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Bonum non est in deo: On the Indistinction of the One and the Exclusion of the Good in Meister EckhartKing, Evan 24 August 2012 (has links)
Meister Eckhart exhibits an unprecedented confidence in the transcendental way of thought in medieval philosophy. Eckhart, unlike his predecessors, identifies being as such (ens commune) and God, allowing the most primary determinations metaphysics – ‘being,’ ‘one,’ ‘true,’ ‘good,’ – to function as both metaphysical and theological first principles. Eckhart placed them at the head of his projected Tripartite Opus, a vast work of quaestiones and commentaries whose intelligibility, he insists, requires the prior foundation of a supposed series of a thousand axioms. The table of contents remains, the opus propositionum does not.
This thesis argues that what enables Eckhart to pursue the direct application of the transcendentals to the divine also makes it unrealizable. His determination of unity is twofold: as (i) indivisibility, and the standard transcendental conception of unity as a negation of the given positive content of being (ens); as (ii) indistinction, comprehending both the negation of otherness which produces the indivisible and the otherness that is negated. There is an inherent tension between Peripatetic metaphysics and Procline henology.
Consequently, the Good is devalued when the Procline One appears within the transcendental perspective. Metaphysics, theology and, a fortiori for Eckhart, ethics, take no consideration of Goodness. I show how this tension gives rise to Eckhart’s association of the divine essence with the Neoplatonic One, while the Peripatetic One and the transcendental “true” function as the explanans of the Trinitarian intellectual self-return. This, in turn, gives rise to the constitutive function of the imago dei, and every imago as such, within that self-relation. Ultimately, this produces a standpoint wherein every essence, only as idea, contains the divine uniform infinity.
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"Etiam realis scientia" : Petrus Aureolis konzeptualistische Transzendentalienlehre vor dem Hintergrund seiner Kritik am Formalitatenrealismus /Gaus, Caroline. January 2008 (has links)
Zugl.: Diss. Univ. Köln, 2007. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 297-304) and indexes.
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John Duns Scotus’s Metaphysics of Goodness: Adventures in 13th-Century MetaethicsSteele, Jeffrey W. 16 November 2015 (has links)
At the center of all medieval Christian accounts of both metaphysics and ethics stands the claim that being and goodness are necessarily connected, and that grasping the nature of this connection is fundamental to explaining the nature of goodness itself. In that vein, medievals offered two distinct ways of conceiving this necessary connection: the nature approach and the creation approach. The nature approach explains the goodness of an entity by an appeal to the entity’s nature as the type of thing it is, and the extent to which it fulfills or perfects the potentialities in its nature. In contrast, the creation approach explains both the being and goodness of an entity by an appeal to God’s creative activity: on this view, both a thing’s being and its goodness are derived from, and explained in terms of, God’s being and goodness. Studies on being and goodness in medieval philosophy often culminate in the synthesizing work of Thomas Aquinas, the leading Dominican theologian at Paris in the 13th century, who brought together these two rival theories about the nature of goodness. Unfortunately, few have paid attention to a distinctively Franciscan approach to the topic around this same time period. My dissertation provides a remedy to this oversight by means of a thorough examination of John Duns Scotus’s approach to being and goodness—an approach that takes into account the shifting tide toward voluntarism (both ethical and theological) at the University of Paris in the late 13th century. I argue that Scotus is also a synthesizer of sorts, harmonizing the two distinct nature approaches of Augustine and Aristotle with his own unique ideas in ways that have profound implications for the future of medieval ethical theorizing, most notably, in his rejection of both the natural law and ethical eudaimonism of Thomas Aquinas.
