<p dir="ltr">The concept of infinity plays a pivotal role in mathematics, yet its precise definition remains elusive. This conceptual ambiguity has given rise to several puzzles in contemporary philosophy of mathematics. In response, this dissertation embarks on a rational reconstruction of Hegels concept of infinity and applies it to resolve two groups of mathematical puzzles, including challenges in applied mathematics, especially the application of differential calculus, and the conceptual ground of set theory, especially Cantors paradox.</p><p dir="ltr">The exploration begins with a historical survey of the concept of infinity in philosophy. It becomes evident that a prevailing interpretation characterizes infinity as the unlimited. In addition, this unlimitedness has taken various forms, including endlessness (Aristotle), all-inclusiveness (Spinoza), and self-sufficiency (Kant).</p><p dir="ltr">The heart of the dissertation lies in reconstructing Hegels concept of genuine infinity. Hegel argues that the unlimited as the negation of the limit entails either the completely indeterminate or another limited entity, neither of which is genuinely infinite. Instead, Hegel points out that genuine infinity is the self-relation of a limited entity. By self-relation, Hegel means that the limited entity alters into another limited entity that is isomorphic to the original one.</p><p dir="ltr">Subsequently, Hegel’s concept of genuine infinity can be translated into a mathematical framework as the intrinsic alteration of quantum (roughly speaking, quantum is Hegel’s term for the variable), which is captured by the corresponding relation among quanta. It is argued that this relation serves as the necessary condition for three mathematical entities traditionally considered infinite: arbitrarily large (small) numbers, infinite sets, and endless sequences. Thus, for Hegel, this intrinsic relation among quanta constitutes the essence of mathematical infinity.</p><p dir="ltr">Hegels concept of mathematical infinity can help us resolve difficulties within contemporary mathematics. First, it addresses the question of why infinite mathematical structures can be applied to describe and predict seemingly finite physical phenomena. The application of mathematics is usually explained by the similarity between mathematical structures and empirical systems, but the lack of apparent empirical counterpart leads one to doubt the application of infinite mathematical structures. Hegels concept of mathematical infinity directs us to focus on the structural similarity between infinite mathematical structures and empirical systems, specifically between the intrinsic alteration of quantum and the change of physical properties with time. With this structural similarity, the application of mathematics can be explained. Second, the dissertation investigates the conceptual ground of set theory, especially the relationship between a set and its members. Hegels analysis of genuine infinity provides a twofold clarification: (1) members of set must be a unit first, which entails that the set of all sets (the Universe) is not a set; (2) members of a set are simultaneously distinct (due to their independent logical content) yet indistinguishable (due to their common structure as a unit). Clarification 1 resolves Cantors paradox as it excludes the Universe; clarification 2 explains arithmetic operations.</p>

This dissertation explores the relationship between mental properties and physicalism to confront the apparent inconsistency between mental realism and the tenets of physicalism. As I see it, the major obstacle to fully integrating mental properties into physicalism is the feasibility of downward mental causation. Specifically, stringent physicalists find it contradictory to maintain that the mind can affect the body without contradicting the tenets of physicalism. This inconsistency claim is most notably addressed in the Causal Exclusion Argument. Though I am not personally committed to physicalism as an absolute worldview, I respect its prevalence and the reasons for its dominance. Rather than reject physicalism, I approach the puzzle with epistemological humility and attempt to work within the scope of physicalism. This exploration involves critically examining physicalism’s leading mental-physical relationships, focusing on emergence as a plausible means to reconcile mental and physical properties without undermining either. Ultimately, I propose a modified form of physicalism that maintains its metaphysical and epistemological theses but in a milder form that is more conducive to emergent mental phenomena and the aspects of reality that are nonlinear and indeterminate. Guided by the work of Jaegwon Kim and Gerald Vision, this dissertation moves beyond their ideas, challenging reductionist perspectives within physicalism. The key contribution is the introduction of Dynamically Stable Causal Holism (or DSC Holism in brief), which represents a significant departure from traditional reductionist approaches, promoting a more holistic understanding of physicalism. Through nonlinear emergence and DSC Holism, I confront the Causal Exclusion Argument. A secondary original contribution is my approach to these puzzles. I integrate and synthesize concepts from the philosophy of science and special sciences to offer a fresh perspective on physically compatible mental realism and downward causation. / Philosophy

