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Of Proofs, Mathematicians, and ComputersYepremyan, Astrik 01 January 2015 (has links)
As computers become a more prevalent commodity in mathematical research and mathematical proof, the question of whether or not a computer assisted proof can be considered a mathematical proof has become an ongoing topic of discussion in the mathematics community. The use of the computer in mathematical research leads to several implications about mathematics in the present day including the notion that mathematical proof can be based on empirical evidence, and that some mathematical conclusions can be achieved a posteriori instead of a priori, as most mathematicians have done before. While some mathematicians are open to the idea of a computer-assisted proof, others are skeptical and would feel more comfortable if presented with a more traditional proof, as it is more surveyable. A surveyable proof enables mathematicians to see the validity of a proof, which is paramount for mathematical growth, and offer critique. In my thesis, I will present the role that the mathematical proof plays within the mathematical community, and thereby conclude that because of the dynamics of the mathematical community and the constant activity of proving, the risks that are associated with a mistake that stems from a computer-assisted proof can be caught by the scrupulous activity of peer review in the mathematics community. Eventually, as the following generations of mathematicians become more trained in using computers and in computer programming, they will be able to better use computers in producing evidence, and in turn, other mathematicians will be able to both understand and trust the resultant proof. Therefore, it remains that whether or not a proof was achieved by a priori or a posteriori, the validity of a proof will be determined by the correct logic behind it, as well as its ability to convince the members of the mathematical community—not on whether the result was reached a priori with a traditional proof, or a posteriori with a computer-assisted proof.
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Cutting Out Worry: Popularizing Psychosurgery in AmericaIannaccone, Antonietta Louise 01 January 2014 (has links)
We think of the lobotomy as utterly primitive and brutal; we shudder at the idea of it. The archetypal image of creepiness, violence, and unnecessary brutality was expressed in the book and movie One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest. This procedure weighs heavy on America’s conscience but in 1945 the procedure was characterized as being as gentle as ‘cutting through butter’ and the therapeutic effect was described as ‘cutting out worry’. How did the lobotomy gain such widespread acceptance? One part of the answer is that Walter Freeman advocated for it not just among his colleagues, but through the popular media outlets of his day as well. In this thesis I will claim that, starting in 1936, Walter Freeman influenced the positive portrayal of lobotomies in the American press. He participated in visual culture that promoted a convergence between medical culture and the popular press by cultivating a representation of the procedure that could appeal to both. His tools included narrative accounts, images, and a public dramatization of himself that was hard to resist. I will show how these efforts were quite successful in the beginning, but that by 1947 he started to lose control of the perceptions and narrative he had worked so hard to construct.
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Meaning change in the context of Thomas S. Kuhn's philosophyKuukkanen, Jouni-Matti January 2006 (has links)
Thomas S. Kuhn claimed that the meanings of scientific terms change in theory changes or in scientific revolutions. In philosophy, meaning change has been taken as the source of a group of problems, such as untranslatability, incommensurability, and referential variance. For this reason, the majority of analytic philosophers have sought to deny that there can be meaning change by focusing on developing a theory of reference that would guarantee referential stability. A number of philosophers have also claimed that Kuhn’s view can be explained by the fact that he accepted and further developed many central tenets of logical empiricism. I maintain that the genesis of Kuhn’s meaning theorising lies in his historical approach and that his view of meaning change is justified. Later in his career he attempted to advance a theory of meaning and can be said to have had limited success in it. What is more, recent cognitive science has unexpectedly managed to shed light on Kuhn’s insights on the organisation of information in the mind, concept learning, and concept definition. Furthermore, although Kuhn’s critique of Putnam’s causal theory of reference has often been dismissed as irrelevant, he has a serious point to address. Kuhn thought that the causal theory that works so well with proper names cannot work with scientific terms. He held that conceptual categories are formed by similarity and dissimilarity relations; therefore, several features and not only one single property are needed for determination of extension. In addition, the causal theory requires universal substances as points of reference of scientific terms. Kuhn was a conceptualist, who held that universals do not exist as mind-independent entities and that mind-dependent family resemblance concepts serve the role of universals. Further, at the beginning of his career, Kuhn was interested in the question of what concepts or ideas are and how they change in their historical context. Although he did not develop his theorising on this issue, I demonstrate that this is a genuine problem in the philosophy of history. Finally, Kuhn argued that scientists cannot have access to truth in history because we cannot transcend our historical niche, and as a consequence, the truth of a belief cannot be a reason for theory choice. Instead of truth, we can rely on justification. I also discuss Kuhn’s idea that problem-solving is the main aim of science and show that this view can be incorporated into coherentist epistemology.