After the introduction, I analyze the nature of primary goodness—the goodness that Scotus thinks is convertible with being and thus a transcendental attribute of everything that exists. There, I compare the notion of convertibility of being and goodness among Scotus and his contemporaries. While Scotus agrees with the mainstream tradition that being and goodness are necessarily coextensive properties of everything that exists, he argues that being and good are formally rather than conceptually distinct. I argue that when the referents of being and good are considered, both views amount to the same thing. But when the concepts of being and good are considered, positing a formal distinction does make a good deal of difference: good does not simply add something to being conceptually, but formally: it is a quasi-attribute of being that exists in the world independently of our conception of it. Thus Scotus’s formal distinction provides a novel justification for the necessary connection between being and goodness.
Furthermore, I argue that Scotus holds an Augustinian hierarchy of being. This hierarchical ranking of being is based upon the magnitude or perfection of the thing’s nature. But since goodness is a necessarily coextensive perfection of being, it too comes in degrees dependent upon the type of being, arranged in terms of the same hierarchy. This account, while inspired by Augustine’s hierarchical nature approach, is expressed in terms of Aristotelian metaphysics.
But this necessary connection between being and goodness in medieval philosophy faced a problem: Following Augustine, medievals claimed that “everything that exists is good insofar as it exists.”’ But how is that compatible with the existence of sinful acts: if every being, in so far as it has being, is good, then every act, insofar as it has being, is good. But if sinful acts are bad, then we seem to be committed to saying either that bad acts are good, or that not every act, in so far as it has being, is good. This first option seems infelicitous; the second denies Augustine’s claims that “everything that exists is good.” Lombard and his followers solve this problem by distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness and claiming that moral goodness is an accident of some acts and does not convert with being. So the sinful act, qua act, is (ontologically) good. But the sinful act, qua disorder is (morally) bad. Eventually, three distinctive grades of accidental or moral goodness will be applied to human acts: generic, circumstantial, and meritorious. I argue that Scotus follows the traditional account of Peter Lombard, Philip the Chancellor, Albert the Great, and Bonaventure in distinguishing ontological goodness from moral goodness, and claiming that only the former converts with being, while the latter is an accident of the act.
Aquinas, in contrast, writing in the heyday of the Aristotelian renaissance, focuses instead on the role of the act in the agent’s perfection and posits his convertibility thesis of being and goodness in the moral as well as the metaphysical realm. Thus, when one begins a late medieval discussion with Aquinas, and then considers what Scotus says, it seems as though Scotus is the radical who departs from the conservative teachings of Aquinas. And this is just false: we need to situate both Aquinas and Scotus within the larger Sentence Commentary tradition extending back to Peter Lombard and his followers in order to understand their agreement and divergence from the tradition.
Next, I turn the discussion to Scotus’s analysis of rightness and wrongness. I first explore the relationship between rightness and God’s will, and situate Scotus’s account within contemporary discussions of theological voluntarism. I argue Scotus holds a restricted-causal-will-theory —whereby only contingent deontological propositions depend upon God’s will for their moral status. In contrast to Aquinas, Scotus denies that contingent moral laws—the Second Table of the 10 Commandments (such do not steal, do not murder, etc.)—are grounded in human nature, and thus he limits the extent to which moral reasoning can move from natural law to the moral obligations we have toward one another. In conjunction with these claims, I argue that Scotus distinguishes goodness from rightness: An act’s rightness will depend on its conformity to either (1) a necessary moral truth or (2) God’s commanding some contingent moral truth. The moral goodness of an act, in contrast, involves right reason’s determination of the suitability or harmony of all factors pertaining to the act. In establishing this, also argue that much of the disparity among contemporary Scotus scholarship on the question of whether Scotus was a divine command theorist or natural law theorist should be directly attributed to a failure to recognize Scotus’s separation of the goodness of an act from the rightness of an act.
