leibniz co-discovered infinitesimal calculus. When the credited discoverer of least action in physics accuses the discoverer of least time in optics and the co-discoverer of infinitesimal calculus of error before and audience of mathematicians, physicists and scientists, it is an event that calls out for investigation. The idea of final causes in physics is the idea that bodies move for an end purpose. During the early modern period, this challenged the intellectual establishment of the day with the idea of thinking in nature. The question which fueled the research for this dissertation is why such a man would accuse two other prominent intellects with such an unprovable metaphysical assumption. The research for this project started with a study of the positions of all three of these men regarding final causes in physics. The second phase was to research the historical context in which Accord Between Different Laws Which at First Seemed Incompatible was written and delivered. This context included the life of Maupertuis as member of the Paris Academy of Sciences and as later President of the Berlin Academy of Sciences. It also included the workings of three highly competitive, state funded, academies of science in Berlin, London and Paris. Research showed that no formal positions were held on the subject of final causes by either Maupertuis or Fermat. Only Leibniz demonstrated an established and well thought out position on the subject. Research did reveal the story of an ambitious man in Maupertuis, who made it the fulfillment of his ambition to rise in the ranks of math and science within the academies and establish himself as an intellectual great in European culture. Consequently, the life and career of Maupertuis illustrates the sociological dimension of scientific achievement. Accord Between Different Laws Which at First Seemed Incompatible turned out to be a politically calculated speech delivered for the purpose of career advancement. In 1744, Maupertuis was being considered by the King of Prussia, Frederick the Great, and the leadership of the Berlin Academy of Science for the presidency of that institution. Maupertuis knew this. Therefore, the work must be interpreted in this context. Consequently, the charge of error against Fermat and Leibniz by Maupertuis must be interpreted likewise. Discovery was made in contextual and Leibnizian research that Maupertuis was aware of Leibniz’s idea of action from 1738 on, and knowingly claimed to have discovered a generalized notion of action in physics which was not his. It is the story of ambition clouding human judgment. The Leibnizians attacked Maupertuis on this matter, led by a member of the Berlin Academy named Samuel Konig. In the “Konig Affair”, Konig accused Maupertuis of what is essentially plagiarism, and Maupertuis countered with charging Konig with forgery for claiming to have in his possession a letter from Leibniz to Jacob Hermann demonstrating Leibniz’s knowledge of least action. Maupertuis buries Konig in legal proceedings, but loses his reputation in the process. During the final stages of the Konig affair, Maupertuis admits to Patrick d’Arcy, a member of the Paris academy, that he had used Leibniz’s theory of action. Having lost his effective leadership as President of the Berlin Academy, Maupertuis spends the last years of his life in his native France without ever relinquishing his title and office. When at first examining the charge of error, the immediate notion is that this is a cause and effect argument. It appears to be an argument about the order of metaphysics before physics. This turns out not to be the case. Maupertuis agrees with Fermat and Leibniz at every turn. The charge is all about career success.

Submitted by Renata Lopes (renatasil82@gmail.com) on 2016-06-22T20:22:00Z No. of bitstreams: 1 eduardoarmarolinoguchi.pdf: 1326675 bytes, checksum: 0ab515b269d9be866efeb390105fb254 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Adriana Oliveira (adriana.oliveira@ufjf.edu.br) on 2016-07-13T15:32:47Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 eduardoarmarolinoguchi.pdf: 1326675 bytes, checksum: 0ab515b269d9be866efeb390105fb254 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-13T15:32:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 eduardoarmarolinoguchi.pdf: 1326675 bytes, checksum: 0ab515b269d9be866efeb390105fb254 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2012-03-26 / CAPES - Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar a possibilidade de se construir uma antropologia filosófica a partir dos romances de Fiódor Dostoiévski. A primeira noção que se destaca neste discurso filosófico é a de revolta, que está intimamente ligada ao fenômeno da liberdade humana. Dostoiévski mostra como a revolta conduz o homem ao niilismo filosófico, em suas várias manifestações históricas. A única alternativa viável para superar estas aporias seria uma nova religiosidade, fundada num verdadeiro sentimento de compaixão. Para Dostoiévski, isto só é possível quando o homem alcança um total domínio de seus impulsos egoístas. A consumação do egoísmo humano é o altruísmo da fé. / The aim of this work is to investigate the possibility to elaborate a philosophical anthropology on Fiódor Dostoyevsky’s novels. The first idea which is to be stressed in this philosophical discourse is that of revolt, and it is closely related to the phenomenon of human freedom. Dostoyevsky show how revolt leads human being to philosophical nihilism, in its different historical manifestations. The only viable alternative in order to surmount those aporias would be a new religiosity, based in a true sentiment of compassion. For Dostoyevsky, this is possible only when human being reaches full dominion of his egotistic impulses. The fulfillment of human egotism is faith’s altruism.