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Prometheus through the agesFranssen, Trijsje Marie January 2014 (has links)
This dissertation explores the role and significance of the ancient Greek myth of Prometheus in Western philosophy from Antiquity to today. Paying particular attention to its moral and existential meanings, an analysis of this in-depth investigation produces an overview of the exceptional array of the myth’s functions and themes. It demonstrates that the most significant functions of the Prometheus myth are its social, epistemic, ontological and moral functions and that the myth’s most significant themes are fire, rebellion, creation, human nature and ambiguity. The dissertation argues that this analysis brings to light meaningful information on two sides of a reference to the Prometheus myth: it reveals the nature, functions, themes and connotations of the myth, while information about these functions and themes provides access to fundamental meanings, moral statements and ontological concepts of the studied author. Based on its findings this work claims that, as in history, first, the Prometheus myth will still be meaningful in philosophy today; and second, that the analysis of the myth’s functions and themes will provide access to essential ideas underlying contemporary references to the myth. To prove the validity of these claims this thesis examines the contemporary debate on ‘human enhancement’. Advocates as well as opponents of enhancement make use of the Prometheus myth in order to support their arguments. Employing the acquired knowledge about the myth’s functions and themes, the dissertation analyses the references encountered. The results of this analysis confirm that the Prometheus myth still has a significant role in a contemporary philosophical context. They improve our understanding of the philosophical argument, ontological framework and ethics of the debate’s participants; and thus demonstrate that the information about the Prometheus myth acquired in this thesis is a useful means to reveal fundamental ideas and conceptualisations underlying contemporary (and possibly future) references to the myth.
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Ethical Considerations Facing the Regulation of Self-Driving Cars in the United StatesMancuso, Richard 01 January 2016 (has links)
Self-driving cars are here. Once an advanced technology that seemed futuristic, they are now closer than most believe. Many of the largest automobile manufacturers are working on autonomous vehicle technology of their own. Perhaps most well-known, though, are the cars being developed by Tesla and Google. Both companies have well-developed prototypes of fully autonomous vehicles, meaning they require no human input or supervision, and Tesla has promised widespread, consumer availability of this technology in the next one to two years.
Along with the availability of this technology to the public and transportation companies like Uber and Lyft, comes a need to establish a regulatory environment. Regulators need to contemplate a new, yet complex, technology with far-reaching implications and determine how best to regulate necessary components. In this paper, I plan to explicate and analyze the ethical impact of the proliferation of self-driving cars that regulators should consider when determining how they ought to regulate.
I will do this by first clarifying any technical terms one might need to be familiar with as well as discussing some of the requisite considerations. Then, I plan to explore a some of the pitfalls regulators might be subject to as they navigate the associated complex issues. Finally, I will explain and analyze the likely benefits and potential risks resulting from roadways filled with autonomous vehicles.
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L'approche sémantique offre-t-elle un meilleur modèle de l'explication scientifique que les théories qu'elle prétend supplanter ?Germain, Pierre-Luc January 2009 (has links)
Mémoire numérisé par la Division de la gestion de documents et des archives de l'Université de Montréal.