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Altar e Ambão: a presença de Cristo na palavra e na eucaristia, visível no espaço sagrado da comunidadeEnrique Antonio Illarze Delgado 15 March 2013 (has links)
Trata-se de um estudo aprofundado e diversificado sobre o espaço litúrgico cristão, lugar
de encontro da comunidade de fé com seu senhor, Jesus Cristo, Logos encarnado,
visível na Palavra e no Pão e no Vinho da refeição eucarística, e expressos nos focos
físicos do ambão e da mesa/altar. O estudo do tema leva, em primeiro lugar, à investigação
sobre as características que devem ter um espaço físico de teofania, vinculadas aos
transcendentais de Beleza, Bondade, Verdade e Harmonia, que Platão entendia como da
essência divina. Busca-se entender como esses transcendentais foram observados ao
longo dos tempos também no pensamento de Plotino, Agostinho, Kant e Hegel. Em
seguida, de forma multidisciplinar, são apresentadas as contribuições de uma teologia
da estética e dos sacramentos, em diálogo com a Filosofia, a Ética, a História, a Arquitetura,
a Filosofia da Arquitetura, a Liturgia e as Santas Escrituras, nas tradições cristãs do
anglicanismo, do luteranismo e do catolicismo romano. Há desdobramentos sobre a
reflexão e o trabalho de arquitetos em torno da expressão concreta da imanência e da
transcendência divinas na arquitetura, tentando expressar o Inexpressável, e vinculando
assim a Bela Arte da Arquitetura ao campo da fé cristã. A seguir, uma exaustiva pesquisa
é realizada em torno ao ambão e ao altar, focos físicos da Presença divina, interpretando-
os a partir de tipologias teológicas e de sua utilização nas três denominações acima
mencionadas. Finalizando, tendo como base teórica a filosofia da arquitetura e a
hermenêutica filosófica de Gadamer, analisa espaços litúrgicos concretos, projetados e
construídos pela arquiteta Maria Inês Bolson Lunardini, especializada em arquitetura
sacra na cidade e na área metropolitana de Porto Alegre (RS). Assim o estudo teórico
realizado ao longo do corpo do trabalho dialoga com um contexto concreto. A tese mostra
que ambão e a mesa/altar são, no contexto do espaço sagrado onde a comunidade de
fé é convocada e se congrega, o lugar da Presença viva do Logos Encarnado. / This academic work is a profound and diversified study on the Christian liturgical
space, place of gathering of the community of faith with his Lord, Jesus Christ, the
incarnated Logos, visible in the Word and in the Bread and Wine of the eucharistical
meal, as expressed in the physical foci of the ambo and the altar/table. The consideration
of the subject leads, firstly, to the research of the characteristics that the physical space
of a theophany must have, entailed to the transcendentals of Beauty, Truth, Goodness
and Harmony, meant by Plato as qualities of the divine essence. Attempt is made in
order to understand how transcendentals were seen along history and also in the thought
of Plotinus, Augustine, Kant and Hegel. Inmediately, in an multidisciplinarian way are
introduced the contributions of a theology of aesthetics and sacraments in dialogue with
Philosophy, Ethics, History, Architecture, Liturgy and Holy Scripture, with glimpses on
the Anglican, Lutheran and Roman Catholic traditions. There are, also, an unfolding on
how architects reflect and work around the concrete expressions of the divine
immanence and transcendence in Architecture, trying to express the Unexpressable, and
relating, in this way, the Fine Art of Architecture to Christian Faith. Following on the
way, an accurate research is made on the ambo and the altar, physical foci of the divine
Presence, viewing them from the point of view of theological typologies and their use in
the three denominations afore said. Finally, and bearing in mind as theoretical base the
philosophy of architecture and the philosophical hermeneutics of Gadamer, is made a
critic of concrete liturgical spaces, designed and built by the architect Maria Ines Bolson
Lunardini, specialized in sacred architecture and working in the city of Porto Alegre
(RS) and its metropolitan area. In this manner, the theoretical study developed along
this work dialogues with a concrete context. Thesis points out that ambo and altar/table
are, in the context of the sacred space where the community of faith is summoned and
gathers, the place of the living Presence of the Incarnated Logos.
