Les sociétés musulmanes se sont engagées dans un processus de sécularisation qui reste encore mal assumé ou mal reconnu. Cette thèse s'attache à étudier comment les penseurs musulmans contemporains trouvent ou élaborent des systèmes de pensée qui permettent de penser cette sécularisation. La séparation du politique et du religieux reste encore ancrée dans un dogmatisme religieux que les auteurs présentés tentent d'abattre à travers divers stratagèmes intellectuels. La typologie mise en place dans ce sens permet de mieux cerner les différentes approches : historique, littéraire, épistémologique et rationnelle. Des thèmes sont ensuite abordés qui présentent de véritables enjeux pour la sécularisation et qui en sont une rude mise à l'épreuve. L'Iran et la Turquie sont les deux modèles pratiques choisis afin d'interroger ce processus de sécularisation au sein des sociétés musulmanes / The Muslim societies got involved in a process of secularization which remains still badly taken or badly acknowledged. This thesis sets out to be studying how the contemporary Muslim thinkers find or work out systems of thought which allow to think of this secularization.Separation of policy and religion still anchored in a religious dogmatism which the introduced authors try to slaughter across various intellectual stratagems. Typography set up in this sense allows to surround different approaches : historical, literary, epistemology and rationnel.Topics are then approached which introduce true stakes for secularization and which are a hard bet in test. Iran and Turkey are both practical models chosen to question this process of secularization within the Muslim societies.

Les rapports turco-européens et turco-moyen-orientaux sont essentiellement influencés par les actions du Parti de la Justice et du Développement (AKP) à partir de son arrivée au pouvoir en 2002 jusqu’à nos jours. Cette thèse cherche à démontrer comment les changements réalisés par l’islamisme turc durant cette période ont impacté la politique étrangère du pays. D’une part, la recherche analyse le renouveau du courant conservateur en Turquie et son emprise progressive sur la société, jusque-là dominée par l’establishment kémaliste. L’application de la doctrine Davutoğlu privilégie une vision multidimensionnelle et civilisationnelle des relations internationales, et réconforte les tenants d’une conception novatrice de l’islamisme turc et la visibilité accrue des facteurs religieux dans la société. D’autre part, les années 2007-2010 sont marquées par la consolidation de l’AKP et l’accentuation des valeurs de l’islam qui aboutissent à une division de la société turque et une désillusion de l’Europe. Enfin, le déclenchement des révoltes populaires du Printemps arabe en 2011 annonce aussi un tournant majeur dans la gestion des relations extérieures turques avec le monde arabe. Cette période est également caractérisée par le début du renforcement d’un autoritarisme provoquant l’accroissement de la polarisation de la société. Le quatrième mandat gouvernemental de l’AKP, débuté en 2015, se trouve dès lors confronté à la multiplication de défis intérieurs et extérieurs pour le mouvement islamique turc. / The relationship of Turkey with Europe and the Middle East is greatly influenced by the actions of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) from coming to power in 2002 until nowadays. This thesis tries to make clear how the changes realized by the Turkish Islam during this period impacted on the foreign policy of the country. On the one hand, the research analyzes the revival of the conservative movement in Turkey and its progressive influence on the society, up to there dominated by the kemalist establishment. The application of the Davutoğlu’s doctrine favors a multidimensional and civilizational vision of the international relations, and comforts the upholders of an innovative design of the Turkish Islam and the greater visibility of the religious factors in the society. On the other hand, the years 2007-2010 are marked by the consolidation of the AKP and the accentuation of the Islamic values, ending in a division of the Turkish society and a disappointment of Europe. Finally the outbreak of popular uprisings of the Arab Spring in 2011 also announces a major turning point in the management of the Turkish external relations with the Arab World. This period is also characterized by the beginning of the strengthening of authoritarianism leading to the increase of the polarization in the society. The fourth term of the AKP’s government, begun in 2015, becomes thereby characterized by the increase of internal and external challenges for the Turkish Islamic movement.