Catholic exegesis of scriptural and dogmatic statements has become rigid in the period following the Enlightenment. Gadamer’s account of philosophical hermeneutics, when applied to the Catholic situation, elaborates how Catholic exegesis might return to its premodern, freer form. Following Gadamer, I hold that to understand is to fuse the horizon of the old with today’s horizon using the preunderstandings that have been provided by the tradition while at the same time bringing the questions of today into dialogue with the text. Examples of how Romans 1 and 2 have been interpreted historically serve to support this thesis. Origen reads Romans 1 and 2 using the traditional understandings afforded him by the ancient Catholic tradition. At the same time, he seeks in the text answers to the questions raised by the heresies of his own day. The early Augustine reads in Romans an answer to the questions posed by the Manicheans. Later he places that same text into dialogue with the Pelagians and, though still using the preunderstandings provided by the tradition, finds new meaning. Aquinas robustly exemplifies this conception of exegesis. He places Romans into dialogue with Aristotle and comes away with a creative fusion of the two. After considering the examples above, I turn to two instances of hermeneutics that fail to be acceptable models of Catholic exegesis. Though the young Luther’s commentary on Romans is a Catholic fusion of traditionary preunderstandings and late medieval thinking, the older Luther ceases to dialogue with the tradition and thereby fails to give an acceptable Catholic interpretation. Barth, on the other hand, provides a paradigmatic example of Gadamerian hermeneutic principles. His exegesis is insufficient not because of his method but because of the Sache, the subject matter, he wrongly reads into the text of Romans. This historical consideration of Catholic philosophical hermeneutics reinforces my proposition that Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics adequately accounts for the Catholic hermeneutic tradition and provides a manner of approaching how that hermeneutic tradition might be appropriated today. Hermeneutics must not be a mere repetition of scriptural and dogmatic utterances but a placing of dogmatic statements into conversation with the situation today. This productive fusion can provide new, surprising meanings that cannot be predicted simply by reference to how statements have been understood in the past.