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Les fonctions théoriques de la notion d’acte d’être (actus essendi) chez Thomas d’AquinBarrette, Geneviève 08 1900 (has links)
Nous entendons, dans ce mémoire, préciser le sens d'actus essendi par l’analyse de
l’emploi du terme par Thomas d’Aquin. Bien que la notion d’acte d’être soit sousjacente
à nombre de développements philosophiques et théologiques de l’Aquinate,
elle n’est considérée pour elle-même dans aucun texte du corpus thomasien. En
exposant le cadre théorique des onze unités textuelles dans lesquelles on retrouve
nommément l’expression, nous explicitons les distinctions qu’opère Thomas entre
l’acte d’être et les notions ontologiques corrélatives (étant, quiddité, être du jugement
prédicatif et être commun). Si « actus essendi » désigne en premier lieu un principe
constitutif de l’étant, il peut encore désigner le terme abstrait correspondant à cette
perfection de l’étant. L’acte d’être est ainsi ce par quoi l’étant est étant; il est
cependant, au plan ontologique, propre à chaque étant singulier tandis que, au plan
conceptuel, le même terme exprime ce qui est commun à tous les étants. Une
traduction des extraits du Scriptum super Sententiis, des Quæstiones de quolibet, de
la Summa Theologiæ, des Quæstiones disputatæ De potentia, de l’Expositio libri De
hebdomadibus et de la Expositio libri Metaphysicæ a été produite pour les fins de
cette étude. / In this paper, we intend to precise the meaning of actus essendi by analyzing how
Thomas Aquinas uses this term. If the notion of the act of being underlies a number of
Aquinas’ philosophical and theological developments, it is not treated in itself in any
of his writings. By exposing the theoretical framework of the eleven textual units in
which the expression namely appears, we explicate how he distinguishes between
the act of being and the correlative ontological notions (the being, the essence, the
predicamental judgment being and common being). If « actus essendi » first
designates a constitutive principle of being, it can also designate the corresponding
abstract term of this perfection of being. The act of being is that by which being is
being; however, it belongs, at the ontological level, to each particular being whereas
at the conceptual level, the same term expresses that which is common to all beings.
Extracts of the following texts have been translated in French for this purpose:
Scriptum super Sententiis, Quæstiones de quolibet, Summa Theologiæ, Quæstiones
disputatæ De potentia, Expositio libri De hebdomadibus and the Sententia libri
Metaphysicæ.
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Les fonctions théoriques de la notion d’acte d’être (actus essendi) chez Thomas d’AquinBarrette, Geneviève 08 1900 (has links)
Nous entendons, dans ce mémoire, préciser le sens d'actus essendi par l’analyse de
l’emploi du terme par Thomas d’Aquin. Bien que la notion d’acte d’être soit sousjacente
à nombre de développements philosophiques et théologiques de l’Aquinate,
elle n’est considérée pour elle-même dans aucun texte du corpus thomasien. En
exposant le cadre théorique des onze unités textuelles dans lesquelles on retrouve
nommément l’expression, nous explicitons les distinctions qu’opère Thomas entre
l’acte d’être et les notions ontologiques corrélatives (étant, quiddité, être du jugement
prédicatif et être commun). Si « actus essendi » désigne en premier lieu un principe
constitutif de l’étant, il peut encore désigner le terme abstrait correspondant à cette
perfection de l’étant. L’acte d’être est ainsi ce par quoi l’étant est étant; il est
cependant, au plan ontologique, propre à chaque étant singulier tandis que, au plan
conceptuel, le même terme exprime ce qui est commun à tous les étants. Une
traduction des extraits du Scriptum super Sententiis, des Quæstiones de quolibet, de
la Summa Theologiæ, des Quæstiones disputatæ De potentia, de l’Expositio libri De
hebdomadibus et de la Expositio libri Metaphysicæ a été produite pour les fins de
cette étude. / In this paper, we intend to precise the meaning of actus essendi by analyzing how
Thomas Aquinas uses this term. If the notion of the act of being underlies a number of
Aquinas’ philosophical and theological developments, it is not treated in itself in any
of his writings. By exposing the theoretical framework of the eleven textual units in
which the expression namely appears, we explicate how he distinguishes between
the act of being and the correlative ontological notions (the being, the essence, the
predicamental judgment being and common being). If « actus essendi » first
designates a constitutive principle of being, it can also designate the corresponding
abstract term of this perfection of being. The act of being is that by which being is
being; however, it belongs, at the ontological level, to each particular being whereas
at the conceptual level, the same term expresses that which is common to all beings.