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Vědecký realismus a přirozený svět / Scientific Realism and the Natural WorldJoseph, Jacques January 2012 (has links)
Jacques Joseph Scientific Realism and the Natural World M.A. thesis Abstract The main topic of this work is the relation between the natural world and the world of the natural sciences, and furthermore the relation of both these worlds to our conception of an external reality "as it really is". The core of the work is rooted mainly in the Anglo-American analytical philosophy of science, namely the debate concerning scientific realism, with a section dedicated to Husserl's conception of the relation between the natural world and natural sciences (as described in his Krisis). The goal of this work is to show scientific realism as broken beyond repair, and to then offer an alternative. The problems that plague realism run deep into its roots, many of which it shares with its opponents, the new alternative theory therefore needs to be completely different. This work suggests the "Natural ontological attitude" (NOA) presented by Arthur Fine, a theory that tries to salvage the intuitions that made realism seem so attractive. NOA is then developped, using texts by W. V. O. Quine and D. Davidson, as a minimalistic metaphysics based strongly on language that still manages to provide a relation to an extra-linguistic reality.
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Every sampling is a testimonyDovsten, Evelina January 2019 (has links)
A self portrait. With an auto ethnographic study method and my own craft; glass making I examine tacit knowledge. A portrait not only of me, but also the human in need of control. An invite to look at our society and see how the measurable is in charge and positivistic science have the leading position in knowledge production. I aim for the subjective, the knowledge stored in my body which is passed on through making, in to the glass to be kept.
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A estrutura das controvérsias científicas: a sociologia da ciência de Thomas Kuhn / The structure of scientific controversies: Thomas Kuhns sociology of scienceSilva, Paulo Pirozelli Almeida 22 February 2018 (has links)
Como cientistas escolhem teorias? O objetivo de nossa tese é entender a resposta de Thomas Kuhn a este problema clássico da filosofia da ciência. Ao retirar o problema da escolha de teorias do campo metodológico e transportá-lo para o campo sociológico, Kuhn expõe os fundamentos de uma abordagem sociológica do desenvolvimento científico. Como tantos outros filósofos, Kuhn defende que teorias científicas são escolhidas a partir de valores epistêmicos critérios como precisão, consistência, abrangência, simplicidade e fecundidade. Segundo ele, porém, estes valores estão sujeitos a interpretações distintas: cientistas podem concordar quanto ao que se deve esperar de uma teoria, mas, em função de históricos pessoais e profissionais particulares, podem discordar em relação a qual delas melhor manifesta essas características. Mas se os cientistas aplicam os valores de maneiras distintas, em que sentido estes valores ditariam as suas escolhas? E, principalmente, como seria possível, dada a variabilidade dos valores, o consenso em uma comunidade de cientistas? A resposta de Kuhn, inaugurando sua abordagem sociológica, é a de que o acordo entre os membros da comunidade seria gerado por uma série de mecanismos sociais. Em primeiro lugar, a pedagogia e o treinamento dos cientistas, que tornaria as avaliações dos cientistas mais parecidas. Depois, a teoria de onda: a produção de novas evidências e argumentos responsáveis por convencer os adeptos de teorias rivais. Por último, a reestruturação da comunidade: a exclusão de membros resistentes e a divisão da comunidade em disciplinas distintas. A fim de esclarecer a natureza desta sociologia, discutiremos dois conjuntos de temas relacionados: os tipos de explicações de crença: racional e causal; e os níveis explicativos desta sociologia: indivíduos, comunidades e grupos. A última parte de nossa tese consiste em uma tentativa de sistematizar um modelo de explicação sociológica da dinâmica das controvérsias científicas, assim como apontar alguns caminhos para uma pesquisa empírica direcionada a estes tópicos. / How do scientists choose theories? The aim of our thesis is to understand Thomas Kuhn\'s answer to this classic problem in Philosophy of Science. By removing the theory-choice problem from the methodological field and transporting it to the sociological field, Kuhn sets out the foundations of a sociological approach to scientific development. Like so many other philosophers, Kuhn argues that scientific theories are chosen based on epistemic values criteria such as accuracy, consistency, scope, simplicity, and fruitfulness. However, these values are, according to him, subject to different interpretations: scientists may agree on what to expect from a theory, but depending on particular personal and professional histories, they may disagree as to which theory best expresses these characteristics. But if scientists apply values in different ways, in which sense would these values dictate scientists choices? And, especially, how could a consensus in a community of scientists be achieved, given the variability of values? Kuhn\'s answer, inaugurating his sociological approach, is that agreement among community members would be generated by a series of social mechanisms. First, the pedagogy and training of scientists, which make scientists appraisals more similar. Secondly, the wave-theory: the production of new evidence and arguments that convince the followers of rival theories. Finally, the restructuring of the community: the exclusion of resistant members and the division of the community into distinct disciplines. In order to clarify the nature of this sociology, we will discuss two sets of related themes: the types of explanations of belief: rational and causal; and the explanatory levels of this sociology: individuals, communities and groups. The last part of our thesis consists of an attempt to systematize a model of sociological explanation for the dynamics of scientific controversies, as well as to point out the ways to an empirical research directed to these topics.