La socialisation politique des jeunes engagés dans le Parti de la Justice et du Développement Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, l’AKP- en Turquie et les conséquences de ce militantisme sur leur rapport à l’autre et leur vision du monde sont l’objet d’étude de cette thèse. La question de la relation avec des groupes « d'autruis » -les Kurdes et les alévis- permet d’examiner le potentiel de démocratisation de l’AKP, parti issu de l’islam politique se définissant comme conservateur démocrate. Présentés auparavant par leur capacité à réaliser la compatibilité de l’islamisme avec la démocratie, le modèle turc et l’AKP, constituent aujourd’hui un cas pour analyser les obstacles à la démocratisation. Grâce à une enquête menée dans huit villes de Turquie -Istanbul, Antalya, Alanya Kayseri, Aksaray, Sivas, Ordu, Van- cette étude examine les trajectoires d’engagement et de cadrage politique des jeunes dans l’AKP. Elle met ainsi en lumière l’absence de transformation du cadre structurel en vue de la reconnaissance des droits de « l’autrui » qui révèle les déficits démocratiques. / This research analyses the political socialization processes of the youth engaged in the Justice and Development Party - Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP - in Turkey and the consequences of this engagement on their perception of the « other» and their worldviews. The question of their relations with ethnic and confessional others – such as the Kurds and the alevis – makes it possible to evaluate the democratization potential of the AKP. Presented as able to merge political Islam and democracy, the Turkish model and the AKP constitute today a case-study to observe the obstacles to democratization. Based on the results of a survey realized in eight different cities of Turkey - Istanbul, Antalya, Alanya Kayseri, Aksaray, Sivas, Ordu, Van - this study examines engagement trajectories and political framings of the AKP youth. It also sheds light on the absence of transformation of the structural framework for the recognition of the rights of the “others”, a fact that exposes democratic deficits

Issu de l’islam politique turc, le Parti de la Justice et du Développement [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP], arrivé au pouvoir en 2002, a suscité l’intérêt des observateurs internationaux par une politique étrangère active. Si celle-ci semble répondre à une certaine cohérence, elle a aussi connu, entre 2002 et 2016, de nombreuses évolutions. L’AKP tire sa vision stratégique et diplomatique des expériences de gouvernement antérieures, des idéologies conservatrices qui ont marqué le pays au XXe siècle et de la pensée de plusieurs intellectuels, dont le plus influent est Ahmet Davutoğlu, conseiller du Premier ministre puis ministre des Affaires étrangères (2009-2014). Le premier mandat de l’AKP (2002-2007) voit ce parti explorer différentes options stratégiques. Puis se met en place une doctrine qui s’appuie sur quelques grands principes, comme la pacification des relations de voisinage, une diplomatie pro-active et l’utilisation de tous les outils à disposition pour rayonner à l’échelle régionale puis globale. L’objectif est de mettre la Turquie au cœur des échanges commerciaux locaux, en s’appuyant sur son influence grandissante au Moyen-Orient pour peser auprès de ses partenaires internationaux. Les révolutions arabes de 2011 poussent l’AKP à repenser sa doctrine. Le pays se veut désormais un exemple au sein duquel valeurs traditionnelles et démocratie conservatrice peuvent cohabiter, ainsi qu’un soutien des Frères Musulmans, qui portent cette vision dans le monde arabe. Mais en 2013, plusieurs crises fragilisent cette vision et poussent la Turquie à renoncer à la doctrine élaborée par l’AKP. / The Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP], which emerged from the Turkish political Islam in 2002, has aroused the interest of international observers through an active foreign policy. While this seems to be consistent, it also underwent many changes between 2002 and 2016. The AKP's strategic and diplomatic vision derives from past government experiences, the conservative ideologies that marked the country in the 20th century and the thoughts of several intellectuals, with Ahmet Davutoğlu, advisor to the Prime Minister and later Minister of Foreign Affairs (2009-2014) being the most influential of them. The first mandate of the AKP (2002-2007) witnessed a series of strategic options being explored within the party. This was followed by the establishment of a doctrine based on a few major principles, such as the pacification of neighbourly relations, pro-active diplomacy and the use of all the tools at hand to influence the regional and subsequently the global level. The objective was to put Turkey at the heart of local trade, using its growing influence in the Middle East to influence its international partners. The Arab revolutions of 2011 pushed the AKP to rethink its doctrine. The country yearns now for being an example within which traditional values and conservative democracy can coexist, as well as support from the Muslim Brotherhood, which brings this vision to the Arab world. But in 2013, several crises weakened this vision and forced Turkey to renounce the doctrine developed by the AKP.