Tesis por compendio / [EN] Amartya Sen's Capability Approach (CA) makes an important contribution to the development literature. It moves from the conventional focus on a single indicator: opulence, to an emphasis on people, their plurality, and the multiple dimensions characterizing their quality of life. As such, it proposes an influential account of human beings and their agency. Its advantages notwithstanding, its notion of agency seems to warrant in depth scrutiny. This dissertation explores the actual scope of the CA's agency as well as its limitations, and suggests a way to complement it. An account of the capabilitarian agent encompasses two elements: freedom or choice and rationality or reasoning. Thus, the CA rejects the conventional rational agent, advancing instead a reasoning one. As such, the CA's agency seems to require attention to measurement and explanation (observables) as well as to meaning and interpretation (unobservables), which demands moving beyond a positivistic philosophy of science. At the same time, it is found that this notion seems to leave people who have others choosing and reasoning for them unaccounted for. To provide a complement the CA on both counts, John Dewey's pragmatism is proposed. It is a philosophy that provides an account of how people think and act. The elaboration of pragmatic agency is carried out from philosophical ontology. Pragmatism is located within the analyticist philosophy of science, as it adheres to mind-world monism and phenomenalism. While the former is evidenced in its concept of transaction, suggesting the mutual constitution of humans and their contexts, the latter is evidenced in its attention to objects, which are anything that a person notices (including in-principle unobservables). The meanings of objects are expressed in terms of action and depend on habits, which are predispositions for actions and, as such, more intimate and informative than choices. Pragmatism, therefore, encompasses more than reflective action.. Accounting for the pragmatic transagent, thus, requires the scrutiny of objects and habits, which implies the inclusion of meaning and interpretation. Consequently, it is found that the CA's reasoning agent can benefit from the inclusion of in-principle unbservables by dint of pragmatic objects and habits, enhance the elements constituting individuals with these same elements, make sense of the nature and function of values and preferences, and enrich its account of the relation between individuals and their context by dint of pragmatic transaction. Therefore, the pragmatic transagent can account for the groups dropped by the CA. Additionally, pragmatism can complement the CA in other aspects. Concerning ontology, while the CA has abstained from addressing ontological issues, pragmatism is found to adhere to an analyticist philosophy of science, which seems to agree with the CA's reasoning agent and its constituting elements: choice (observables) and reasoning (unobservables). As for empirical issues, the CA has supported its flexibility on a lay understanding of pragmatism, since it seems to maintain positivist traces. Subscribing to it philosophically could prove beneficial. Apropos of freedom, pragmatism's naturalist philosophy can contribute to alleviate the CA's focus on choice and to account for the continuity of behavior, encompassing non-reflective as well as reflective action, seemingly the main focus of the CA. With respect to democracy, pragmatism casts a wider net than the CA applying democracy to all levels of human association, not only society or the state, which seems to be the CA's concern. Finally, as regards normativity, although both are consequentialist, while the CA holds freedom and achievement as the end, pragmatism advances solely action. These are not incompatible positions. To the extent that the CA can further action, a pragmatic capability approach can accommodate regarding development as freedom. / [ES] El Enfoque de Capacidad (EC) de Amartya Sen hace una importante contribución a la literatura del desarrollo. Se mueve del enfoque convencional en un único indicador: opulencia, a un énfasis en la gente, su pluralidad, y las múltiples dimensiones que caracterizan su calidad de vida. Así, propone una explicación de los seres humanos y su agencia. Sin perjuicio de sus ventajas, su noción de agencia parece merecer estudio a profundidad. Esta disertación explora el alcance real de la agencia del EC así como sus limitaciones, y sugiere una forma de complementarla. Una elaboración del agente capacitario abarca dos elementos: libertad o elección y racionalidad o razonamiento. Así, el EC rechaza al agente racional convencional y promueve uno razonante. Por tanto, la agencia del EC parece requerir atención a la medición y explicación (observables) así como al significado e interpretación (inobservables), lo que demanda moverse más allá de una filosofía de la ciencia positivista. Al mismo tiempo, se encuentra que esta noción parece dejar gente que tiene a otros eligiendo y razonando por ellos sin explicación. Para brindar un complemento al EC en ambos aspectos, se propone el pragmatismo de John Dewey. Es una filosofía con una propuesta de cómo la gente piensa y actúa. La elaboración de la agencia pragmática se hace desde la ontología filosófica. El pragmatismo se ubica como una filosofía de la ciencia analiticista pues adopta el monismo mente-mundo y el fenomenalismo. Mientras el primero se evidencia en su concepto de transacción, sugiriendo una mutua constitución entre humanos y contextos, el segundo lo hace en su atención a objetos, todo lo que una persona nota (incluyendo en principio inobservables). El significado de los objetos se expresa en términos de acción y dependen de hábitos, que son predisposiciones para acciones y, por tanto, son más íntimos e informativos que las elecciones. Así, se abarca más que la acción reflexiva. Explicar al transagente pragmático requiere el estudio de objetivos y hábitos, lo que implica la inclusión de