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A unidade temática \"Compreensão Humana do Universo\" pela perspectiva antropológica da Astronomia Cultural / The thematic unit \"Compreensão Humana do Universo\" by the anthropological perspective of Cultural AstronomyLacerda, Flaubert Meira Rocha 22 November 2017 (has links)
A partir da unidade temática Compreensão Humana do Universo, referida nas Orientações Educacionais Complementares aos Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais do Ensino Médio: Ciências da Natureza, Matemática e suas Tecnologias, capítulo Física, é possível discutir uma série de conceitos presentes em seus objetivos, em especial, sobre os modelos explicativos do universo em diferentes modos de conhecimento. A fim de contribuir com esta discussão, de forma a tratar igualitariamente os diferentes modelos, que o presente trabalho tem como objetivo fornecer subsídios teóricos e metodológicos para o planejamento e implementação de aulas direcionadas para tal unidade temática, a partir de uma abordagem histórica-filosófica e pela perspectiva antropológica da Astronomia Cultural. Para transformar esta intenção em ação foi elaborada uma sequência didática, a qual foi conduzida segundo o processo EAR de validação. A sequência foi aplicada em uma turma de primeiro ano do ensino médio. Os dados da aplicação foram coletados por meio de gravação das aulas, dos diários de aula e do material (desenhos e questionários diagnósticos) produzidos pela turma. A fonte principal de dados foi o material produzido pela turma, o qual foi submetido à análise de conteúdo categorial. Como resultado da análise desse material verificou-se que a sequência didática aplicada, de acordo com os parâmetros adotados para sua elaboração, conseguiu com que a turma caracterizasse e delimitasse os modelos explicativos do universo segundo os tipos de conhecimentos dos quais estes são advindos / From the thematic unit \"Compreensão Humana do Universo\", referred to in the Orientações Educacionais Complementares aos Parâmetros Curriculares Nacionais do Ensino Médio: Ciências da Natureza, Matemática e suas Tecnologias, chapter \"Física\", it is possible to discuss a series of concepts present in its objectives, in particular, on the explanatory models of the universe in different models of knowledge. In order to contribute to this discussion, treating the different models equally, the present work aims to provide theoretical and methodological support for the planning and implementation of classes directed to such thematic unit, based on a historical-philosophical approach and by anthropological perspective of Cultural Astronomy. To transform this intention into action, a didactic sequence was elaborated, which was conducted according to the EAR process of validation. The sequence was applied in a first-year High School class. The application data were collected by recording the classes, class diaries and the material (drawings and diagnostic questionnaires) produced by the students. The main source of data was the material produced by the students, which was submitted to Categorical Content Analysis. As a result of the analysis of this material, it was verified that the didactic sequence applied, according to the parameters adopted for its elaboration, enabled the students to characterize and delimit the explanatory models of the universe according to the types of knowledge from which these are derived
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