Depuis la fin de la guerre froide, les Etats-Unis militent en faveur de l’intégration de la Turquie à l’UE et deviennent, sous la présidence Clinton, les plus ardents défenseurs de la cause turque, avant même Ankara. Comment expliquer ce positionnement de la superpuissance mondiale, elle qui n’appartient pourtant pas au continent européen et ne dispose pas d’un pouvoir décisionnel dans l’UE ? Cet activisme s’explique par la mutation des enjeux et des défis au XXIe siècle : résurgence éventuelle de la Russie, influence iranienne dans le monde musulman, montée de la menace djihadiste ou « choc des civilisations » prédit par Huntington. Pour y faire face, Washington regarde l’alliance de l’UE chrétienne à la Turquie musulmane comme une stratégie préventive : l’adhésion d’Ankara, outre son aspect symbolique qui permettrait de contrer la rhétorique des djihadistes tout en signalant aux musulmans vivant en Europe qu’ils ne sont pas étrangers au continent, ferait de la Turquie un modèle pour l’ensemble de son voisinage et une force de projection occidentale dans le monde musulman. L’UE, grâce à son pouvoir normatif, est indispensable à cette fin : sans elle, la démocratie ainsi que le libéralisme politique et économique pourraient-ils s’implanter en terre d’Islam ? Sans elle, la Turquie restera-t-elle un Etat laïc ancré à l’Occident ? Les attentats du 11 septembre 2001 propulsent cette stratégie au sommet des priorités des administrations Bush : elle s’intègre désormais dans leur Freedom agenda. Si la survenue des printemps arabes en 2011 aurait dû rendre indispensable l’ancrage de la Turquie à l’UE afin de s’assurer qu’elle puisse influencer les événements en propageant les valeurs occidentales auprès de ces populations en quête de démocratie, l’Amérique cesse pourtant progressivement son militantisme envers une adhésion qui devient chimérique. Au lieu de souder l’alliance entre les Etats-Unis, la Turquie et l’UE, les printemps arabes auront fissuré les fondations déjà écornées de ce partenariat, si bien qu’à la fin du mandat d’Obama, la relation triangulaire est déliquescente. / In the aftermath of the Cold War, the US has asserted a strong lobbying in favor of Turkey’s accession to the EU, and became the first supporter of this integration, before Ankara itself. How could we explain the US involvement since it doesn’t belong to the European continent? The new world order brought new challenges for the 21st century. Therefore, such an integration was perceived as a preventive strategy by Washington to deter upcoming threats facing the West, such as Russian resurgence, Iranian influence in the Muslim world, jihadism, or the « clash of civilizations ». Indeed, it would help bridging the growing gap between the West and the Muslim world by uniting under the same roof Christian countries within the EU, and the former Caliphate. It would also enable Turkey to be a Western projection force in its neighborhood — stretching from the Balkans to the Middle East — by becoming a model. To do so, Turkey has to become more liberal politically and economically. However, would it be possible without European prospects? From a US perspective, the normative power of the EU is necessary to see Turkey succeeding in proving that Islam, secularism and democracy are compatible and to spread Western values in its neighborhood while anchoring Ankara firmly in the West. 9/11 reinforced the significance of this strategy, which got integrated into the Freedom agenda and the global war on terror. Therefore, supporting Ankara’s accession became a top priority of Bush administrations. Barack Obama maintained this policy, even though the US lobbying slowed down, since it appeared this integration might never occur. The Arab awakening could have been the perfect occasion to bring closer together Turkey and the EU so that Ankara could become the model Arabs were calling for. However, instead of strengthening the US-Turkey-EU relations, those events damaged their alliance, which was already strained. At the end of Obama’s presidency, this triangular relation seemed on the verge to collapse.

The academic literature on Islamist moderation offers several explanations for why some Islamist political movements are moderate and others radical. These theories focus on the movements' ideology, tactics, and internal democracy. Few accounts address, however, how an Islamist movement's relations with external powers influence this outcome. This paper finds that "moderation" reflects an Islamist movement's relationship of compliance or defiance with external powers rather than its essential organizational characteristics. In comparing the Moroccan Justice and Development Party (PJD) with the Egyptian Muslim Brothers, it explores why the United States has built good relations with the former but not with the latter. Employing approximately 20 interviews conducted with Islamists, U.S. diplomats, and Moroccan experts in 2009, I show that the PJD's compliance with U.S. foreign policy decisions and interests helps to shape perceptions that the movement is more moderate than its Egyptian counterpart, despite the two movements' similar ideology, tactics, and internal practices. / text

This study, using contemporary history and empirical research, updates traditional rentier state theory, which largely fails to account for the existence of opposition movements, by demonstrating the political capital held by Muslim Brotherhood affiliates in Kuwait, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This study thus also fills a critical gap in existing literature on political Islam by examining previously unstudied movements in the smaller Gulf states that do not require Brotherhood organisations to provide services, to form social networks, or to contest elections (aside from in Kuwait). Through a divergent case study, we demonstrate the degree to which and the means through which the Ikhwan shapes domestic politics in the some of the world’s wealthiest oil states, the super-rentiers. This research helps to break the causal link established by rentier state theory between oil rents and lack of politically relevant Islamist organizations. As will be shown, Muslim Brotherhood organizations in the Gulf are politically influential entities. It is important to note, however, that these groups shape cultural and social ideas as readily as political notions. The division between these sectors is often blurred in the atmosphere of the socially conservative super-rentiers, as politics is often displaced to the social sphere in restricted political systems. We therefore elucidate a new model for understanding how Muslim Brotherhood movements influence government policies, in addition to cultural and social policies, in the wealthiest rentier states of the Gulf, which we call rentier Islamism.