Extracts of the following texts have been translated in French for this purpose:
Scriptum super Sententiis, Quæstiones de quolibet, Summa Theologiæ, Quæstiones
disputatæ De potentia, Expositio libri De hebdomadibus and the Sententia libri
Metaphysicæ.
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Le problème du mal dans la Summa de bono de Philippe le ChancelierBarichard, Louis-Hervé 08 1900 (has links)
Ce mémoire entend mettre en lumière la solution au problème du mal développée par Philippe le Chancelier dans la Summa de bono (1225-1228). À cet effet, notre analyse se polarise sur la notion du mal qui occupe à la fois le système des transcendantaux et la division du bien créé découlant du principe du souverain bien. La somme est bâtie d’après la primauté de la notion du bien transcendantal, et fut rédigée par opposition avec la doctrine manichéenne des Cathares, en vogue au XIIIe siècle, qui s’appuyait sur la prééminence de deux principes métaphysiques causant le bien et le mal, d’où devaient procéder toutes les choses de la Création. Ceci explique que nous ayons privilégié de seulement examiner les notions du bien et du mal en un sens général, car c’est au stade universel de l’ontologie du bien que l’auteur défait la possibilité du mal de nature, en amont des ramifications du bien créé, déployées, à l’envi, dans les questions de la somme où les réponses sont assignées à des problèmes spécifiques. Nous offrons ici, pour la première fois, une traduction en français d’une série de questions ayant permis de mener à bien ce projet. / This master’s thesis intends to clarify Philip the Chancellor’s answer to the problem of evil in the Summa de bono (1225-1228). To this end, we focus on the concept of evil as located within the transcendental system and the division of created good resulting from the supreme good. This sum, which is conceived from the primacy of the transcendental notion of good, was drafted in opposition to the Manichean doctrine of Cathars, a belief popular in the thirteenth century, which states that two metaphysical principles cause good and evil and it is from these principles that all things are created by nature. For this reason, we decided to study the concepts of good and evil only in a general sense, because the author dismantles the possibility of natural evil at the universal level of the ontology of the good and, prior to the deployment of the created good, it is through the sum’s questions that specific problems can be resolved. Here, we offer for the first time a French translation of several questions useful to this project.
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Le problème du mal dans la Summa de bono de Philippe le ChancelierBarichard, Louis-Hervé 08 1900 (has links)
Ce mémoire entend mettre en lumière la solution au problème du mal développée par Philippe le Chancelier dans la Summa de bono (1225-1228). À cet effet, notre analyse se polarise sur la notion du mal qui occupe à la fois le système des transcendantaux et la division du bien créé découlant du principe du souverain bien. La somme est bâtie d’après la primauté de la notion du bien transcendantal, et fut rédigée par opposition avec la doctrine manichéenne des Cathares, en vogue au XIIIe siècle, qui s’appuyait sur la prééminence de deux principes métaphysiques causant le bien et le mal, d’où devaient procéder toutes les choses de la Création. Ceci explique que nous ayons privilégié de seulement examiner les notions du bien et du mal en un sens général, car c’est au stade universel de l’ontologie du bien que l’auteur défait la possibilité du mal de nature, en amont des ramifications du bien créé, déployées, à l’envi, dans les questions de la somme où les réponses sont assignées à des problèmes spécifiques. Nous offrons ici, pour la première fois, une traduction en français d’une série de questions ayant permis de mener à bien ce projet. / This master’s thesis intends to clarify Philip the Chancellor’s answer to the problem of evil in the Summa de bono (1225-1228). To this end, we focus on the concept of evil as located within the transcendental system and the division of created good resulting from the supreme good. This sum, which is conceived from the primacy of the transcendental notion of good, was drafted in opposition to the Manichean doctrine of Cathars, a belief popular in the thirteenth century, which states that two metaphysical principles cause good and evil and it is from these principles that all things are created by nature. For this reason, we decided to study the concepts of good and evil only in a general sense, because the author dismantles the possibility of natural evil at the universal level of the ontology of the good and, prior to the deployment of the created good, it is through the sum’s questions that specific problems can be resolved. Here, we offer for the first time a French translation of several questions useful to this project.