At the center of all medieval Christian accounts of both metaphysics and ethics stands the claim that being and goodness are necessarily connected, and that grasping the nature of this connection is fundamental to explaining the nature of goodness itself. In that vein, medievals offered two distinct ways of conceiving this necessary connection: the nature approach and the creation approach. The nature approach explains the goodness of an entity by an appeal to the entity’s nature as the type of thing it is, and the extent to which it fulfills or perfects the potentialities in its nature. In contrast, the creation approach explains both the being and goodness of an entity by an appeal to God’s creative activity: on this view, both a thing’s being and its goodness are derived from, and explained in terms of, God’s being and goodness. Studies on being and goodness in medieval philosophy often culminate in the synthesizing work of Thomas Aquinas, the leading Dominican theologian at Paris in the 13th century, who brought together these two rival theories about the nature of goodness. Unfortunately, few have paid attention to a distinctively Franciscan approach to the topic around this same time period. My dissertation provides a remedy to this oversight by means of a thorough examination of John Duns Scotus’s approach to being and goodness—an approach that takes into account the shifting tide toward voluntarism (both ethical and theological) at the University of Paris in the late 13th century. I argue that Scotus is also a synthesizer of sorts, harmonizing the two distinct nature approaches of Augustine and Aristotle with his own unique ideas in ways that have profound implications for the future of medieval ethical theorizing, most notably, in his rejection of both the natural law and ethical eudaimonism of Thomas Aquinas. After the introduction, I analyze the nature of primary goodness—the goodness that Scotus thinks is convertible with being and thus a transcendental attribute of everything that exists. There, I compare the notion of convertibility of being and goodness among Scotus and his contemporaries. While Scotus agrees with the mainstream tradition that being and goodness are necessarily coextensive properties of everything that exists, he argues that being and good are formally rather than conceptually distinct. I argue that when the referents of being and good are considered, both views amount to the same thing. But when the concepts of being and good are considered, positing a formal distinction does make a good deal of difference: good does not simply add something to being conceptually, but formally: it is a quasi-attribute of being that exists in the world independently of our conception of it. Thus Scotus’s formal distinction provides a novel justification for the necessary connection between being and goodness. Furthermore, I argue that Scotus holds an Augustinian hierarchy of being. This hierarchical ranking of being is based upon the magnitude or perfection of the thing’s nature. But since goodness is a necessarily coextensive perfection of being, it too comes in degrees dependent upon the type of being, arranged in terms of the same hierarchy. This account, while inspired by Augustine’s hierarchical nature approach, is expressed in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics. But this necessary connection between being and goodness in medieval philosophy faced a problem: Following Augustine, medievals claimed that “everything that exists is good insofar as it exists.”’ But how is that compatible with the existence of sinful acts: if every being, in so far as it has being, is good, then every act, insofar as it has being, is good. But if sinful acts are bad, then we seem to be committed to saying either that bad acts are good, or that not every act, in so far as it has being, is good. This first option seems infelicitous; the second denies Augustine’s claims that “everything that exists is good.” Lombard and his followers solve this problem by distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness and claiming that moral goodness is an accident of some acts and does not convert with being. So the sinful act, qua act, is (ontologically) good. But the sinful act, qua disorder is (morally) bad. Eventually, three distinctive grades of accidental or moral goodness will be applied to human acts: generic, circumstantial, and meritorious. I argue that Scotus follows the traditional account of Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure in distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness, and claiming that only the former converts with being, while the latter is an accident of the act. Aquinas, in contrast, writing in the heyday of the Aristotelian renaissance, focuses instead on the role of the act in the agent’s perfection and posits his convertibility thesis of being and goodness in the moral as well as the metaphysical realm. Thus, when one begins a late medieval discussion with Aquinas, and then considers what Scotus says, it seems as though Scotus is the radical who departs from the conservative teachings of Aquinas. And this is just false: we need to situate both Aquinas and Scotus within the larger Sentence Commentary tradition extending back to Peter Lombard and his followers in order to understand their agreement and divergence from the tradition. Next, I turn the discussion to Scotus’s analysis of rightness and wrongness. I first explore the relationship between rightness and God’s will, and situate Scotus’s account within contemporary discussions of theological voluntarism. I argue Scotus holds a restricted-causal-will-theory —whereby only contingent deontological propositions depend upon God’s will for their moral status. In contrast to Aquinas, Scotus denies that contingent moral laws—the Second Table of the 10 Commandments (such do not steal, do not murder, etc.)—are grounded in human nature, and thus he limits the extent to which moral reasoning can move from natural law to the moral obligations we have toward one another. In conjunction with these claims, I argue that Scotus distinguishes goodness from rightness: An act’s rightness will depend on its conformity to either (1) a necessary moral truth or (2) God’s commanding some contingent moral truth. The moral goodness of an act, in contrast, involves right reason’s determination of the suitability or harmony of all factors pertaining to the act. In establishing this, also argue that much of the disparity among contemporary Scotus scholarship on the question of whether Scotus was a divine command theorist or natural law theorist should be directly attributed to a failure to recognize Scotus’s separation of the goodness of an act from the rightness of an act.