Thèse : ? : Indiana University : 1989. / Bibliogr. p. [143]-147.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Washington, 2001. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 400-422).

Thesis (doctoral)--Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität, München. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 131-146).

Thomas Hobbes insisted that he had set forth the "true and only moral philosophy" and that he was the founder of civil science. Yet, the character of Hobbes's moral and political theory and its role in his civil doctrines has been the subject of much controversy. In this dissertation I defend an interpretation as a properly natural law theorist in his accounts of the foundations of moral philosophy and civil science, morality, commonwealth, and positive law. I juxtapose Hobbes's thought to the Aristotelian-Thomistic natural law tradition and argue that Hobbes's novelty flows chiefly from his doctrine of the human good. / text

Thesis (doctoral)--Université de Paris IV, 1977. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 521-574).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--York University, 2005. Graduate Programme in Philosophy. / Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 227-240). Also available on the Internet. MODE OF ACCESS via web browser by entering the following URL: http://wwwlib.umi.com/cr/yorku/fullcit?pNR11615

This thesis is an examination of the linguistic approach to modality (also known as 'linguistic conventionalism') - i.e. the view that necessity is to be explained in terms of the linguistic rules that we have adopted. Drawing on an investigation into the history of this approach, I argue against the currently prevalent attitude that it can be dismissed as misguided. The aim, however, is not to argue that the linguistic approach is correct, but, more modestly, to put it back on the table as an interesting and viable research program. The thesis is divided into three parts. In part A, I articulate a conception of the commitments of the approach based on the ideas that influenced it, how it emerged and developed in the work of the logical positivists, and, in particular, the role it was meant to play in "making a consistent empiricism possible". Next, in part B, I defend the core ideas of the approach against various objections. Notably, I consider the objection that truth cannot be "created" by convention, the objection that necessities cannot be explained in terms of contingencies, and the objection that determining what the linguistic conventions are, unlike determining what the modal facts are, is a straightforwardly empirical matter. In part C, finally, I turn to objections which purport to show that there are limits to what can be explained in terms of linguistic convention. Specifically, I consider whether we need to assume a non-conventional distinction between admissible and inadmissible linguistic rules, a non-conventional consequence relation, or a non-conventional starting-point in order to get the linguistic approach off the ground. An overarching question is whether we are forced to take some logic for granted in a way which would undermine the explanatory ambitions of the approach. I argue that some of the prominent objections rely on misunderstandings, that some can be answered head-on, and that some point to genuine challenges and constraints which put pressure on the linguistic approach, but do not warrant a wholesale rejection of the view. Instead, they point to areas where further work is needed.

This dissertation explores one family's experience of a son's disclosure of homosexuality, through the use of a second-order cybernetic epistemology, and social constructionist theory. Second-order cybernetics enables a description of patterns and themes that recursively connect the family's ideas and behaviour. Social constructionism enables the family's reaction to disclosure to be recursively linked to their fit with wider society. By using semantic and political frames of reference to describe the family's narratives around disclosure, this study indicates that disclosure is a relational metaphor, dependent on the family's locally co-constructed and transgenerational meanings. It also shows that although the family change with disclosure, stability is regained in a way consistent with the family's rules and norms. This study therefore demystifies viewing disclosure in one way only and creates alternative ways of conceptualising it. / Psychology / M.A. (Clinical Psychology)

Este trabalho teve como principal objetivo discutir e analisar o papel de intelectuais cariocas das décadas de 30 e 40 do século XX na popularização de Euclides da Cunha e na construção de uma imagem que associa o escritor ao pensamento positivista. Para fundamentar a discussão e a análise, são analisados os conceitos de positivismo e evolucionismo, as trajetórias profissionais dos intelectuais citados, a militância dos mesmos no Grêmio Euclides da Cunha do Rio de Janeiro e a importância de suas atuações para a divulgação não só da obra de Euclides da Cunha, mas de uma interpretação específica sobre ela e sobre seu autor, contribuindo para cristalizar a noção de que Euclides da Cunha foi positivista. / This work had as main objective to discuss and analyze the role of intellectuals in Rio at the decades of the 30th and 40th century in the popularization of Euclides da Cunha and the construction of an image that links the writer to positivist thinking. To support the discussion and analysis this work reviews the concepts of positivism and evolutionism, the career paths of intellectuals mentioned, the militancy of the same with Gremio Euclides da Cunha of Rio de Janeiro and the importance of their actions to disseminate not only the work of Euclides da Cunha, but a specific interpretation on it and on its author, helping to crystallize the notion that Euclides da Cunha was positivist.

This paper attempts to find in the facts of George Eliot's life the evidences of positive philosophy, to trace the philosophy to its logical basis and to show its influence on her work. There are many who say such a study is useless or at best unimportant, but I do not agree. I am not attempting to "piece out" an entire philosophy by combining fragmentary allusions I have found in her work. I am not disappointed to find her thought inconsistent, or mixed, or different at one period from another. There is no philosophical system that must not admit ambiguity and inconsistency if it proceeds far enough. Life presents problems which probably never will be solved.