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Objektivní a subjektivní poznání krásy v díle Tomáše Akvinského / Objective and Subjective Cognition of Beauty in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas.FLEISCHMANN, Dan January 2015 (has links)
This thesis deals with the objective and subjective cognition of beauty by a scholastic philosopher Thomas Aquinas. The initial chapters provide historical sources and a source of St. Thomas´s beauty, because beauty was not the main topic of theology and philosophy in the Middle Ages. From the definition of beauty, we know that beauty belongs to the cognitive power, thus next chapters present the activity of the senses and reason, by which we recognize beauty. (Pulchrum autem respicit vim cognoscitivam). This cognitive power results in the objective characteristics of beauty, ie.: a) integrity; b) proportion; c) clarity.) The penultimate chapter justifies the importance of knowledge of objective and subjective beauty, from which it follows in us enjoyment (delectatio et amor). If there is a reason to evaluate the knowledge and principles relating to the beauty, there is a necessary overlap present knowledge such as science. The final chapter addresses the interesting question of modern science - aesthetics: "Whether beauty, as written by Thomas Aquinas, is a specific distinct transcendental or only implicit transcendental initiated by the philosophers of the 20th century?" The thesis tries to show the importance of studying medieval philosophy in shaping topics such as beauty and art.
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Le mode d'être des objets intentionnels : une étude du rôle constituant de l'intellect chez Thierry de Freiberg / On the mode of being of intentional objects : the constitutive function of the intellect by Dietrich of Freiberg (1250-1310)Decaix, Véronique 18 March 2013 (has links)
Cette thèse traite de la doctrine catégorielle, de l’ontologie et de la théorie de la connaissance de Dietrich de Freiberg dans le De origine rerum praedicamentalium. L’enjeu principal est d’étudier la fonction constitutive que l’intellect opère sur catégories et sur l’étant en tant que tel. La première partie replace le traité dans le contexte historique des débats à l’université de Paris à la fin du XIIIe siècle touchant au statut des catégories et à la manière d’ordonner les genres réels de l’étant. Elle confronte la dérivation essentielle des prédicaments chez Dietrich aux modèles de systématisation élaborées par ses prédécesseurs, tels qu’Albert le Grand, Thomas d’Aquin, Henri de Gand. La deuxième partie s’attache aux objets constitués par l’intellect : l’Un comme principe du nombre et de la division, la relation et le temps. La dernière partie enquête la modalité sur laquelle l’intellect opère cette activité sur l’étant et montre en définitive que le sujet de la métaphysique, l’être quiditatif des étants, se situe à la croisée de la logique et du réel / This thesis deals with Dietrich of Freiberg’s doctrine of categories, ontology and theory of knowledge, as present in the treatise De origine rerum praedicamentalium. The primary aim is to examine the constitutive function the intellect exercises on the categories and being as being. The first part of this thesis replaces the treatise in the historical background of the late 13th century debates from the University of Paris regarding the nature of categories and the manner of organizing the real genera of being. It compares Dietrich’s deduction of the categories with the systematization of some of his predecessors such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Henry of Ghent. The second part of the thesis deals with the objects caused by the intellect: the One as principle of number and division, relation and time. The last part investigates the manner in which the intellect exercises its constitutive power on being and demonstrates in the final analysis that the subject of metaphysics, the quiditative being of things, is placed at the intersection of logic and reality
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