This thesis describes how the religious-secular, economic, and cultural dimensions come to expression in the electoral manifestos of two political parties in the 2016 elections in Morocco. The parties in question are the Islamist-oriented Party of Justice and Development (PJD) and the non-Islamist Party of Authenticity and Modernity (PAM), viewed as leading contenders and emerged as the two biggest parties in the same election year. This study applies a qualitative text analysis of the manifestos and shows that the parties differed on two dimensions of three. The parties showed the most significant difference under the religious-secular dimension, where PJD supported increased religious influence on policymaking. In contrast, PAM kept itself neutral and neither supported nor opposed religious influence on state affairs. The next most significant difference was found under the cultural dimension. Both parties expressed support for gender equality, albeit PAM was more ambitious and proposed an amendment to the family law to equalize women with men regarding the right of the Moroccan woman to transfer her citizenship to her non-Moroccan husband. In contrast, PJD proposed extending maternity leave and fighting violence against women. The slightest differences were found under the economic dimension. Surprisingly, both parties advocated for almost the same free-market and redistribution policies even though they represented two opposing blocks in the Moroccan party system.

No description available.

The Middle East is a predominately Islamic region. Islam is not only a religion, it is the Muslim way of life and law. The western world follows a more modern system of government, in the form of democracy. Democracy is not modern, as in new, since it was started by the ancient Greeks, but it is modern, because it is the main system being adopted in contemporary times. Muslims follow the ideals found in the Holy Quran, the book dictated by the prophet Muhammad. The Middle East has had a strong Islamic influence since the mid-seventh century. Islam originated in Mecca in 610 C.E. About twelve years later, in 622 C.E., after much persecution in Mecca, Muslims migrated to Medina. This was in 622 C.E. and it marked the start of the Muslim calendar. Soon, by 655 C.E., Islam had begun spreading over the regions along the Mediterranean Sea, Arabian Peninsula, Asia, and Africa. This research will span the political systems from pre-Ottoman, to Ottoman, to the Modern era. The beginning of the modern Middle East is marked by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the end of World War I. Since the end of World War I, much of the Middle Eastern region has been exposed to the western system of government and western culture. The intent of this Thesis is to analyze and draw a conclusion on the possibility of Politically Islamic states having Democracy and following Democratic ideologies. It will examine the ideologies of Islam to determine if democracy, a system of government that includes the citizens of the nation having the right to speak and receiving civil liberties to choose their leaders, is actually present. It will use data from Turkey, Iran, and Egypt, Middle Eastern nations located either in, or bordering, three different continents of the world. In each country the research will examine, the governmental system, the regime type, the leaders past and present, and the policies, including how each country vary according to a specific Islamic sector (Sunni or Shia). This thesis will draw conclusions from the comparative analysis on each case study, on whether it is possible to have democracy in a state where Islamic ideologies are a major factor. From the case study findings, there were clear differences between all the countries studied. Turkey was found to be majority Sunni with a secular republic government but it is showing signs of reverting into the realm of political Islam. Iran was found to be majority Shia with a religious republic government, one that freely allows religion into the law-making body and has emphasized policies that are based on Islamic law. In addition, Iran shows adversity to western democratic bodies, which falls in line with the idea that Islam and democracy are at odds. Finally, Egypt the most revolution-plagued has changed leaders constantly through coups and protests, when the citizens find the leaders as corrupt or not acting in the best interest of the country. Like Turkey, Egypt is a secular republic with the majority of its citizens being from the Sunni Islamic sect it has recently shown an inclination to be the most democratic nation of those studied. The research showed that the Middle East is still having trouble adjusting to the idea of democracy and democratic ideology. The issues were found on various cultural, social, and leadership levels. There were not only civil and regional disputes among the nations of the Middle East, some of the issues have been extended to international levels. The split between Democracy and traditional Islamic values, appeared to only deepen the conflicts of the region.