significados e interpretación. Consecuentemente, se encuentra que el agente razonante del EC puede beneficiarse de la inclusión de en principio inobservables mediante los objetos y hábitos pragmáticos, ampliar los elementos que constituyen a los individuos con los mismos elementos, darle sentido a la naturaleza y función de valores y preferencias, y enriquecer su explicación de la relación entre individuos y su contexto mediante la transacción pragmática. Por tanto, el transagente pragmático puede incluir grupos abandonados por el EC. Adicionalmente, el pragmatismo puede complementar al EC en otros aspectos. Sobre la ontología, mientras el EC se ha abstenido de tratar temas ontológicos, el pragmatismo se adhiere a una filosofía de las ciencias analiticista, que parece coincidir con el agente razonante del EC y sus elementos constitutivos: elección (observables) y razonamiento (inobservables). Con respecto a asuntos empíricos, el EC ha basado su flexibilidad en un entendimiento inexperto del pragmatismo, ya que parece mantener rastros positivistas. Suscribirse a su filosofía puede resultar beneficioso. A propósito de la libertad, la filosofía naturalista del pragmatismo puede ayudar a aliviar la atención del EC a la elección y abordar la continuidad del comportamiento, abarcando acción no reflexiva y reflexiva, que parece ser el énfasis del EC. Sobre la democracia, el pragmatismo amplía la red más allá que el EC al aplicar la democracia a todos los niveles de asociación humana, no solo la sociedad y el estado, que parece ser el interés del EC. Finalmente, acerca de la normatividad, aunque ambos son consecuencialistas, mientras el EC propone las capacidad y funcionamientos como fines, el pragmatismo promueve la acción. Estas no son posiciones incompatibles. En la medida en que el EC pueda avanzar la acción, un enfoque de capacidad pragmático puede alojar considerar al desarrollo como libertad. / [CA] L'Enfocament de Capacitat (EC) d'Amartya Sen fa una important contribucio a la lliteratura del desenroll. Se mou de l'enfocament convencional en un unic indicador: opulencia, a un emfatis en la gent, la seua pluralitat, i les multiples dimensions que caracterisen la seua calitat de vida. Aixina, propon una explicacio dels sers humans i la seua agencia. Sense perjuï de les seues ventages, la seua nocio d'agencia sembla mereixer estudi a fondaria. Esta dissertacio explora l'alcanç real de l'agencia de l'EC aixina com les seues llimitacions, i sugerix una forma de complementar-la. Una elaboracio de l'agent capacitat albarca dos elements: llibertat o eleccio i racionalitat o raonament. Aixina, l'EC rebuja a l'agent racional convencional i promou un raonant. Per tant, l'agencia de l'EC sembla requerir atencio a la medicio i explicacio (observables) aixina com al significat i interpretacio (inobservables), lo que demanda moure's mes alla d'una filosofia de la ciencia positivista. Al mateix temps, se troba que esta nocio sembla deixar gent que te a atres triant i raonant per ells sense explicacio. Per a brindar un complement a l'EC en abdos aspectes, se propon el pragmatisme de John Dewey. Es una filosofia en una proposta de com la gent pensa i actua. L'elaboracio de l'agencia pragmatica se fa des de l'ontologia filosofica. El pragmatisme s'ubica com una filosofia de la ciencia analiticist puix adopta el monisme ment-mon i el fenomenalisme. Mentres el primer s'evidencia en el seu concepte de transaccio, sugerint una mutua constitucio entre humans i contexts, el segon ho fa en la seua atencio a objectes, tot lo que una persona nota (incloent en principi inobservables). El significat dels objectes s'expressa en termens d'accio i depenen d'habits, que son predisposicions per a accions i, per tant, son mes intims i informatius que les eleccions. Aixina, se compren mes que l'accio reflexiva. Explicar al transagent pragmatic requerix l'estudi d'objectius i habits, lo que implica l'inclusio de significats i interpretacio. Conseqüentment, se troba que l'agent raonant de l'EC pot beneficiar-se de l'inclusio d'en principi inobservables mediant els objectes i habits pragmatics, ampliar els elements que constituixen als individus en els mateixos elements, donar-li sentit a la naturalea i funcio de valors i preferencies, i enriquir la seua explicacio de la relacio entre individus i el seu context mediant la transaccio pragmatica. Per tant, el transagent pragmatic pot incloure grups abandonats per l'EC. Adicionalment, el pragmatisme pot complementar a l'EC en atres aspectes. Sobre l'ontologia, mentres l'EC s'ha abstingut de tractar temes ontologics, el pragmatisme s'adherix a una filosofia de les ciencies analiticist, que sembla coincidir en l'agent raonant de l'EC i els seus elements constitutius: eleccio (observables) i raonament (inobservables). En respecte a assunts empirics, l'EC ha basat la seua flexibilitat en un enteniment inexpert del pragmatisme, ya que sembla mantindre rastres positivistes. Subscriure's a la seua filosofia pot resultar beneficios. A proposit de la llibertat, la filosofia naturalista del pragmatisme pot ajudar a aliviar l'atencio de l'EC a l'eleccio i abordar la continuïtat del comportament, comprenent accio no reflexiva i reflexiva, que sembla ser el emfatis de l'EC. Sobre la democracia, el pragmatisme amplia la xarcia mes alla que l'EC a l'aplicar la democracia a tots els nivells d'associacio humana, no nomes la societat i l'estat, que sembla ser l'interes de l'EC. Finalment, al voltant de la normativitat, encara que abdos son conseqüèncialistes, mentres l'EC propon les capacitat i funcionaments com fins, el pragmatisme promou l'accio. Estes no son posicions incompatibles. En la mesura en que l'EC puga alvançar l'accio, un enfocament de capacitat pragmatica pot estajar considerar al desenroll com llibertat. / Garcés Velástegui, PF. (2020). Towards a pragmatic capability approach: Essays on human development, agency and pragmatism [Tesis doctoral]. Universitat Politècnica de València. https://doi.org/10.4995/Thesis/10251/153796 / Compendio

2023 / This dissertation lies at the intersection of philosophy of climate science, philosophy of the historical sciences, philosophy of model-based science, and philosophy of data. I focus on epistemological and methodological issues concerning how scientists use episodes of climate change in Earth’s deep past that significantly resemble incipient climate change ("paleoclimate analogues") to inform their climate projections. I argue that we should conceptualize paleoclimate analogues as kind of climate model - a naturally-occurring, full-size, concrete model – and that viewing paleoclimate analogues through this lens has important philosophical implications. It follows, for instance, that the usefulness of models does not depend on our ability to experimentally manipulate them (we cannot manipulate the deep past). I also argue that the historical sciences can be predictive: they can use the past as a guide to the future. I give several recommendations for scientists, including some guidance on how to manage, process, and evaluate paleoclimate data in order for it to be used to inform our climate projections, despite various sources of error and uncertainty inherent to our reconstructions of the deep past. I close with some general reflections on "using the past as a guide to the future," within the context of paleoclimate analogues and beyond.

I develop a genealogy of the concept of ‘energy' in western philosophy and science, focusing on how energy concepts (e.g., energeia, vis viva, kinetic/potential energy) have been theorized in relation to time. Looking especially to the ideas of Gilles Deleuze, Henri Bergson, Friedrich Nietzsche, and Martin Heidegger, I argue that the thread that connects energy concepts through time is the epistemological tendency to derive conceptual accounts of change from a prior ontological sameness or essence. I then attempt to lay the groundwork for a process metaphysics that harmonizes with contemporary findings in the physical sciences, while also extending the concept of energy to account for the presence of subjectivity in nature.

no / The title The Demons of Science may at first appear like a contradiction in terms. Demons are associated with the forces of darkness; science represents the power of light. One could assume, therefore, that science has no time for demons. This book aims to destroy this assumption. Science opens its gates to demons as long as they play a rational rather than an evil part. They are put to work. Demons are figures of thought: they belong to the category of thought experiments, which are routinely employed in science and philosophy. As they are cast as agents with superhuman abilities, we may expect that demons provide us with valuable—albeit non-empirical—clues about the constitution of the physical world. But I am interested in exploring not only what the demons tell us but also what they do not tell us about our world. They are cast as superhuman actors but even demons have their limitations. The following chapters contain, I believe, the first systematic study of the role of demons in scientific and philosophical reasoning about the external world.

The purpose of this study as been to contribute to the emerging interdisciplinary field of historical sleep studies, which spans the biological and social sciences, legal studies, and the humanities. As an interdisciplinary scholar based primarily in the humanities, my goals have been twofold: to develop a critical archive for the use of scholars in this emerging field; and to demonstrate how that archive might be used to productive effect in literary studies. To that end, this project begins with a critical introduction to the field of sleep studies and its relationship to eighteenth- and nineteenth-century thought and follows with two distinct but connected sections: the archive itself and a short series of literary case-studies drawn from across the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. My hope is that these case studies will show how the materials in the archive allow literary scholars to produce new insights about familiar, canonical texts. <br>

<div>This dissertation redefines the placebo effect in light of new empirical observations and certain strands of philosophical ethics. </div>Chapter 1 critically reviews available definitions of placebo responsiveness against their abilities to hang together the diversity of empirical observations and emerging research interests. Projecting Wittgenstein's example of a child learning pain language, Chapter 2 redefines the phenomenon as a particular kind of experience of meaning and reconsiders clinical empathy in terms of the loss and recovery of language that belongs to illness experience and diagnosis. Chapter 3 broadens the account of psychosomatic responsiveness from the experience of meaning to the experience of values, utilising Canguilhem's definition of health and Nietzsche's genealogical account of the health of values. Chapter 4 explores the foregoing by recounting how Wittgenstein's moral philosophy might hold together the traditional ethical and bioethical question of what makes life worth living with psychosomatic responsiveness.

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